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ABSTRACT
The nominated Legislative Council in New South Wales was 
never intended as a bastion of squatter supremacy but was 
preferred to an elective upper house partly because it seemed 
likely to give representation to urban conservatives and 
partly because it could be 'swamped' in constitutional dead­
locks with the Assembly. In the first years of responsible 
government the Council became, as expected, the organ of urban 
conservatism, but those years also saw the growth of a radical 
liberal movement drawing most of its support from small 
traders, minor professional men and artisans. The wealthy 
businessmen, lawyers, landowners and squatters whose interests 
the Council was designed to protect were unable to prevent the 
enactment of 'class legislation'in favour of the 'little man'; 
they heard liberal politicians attack the supremacy of statute 
law and deny the necessity for a conservative upper house; 
and they saw state aid withdrawn at a time when the influence 
of conventional religion seemed necessary to prevent the 
'disintegration' of society. Above all, the Governor was 
forced to swamp the Council when no strictly constitutional 
deadlock existed, destroying conservative faith in the 
nominated upper house. After the swamping, however, Cowper, 
the liberal Premier, conciliated the conservatives and during 
the 1860s they regained some of their influence. Liberal 
eagerness for 'popular' reforms diminished and, as the 
conservatives' fears subsided, they began once more to favour 
the nominated Council. By the early 1870s, many liberals also 
agreed that the principle of nomination had worked well. The 
old political divisions were by then almost irrelevant and 
conservatives of the 1850s contributed significantly to the 
'liberal' ethos of the 1870s and early 1880s.
INTRODUCTION
This thesis does not pretend to give a comprehensive 
account of the New South Wales Legislative Council from 1856 
to 1872. The reader will not find a detailed record of the 
Council's business or its contribution to the legislation of 
the period. Even such matters as the Council's relationship 
with governors, governments and the Assembly are not treated 
as subjects significant in their own right, although they are 
often referred to. Instead, the Council, its critics and the 
issues which they debated are made the vehicles for a 
discussion of liberalism, conservatism and changes in the 
pattern of political conflict in New South Wales in the third 
quarter of the nineteenth century. Even here, the treatment 
has been selective. It would be a strange thesis which chose 
a predominantly conservative upper house as the most suitable 
medium for an examination of liberalism, and the discussion 
has naturally been directed primarily towards an explanation 
of conservative attitudes and actions. The analysis of 
liberalism is, however, by no means perfunctory, and in some 
ways represents a radical departure from previous 
interpretations.
Implicit in the analysis of political beliefs in this 
thesis is the rejection of two crude theories of political 
motivation. The first is that men's political positions can 
be explained simply in terms of the arguments which were used 
to justify them. This type of explanation is usually 
deficient in one of two ways. In the first place, such 
arguments are frequently based upon appeals to beliefs sacred 
to both sides, such as justice, laissez-faire, or admiration 
for things British. In such cases, the arguments do not reveal 
the divergent attitudes which cause men to disagree: they are 
simply appeals to bi-partisan principles invoked to rationalize 
and justify positions adopted for other reasons.
In the second place, even where the contending parties 
justify their stand in terms of theories rejected by the other 
side, these doctrines are not a sufficient explanation of 
their position. For example, to explain the opposition of
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liberals and conservatives in terms of their adherence to 
liberal and conservative beliefs simply begs the question of 
why liberal principles appealed to some men and conservative 
principles to others.
The explanation of the role of liberal and conservative 
ideologies in this thesis is based upon the view that men 
favoured those doctrines which satisfied their needs, whether 
those needs were the product of economic interest, social 
pressures, political ambition or genetic predisposition. Men 
were conservatives in the 1850s when they had a psychological 
stake, whatever its origins, in the social and political order 
which existed before responsible government. They found the 
doctrines of British conservatives appealing because they 
provided arguments against change and rationalized attachment 
to the existing social and political order. The theories of 
British radicals and liberals were distasteful because they 
did not meet the conservatives 1 need for a justification of the 
status quo. By the same token, radicals in New South Wales 
were men who had a psychological interest in change and who 
for that reason rejected conservative doctrines and clung to 
radical ones.
This is not to say that political beliefs were 
unimportant, for the second crude theory of political motivation 
which must be rejected is that political theories have no 
influence. It would be misleading to say that in New South 
Wales in the 1850s liberals and conservatives were simply 
trying to defend their interests - particularly if those 
interests are seen as purely economic ones. In the first 
place, men sometimes defined their interests in terms of 
ideologies. It will be argued, for instance, that the 
conservatives preferred a nominated Legislative Council partly 
because their conception of their interests was moulded by 
British constitutional doctrines. In such cases, interest and 
ideology are complementary. In the second place, political 
beliefs often outlive the needs which created them and are 
preserved in situations to which they are inappropriate. The 
Reverend J.D. Lang, for instance, still preferred an elective 
Council Lo a nominated one even when he came to believe that 
the most democratic elective upper house would, in practice,
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be worse than the existing nominated chamber.^ His continued 
adherence to the elective principle was, of course, a 
manifestation of the psychological need to appear consistent, 
but this does not reduce the importance of the political 
beliefs to which he felt compelled to remain faithful. Ideas 
and the need to adhere to them are both integral parts of any 
explanation of his behaviour.
In all political conflicts there are interests at stake, 
whether political, social, emotional or economic. There are 
also ideologies which correspond to those interests. The task 
of this thesis is to identify the interests which lay behind 
the political conflicts of the 1850s and early 1860s and to 
isolate the ideologies which helped to mould men's actions.
The interests which conservatives and liberals were fighting 
for were not always those which historians have thought 
important; still less were the ideologies influential in the 
way some have supposed.
1J .L .C ., 1873-4, pt.l, pp.381-6, passim. See below, pp.307-8.
CHAPTER I
INTERESTS, IDEOLOGY AND THE UPPER HOUSE
IN 1853
In December 1852, Sir John Pakington, the British 
Secretary of State for Colonies, instructed the governors of 
all the Australian colonies except Western Australia to invite 
their Legislative Councils to draft new constitutions. When 
the invitation was conveyed to the New South Wales Legislative 
Council in May 1853, it immediately appointed a select 
committee chaired by W.C. Wentworth to consider the form of 
constitution which the colony should adopt. By the end of 
July, the committee had produced a report whose 
recommendations remained the subject of controversy until a 
bill embodying the new constitution was passed in December and 
forwarded to the British government for approval.
Most of the argument centred around the form of the upper
house. The select committee had suggested the gradual creation
of an aristocracy which would in the distant future supply the
elements for an upper house. At first, the upper chamber was
to consist of nominees, some with titles and some without them.
It was to continue in that form until the number of peers
reached fifty, when it was to lose its wholly nominated
character and become the exclusive preserve of titled
aristocrats. The peers were then to elect twenty of their
number to the upper house, where they would hold their seats
for life. They were not to sit there alone, however, but were
to share power with nominated peers whose right to a seat in
the upper house had been explicitly stated by a special
provision in the letters patent conferring their titles. As
it was expected that the right of creating such peers would be
2delegated by the Crown to the Governor, and as no limit was
"^Clause VI of the select committee's 'Bill to Confer a 
Constitution on New South Wales...', reproduced in E.K. 
Silvester (ed.), The Speeches on the Second Reading of the Bill 
for Framing a New Constitution for the Colony, Sydney, 1853, 
pp.5-19.
Wentworth in ibid., pp.181.2
2set to the number which he would be entitled to appoint, it 
is clear that the proposed aristocratic chamber could have 
been swamped. In that respect, it had all the vulnerability of 
a wholly nominated upper house whose members did not have 
titles.
A few conservatives like James Macarthur had long
considered the possibility of a colonial aristocracy,^ but it
was not an important feature of conservative thought. The
principal members of the select committee of 1853 had sat on a
similar committee in 1852, and, although it had been unable to
agree on the form of the upper house, none of its members had
2suggested the creation of an aristocracy. When the proposal 
was made by the 1853 select committee, it came as a surprise. 
Moreover the recommendation had been opposed by at least three 
members of the Committee and others, notably Wentworth, 
Macarthur, Deas Thomson and Plunkett, explicitly stated that3the hereditary clauses were dispensable. When those clauses
were condemned, not only by the liberals, but by leading
conservatives like Manning, Douglass, and the editors of the4Sydney Morning Herald, Wentworth withdrew them in committee 
and proposed a wholly nominated upper house whose members were 
not to possess titles.
Wentworth did not expect full responsible government to 
follow immediately on the introduction of the constitution, so, 
in order to ensure that all life appointments were made on the 
advice of a fully responsible ministry, he provided that all 
members appointed during the first five years were to resign at5the end of that period. The number of members was to be at
"^Article on James Macarthur in A . D . B . , vol.II; C.J. Borthwick, 
'The Bunyip Aristocracy1 23*5, B .A . Hons, thesis, A.N.U., 1969; and
J.N. Dickinson, A letter to...the Speaker on the Formation of 
a Second Chamber..., Sydney, 1853.
2Cf. report of the select committee in V . & P . (L.C., N.S.W.),
1852, pt.l, p.417; and Wentworth in S .M .H ., 13 December 1852.
3Silvester, op.cit., pp.105, 143, 158, 181. The hereditary 
aristocracy was opposed by the liberals Cowper and Turlow and 
the conservative Douglass.
^Ibid., pp.158, 181; S .M .H ., 3, 17 August 1853, editorials.
5S .M.H., 9 December 1853. See clause 3 of the final 
constitution, which is appended as Schedule 1 to the Imperial 
Act 18 and 19 Viet., C .54.
3least twenty-one, but, as before, there was to be no upper 
limit.^ What the wholly nominated chamber and the 
aristocratic chamber had in common was that they could both 
be swamped.
An examination of the debate over the two proposals for an
upper house reveals much about the division between liberals
and conservatives in the 1850s and about the relationship
between interests, ideology and political action. The
following discussion will focus on two questions. The first
concerns the relationship of conservatism to economic
interests. Does the choice of a nominated upper house confirm
Manning Clark's view that Australian conservatives 'restricted
2their conservatism to a defence of their economic interests ?
More specifically, does the choice of a nominated chamber
support the allegation that 'the conservative constitution
bills were characterized correctly as ways of assuring the
3future of squatting'?
The second question, which is related to the first, is 
whether conservatives in New South Wales were aware that a 
nominated upper house could be swamped. Working from the 
assumption that the conservatives were bent on making 
democratic reform as difficult as possible, historians have 
agreed that those who framed the constitution cannot have 
realized that swamping could render a nominated house weaker 
than an elected one. Conservatives in New South Wales have 
therefore been dismissed as less perceptive than their 
counterparts in Victoria. Serie, for instance, says that the 
Victorians were
^Clause 2 of the final constitution.
2C.M.H. Clark (ed.), Select Documents in Australian History, 
1851-1900, Sydney, 1855, p.318.
3T.H. Irving, 'The -Development of Liberal Politics in New 
South Wales, 1854-1855', Ph.D. thesis, Sydney University, 
1967, p.12; cf. A.C.V. Melbourne's Early Constitutional 
Development in Australia, Brisbane, 1963, pp.422f, which 
states that the constitution was 'designed particularly to 
protect the landed interests of the colony, and to protect 
their influence in the future'.
4clear-sighted where Wentworth was hazy: compelled 
to drop his plan for a hereditary aristocracy,
Wentworth was not sufficiently astute to see that 
the popular outcry for an elective Council would 
work out to his advantage, and he persisted with 
his plan for nominees. W.F. Stawell and 
J.V.F. Foster...who were the chief architects of 
the LVictorian : constitution... clearly realized 
that 'a nominee Upper House is a much more 
democratic one than an elective one', mainly 
because of the ease with which the ministry of the 
day could swamp a dissident Council.
Similar views have been expressed by historians such as Main,
Nadel, McNaught'qn and Turner.^
The interpretation of the constitution as primarily a
defence of conservative economic interests stems partly from
the belief that because Australians made no important
constribution to conservative political theory, they were
uninfluenced by theory, an obvious non seguitur. It also stems
partly from uncritical acceptance of the propaganda of
nineteenth century liberals, who tried to identify their
opponents with the squatters, a group notorious for its
devotion to sectional economic interest. The propaganda was
plausible enough, for, as can be seen from Table I, the
squatters were, in a numerical sense, the backbone of
conservatism in the Council.
Geoffrey Serie, ‘The Victorian Legislative Council, 1856- 
1950‘, in J.J. Eastwood and F.B. Smith (eds), Historical 
Studies, Selected Articles, first series, Melbourne, 1964, 
p .128f.
2J.M. Main, ‘Making Constitutions in New South Wales and 
Victoria, 1853-1854', in Margot Beever and F.B. Smith (eds), 
Historical Studies, Selected Articles, second series, 
Melbourne, 1967, pp.6lf, 63, 65; Ken Turner, House of Review, 
Sydney, 1969, p.7; George Nadel, Australia's Colonial Culture, 
Melbourne, 19 57, p.18; I.D. McNaught^n, 'Colonial Liberalism', 
in Gordon Greenwood (ed.), Australia, a Social and Political 
History, Sydney, 1955, p.104.
5TABLE I1
OCCUPATIONS OF LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES 
IN THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, DECEMBER 1853
Occupations Liberals Conservatives
Landholders with squattinq
interests in the 3 22
unsettled districts 
Landholders without
squatting interests in 1 2
the unsettled districts
Government officials 0 9
Lawyers in private practice 3 6
Medical practitioners 0 2
Businessmen 3 2
Unknown 0 1
TOTAL 10 44
Two liberal merchants and two conservative professional
2men were also squatters, so that half the liberals and just
over half the conservatives had squatting interests. In all,
twenty-nine of the fifty-four members of the Council were
connected with squatting. However, the squatters were unable
to make the Council the pliant instrument of their wishes.
They were more irregular in their attendance than other members,
especially the conservative nominees, who nearly all lived in3Sydney and who in most cases had no squatting interests. 
Moreover, squatter arrogance repelled not only liberals but 
also many urban conservatives. Few but squatters could enjoy 
Wentworth's sneers at other classes and many resented the
The classification of members as liberal or conservative is 
based on their voting record in Appendix I; the occupational 
details are taken from Appendix II.
2Robert Campbell and James Richardson were the liberals; and 
Edward Broadhurst and W.M. Manning were the conservatives. 
See Appendix II.
3See Appendix II. Cf. Windeyer, S.M.H., 13 June 1846; and 
Lowe, S,M .H ., 4 May 1848.
6extent to which the squatters identified their own interests
with the interests of the colony as a whole. Even many
squatters must have been dismayed when one of their number,
George Leslie, a member of the Council, told a select committee
that, because 'the rest of the Colony is principally dependent
upon the squatters', the community as a whole would benefit if
land were taken from other classes and given to the squatters.^
The result was that, even on the land question, the
squatters were unable to establish any clear ascendancy.
Although they succeeded in defeating anti-squatting
2resolutions in 1847 and 1848, they were defeated on other
occasions by a combination of liberals, government members and
conservatives with large interest as landowners. In 1846, for
instance, Thomson and Plunkett, resentful of squatter attacks
on the government's land policy, helped to pass Lowe's anti-3squatter resolutions, and in 1847 and 1849, the squatters 
were unable to control the nominations to select committees 
whose reports, written by Robert Lowe, attacked the high price 
of Crown land because it made freehold ownership uneconomic4and enabled the squatters to 'lock up1 the land.
On constitutional questions, most squatters were numbered 
amongst the 'backwoodsmen' and they had less influence than 
usual. Lacking any firm grounding in law and constitutional 
theory, they deferred to those whose education and experience 
fitted them for the task. Responsibility for shaping the 
constitution devolved mainly upon a clearly defined group of 
seven, of whom only Wentworth was principally a squatter,
"^Leslie in evidence before the select committee on the price 
of land, V. & P. (L.C., N.S.W.), 1847, pt.2, p.539. Leslie 
was trapped into his rash assertions of squatter superiority 
during shrewd cross-examination by Cowper and Lowe.
V^. «Sc P. (L.C., N.S.W.), 12 May 1848; Ruth Knight, Illiberal 
Liberal, Melbourne, 1966, pp.180-1.
V  & P. (L.C., N.S.W.), 1846, 2nd session, pp.40-41. The 
squatters were defeated in the main divisions by votes of 
twelve to ten, twelve to seven and eleven to ten. See also 
Irving, op.cit., p.141.
4See the reports of the select committee on the minimum price 
of land in V. & P. (L.C., N.S.W.), 1847, pt.ll, pp.513-20, 
and the select committee on land and immigration, V . & P.
(L.C., N.S.W.), 1849, pt.ll, pp.543-60. Cf. Knight, op.cit., 
pp.182, 232-3.
7although two others also had squatting interests in the
unsettled districts. They were James Macarthur, a landowner
who held only one run in the unsettled districts and who
opposed the concessions given to the squatters by the 1847
Order-in-Council; and W.M. Manning, the Solicitor-General, who
strenuously denied the squatters' claim to superiority over
other classes." The other leaders on the constitutional issue
were Dr H.G. Douglass, a medical practitioner and landowner;
James Martin, a solicitor; Deas Thomson, the Colonial Secretary;
and John Hubert Plunkett, the Attorney-General. The reasons for
regarding these men as the principal framers of the
constitution are cogent. All except Manning were on the select
committee which drafted the Constitution bill and, with the
liberal Cowper, they were the only members to attend a majority
2of the committee's meetings. Moreover, their speeches on the 
second reading all occupy at least ten pages in the printed 
report of the debates, although no other conservative spoke for 
more than seven pages. In all, this small knot of conservative
^"Details of members' squatting interests are based on the 
squatting lists appended to the report on Crown lands in 
V. & P. (L.C., N.S.W.), 1854, pt.II. Main, loc.cit., pp.59,
63, states incorrectly that H.G. Douglass and James Martin, 
members of the committee, had squatting interests. Douglass 
held land as a tenant of the Crown only in the settled districts, 
where he had none of the advantages of long leases and security 
of tenure enjoyed by lessees in the unsettled districts to whom 
the term 'squatter' is normally applied. The squatting lists 
mention a J. Martin, but he was probably not James Martin,
M.L.C., whose biographer makes no mention of squatting 
interests. (Cf. Elena Grainger, Martin of Martin Place, Sydney, 
1970.) Manning's name does not appear in the squatting lists, 
apparently because he held his land as a partner in pastoral 
companies. (See the forthcoming article on Manning by Martha 
Rutledge in A.D.B., vol.5.) For Manning's denial of squatter 
superiority, see Silvester, op.cit., p.177. For James 
Macarthur's hostility to the claims of the squatters, see 
Michael Roe, Quest for Authority in Eastern Australia,
Melbourne, 1965, pp.51, 74, 107.
2Attendance at the select committee's thirteen meetings was as 
follows:
W.C. Wentworth 13 J. Martin 7
E.D. Thomson 12 C . Cowper 7
H.G. Douglass 12 G. Macleay 6
J.H. Plunkett 9 T.A. Murray 3
J. Macarthur 9 W. Thurlow 3
Source: J.M. Ward, Earl Grey and the Australian Colonies,
Melbourne, 1958, p.327.
8leaders made some 80 per cent, by volume, of their side's
contribution to the debate. They were also disproportionately
influential in committee. Wentworth was the only leader who
can be identified with the squatters, who, for all their
numerical predominance, had little influence in constitutional
matters and at no stage acted as a separate group. Their
acquiescent role can be fairly judged by the fact that they did
not even divide the Council on an amendment by Manning which
removed a constitutional guarantee that they would be
compensated for any loss of their privileges under the
existing land regulations.^
The conservative leaders represented no particular
occupational group, but what they had in common was membership
of the traditional elites of colonial society. Thomson,
Plunkett, Manning, Macarthur and Douglass belonged to the
Colony's self-defined 'upper class', a group descended from the
old 'Exclusivist' faction and those whom it accepted as social
equals. This class had at its apex the Governor, the leading
government officials, the judges, and colonists who were their
close associates - men like Henry Watson Parker, Dr Charles
Nicholson, the Macarthurs and the Macleays. Its membership
coincided to some extent, but by no means entirely, with that
of the Australian Club, whose founder, the merchant
S.A . Donaldson, made the exaggerated boast that it contained
2'all the aristocracy of the country'.
Members of this class dominated educational, cultural and
charitable bodies like the University Senate, the
3Philosophical Society and the Benevolent Asylum. and they were 
the leading force in the colony's political life They 
included a liberal minority, consisting mainly of some leading4merchants and professional men, but most of them were 
conservatives. In 1853, they included most of the leading 
conservatives in the Council.
~^S, M.H. , 15 December 1853, amendment to clause LXVIII.
2Quoted Roe, op.cit., p.38.
3See Tables IV-VII in Chapter II, which show the influence of 
conservative members of the Council in 1858. These men were 
mostly members of the 'upper class'.
4This is discussed in greater detail later in the chapter.
9Wentworth and Martin were by 1853 political allies of
conservatives like Thomson and Macarthur, but they were not
socially accepted by the 'upper class' . There were complaints
when Wentworth's wife was received at Government House in
1847,^" and T.S. Mort said in 1863:
I have never met him [Wentworthj in society as he 
did not move in the same spheres as myself. Had 
he visited with the principal families in the 
colony at the time I must have met him, as I have 
exchanged visits with nearly the whole of them.^
Wentworth was closely associated with a few members of
the 'upper class' like Dr Douglass, but for the most part his
associates seemed to be "raffish 'landlords' and the
3'Australians'". The latter, successors of the old 
'Emancipist' party, were often men of wealth and ability who, 
because of a criminal record, convict parentage or their habits 
of life, were not fully accepted by the 'upper class'. They 
included William Bland, esteemed for his philanthropy, but a 
former convict; Robert Fitzgerald, one of the wealthiest men in 
the colony but the son of a convict; George Nichols, successful 
as a lawyer, newspaper proprietor and politician, but also of 
convict parentage; George Hill, a wealthy pastoralist, butcher 
and city politician of emancipist descent; and the brilliant 
young lawyer-politician, James Martin, who was the son of poor 
Catholic parents and had recently been blackballed by the
4Australian Club.
What Wentworth and his friends had in common with the 
'upper class' was that they, too, were leaders of colonial 
society - an aristocracy of merit and affluence amongst those 
who were denied conventional respectability. Like the 'upper 
class', they included a number of liberals - of whom Bland and
Barrie Dyster, 'The Fate of Colonial Conservatism on the Eve 
of the Gold-Rush', J . R . A . H . S . , vol.54, pt.4, December 18f68, 
pp.348f. "■
2Quoted Alan Barnard, Visions and Profits: Studies in the 
Business Career of T.S. Mort, Sydney, 1961, p.20.
3Dyster, 'The Fate of Colonial Conservatism...1 234, p.348.
4Melbourne Morning Herald, 6 August 1853. I owe this 
reference to Ged Martin.
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Hill were the most notable - but most of them were by 1853
conservatives. In the past, they had captured much support
from the underprivileged by stressing resistance to arbitrary
government, by pandering to 1 populist1 sentiment amongst
aggrieved minorities, and by appealing as 'sons of the soil'
to 'Australian' mistrust of fly-by-night immigrants.'*' At the
elections of 1851, however, the electoral appeal of the old
formulas showed signs of waning as attitudes towards democratic
2reform became the touchstone of political worth. Wentworth 
was almost defeated in Sydney and it was clear that the 
'Australian' party was losing the under-privileged vote to the 
democrats and becoming dependent upon the same constituency as 
the conservative wing of the 'upper class'. The two groups 
therefore consolidated a political alliance against the 
liberals which had long been germinating and combined to
produce a constitution which was avowedly designed to check
3the development of democracy. The debates over the 
constitution saw the sinking of traditional antipathies as 
Wentworth, for the first time in his career, conceded the
right of the nominees to vote on a matter affecting the
4representation of the people. Conservatives of all varieties 
came together to defend their interests against the spectre of 
democracy.
As well as having a common interest in preserving their 
political position, the leading conservatives shared a cultural
Cf. Barrie Dyster, 'The Role of Sydney and the Roles of its 
Citizens in New South Wales, 1841-1851', M.A. Thesis, Sydney 
University, 1965, p.242, et passim; Roe, op.cit., pp.85-88; 
Knight, op.cit., pp.217, 240-1, et passim.
^Cf. S.M .H., 2 October 1851, quoted Irving, op.cit., p.393.
3Cf. the report of the select committee which prepared the 
Constitution Bill, reproduced in Silvester, op.cit., pp.1-4.
The debates over the bill were concerned with the distribution 
of power within the colony rather than with the transfer of 
power from the imperial authorities to the colonial parliament. 
All the conservatives admitted openly that their intentions 
were anti-democratic.
^See his defence of his attitude to the nominees in Silvester, 
op.cit., p.225. Even in 1852, Wentworth had tried to exclude 
nominees from the select committee on the constitution.
(S.M.H., 17 June 1852.)
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heritage which furnished the necessary intellectual
justification for a constitution weighted in their favour.
Except for Martin, they had grown up in circles where the
notion of the hierarchic society was taken for granted.
Wentworth, a Cambridge graduate, had been acknowledged as a
kinsman by Lord Fitzwilliam and had dreamed of founding a
pastoral aristocracy by marrying James Macarthur1 234s sister until
he was rebuffed because of his convict mother and his father's
doubtful reputation;^ Macarthur, the fourth son of the colony's
leading Exclusivist family, had been educated by Huon de
Kerilleau, a French emigre claiming noble blood, and had later
become acquainted with the conservative French political
theorist, Sismondi, and seen his brothers form close ties with
2the Colonial Office and the British aristocracy; Deas Thomson 
was the son of Sir John Deas Thomson, sometime Accountant- 
General of the Royal Navy, and was the son-in-law of Governor 
Bourke; Plunkett was descended from the Irish Catholic 
aristocracy and had been a successful barrister in Ireland 
until, to escape a blighted love, he had secured the position 
of Solicitor-General in New South Wales through the good3services of his relative, Lord Fingall; Manning, a product of
University College, London, came from a family patronized by
Lord Brougham and had published four volumes of law reports4before migrating to New South Wales in 1837; and Dr Douglass, 
a member of the Royal Irish Academy by the age of thirty, had 
not only filled official positions in New South Wales, but had 
been surgeon extraordinary to the household of William IV and 
had won commendation and a medal from Louis Philippe of France
Wentworth's father had been tried four times for highway 
robbery and there is some evidence that he avoided a conviction 
by agreeing to leave Britain. Cf. articles on Darcy Wentworth 
and W.C. Wentworth in A .D .B., vol.2; and A.C.V. Melbourne, 
William Charles Wentworth, Brisbane, 1934.
2Article on Huon de Kerilleau in A.D.B., vol.l; Article on 
James Macarthur in A.D.B., vol.2; Macarthur in Silvester, op. 
cit., p.l38ff; M.H. Ellis, John Macarthur, Sydney, 1955, 
pp.481, 496, 518.
3John Molony, An Architect of Freedom, Canberra, 1973, pp.4-9.
4Article on J.E. Manning in A .D .B., vol.l; forthcoming article 
on W.M. Manning in A .D .B., vol.5.
12
for his services in a cholera epidemic. Only Martin was of 
humble birth, and he had not experienced the frustrations 
which might have turned him to radicalism, for his abilities 
had been recognized by the leaders of the 'Australian' faction 
and he had advanced rapidly under the patronage of Nichols, 
Wentworth and Fitzgerald, absorbing the values of the elite he 
was so anxious to join.
All the leading conservatives were educated men who served
on the Senate of Sydney University, and they were acquainted
with the rich tradition of political theory produced by British
conservatives, Whig and Tory, to rationalize their hegemony.
Burke, Hallam, Macaulay, De Lolme, and a succession of British
politicians were all quoted in debate to strengthen the case
for a conservative constitution, as were De Tocqueville and the
American conservatives Story and Calhoun. The conservatives
also found intellectual justification for their political
position from less obvious sources. Plunkett, Manning,
Wentworth and Martin were all lawyers who had learned from 
3Blackstone the necessity for a 'balanced constitution' in 
which the influence of mere numbers was limited by a judicious 
admixture of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy; and 
conservative political and social assumptions coloured much of 
the literature which formed part of a gentleman's education.
4Wentworth quoted Pope's eulogy of the 'balanced constitution' 
and Judge Dickinson, who discussed the constitution with 
Thomson and other 'upper class' conservatives, quoted Milton's 
view that
...orders and degree ^
Jar not with liberty but well consist.
■^Article on Douglass in A . D . B. , vol.l.
2Roe, op.cit., pp.86-7; Bede Nairn, forthcoming article on 
Martin in A .D .B., vol.5.
3Sir William Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Laws of 
England formed the general introduction to legal studies in 
Britain, the United States, and, of course, New South Wales. 
Cf. article on Blackstone in D .N.B., vol.V, London, 1886; and 
J.F. Hargrave's Introductory Lecture on General Jurisprudence 
Delivered at the University of Sydney, March 5, 1860, Sydney, 
1860.
^Silvester, op.cit., p.224.
5Quoted J.N. Dickinson, A Letter to...the Speaker on the Formation of a Second Chamber...", Sydney, 1853, p.14.
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He also reproduced from Troilus and Cressida the classic 
justification of the hierarchic society:
How could communities...
But by degree stand in authentic place?
Take but degree away, untune that string,
And hark, what discord follows!1 234
Like all conservatives, Dickinson regarded 'degree1 as
congenial to human nature and a feature of all stable societies.
He shared with Macarthur an admiration for the French political
theorist, Sismondi, and adopted his view that everywhere there
were four aristocracies, those of 'wealth, talent, manners and
birth', each with its special virtues and defects. These
1 natural aristocracies', he thought, 'should be blended into
one constitutional aristocracy, so that each might check and
2influence the others'. He therefore proposed the creation of 
an order of colonial baronets from whose ranks the members of 
an upper house could be drawn as representatives of society's 
second estate.
The creation of an aristocracy as proposed by Dickinson
and Wentworth was in part a way of institutionalizing the
colonial elites, of giving them the formal status of an estate.
With their position enshrined in law, members of the
aristocracy thus created would enjoy a constitutional and
social eminence capable of surviving any deterioration in
personal fortunes or even a decline in the economic position of
the whole class. Such privileged status was not desired on
merely personal grounds, for both Wentworth and Macarthur, two
of the leading proponents of an aristocratic order, later
declined honours - the former a baronetcy and the latter a 4knrghthood. Rather, it was thought desirable to strengthen 
the position of the colonial elite as a whole by the creation 
of an aristocracy which, it was hoped, would make 1 ingrain in
^Quoted ibid.
2Ibid., pp.12-13. Macarthur had been acquainted with 
Sismondi and quoted him extensively in the debates on the 
constitution. Cf. Silvester, op.cit., pp.l38ff.
3Dickinson, op.cit., pp.14-15, 19, 21, 27.
4H.W.K. Young to F. Wentworth, 5 February 1886, Wentworth 
Papers, M.L., A760; Denison to Macarthur, 30 May 1859, 
Macarthur Papers, vol.28, A2924, p.303.
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the people' habits of deference which would prevent the 
triumph of democracy.^
The proposals for an aristocracy also embodied in a
striking form the conservative conviction that to be stable, a
constitution had to strike a proper balance between the
different estates and interests, ensuring that none triumphed
over the others. Thus, no group was to be given dominance on
account of its numerical superiority, but each was to be given
that amount of influence which, from experience, was seen as
most likely to promote stability. The model of such a
'balanced constitution' was, of course, the British, which had
survived unscathed when less perfect forms of government had
2fallen amidst the revolutions of 1848.
Under the New South Wales constitution, 'balance' on the
British model was to be achieved on two levels. In the lower
house, the influence of 'numbers' was to be checked by the
perpetuation of the electoral system devised by Deas Thomson
in 1851. Under that system, separate representation was given
to the mercantile, agricultural and pastoral interests, with- a
special weighting in favour of the last because of its wealth
and conservatism. Consequently, the lower house was given a3substantial element of conservatism.
On the second level, the lower house was held to 
represent 'the people' and, irrespective of the political 
opinions or social status of its members, it was thought to 
need 'checking' by an aristocratic upper chamber. The reason 
was, as Sismondi put it, that
^G.W. Rusden to J. Macarthur, 4 December 1853, Macarthur 
Papers, vol.27, A2923, p.466.
2For a discussion of the balancing of estates and interests in 
the British constitution see Corinne Comstock Weston, English 
Constitutional Theory and the House of Lords, London, 1965; 
and Samuel H. Beer, ^Modern British Politics, London, 1965, Ch.I, 
passim.
3See the N.S.W. Act 14 Vic., no.47; and Thomson's explanation 
in E. Deas Thomson, Corrected Report of the Speeches of the 
Hon. E. Deas Thomson...on the First and Second Readings of the 
Bill for the Division of the Colony into Electoral Districts, 
Sydney, 1851.
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both aristocracy and democracy are two necessary 
elements in all good government: each pernicious 
when it is exclusive, or even when it governs: 
both essential to the happiness of nations, when 
they are skilfully combined so as to work * 
together.^
Thus, conservatism and stability, which were held to be 
inseparable, were secured by a double system of checks and 
balances, one system being incorporated in the distribution of 
the electorates, the other in the upper house.
To secure such a balance it was not, of course, necessary 
to create a titled aristocracy, although it was thought, 
naively as it turned out, that such a step would be conducive 
to the creation of a proper sense of social hierarchy. Nor 
did the upper house have to be nominated, for Dickinson's 
aristocratic chamber was to be elective and Wentworth's was to 
be partly elective. In fact, the requisite 'balance' could be 
secured if there were no upper house at all, provided the 
single chamber was so constructed as to give 'aristocracy' its 
due weight. This is borne out by the fact that, although in 
1853 the conservatives argued that bicameralism was an 
essential element of all constitutions, many of them had found 
it convenient to repudiate this view only a short time earlier.
Bicameralism was not a constitutional principle desired 
as an end in itself, and whether most conservatives accepted or 
rejected it depended upon whether it seemed likely to help or 
hinder the attainment of more important political goals. In 
the late 1840s and early 1850s Wentworth and most of the 
elected conservatives had opposed the creation of an upper 
house because they feared it would strengthen the hands of 
both the government and the liberals. From 1846, Deas Thomson 
had been lamenting that in the existing mixed single chamber, 
the nominees were swamped by the elective members and did not 
pose an effective barrier to hostile attacks on the executive. 
He therefore advocated the creation of an entirely nominated 
upper house which could amend or reject hostile measures and 
repudiate attacks made on the government by the elective 
chamber. He thought that such a body, standing between the 
people's representatives and the Crown, would halve the
^■Quoted Dickinson, op.cit., p.13.
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number of collisions between the legislature and the 
executive.^
The liberals advocated the creation of a nominated upper
house for different reasons. On the one hand, they saw it as
a means of removing a large body of conservatives from the
existing mixed chamber; on the other hand, they predicted that
the lower house would prove more powerful, so that the influence
of the government would ultimately be weakened. Robert Lowe,
for instance, thought that if the upper house supported the
lower, then the voice of the legislature would be heard with
all the more force; but that if it did not, then 'the opinions
of such a house would not carry much weight; not half so much
2as that of the representatives of the people'.
Conservatives hostile to the government naturally saw
little to recommend an upper house which was, as Captain M.C.
O'Connell observed, advocated by the Colonial Secretary 'to
strengthen the executive' and welcomed by Robert Lowe 'because
3it would increase the popular power'. Consequently, they
joined Wentworth in condemning bicameralism because it would.
prevent 'wholesome collisions' between the people and the
executive, and because it would be many years before the
colony possessed 'any class of sufficient fortune and stability
to be raised to the situation of hereditary legislators, or
4even to be created legislators for life.' . For the moment, 
Wentworth wanted the nominees to sit in a single blended 
chamber, where they could strengthen his hand against the 
liberals and where, at the same time, they could be outvoted 
by a combination of liberals and elected conservatives.
■^Thomson in S .M .H . , 13 June 1846; cf. Thomson, S .M.H. , 4 May 
1848; and Darvall, then a government nominee, S.M.H., 5 May 
1848.
3Lowe, S.M.H., 4 May 1848; cf. Windeyer, S.M.H., 13 June 1846; 
the favourable references to bicameralism by Cowper and Lamb,
S .M.H., 5 May 1848; and Irving, op.cit., pp.48-9.
30'Connell, S.M.H., 5 May 1848.
4Resolution by Wentworth, S.M.H., 28 April 1848; cf. Wentworth, 
S.M.H., 13 June 1846; Dangar and Bland, S .M.H., 5 May 1848;
S.M .H . editorial, 28 April 1848; Irving, op.cit., pp.49-50, 
362-3.
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By 1853, all shades of opinion in the Council had swung 
solidly to bicameralism, for the government had solved its 
differences with Wentworth and the elective conservatives, 
making their fears that an upper house would side with the 
government irrelevant. The main source of opposition to the 
government was now the small group of liberals,^ and any 
constitutional change which strengthened the government against 
liberal demands was, in the eyes of elected conservatives, a 
good one.
The alliance between the conservatives and the government
was finally sealed by the arrival of Pakington's despatch in
May 1853, which met the grievances which had caused the
clashes between the government and the elected members.
Moreover, the despatch settled the issues in dispute on terms
which guaranteed conservative support for an upper house. As
late as June 1852, when Wentworth proposed the appointment of
a select committee to draft a constitution, he had dismissed
as 'preposterous' any suggestion that there should be two
houses while the imperial government retained control of the -
Crown lands and 'so long as the full control of all the
revenues of the country was withheld from the representatives
2of the people'. When the committee met, there was still some3conservative opposition to bicameralism, but since the 
proposed constitution transferred control. of the Crown lands 
and the revenue to the colony, Wentworth was able to agree
In the session of 1853, which was dominated by the 
constitution bill, the government and the elected conservatives 
acted together against the liberals; and in September 1854, a 
vote of no-confidence in the ministry produced a split 
approximately on liberal-conservative lines, with the liberals 
against the government. Cf. P. Loveday, 'The Development of 
Parliamentary Government in New South Wales, 1856-1870', Ph.D. 
thesis, Sydney University, 1962, pp.456-7. See also Jan 
Forrest, 'Political Divisions in the New South Wales 
Legislative Council, 1847-53', J.R.A.H.S,, vol.50, pt.6, 
December 1964, pp.466, 476, 487-8, et passim.
^Wentworth, S.M.H., 17 June 1852.
3Wentworth said that some members of the committee favoured a 
single chamber, and the two liberals on the committee, Cowper 
and Lamb, were long-standing supporters of bicameralism. 
(Wentworth, S.M.H., 13 December 1852; Cowper and Lamb, S.M.H.,
5 May 1848.)
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that it should also provide for an upper house. Pakington's
despatch clinched Wentworth's conversion to bicameralism, for
it dwelt on the advantages of a house of review, and said that
'Her Majesty's Government believe it to be desirable for the
interests of the Colony' that the creation of a second house
'should precede those important concessions' which it was
prepared to make. The despatch then stated that 'it is the
wish of Her Majesty's Government that the Council should
establish the new legislature on the bases of an Elective
Assembly and a Legislative Council to be nominated by the
Crown' and said that 'On the receipt...of such a Constitutional
enactment' the colony would be granted control of the Crown
2lands and the revenue. Pakington had expressed his 
willingness to remedy those grievances which had been the 
principal cause of Wentworth's opposition to the government, 
but he had made that concession conditional upon the division 
of the legislature into an elective Assembly and a nominated 
Council. Consequently, the desire for colonial control of lands 
and revenue, which had previously led Wentworth to oppose a . 
nominated upper house because he feared it would support the 
government, now made him an ardent supporter of bicameralism.
The reasons for the conversion of the conservatives to
bicameralism are clear, but it is less obvious why they
preferred a nominated upper house to an*elective one.
Pakington's despatch bound them to a nominated upper house,
but he lost office less than a week after it was sent and was
replaced by the Duke of Newcastle, whose preference for the
elective principle was made known in the colony before the
select committee had completed its deliberations. Moreover, it
is clear that most conservatives favoured the principle of
3nomination long before Pakington's despatch was received.
^Cf. Wentworth, S,M.H., 13 December 1852.
2Pakington to Fitzroy, 15 December 1852, V . & P. (L.C., N.S.W.),1853, pt.l.
3Discussions of bicameralism in the 1840s had always assumed 
that the upper house would consist of the nominee element in 
the existing Legislative Council. For a frank assessment by 
Wentworth of opinion on the desired form of upper house, see 
S.M.H., 13 December 1852.
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The conservatives advanced many arguments in support of
the nominee principle which bore little relationship to their
motives for supporting it. For instance, when the Duke of
Newcastle released the colonists from Pakington's decision that
they should have a nominated chamber, Wentworth resorted to the
argument that they were still bound by the terms of their
previous petitions and remonstrances, which had asked for a
form of government 'similar in its outline to that of Canada1.
He contended that they were therefore in honour bound to form
an upper house based on the principle of nomination which
prevailed in Canada, and that no Secretary of State for
Colonies had the power to release them from such a 'compact'.'*"
However, this argument was plainly the invention of a mind
adept at inventing post factum justifications for whatever
course of action he preferred, for his reasoning was as much a
condemnation of his own proposals for an upper house as it was
of the elective principle. As late as June 1852, he had
advocated unicameralism; he had subsequently advocated a
nominated upper house in which the Governor's choice of
members was to be restricted by a provision that two-thirds of
them should previously have sat as elected members of the 
2legislature; and in the very speech in which he claimed they 
were bound to form an upper house like Canada's, he advocated 
the creation of an aristocratic chamber•whose members were to 
be partly elected and partly nominated. All these proposals 
were in fact clear breaches of the 'compact' by which he 
professed to be bound.
There were other arguments which were at least as much 
rationalizations of the conservatives' preference for a 
nominated upper house as explanations of it. One such 
argument, employed by most conservatives, was that an elective 
chamber was 'anti-monarchical1, that it smacked of a 'disloyal' 
preference for American institutions, and that it would lead 
to a republic. Two significant attempts were made to give 
substance to these accusations. The first was advanced by Sir 
Alfred Stephen, the Chief Justice, who argued that the Crown's
"^Silvester, op.cit., p.32.
^Wentworth, S .M.H., 13 December 1852.
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power of nomination was 'an ancient and valuable prerogative, 
conducing largely to its just and proper influence'.^ In his 
eyes, therefore, even the most conservative and aristocratic 
elective upper house had one grave defect: it deprived the 
Crown of the 'high and important privilege, of conferring upon 
eminent services and merit one of the greatest distinctions,... 
the honor...of [becoming1 *345 a member of [thej Legislative 
Senate'.^
3Stephen was a self-proclaimed Tory and his concern for
the preservation of the Crown's influence was undoubtedly
sincere. However, such men were rare in colonial life, and the
elected conservatives, in particular, had spent much of their
political careers condemning the nominated members of the
Council as mere 'puppets' of the Governor and declaiming
against the 'unconstitutional' influence exercised by the Crown4in New South Wales. Even James Macarthur had used the
language of Whiggism in opposing the imperial authorities, and
on other counts, as in his support of national education and
his opposition to an established church, he gave evidence that
5he was not a traditional Tory. It is not surprising, then, 
that no conservative in the Council condemned an elective upper 
house as 'anti-monarchical' on the same grounds as Stephen, for 
that would have given the liberals additional grounds for 
accusing them of inconsistency.
Wentworth made the only other significant attempt to 
justify the charge that an elective upper house would lead to a 
republic when he argued that if it were elected from large 
constituencies amalgamating both rural and urban areas it would
^Sir Alfred Stephen, Thoughts on the Constitution of a Second 
Legislative Chamber for New South Wales..., Sydney, 1853, p.12.
^Ibid., p .10.
3Martha Rutledge, 'Sir Alfred Stephen and Divorce Law Reform 
in New South Wales, 1886-1892', M.A. thesis, A.N.U., 1968, 
p . 17 , n . 2 .
4See, for example, S .M .H ,, 6 September 1853, speech by Parkes 
quoting letter by Wentworth to Free Press, 6 January 1842.
5Roe, op.cit., p.44; Dyster, 'The Role of Sydney...', p.252.
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be more radical than the lower house, as the votes of urban
liberals would swamp those of rural conservatives. Such a
second chamber would be unable to interpose as an aristocratic
buffer between the lower house and the Crown, so that clashes
between the monarchic and democratic elements would occur,
leading to a rupture.^ However, his concern for protecting
the Crown from attacks by the people's representatives was
lightly worn, for he had hitherto praised such 'wholesome
constitutional collisions' with the executive as the 'main
2source and preservation of constitutional freedom'. His 
tenderness for royal prerogatives waxed and waned according to 
his political interests and cannot be viewed as a genuine 
ground of his espousal of the principle of nomination. Moreover, 
the image of an upper house more radical than the lower house 
was unreal, for there was no reason why large electorates 
could not give separate representation to urban and rural 
interests on the same principle as in the electoral 
distribution for the lower house; and there was no reason why 
the franchise could not be made more restrictive for the upper 
house in order to guarantee its conservatism, as many liberals 
advised. In alleging that an elective upper house would be 
more radical than the lower house, Wentworth had manufactured a 
completely artificial situation; he was obviously just 
searching for arguments to support a case he had already 
decided on.
Other conservatives made vague accusations that the desire 
for an elective upper house displayed a disloyal preference 
for American institutions over British ones and constituted an 
implied attack on all non-elective components of the 
constitution, including the Crown. They cheered loudly when 
old Alexander Berry accused those who wanted an elective 3chamber of being 'vehement clamourers for republicanism', andcprolonged applause greeted Wentworth's mildly xenophobia, demand4for 'a British, not a Yankee constitution'. It is difficult
^Silvester, op.cit., pp.245-6.
2Resolution number seven by Wentworth, S.M .H., 28 April 1843; 
cf. Wentworth in S.M.H., 17 June 1852.
3Silvester, op.cit., p.209.
^Ibid., p.34.
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to avoid the conclusion that these accusations were more in
the nature of cynical propaganda than the true foundation of
the conservative preference for the principle of nomination.
They had no fixed aversion to American ideas as such and
quoted with admiration the works of American conservatives;^
and they had great difficulty in explaining why four of the
last five Secretaries of State for Colonies favoured the
elective principle and why a committee of the Privy Council had
just recommended an elective upper house for the Cape of Good
Hope. Moreover, they totally (and in part wilfully)
misrepresented the intentions of their opponents, for the
Reverend J.D. Lang was out of the country until after the
debate on the second reading and the voice of radical
3republicanism was not heard. Instead, the agitation against 
the constitution was dominated by patrician liberals from the 
colonial 'upper class' like Cowper, Darvall and Holden, who4were loud in their declamations of loyalty. The conservatives 
were, however, desperately anxious to smear all their opponents 
by identifying them with Lang's republicanism, and they 
persisted with their wild accusations. If they believed their 
own propaganda, this was probably largely because it was in 
their interests to do so.
What, then, were the real bases of conservative support 
for the principle of nomination? Part of the explanation lies 
in simple intellectual inertia. Opinion in Britain had only 
recently begun to harden in favour of the elective principle, 
and news of the changes reached the colony too late to shake 
the traditional conservative presumption, based upon precedent, 
that any upper house would be at least partly nominated. 
However, the explanation goes deeper than this, for important 
groups in the community had a vested interest in the 
preservation of the nominee system.
^For example, Wentworth's quotation of Calhoun, ibid., pp.27, 
49-50.
2Cf. Wentworth, ibid., pp.32-4. Gladstone, Grey, Newcastle and 
Stanley favoured an elective upper house. Pakington preferred 
nomination.
3See the discussion of liberal and radical attitudes towards 
the upper house later in this chapter.
4For example, Cowper, ibid., p.127.
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A clue to the nature of the conservatives' support for
that system is provided by their description of the class
which the upper house was supposed to represent. Most
conservatives thought the creation of a titled aristocracy
unnecessary, but all agreed that the upper house was to
represent the colony's leading citizens, its natural
aristocracy. As the cultured W.A. Duncan (a one-time radical)
put it, the upper house was to represent
a superior class of citizens, to which, whether 
the distinction may have arisen from great talents, 
eminent public services, or from whatever other 
cause, the general designation of Aristocracy is 
applied. ^
The role of the upper house as the representative of the
'Aristocracy' was thus distinguished clearly from that of the
lower house, which, whatever its actual composition,
constitutionally represented 'the people' and 'balanced' the
claims of the three great vertically defined interests of the
country - those associated with agriculture, commerce and the2pastoral industry. According to the theory propounded by most
conservatives, the colony's 'aristocracy' was identified with
no one of these interests, but consisted of the leading members
of them all. Even Wentworth, who arrogantly saw in the
colony's 'Shepherd Kings' the greatest potential for an 3aristocracy, fell into the customary way of speaking and
described the proposed upper house as
a powerful body... formed of men of wealth, property 
and education - men not raised from any particular 
section of the community, but from every class that 
has the energy to aspire to rank and honour.
This doctrine was seriously challenged by only one
conservative, James Martin, a man of imposing intellectual
powers whose fear of the lower orders led him to favour 'class
^W.A. Duncan, A Plea for the New South Wales Constitution, 
Sydney, 1856, p.9.
2See the 1851 Electoral Act, 14 Vic. no.47; and E. Deas Thomson, 
Corrected Report of the Speeches of the Hon. E. Peas Thomson... 
on the First and Second Readings of the Bill for the Division 
of the Colony into Electoral Districts, Sydney, 1851.
3Silvester, op.cit., p.223.
^Ibid., p .36.
representation' as the price of conservatism. In a powerful
speech on the second reading of the Constitution Bill, Martin
claimed that the conservatives were naive in putting their
faith in an upper house which could be swamped by additional
nominees, and argued for one elected exclusively by the large
landholders.^ But his eloquence was unavailing, for the plan
was unanimously rejected by other conservatives. Deas Thomson
complained that merchants, bankers and professional men were
2as deserving of representation as landholders, and W.M. Manning 
thought
it would have the effect of setting class against 
class; and it would create for one class of the 
community a superiority over the others. That 
class would have, besides the common right of 
electing the Lower House, the exclusive right of 
electing the Upper House, which I need scarcely 
point out would be apt to lead to the most serious jealousies and most deplorable antagonisms.-^
Similar objections were voiced by Douglass, Macleay and
W. Bowman, conservatives who had landed interests but who
identified themselves with the interests of the 'aristocracy*
as a whole, rather than with the viewpoint of one of its
4constituent classes. In conservative eyes, the proposal for a 
nominated upper house was free from the objectionable features 
of Martin's proposals. Appointed by the Crown on the advice of 
responsible ministers, it would represent no faction but the 
whole community, for it was the role of the Crown and its 
advisors to represent the common good. As the Sydney Morning 
Herald put it:
Let it [the upper house] be elected as MR. MARTIN 
proposes, and it would represent a class. Let 
it be appointed by the Crown and it would represent 
the Commonwealth. 5
^Ibid., pp.76, 97ff.
2Ibid., p.172.
3Ibid., p .181f.
4Douglass (ibid., p.158); Macleay (ibid., p.161); W. Bowman 
in Legislative Council, quoted Empire, 3 September 1853;
S.M .H., 29 August 1853, editorial.
~*S .M .H . , 29 August 1853, editorial.
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The Herald1s argument was perhaps too sophisticated for many 
conservatives to appreciate, but that paper spoke for the 
large number of conservatives like Manning and Thomson who 
belonged to the colony's 'urban aristocracy' and who regarded 
the squatters' claim to superiority as an insult to their own 
status.
At the root of the urban conservatives' conviction that a
nominated Council was more representative than an elective one,
there was a strong element of self-interest. Not only was a
chamber elected by large freeholders an implicit denial of the
equality of urban wealth, but it was also likely to ensure that
urban conservatives were poorly represented in Parliament.
Experience had shown that it was very difficult for an urban
conservative to gain election to the existing Council. Urban
electorates usually returned liberal candidates, and
conservatives from Sydney had difficulty in competing
successfully against well known local squatters in the pastoral
electorates. Moreover, by the electoral redistribution of
1851, Deas Thomson had 'balanced' the electorates in a way
which favoured the pastoral districts, and while this reduced
the strength of the liberals, it also reduced the number of
seats in which urban conservatives could conveniently stand.
As a result, in 1853, there were only five conservatives
following urban occupations out of the twenty-six elected
2conservatives in the Council. The 'urban aristocracy', gained
adequate representation only through the presence in the
Council of the eighteen conservative nominees, thirteen of whom
lived in Sydney or its environs and derived their principal
3income from commercial and professional pursuits.
The fact that the 'urban aristocracy' depended largely 
upon the nominee system for its parliamentary representation 
was certainly not lost upon men like Thomson, Plunkett and 
Manning, who had framed the electoral laws and who had heard 
frequent complaints that the nominees had disproportionate
^Cf. Irving, op.cit., pp. 383-91.
2See Appendix 11.
See Appendix 11.3
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influence in the existing Council because most of them lived 
in Sydney and could attend more easily than the elected 
conservatives, most of whom lived in the country.^
Consequently, when Manning and Thomson objected that Martin's 
elective upper house would discriminate against merchants, 
bankers and professional men and would give 'one class of the 
community a superiority over the others', they were not speaking 
of some abstract injustice but were expressing a genuine fear 
that an elective chamber would leave their own class virtually 
unrepresented.
Some of the nominees, respectable members of the 'upper
class', evinced a distaste for electoral contests which does
much to explain their inability to match the liberals and the
'Australians' in the rough and tumble of urban politics. Many
conservatives resented the accompaniments of electoral
politics - the treating of voters, the occasional violence -
and their poor opinion of the electors led them to assume that
the candidate who solicited votes by the basest means had the
best chance of success. Thomas Barker, a wealthy manufacturer,
feared that an elective chamber might be dominated by the most
unscrupulous spenders, who would then enrich themselves at the
2colony's expense; and Plunkett, the Attorney-General, asserted 
that
If the Upper House be elected by the large 
farmers... there must consequently be district 
elections. Where there were those elections 
there would be a canvass for votes, and where 
there was such a canvass, there would, as in all 
other popular elections, be corruption. The man 
who spent the most money and made the most 
promises would be the most likely to succeed, 
without reference to his qualifications (Cheers) ; 
and it was the most crafty and unprincipled knave 
who would promise most largely.... But some of the 
best men were those who would not be induced to 
go through a contested election and run the risk 
of being disgraced by some contemptible candidate, 
who would canvass better achieving victory over 
him. (Hear, h.ear.)3
'''See, for example, Windeyer, S .M .H . , 13 June 1846; Lowe, S ,M.H. , 
4 May 1848.
2Silvester, op.cit., pp.186-7.
^Ibid., p.108.
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In particular, Plunkett thought that a nominated upper house
would attract the cream of retired members of the lower house
and gentlemen like Sir William Burton, Puisne Judge at Madras
and a former judge of the New South Wales Supreme Court, who
intended to return to the colony and would not wish to campaign
on the hustings.'- He might also have mentioned Deas Thomson,
the Colonial Secretary, who had never contested an election
and whose desire to stand aloof from 'party politics' after
responsible government led him to avoid electoral contests and
2retire to the upper house. Even conservatives active in
electoral politics considered that the best election was an
3uncontested one, and conservatives in general had no desire to
make election the sole means of political advancement. Had
they done so, they would have excluded from political life
some of the 'finest gentlemen' in the colony.
The final major argument which conservatives used against
Martin's proposal for an elective chamber was that it made no
provision for the resolution of conflicts between the two
branches of the legislature. The dilemma of those who
favoured an elective upper house was explained by H.M. Marsh:
If we make it [the Upper House] elective by the 
class of people who elect the Lower House, there 
will be no distinction between it and a democracy 
....If we make it elective by another and a higher 
class, we shall make it an oligarchy.^
The solution which was provided by both the plan for an 
aristocratic chamber and by that for a non-aristocratic 
nominated house was to give the Governor power to appoint
^Ibid.
2Cf. Cowper to Parkes, 27 August 1856, P.C., vol.6, A876. 
Thomson turned down the chance of becoming the first President 
of the new Legislative Council in 1856 because he thought the 
office 'a political one'. (Denison to Labouchere, 24 August 
1856, P.R.O./C.O., 201/494.) Thomson, however, later became 
involved in a type of 'party politics' in the Council. (See 
below, passim, but esp. Ch.II.)
3Cf. J.M. Antill to James Macarthur, 9 January 1857, Macarthur 
Papers, vol.28, A2924, pp.5-7.
4Silvester, op.cit., pp.215-6.
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sufficient new members to break any deadlock between the
houses. Martin and a few conservatives outside the Council,
like Sir Alfred Stephen and Robert Johnson, made this the core
of their objection to both proposals/ but most conservatives
agreed with Marsh's view that the 'expansive principle' was an
advantage. Swamping was explicitly and favourably referred to
2by Wentworth, Manning, Macarthur and Douglass, while many
other conservatives referred implicitly and with equanimity to
what everyone knew: that a nominated house with unlimited
membership could be coerced. Wentworth explicitly mentioned
the possibility of swamping at least five times and he
elaborated at length on its advantages:
...it is in this expansive character of this 
upper house that the real safety-valve is to be 
found (cheers.) Sir, it is this expansive 
character of the House of Lords which has saved 
England from more than one revolution. It is to 
this expansive character that I look forward as a 
port of refuge for the constitution at all times.
Sir, any one can perceive, if the time should 
arrive - and most assuredly it will arrive - that 
there is an obstructive body in the Upper House 
impeding the legislation of the Lower House 
unnecessarily - impeding it, not for purposes of revision or consideration, but for purposes of 
faction, or even from an erroneous conviction or 
opinion of their own - I say, if a dead lock of 
this kind should ever arise, there is a remedy.
The constitutional minister of the day has only to 
advise a further creation to the extent necessary 
to get rid of the obstruction, and then the  ^
obstruction, as a matter of course, will cease.
The widely held opinion that Wentworth and the other
conservatives did not foresee the possibility of a swamping is
clearly incorrect. This view has been based less upon
examination of the evidence than upon inferences from the
presumed nature of conservative intentions in New South Wales
in the 1850s. Such a procedure was natural enough in view of
the fact that most historians have made only passing comments
■^ Martin, ibid., pp.98-9; Stephen, op.cit., pp.llff, 15;
Johnson, S.M.H., 6 September 1853.
2Wentworth, S,M.H., 9 December 1853, and in Silvester, op.cit., 
pp.35, 215-6, 221, 224; Manning, ibid., p.l80ff; Macarthur, 
ibid., p.143; Douglass, ibid., p.158.
^Ibid., pp.215-6.
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on the choice of a nominated upper house in New South Wales. 
However, their erroneous conclusion that the conservatives did 
not appreciate the potential weakness of a nominated chamber 
throws into doubt the validity of the premise about 
conservative intentions on which it was based. It will 
therefore be necessary to indicate some alternative conclusions 
on the nature of conservatism in New South Wales in the early 
1850s.
To begin with, the facile identification of conservatism 
with the defence of squatter interests must be abandoned. 
Wentworth was the only conservative leader in the Council who 
derived his principal income from squatting and whole-heartedly 
endorsed the squatters' cause. Moreover, the squatters in 
general had little influence on the framing of the constitution, 
and the nominated upper house was certainly not intended to be 
a stronghold of the 1 Shepherd Kings1 . The leading conservatives 
saw the upper house as a chamber which would represent an 
'aristocracy' drawn from both urban and rural interests, and 
they preferred the principle of nomination to that of election 
partly because they did not want rural interests to predominate. 
In that respect, the nominated chamber was intended to be the 
successor to the nominated element in the old Council, which 
had ensured that urban conservatives were amply represented.
It should also be noted that the only economic reason 
which the urban conservatives had for wanting strong political 
representation in the upper house instead of abandoning it to 
rural conservatives was a desire to ensure that the squatters 
did not legislate too blatantly in their own interests. A more 
important reason was that, for urban conservatives, political 
power had its own rewards - prestige, patronage, the 
gratification of narcissistic idealism and the satisfaction of 
personally influencing the course of events.
It must also be stressed that although what passed for 
'constitutional principle' was often simply a convenient 
rationalization for expediency or self-interest, political 
theory was sometimes important in guiding politician's actions. 
It was not that they followed political theory to the detriment 
of their interests, but rather that their conception of their 
interests was moulded by political theory. It is impossible to 
dismiss the praise lavished upon the 'expansive character' of
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the nominated upper house as just another argument in favour 
of a chamber desired for other reasons. It would have been a 
simple matter to fix the membership of the upper house at a 
specific number, making it impervious to swamping. Such a 
chamber would have been just as effective in representing urban 
conservatives and those who shrank from soliciting votes, and 
it had a precedent in the fixed number of nominees in the 
existing Legislative Council. We must conclude, then, that the 
conservatives genuinely regarded the 'expansive principle' as 
an advantage. They did so, not because they ignored their 
interests, but because they defined their interests in terms of 
Whig constitutional theory. All the conservatives knew that 
the House of Lords had passed the 1832 Reform Act under the 
threat of swamping and, with Wentworth, most regarded its 
submission in that crisis as 'one of the purest efforts of the 
patriotism of its members' and a model for all second chambers. 
They thereby endorsed the conventional Whig doctrine that the 
conservative branch of the legislature could not indefinitely 
resist strong and repeated demands for change without damaging 
the structure of the body politic and exposing itself to the 
danger of being swept away by an engaged populace. Such 
turmoil was seen as a threat to conservative political 
interests and, ultimately, as a threat to conservative property. 
The possibility of swamping was therefore seen as a necessary 
safeguard to ensure that the upper house did not oppose reform 
until too late. Consequently, although the conservatives 
lauded the nominated chamber as a strong barrier to rash 
change, they also praised it for its weakness. They had no 
desire to impose on the colony an unyielding oligarchy, but 
only to create a colonial equivalent of that imperfect defence 
of vested interests, the British House of Lords.
The liberal movement in New South Wales in 1853 drew its 
strength from two sources. Some of its members, such as 
Edward Flood, Henry Parkes, J.R. Wilshire and W.R. Piddington, 
came from the middle ranks of colonial society. They had often
■^Silvester, op.cit. , pp. 215-6.
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been prominent in municipal politics in the 1840s and, in some
cases, were of working class origin. However, although such
men were playing an increasingly important role in the
movement, they did not dominate it. The greatest influence was
wielded by merchants and professional men, many of them leaders
of colonial society. Men like J.B. Darvall, T.S. Mort,
G.K. Holden, Richard Jones, Charles Cowper, John Lamb, James
Norton, Robert Campbell and Alexander Park could meet the
leading conservatives on terms of social equality, although
political antagonisms sometimes caused a degree of personal
estrangement. John Lamb, for instance, a prince of the
colony's commercial world who as a young man had married the
daughter of a deputy-chairman of Lloyds, was so incensed by the
results of the 1851 elections that he proposed the formation of
a Reform Club to counter the influence of the predominantly
conservative Australian Club.'*" Yet other liberals, like
Darvall and Jones, were long-standing members of the Australian 
2Club, and Darvall, in particular, was a notorious snob whose 
social sympathies made him an easy target for satirists.
W.B. Dailey, for instance, dramatized the dichotomy between 
his 'popular' politics and his aristocratic pretensions in an 
article in Sydney Punch:
Having no particle of sympathy with the motives, 
the objects, the hopes or the fears of those by 
whom he was surrounded, he lent his name, his 
powers, the prestige of his position to 
gentlemen whose existence, except from a public 
platform, he would hardly care to acknowledge.
With a persuasive eloquence as sweet as the honey 
of the Sicilian mountain, he could second a 
resolution for the five points of the charter, 
and with the same delightful imperturbability cut 
the mover dead in the street in the next half-hour - 
and both operations would be marked by a grace and  ^
an appropriateness which none could hope to emulate.
“^Irving, op.cit., p. 392 .
2See 'Original Founders and Old Members of the Australian Club 
in 1844', manuscript, King Papers, vol.2, M.L., A1977, pp.224-33.
3Quoted W.J.V. Windeyer, 'Responsible Government-Highlights, 
Sidelights and Reflections', J.R.A.H.S., vol.42, pt.6, 1956, 
p.297.
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With another patrician liberal, Charles Cowper, Darvall
led the liberal attack on the Constitution Bill in the Council.
Their objections focussed on the electoral distribution and on
the proposed upper house. J.M. Main has argued that they did
not foresee that a nominated house would be weaker than an
elective one and that they 'protested against a nominated
chamber simply because it would perpetuate privilege, and on
the ground that it would be "irresponsible"'.^ It is true
that they repeatedly asserted that the conservatives were
merely trying to perpetuate their privileges through a nominated
upper house; it is also true that they condemned such a house
as 'irresponsible', as indeed it was in the technical sense of
the word; but it remains equally true that they saw clearly
that a nominated upper house could be coerced with the threat
of swamping by a responsible executive. Cowper quoted
extensively from speeches by the Duke of Newcastle and
Gladstone to show that nominated chambers had frequently been
swamped, so that many conservatives had come to favour
elective ones. He himself thought the elective principle more
2conservative, and favoured it partly for this reason.
The same argument was repeated by other liberals, and
Darvall, in particular, dwelt upon the dismal prospect of an
upper house made gross and despised by repeated swampings:
They [the ministers] could declare [that] it 
should consist of more members; and degraded indeed 
the members of such a body must feel, speaking and 
voting for nobody, and feeling that they were 
liable at any moment thus to be set aside by the 
vote of the popular body. But if this body might 
at the outset be somewhat respectable, it would 
become feeble in its manhood, and helpless and 
decrepit in its old age. The larger it became in 
numbers, the more abject and contemptible would 
the position of its members become.^
^Main, loc.cit., p.51.
2Silvester, op.cit., pp.119-121. See also Cowper in S.M.H., 
6 September 1853.
3S.M .H ., 16 August 1853. See also Piddington, S,M.H.,
6 September 1853; Empire, 3 September 1853, editorial; 
Campbell in Silvester, op.cit., p.149; and Bligh's oblique 
reference in ibid., p.175.
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Darvall put the argument in a different and perhaps more 
common form when he noted that if able and respected men 
became 'branded with those fatal letters contained in the word 
nominee, then the respect which attached to them, the influence 
they exercised, were gone...destroyed by the unfortunate caress 
which made them n o m i n e e s ' H e  therefore deemed it inevitable 
that a nominee upper house would lack the popular support 
necessary for it to stand up to the lower house and fulfill its 
conservative functions. This argument was basic to most 
liberal opposition to the nominated upper house.
In insisting upon these points, Darvall was not simply
inventing reasons for condemning a nominated upper house, but
was giving a genuine reason for his opposition to it. When
radical liberals who repudiated the idea that there should be
a conservative 'check' on the Assembly gained the ascendancy
in the later 1850s, Darvall became a conservative, for with
many other liberal men of substance he was an advocate of
hierarchy in the social and political order. In 1853, such
opinions were dominant in liberal circles and even Parkes'
Empire, which spoke for more radical liberals, noted with
apparent satisfaction that in English societies there was a
disposition amongst voters to defer to the claims of character,3condition and wealth. What distinguished the liberals from 
the conservatives was that they were more inclined to trust 
'the people', who, they believed, could be given more power as 
they could be trusted to vote for their betters. Yet, like 
moderate British reformers, they were prepared to grant the 
people power only within the framework of a 'balanced 
constitution' in which the colony's leading citizens had 
special representation. Robert Campbell, M.L.C., a member of 
the colony's oldest merchant family and a self-confessed 
'democrat', expressed this view in its most extreme form:
~^~S . M. H . , 16 August 1853.
2For the conversion of Darvall and many other patrician 
liberals to conservatism in the late 1850s and early 1860s, see Chapter III, above.
3Empire, 5 October 1853, editorial.
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While I contend for universal suffrage as the 
birthright of every Englishman, I would equally 
contend that the nomination of an Upper House 
should be left in the hands of those to whom it 
properly belongs. It belongs to the aristocracy, 
whether the aristocracy be one of birth, of 
talent, or of wealth. The members of this upper 
house should represent their order, as the 
tribunes of the people represented theirs. (Hear, 
hear.) History showed that this independence of 
the House of Lords, so far from having any 
oppressive tendency, has been the means, on many 
occasions, of preventing the people from being 
tyrannized over. (Hear, hear.) This Upper House 
should, I think, be elected independently of the 
Crown and the people. If the members are mere 
nominees, it is impossible that they can be 
independent; but all difficulty may be got over 
by introducing the elective principle and 
allowing the members of the aristocracy to elect 
their representatives.-'-
While most liberals preferred to avoid using the term
'aristocracy' in the Australian context, they retained
Campbell's basic assumption that the upper house would
represent the better class of colonist. This was shown by the
attitude of the Constitution Committee, which led the
opposition to the constitution. Its members included a few
conservatives like Robert Johnson and H.S. Russell, but for the
most part it consisted of patrician liberals like Darvall,
Cowper, T.S. Mort, T.W. Smart and G.K. Holden, and of some men
of inferior status like Parkes, Wilshire and E.J. Hawksley who
2had at least vague connections with the radical movement. The
committee's composition was so varied that it found agreement 
3difficult, but, when a compromise was eventually effected, it 
revealed essentially conservative assumptions. It was resolved 
that
The Upper House...must be essentially conservative 
in its character, that is, constituted as far as 
possible... by any justifiable conditions of the 
franchise, of those members of society who are 
most identified with the interests of the country 
by long experience of its various interests, who 
are best known for their intelligence and general
■^Silvester, op.cit., p.148.
2The list of members is in S.M.H ., 6 September 1853.
3See, for instance, letter siqned 'SQUIB', S.M.H., 29 November 1853.
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independence, and who have most merited the 
confidence of their fellows by the exercise of a 
matured judgement and the performance of public 
services.^
There was little agreement, however, as to how the return
of such men was to be assured. The resolution implied that
special restrictions on the franchise would be most effectual,
but at the same meeting it was decided that no special property
qualification should be imposed. It was resolved instead that
the candidates should be confined to a list of at least a
hundred men certified by the Governor or the lower house as
'qualified by moral endowments and social position for the2higher duties of legislation'. They were to be elected from
large constituencies, a move probably designed to keep them
remote from purely local interests and to ensure that they
were men of considerable reputation who were wealthy enough to
3campaign over a wide area. The members were also to be 
elected for nine years with one third retiring every three 
years, for long tenure and gradual retirements were seen as a 
guarantee that the upper house would be immune from passing 
gusts of popular fancy while ultimately being amenable to the 
will of the people.
The committee's plan probably satisfied very few. It was 
adopted by only four votes to three at a meeting attended by a4mere seven of the ninety-six members and received little 
praise. The radicals thought it conservative, and many 
liberals disliked the vestiges of nomineeism which it proposed 
to substitute for property qualifications. In fact, most 
liberals probably thought the imposition of a property 
qualification on either the electors or the candidates the best 
solution. G.K. Holden, who had put forward the committee's
~^S .M.H. , 23 November 1853.
2Ibid.
3The rationale behind large constituencies was not explained 
by members of the Constitution Committee in 1853, but debates 
in the later 1850s and early 1860s revealed how such 
constituencies seemed likely to favour conservative interests. 
See the section on the debate over reform of the Council in 
Chapter III, below.
.M.H., 23 November 1853.
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plan as a compromise after the committee had met for weeks
without reaching agreement, had previously moved at a public
meeting that members of the upper house should be subject to
qualifications of 'age, property and residence'. This
proposal was endorsed by the meeting and embodied in a petition.
The imposition of a property qualification was also the
device most frequently suggested in petitions from the country
districts. Eleven anti-constitution petitions to the
Legislative Council made specific recommendations for the
form of the upper house and five of them, signed by 1,532
people, suggested a special property qualification for the
2electors or for the members or for both. Most of the other
petitions made suggestions which would certainly have resulted
in a conservative upper house. One petition, signed by 4443people, wanted it elected from a body of crown nominees; two 
petitions, signed by a total of 455 people, wanted one third of 
the members nominated by the Crown, one third by the lower 
house, and one third nominated by those already appointed by4the Crown and the lower house; and two petitions, whose 
combined signatories totalled 330, thought larger electorates, 
long periods of office and a minimum age qualification a 5sufficient guarantee that the upper house would be conservative. 
Only one petition, coming from sixty-five residents of Scone, 
the stamping ground of the radical John Robertson, questioned 
the belief that a conservative upper house was necessary.^
It is clear, then, that most of those actively opposed to 
the nominated upper house still accepted the idea that it 
should be conservative. This reflected the quiescence of the 
radical movement, whose outstanding figure, the Reverend J.D. 
Lang, was overseas until the agitation against the constitution
^Empire, 7 September 1853.
2Petitions from Parramatta, Yass, Maitland, Morpeth and 
twenty-four 'Landed Proprietors and Colonists of New South 
Wales', V. & P. (L.C., N.S.W.), 1854, pt.24, n.p.
3Petition from Goulburn, ibid.
4Petitions from Campbelltown and from Windsor, Richmond and 
districts, ibid.
5Petitions from Wagga and from Scone and Murrurundi, ibid.
^Ibid.
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was almost at an end. Sydney's radical newspaper, the 
Chartist-oriented People's Advocate, was at first content 
merely to support the liberal-dominated Constitution Committee. 
It avoided raising questions such as manhood suffrage which 
would have embarrassed many of the Liberals,^ and its editor, 
E.J. Hawksley, joined the Constitution Committee. Only in 
Lang's stronghold, the Illawarra, did a separate radical
2organization emerge in the form of the Shoalhaven League, and
this had no influence in the colony at large. Hawksley spoke
at one meeting organized by the Constitution Committee, and
Daniel Deniehy and Parkes, who still retained some radical
ties, spoke at several; but for the most part the speakers'
platforms were occupied by 'landholders, merchants, clergymen,
3barristers, solicitors and other professional gentlemen', the 
elite of orthodox liberalism. The artisans and small traders 
who formed the backbone of radicalism merely helped to swell4the numbers in the audience.
The radicals and patrician liberals were united only in 
opposition to Wentworth's proposals for a colonial aristocracy 
and a nominated upper house, and the alliance was ruptured 
when the Constitution Committee produced its own plan. John 
Robertson thought the Committee had merely 'nibbled and jibbed, 
and allowed the seven words, "the Glorious Constitution of the 
Father land" to be an answer for everything'; he termed its5agitation 'puny, sickly, if not contemptible'. Not to be 
outdone, the People1 *345s Advocate contemptuously described the 
committee's proposals as 'neither fish, flesh nor fowl' and
^Cf. People's Advocate, 10 September 1853, editorial.
.M.H., 6 September 1853.
3People's Advocate, 10 September 1853; cf. S.M.H., 16 August 
1853.
4See the description of the crowd in People's Advocate,
10 September 1853. For the composition of the radical 
movement, see P. Loveday, 'The Development of Parliamentary 
Government in New South Wales, 1856-1870', Ph.D. thesis,
Sydney University, 1962, p.38. For the contrasting composition 
of the liberal movement, see ibid., p.29.
5Robertson to J.D. Lang, 26 November 1852, Lang Papers, vol.6, 
A2226, p.649.
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hoped it would never meet again.^ The fundamental difference
between the radicals and most liberals was that the radicals
rejected the idea of the hierarchic society and its political
corollary that the upper house should represent the more
aristocratic and conservative elements in the community.
Consequently, they found it difficult to assign to the upper
house any function beyond that of correcting technical defects
in legislation, a task which could be performed satisfactorily
by a committee of revision within a single chamber. Robertson,
for example, thought it would be better to have only one house
but, because he saw 'no principle involved', he deferred to
public opinion and proposed that the upper house should be2elected by the lower; and Lang thought one house sufficient,
although he proposed a second one as a concession to British
3and American precedent. Unlike the leading liberals, the 
radicals had no adequate rationale for the existence of an 
upper house and within a few years were to advocate its4abolition.
How are we to explain the paradox that the liberals 
advocated a form of upper house which, in other colonies, 
proved to be a more rigid obstacle to their cause than the 
nominated house favoured by the conservatives? Part of the 
answer is that the upper houses which they proposed were often 
designed to be only moderately conservative. Cowper, for 
instance, wanted a chamber which would not be subject to 
dissolution and whose members would be elected for ten years5with half retiring every five years. He expressed no 
preference on the qualification for voters, and probably 
intended it to be the same as for the lower house. Even with a 
liberal franchise such a house would have reflected changing 
electoral opinion only slowly and would have been a strong
^People's Advocate, 5 December 1853.
2Empire, 5 December 1853.
3J.D. Lang, An Anatomical Lecture on the New Constitution..., 
Sydney, 1854, p.12.
4See Chapter III, below.
~*S . M.H. , 6 September 1853.
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conservative influence in periods of very rapid political 
change. However, it would probably have been no more 
obstructive than the nominated Legislative Council proved to be. 
Similarly, the Constitution Committee's proposal and many of 
the plans advocated in the petitions would not have resulted in 
a chamber as hostile to liberal reforms as the Victorian 
Legislative Council showed itself to be after responsible 
government. The liberals had no desire to create an 
impregnable stronghold of conservative oligarchy. For them, it 
was not as important to have an 'expansive principle' to remedy 
a deadlock between the houses as it was for the conservatives, 
for the type of elective chamber which they wanted was less 
likely to indulge in protracted warfare with the Assembly than 
the type advocated by Martin.
However, this explanation is not sufficient for it is 
clear that most liberals wanted an upper house very like that 
proposed by the conservatives: they wanted one which would be 
conservative, but which would not have the power to ignore 
strongly expressed public opinion for too long. The British 
solution to the problem was to have a conservative upper house 
which could, if necessary, be swamped by appointing an unlimited 
number of nominated members. It was this solution which the 
conservatives adopted. To have favoured nomineeism would, 
however, have been political suicide for a liberal in 1853.
It is true that in the 1840s the liberals had advocated a 
nominated upper house/ but in context this had not been an 
avowal of nomineeism. Without responsible government, the 
liberals were faced with the inevitability of having government 
nominees in the legislature and they advocated their 
separation into a second chamber because they believed it would 
weaken both the government and the conservatives. Consequently, 
when liberal advocacy of a nominated upper house is viewed in 
the context of the politics of the 1840s, it is apparent that 
it was motivated by hostility to the nominees - that it was 
designed to limit their influence and strike at the 
conservatism and government influence with which they were 
associated.
■^Cf. Lowe, S .M .H . , 4 May 1848; Windeyer, S .M.H. , 13 June 1846.
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In 1852 and 1853, when the debate centred around 
constitutions which were avowedly designed to introduce some 
form of responsible government, it was unthinkable that a 
liberal should advocate a nominated upper house, for by then it 
was possible to consider the alternative of an elective one. 
Consequently, the liberal Robert Lowe, who in 1848 had 
repudiated Wentworth's suggestion that the colony lacked the 
materials for a nominated upper house/ now wrote from London 
inviting Parkes to publish his view that as far as appointments 
for life were concerned,
Your present public men are not as a body worthy 
of so marked a distinction, or rather so close a 
monopoly; and I am quite sure that, if they are 
appointed for life, in a few years you will be 
heartily ashamed of them, and find that you have 
anticipated your resources by putting worse men 
in a place which might have been occupied by 
better.^
In 1853, to advocate a nominated upper house was to advocate 
nomineeism, whereas in 1848 it had been to attack it. It would 
therefore have been inconsistent for a liberal to continue to 
advocate a nominated chamber in 1853; it would also have ended 
the political career of any politician dependent upon the 
'popular' vote.
Even 'upper class' liberals like Darvall were better 
situated than the conservatives to appreciate the depth of 
anti-nominee sentiment in the community, for their political 
associations brought them into contact with other sections of 
society, including the most radical. They thought anti-nominee 
prejudice so strong that a nominated house would be unable to 
secure the public support which it needed in order to stand up 
to the lower house. Consequently, even had they favoured 
nomineeism in principle, they would have been forced to abandon 
it in practice because of their desire to make the upper house 
conservative. They had to devise other methods of creating
/owe, S . M .H . , 4 May 1848.
2Lowe to Parkes, 6 April 1853, reproduced in Sir Henry Parkes, 
Fifty Years in the Making of Australian History, 2 vols, vol.l, 
London, 1892, pp.44-5. Parkes published the letter in the 
Empire.
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an upper house which would have been conservative, but .not 
dangerously obstructive.
By choosing a nominated upper house, conservatives in New
South Wales marked themselves off as men shaped by different
ideals and circumstances than their Victorian counterparts, who
deliberately chose an oligarchic elective chamber. Some clues
as to the reasons for this difference may, perhaps, be afforded
by a comparison of the different standards of debate in the
two colonies, for such a test makes it clear that Victoria
lacked the educated, conservative elite which dominated the
proceedings in New South Wales.^ In the late 1830s, when
Macarthur was already theorizing about the benefits of a
2colonial aristocracy and Wentworth was long established as a 
political leader adept at the manipulation of constitutional 
principles, Victoria was still an extended sheep run in the 
south of New South Wales. Consequently, in the early 1850s, 
Victoria had no long-established gentry to produce a Macarthur; 
and Melbourne, which had been turned by the gold rushes into 
'a cross between a military staging-camp and a wild-west3frontier town', was not old enough to have produced an 'urban 
aristocracy' capable of nourishing the attainments of men 
comparable to Sydney's Stephens, Mannings, Plunketts and 
Thomsons. Moreover, the squatters, preoccupied with 
establishing themselves, were even more inarticulate than their
counterparts in New South Wales, for they had no Wentworth to4speak for them. In general terms, Victoria lacked any 
significant body of legislators who were sufficiently acquainted 
with Whig constitutional theory to define their interests in 
terms of it. It is perhaps partly because of this that 
conservatives in the southern colony had less appreciation of
^The Victorian debates are printed in G.H.F. Webb (ed.), Debate 
in the Legislative Council of Victoria on the New Constitution 
Bill, Melbourne, 1854.
2Article on Macarthur in A .D .B., vol.2.
3Geoffrey Serie, The Golden Age, Melbourne, 1963, p.67.
4Cf. ibid., p.138, et passim.
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the virtues of the 'expansive principle' and were more,
inclined to the 'purse test of political worth'. Certainly,
not even James Martin could have matched Annand's unblushing
claim that if 'any one had made £18,000 by sly-grog-selling...
he would be anxious to keep it, and would therefore be a proper
person to be a member of the Upper House'.
Yet, it must be doubted whether a lower level of political
sophistication was the major reason for the Victorian rejection
of the principle of nomination, or even an important one. The
major reason, surely, was that the Victorians were threatened
far more directly by what Wentworth called the 'Americans,
Chartists, Socialists, and all manner of undesirable people'
2brought by the gold rush. Between 1851 and 1853, the
population of Victoria increased by 129 per cent while that of
3New South Wales increased by only 15 per cent. The result was 
that Victorian conservatives feared that radical political
change was likely to follow the revolution in the social and 
economic life of the colony. They therefore took steps to 
build the most rigid possible barriers to thwart it. They had 
not wanted any change in their constitution for fear that such4a move would be the prelude to democracy and, when Pakington's 
despatch forced their hand, they sought in an oligarchical 
upper house a substitute for imperial protection.
In New South Wales the onset of the gold rushes in 1851 
had caused panic in some circles. Wentworth had urged the5despatch of troops to the fields to keep order; and Macarthur 
had urged the temporary prohibition of mining to halt 'the 
deranging and upsetting of our social system to its very 
foundation' and to stop the 'spoliation' of the country's 
resources. However, mining was not prohibited; troops were not
^Argus, 11 February 1854.
2Silvester, op.cit., p.51.
3Based on the table in Clark, op.cit., p.664.
4Serie, The Golden Age, p.146.
5Molony, op.cit., p.83, n.46.
^Macarthur to Thomson, 29 May 1851, Macarthur Papers, vol.24, 
A2920.
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sent; and, although Deas Thomson was initially concerned at
the possibility of disruption as a result of the rushes, he
was satisfied by the end of 1851 that many of the expected
troubles had not eventuated.^ In 1853, Wentworth, perhaps
resentful of the fact that exports of gold ha;d been nearly four
2times as valuable as exports of wool the previous year, still
continued to deprecate the mining industry as a 'branch of3anarchy and discord' and to wish for its decline, but he was
exceptional. The government had offered a reward for new gold
discoveries; and in September 1852, Plunkett noted that gold
had not disrupted other industries and that, thanks to the
police and to ‘the orderly character of the diggers as a body,4the law has never been more powerful than at present'. 
Summarizing the general mood a week after the debate on the 
constitution had ended, the Sydney Morning Herald announced 
that gold had 'settled down as one of the permanent and 
ordinary interests of the colony...pursued without order,5without excitement'.
In 1853, conservatives in New South Wales expected 
democratic influence to increase to some extent, but they were 
not confronted with the threat of a radical disorientation of 
the established political, social and economic order. 
Consequently, they could still theorize calmly about the 
advantages of the ‘expansive principle' in the upper house, 
confident that democratic pressures would be sufficiently mild 
for the Governor to use his discretionary power to refuse 
nominations if the classic conditions for a swamping were not
^"Geoffrey Blainey, The Rush that Never Ended, Melbourne, 1963, 
p. 27 .
2See the figures in New South Wales Statistical Register 1861, 
Sydney, 1862. Gold production varied enormously from year to 
year, and from 1854 to 1859, wool regained its supremacy, only 
to lose it again in 1860-61.
3Silvester, op.cit., p.29.
4Quoted Molony, op.cit., p .84.
5S .M .H ., 1 January 1854, quoted Molony, op.cit., p .84.
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present. Within a few years, however, the threat from 
aggressive democracy, culminating in a swamping which ignored 
the conditions which were supposed to govern such an action, 
convinced many conservatives, at least temporarily, that in 
1853 they had been mistaken.
See Chapter IV, parts 2 and 4, the beginning of Chapter V, 
Chapter VI, part 4, et passim, below. Despite the
swamping of 1861, conservative expectations that the Governor 
would use his discretionary powers were largely justified.
The nominated Council was only subjected to an actual swamping 
once, and even in the 1920s Governors Sir Dudley de Chair and 
Sir Philip Game frustrated J.T. Lang's attempts to secure a 
reliable majority in the Council when they refused to make the 
necessary appointments. In Queensland, the Governor refused 
to swamp the Council to facilitate its abolition, and the 
necessary appointments were not made until his departure, when 
the Labor Speaker of the Legislative Assembly stepped down to 
become Lieutenant-Governor. See Turner, House of Review?, 
pp.6-7, 12-19.
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CHAPTER II
PARTY, PATRONAGE AND THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL,
1856-61
Even in 1853, some conservatives foresaw that their
dominance would soon be challenged. 'Wentworth's retirement
from the Council and Thomson's relinquishment of office', wrote
Sir Charles Nicholson, 'will leave voids on both sides, which
I see no chance of being filled up except by an addition to the
democratic element.'^  On the eve of responsible government
some three years later, conservative concern was far more
general. 'The tide of democracy is flowing fast', said
Judge Roger Therry, and he seemed to assume that conservatives
could only ensure 'that it does not set in with a too sudden
2and formidable force.' Similarly, the Governor, Sir William
Denison, who himself looked upon change as 'an evil of great 3magnitude', observed that
those who cried out most for responsible 
Government are now by no means satisfied with the 
prospect of the article they have got. They 
begin to see that the elements they thought could 
easily be found in this colony, are not in such 
quantities as will give me much choice in my men.
They see also lots of hungry adventurers striving 
to push themselves forward into importance, and 
they begin to think that^'let well alone' is a 
good and useful proverb.
However, the elections held early in 1856 appeared to give 
the conservatives a majority and, on the advice of James 
Macarthur and others, Denison commissioned Stuart Alexander 
Donaldson to form the first responsible ministry. Donaldson
■^Nicholson to James Macarthur, 21 April 1853, Macarthur Papers, 
vol.27, A2923, pp.151-2.
2Therry to James Macarthur, 1 March 1856, Macarthur Papers, 
vol.34, A2930, pp.41-2.
3Denison to Lady Hornby, 8 December 1855, quoted W.T. Denison, 
Varieties of Vice-Regal Life, 2 vols, London, 1870, vol.I, 
p.304.
4Denison to Mrs Stanley, 16 September 1855, quoted ibid., 
p.315.
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had generally voted with the conservatives in the old
Legislative Council, but he favoured an elective upper house,
and not one justified in terms as patently oligarchic as
those used by James Martin.^ Consequently, his bona fides as
a conservative were suspect, and Macarthur seems to have
supported him partly in the hope that he could unite the
different elements of the upper class in a 'ministry of all the
talents'. On Macarthur's advice, Donaldson invited Cowper to
become Colonial Secretary, an offer which Cowper only
2hesitantly refused. However, J.B. Darvall, the other liberal
leader in the old Council, accepted the post of Solicitor-
General. Donaldson and Darvall both met Macarthur's spirit of
compromise by promising not to press for alterations in the3constitution beyond the repeal of the two-thirds clauses, and
the other members of the ministry all had sound conservative
credentials. They were drawn from both the old 'upper class'
and from Wentworth's 'Australian' faction. From the former,
there were Thomas Holt, W.M. Manning and W.C. Mayne, and from
the latter there was G.R. Nichols, the son of a convict.
Thus, while essentially conservative, the ministry drew
strength from all the elements which had hitherto dominated
colonial life. Macarthur, who had helped to form the ministry
and briefly joined it in the transition period before
responsible government, was praised for 'evincing a spirit of
compromise' calculated to 'meet effectually the exigencies of 4the times'. Indeed, the formation of such a ministry was the 
first step towards a coalition of all the traditional elites 
in opposition to the radical liberalism of the late 1850s and
W.M. Manning to James Macarthur, 12 June 1856, Macarthur 
Papers, vol.27, A2923, pp.542-8; Donaldson in S.M.H.,
13 December 1852.
2John M. Ward, article on Cowper in A .D .B., vol.3.
3W.M. Manning to James Macarthur, 12 June 1856, Macarthur 
Papers, vol.27, A2923, pp.542-8.
4H.G. Douglass to James Macarthur, 28 April 1856, Macarthur 
Papers, vol.27, A2923.
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early 1860s.^ But while Donaldson's ministry proved to. be
the portent of radical political change, it also gave hope of
security, for nearly all members of the old elites were united
in their desire for a conservative upper house. The ministry
could therefore be safely entrusted with the task of making
the first appointments to the new Legislative Council.
Responsibility for the first appointments was not
confined to the Governor and the Premier. Denison was
comparatively new to the colony and often drew upon the advice,
not only of his constitutional advisers, but of colonial
2notables like the Macarthurs and the Macleays; and although
Donaldson was in the key position as the ministry's official
channel of communication with the Governor, he actively
involved his fellow ministers in the appointments and they in
3turn solicited outside advice. The list of proposed
appointees was even leaked to the press and revised in the
4light of criticism.
The constitution prescribed that the minimum number of 
councillors should be twenty-one, but set no upper limit.
Many had assumed that the number would, under normal 
circumstances, be kept close to twenty-one, but invitations 
were issued to thirty-six men - precisely two-thirds the 
membership of the Assembly. The number seems to have been 
chosen by design, for when thirteen of those initially invited 
declined, further invitations were issued until the number of 
members again reached thirty-six. The Governor then sent the
This process, which resulted in the formation of a 
conservative movement of 'big men' to meet the threat of a 
radical liberal movement dominated by small traders and men 
of humble origin, is discussed in Chapter III.
2See, for example, Denison to Manning, 19 December 1855, M.L., 
MSS 1107; Denison, Varieties..., vol.I, p.332; article on 
Cowper by John M. Ward in A .D .B ., vol.3; and John N. Molony, 
An Architect of Freedom, Canberra, 1973, pp.221-2.
2Manning to Donaldson, 19 June [April?] 1856, Letters, 
Donaldson Ministry, A731, pp.106-10; Manning to Plunkett,
5 May 1856, Manning Papers, M.L., MSS 246/3.
4Members included after their omission had been criticized 
by the Sydney Morning Herald were Dr James Mitchell and 
George Allen. Cf. S .M .H ., 3, 8 May 1856.
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Colonial Office a list of the members with an explanation of 
the principles upon which they had been selected."^
The appointment of so many members was criticized by the
2liberals. Darvall was questioned about it on the hustings
and Parkes' Empire saw in it a plot to make the Council so
bloated with conservatives that subsequent liberal
3appointments would be impossible. The accusation was
exaggerated, but it may have had some point, for it was
everywhere believed that the Council should be kept
considerably smaller than the Assembly. However, there is no
positive evidence that the allegation was true, and the
appointment of a large number of members can be explained
adequately on other grounds. By fixing the number of members
at thirty-six, rather than at, say twenty-one, the government
ensured that it would be able to appoint representatives of a
wide range of interests, and its members seem to have been
anxious to make the Council appear as 'representative' as
possible. Justifying the nominations to his electors, Darvall
stressed that they had been made without reference to party
considerations and that an attempt had been made to nominate
'such men as would have been elected had the elective
4principle prevailed'; and Denison was equally anxious that the 
appointments should not be thought partisan. He told the 
Colonial Office that:
The view taken by my advisers, and in which I fully 
concurred, was that as the benefit to be derived 
from the existence of a second Chamber must depend 
upon the amount of confidence bestowed upon it by 
the country at large; and as this confidence would 
hardly exist were the primary appointments evidently 
dictated by political or party considerations, the 
greatest care should be taken to make the upper 
house as much as possible the representative of all 
the varying parties, classes and interests in the 
community.5
^Denison to 
P . R . 0 . /C . 0 .
2S.M.H., 17
3Empire, 30 
4S.M.H., 17
5Denison to
Labouchere, 
201/494.
June 1856.
May 1856.
June 1856.
Labouchere,
22 August 1856, with enclosure.
22 August 1856, P.R.O./C.O. 201/494.
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Denison spoke in the context of conservative assumptions 
about the role of the Council and he clearly meant that it 
would be a stronger defence against 'rash1 legislation if it 
was not seen to be dominated by a narrow, conservative clique. 
There were, however, inherent difficulties in trying to make 
the Council both 'representative' and conservative. For those, 
like Denison, who thought that the only relevant divisions in 
society were those between such vertically defined groups as 
the pastoral and mercantile interests, the problem could be 
solved simply by appointing the most 'aristocratic' and 
conservative members of such interests; but not all were 
prepared to accept that the Council could be 'representative' 
if it represented only vertically defined interests, ignoring 
the existence of horizontally defined ones like small traders 
and artisans; and, the occupational composition of the Council 
aside, some were prepared to deny the representative 
character of any body composed largely of men with conservative 
views. Nominations in accordance with the conservative 
conception of the Council were therefore bound to be 
criticized, and Denison's assertion that they were 
representative, as far as possible, of 'all the varying 
parties, classes and interests in the community' missed the 
point of the attack. His definitions of 'class' and 'interest' 
did not allow that the lower orders formed a separate category 
and when he said that representation had been given to all 
parties, he meant symbolic representation, not equal 
representation or representation in proportion to the support 
they drew from the community.
Denison claimed only that his concern had been to ensure 
that the nominations were not 'evidently' dictated by 
political considerations, and when he went on to state that an 
attempt had been made to represent all parties, he implied 
that the appearance belied the reality. At other times he 
maintained that the political views of the candidates 
were not considered at all, and that the appointments had 
been made 'entirely on the ground of character and 
respectability'.^ He was probably unconscious that he had
^Ibid. See also Denison to Cowper, 26 February 1858 (copy) , 
enclosed with Denison to Stanley, 17 July 1858, P.R.O./C.O. 
201/503.
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offered two conflicting explanations, and they served equally
well his purpose - to deny that the appointments had favoured
the conservatives at the expense of the liberals. He thereby
implied that the Council did not conform to the conservative
ideal - that it was not, in fact, the conservative branch of
the legislature. This assertion, as everyone knew, was
nonsense and Denison was not as devoted to the ideal of a
non-party Council as he pretended. When Alexander Warren, one
of the first men appointed to the Council, was unable to join
Donaldson's ministry as Treasurer, Denison wrote him a cordial
letter, regretting the loss of his services and expressing the
hope that he would support the government notwithstanding.
Nevertheless, it is probable that the political views of
candidates for appointment were seldom directly considered,
for when men were chosen on the basis of 'character and
respectability', as conservatives defined those terms, their
political opinions could almost be taken for granted. High
position and a record of service to the community through
charitable, religious and learned institutions were important
qualifications, and the men with the best record in these
2respects were usually conservatives. Moreover, conservative
views were themselves almost a test of the balanced judgment
to be expected from men of character and respectability. As
the Chief Justice, Sir Alfred Stephen, who was close to the
3Governor and his advisers, put it: 'radicalism...always4implies some mental obliquity'.
The letter is referred to in Denison to Donaldson, [4?] June 
1856, Letters, Donaldson Ministry, A731, pp.5-8. Cf. the very 
cordial letter from Warren to Donaldson, 26 October 1856, 
ibid., pp.286-7.
^See Tables IV, V, VI and VII, below.
3 r nCf. Stephen to 'My dear Donaldson', | _ ? J  July 1856, Letters,
Donaldson Ministry, A731, pp.428-9. Social connection as well 
as official position brought Stephen and his family into 
contact with the Denisons, for Stephen's mother-in-law was 
the widow of Denison's chaplain at Hobart. Cf. Denison, 
Varieties..., vol.I, p.302. Journal entry, 24 January 1855.
4Quoted in Cowper to Stephen, 11 April 1859, (copy), 
Macarthur Papers, vol.28, A2924, p.293.
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Despite the disadvantage at which they stood, some men
who had been identified with the liberal movement were invited
to become members of the Council. A.J.P. Lutwyche, the very
individual against whom Stephen's slur was directed, was
offered a seat, but refused it because he objected to the
principle of nomination;^ and William Bland, an associate of
Wentworth's but a life long liberal, declined, possibly on the 
2same grounds. James Bligh, a liberal solicitor, was amongst
the first appointed, and David Jones and George Hill, both
identified with the liberal cause, took their seats soon after.
Others who may have been appointed in the belief that they were
liberals, were Wentworth's old associate, Robert Fitzgerald,
3who publicly supported Cowper in 1856; G.K. Holden, who had 
been the dominant force on the Constitution Committee which 
led the agitation against the constitution in 1853; and Robert 
Johnson, Thomas Hood, John Alexander and Dr Arthur A'Beckett,4less significant figures in the same movement. Johnson, 
however, had always claimed to be a conservative, although he 
had argued against the constitution in the same terms as the 
liberals.^
None of the appointees had been a radical liberal and of 
the nine who had been in some measure associated with the 
liberal cause, only Bligh proved a consistent liberal in the 
Council. Jones voted with the liberals more frequently than 
he voted with the conservatives, but was closely identified 
with neither p a r t y a n d  while Hill always sat on the liberal
^So I interpret Lutwyche 1 2345s letter, S. M. H . , 13 May 1856.
2Cf. Cowper to Denison, 26 February 1858, enclosed with 
Denison to Stanley, 17 July 1858, P.R.O./C.O. 201/503.
3Empire, 30 September 1856.
4Holden had been the author of the plan for an Upper House 
eventually adopted by the Committee. (S.M .H., 9, 17,
23 November 1853). Members of the Committee are listed in 
ibid., 6 September 1853.
5S.M .H ., 4, 16 August 1853; People's Advocate, 20 August 1853.
^See below, p.83. Jones' voting pattern matched his claim 
that 'He never had, and never wished to have, a desire to 
attach himself to any party....' (S.M.H., 6 October 1858.)
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side of the house, he sided with the conservatives on.most
issues in 1860 and 1861.^ Johnson, Fitzgerald, Hood, Holden
and A 1 2*4Beckett spoke and voted as conservatives on every major
issue. As a result, the Council probably proved to be more
conservative than Denison and his advisers realized when they
appointed it. Between 1856 and the emergence of conflict
between liberals and conservatives in the Council in 1858, the
liberal movement had become more radical. This process, which
will be examined in detail in the next chapter, made
conservatives out of many Whiggish liberals who had been
associated with the Wentworth faction and the old 'upper class'.
2In 1853, many liberals had not argued for manhood suffrage
and their views on the land question had been equally moderate.
Even in 1855, liberals in the old Legislative Council had
pressed only for the survey of more land in the intermediate 
3districts a far cry from the principle of free selection
before survey which became a touchstone of liberal principle
after 1858. The pace of change left many in its wake and, in
addition to those initial appointees mentioned above, at least
three members who took their seats between 1858 and 1861 were
former liberals who had become conservatives by loving too well4the progressive ideas of an era which had passed.
The most striking evidence of official determination 
to make the Council appear representative was the attempt
1S,M.H., 21 February 1861. Hill's voting record is in Appendix 
III.
2Liberal members of the old Council had tried only to have £5 householders admitted to the franchise by the constitution, 
although some favoured manhood suffrage.
~^S .M.H. , 12 September 1855.
4The three members were Alexander Park, a liberal member of 
the old Legislative Council and a member of the Constitution 
Committee; Edward Hunt, a member of the Constitution Committee 
who did not swing over to the conservatives until 1861; and 
James Norton, who had been associated with liberal politics in 
Sydney in the early 1850s. See S.M .H., 6 September 1853 
(Park, Hunt); P. Loveday, 'The Development of Parliamentary 
Government in New South Wales, 1856-1870, Ph.D., University of 
Sydney 1962, p.457 (Park); and manuscript note in Lang Papers, 
vol.6, A2226, p.582 (Norton). Voting behaviour of all 
members in the Council from 1858 is summarized in Appendix III.
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to afford representation to all the major religious
denominations. Invitations were extended to Bishops Barker
and Polding, the respective heads of the Anglican and Roman
Catholic denominations; to the Reverend W.B. Boyce, President
of the Methodist conference; and to the Reverend W. Purves,
until recently Moderator of the main body of Presbyterians.
The clerical invitations mimicked the clerical component of the
House of Lords, but they belonged more properly to the colonial
tradition in which the State supported all major religions but
established none. They symbolized the State's even handed
commitment to the well-being of all Christian denominations
and stood squarely in the tradition of Bourke's Church Act of
1836.“*" At the same time, the invitations were consistent with
the ideal of the Council as a body representing the colonial
aristocracy, for Barker and Polding followed the Chief
2Justice in the colony's official order of precedence and
Boyce and Purves, apart from their purely religious eminence,
were prominent members of the community who sat on the3University Senate.
The appointment of leading members of the clergy had been 
suggested less than three years previously by Sir Alfred
4Stephen, but the invitations were probably the result of 
pressure from the Governor himself, for he had long favoured5such a scheme. His attempt to put it into practice aroused 
widespread protest, not least from the conservative Sydney 
Morning Herald, which was owned by John Fairfax, a prominent
The Church Act is discussed by Naomi Turner, Sinews of 
Sectarian Warfare, Canberra, 1972; and John N. Molony, An 
Architect of Freedom, Canberra, 1973.
2Waugh's Australian Almanac, Sydney, 1858, p.105.
3Waugh & Cox's Australian Almanac..., Sydney, 1856, p.145.
4Sir Alfred Stephen, Thoughts on the Constitution of a Second 
Legislative Chamber for New South Wales..., Sydney, 1853, p.7.
5The Sydney Morning Herald, 12 May 1856, commented drily that 
'The clerical element in the late nominations... is 
notoriously an ancient prejudice of his Excellency'. Cf. 
S.M.H., 6 May 1856. The Herald1 2345s editor, the Reverend John 
West, had known Denison in Hobart, where both had lived until 
some two years previously.
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Congregationalist, and edited by the Reverend John West, a
minister of the same faith. The Herald argued that if Purves
deserved a seat, then so did the Congregationalists' Dr Ross
and the Scottish Free Church's Mr Salmon,'*" but on more general
grounds it objected to clerical nominations altogether. It
argued from traditional Nonconformist premises that the
nominations implied a connection between Church and State,
said that it was unwise to expose clerics to political
criticisms, and noted that the nomination of leaders of minor
denominations afforded no protection against a Council whose
members were still nearly all Anglicans. It would have been
far better, said the Herald, to abandon the assumption that
members of the Council would divide on religious lines, and to
trust the Anglican majority to act according to 'fixed
principles of moral right', not 'the self-interest of a 
2communion'. Here the Herald misrepresented the ministry's
assumptions, for the clerical invitations had symbolic value
only; but it expressed accurately the conservative view of the
Council when it went on to argue that if Anglicans alone were
suitable for appointment on non-religious grounds, then they
alone should be appointed. It thought the ministry's
difficulties in this respect, however, stemmed from its lack of3acquaintance with the community.
The ministry was saved from its critics by the refusal of 
the clergy to accept office, but it still managed to give 
representation to the main religious minorities. At the same 
time as it issued invitations to the clergy, it had offered 
seats to J.L. Montefiore, a Jewish merchant, and to at least 
two Presbyterians, Alexander Warren and Alexander Berry. All 
three accepted. It had also tried to find lay Catholics with 
suitable qualifications. W.M. Manning, the Attorney-General
1S.M.H., 3 May 1856.
3S .M.H., 6 May 1856. See also S .M .H ., 2 May 1856. The 
invitations to the clergy were also criticized by the Empire, 
3 May 1856.
3S.M.H., 6 May 1856.
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elect,^ had solicited advice on the matter from several
people, including two prominent Irish Catholics, Judge Therry
and Michael Fitzpatrick, the Clerk of the old Legislative
Council. Neither man could suggest anyone suitable and Therry
noted 'the remarkable fact that very few gentlemen of
education [had] ever been attracted from his country [Ireland]
2to this colony'. When Polding refused the nomination, Therry
suggested a Mr Loughnan, whom Manning rejected as unsuitable
because 'nobody knows that he is qualified'. Therry then3proposed that a seat be offered to Dr James Murray, a
prominent Queanbeyan medical practitioner and landholder and
the elder brother of T.A. Murray, a future President of the
Council. Manning immediately recommended Dr Murray to
Donaldson and he was sent an invitation which he at first4refused because of the 'precarious state' of his health, but 
accepted when pressed a second time. Murray died a few weeks 
later, before the ministry had filled the Council up to its 
arbitrary limit of thirty-six, but the Catholics were not 
deprived of all representation. In a further effort to find 
members of that persuasion, Manning had consulted John Hubert5Plunkett, a prominent Catholic member of the Assembly and, 
perhaps as a result of his advice, the ministry appointed 
Therry himself.  ^ it also appointed George Allen, a prominent
At the time the appointments were made, the ministers had not 
yet assumed responsibility for their departments and were all, 
in a sense, ministers without portfolio. The best exposition 
of their status is given by C.H. Currey's article on Denison 
in A .D,B., vol.4, p.50.
2Manning to Plunkett, 5 May 1856, Manning Papers, M.L.,
MSS 246/3.
3 Ibid.
4Murray to Denison, 17 May 1856, M.L., MSS AM 63.
5Manning to Plunkett, 5 May 1856, Manning Papers, M.L.,
MSS 246/3.
^Therry had been the only one of the three Supreme Court 
Judges omitted from the original invitations. This was 
probably because there was some feeling in the Ministry that 
not all the judges should be appointed, and Therry was the 
most junior judge. Cf. Darvall's speech in S.M .H,, 17 June 
1856.
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Methodist whose omission,from the original list had been 
criticized by the Herald;^  John Alexander, a Presbyterian 
merchant; and David Jones, founder of the merchant house of 
the same name and a prominent Congregationalist. Thus, the 
completed Council contained one Jew, one Catholic, one known 
Congregationalist, one known Methodist and three known 
Presbyterians. Their presence was a purely symbolic tribute 
to the ideal of a representative Council, for the remaining 
twenty-nine members were all, or nearly all, Anglicans. It was 
assumed that the Anglican majority would act impartially 
towards all denominations in accordance with the ideals of 
parliamentarism and justice.
The preponderance of Anglicans amongst the initial
nominees reflected the social and political structure of the
colony, for Catholics were disproportionately represented
amongst the working classes, while Nonconformists were
2probably over-represented in liberal circles. Representation 
in proportion to population was therefore impossible without 
violating the interconnected principles that the Council should 
be conservative and should represent the colony's 
1 aristocracy' .
It should, however, have been possible to strike a better 
balance between vertically defined economic interests. To 
help assess whether such a balance was achieved, information on 
the occupational structure of the Council is provided in 
Table II.
.M .H., 3 May 1856, editorial.
2The religion of thirteen liberal members of the Council 
between 1858 and 1861 is known. Seven were Nonconformists and 
six were Anglicans. Jones, the Council's 'independent 
liberal' was also a Nonconformist. There was overwhelming 
Nonconformist support for radical and liberal candidates 
against conservatives in Britain. See J.R. Vincent,
Pollbooks: How Victorians Voted, Cambridge, 1967, pp.67-70.
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TABLE II1
COMPOSITION OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL,
JULY 1856
Category Occupation Number Percentage
(Pastoralists
Pastoral/agricultural (
(Agriculturalists
11 )
)
1 )
 12 33%
Commercial/
manufacturing
(Merchants 6 )
( )(Other commercial )
( and manufacturing 4 )
10 28%
Professional
( Judges 
I Barristers 
(Solicitors
Medical
Practitioners
(Retired government 
(officials
Military officers
3 )
5 )
) 14
3 )
39%
How far we can regard the Council as representative of
the various vertically defined interests depends, of course,
on how we classify those interests. If we adopt the division
used in the table, then it can be seen that the pastoral/
agricultural, commercial/manufacturing, and professional
interests were approximately balanced. However, these
classifications are arbitrary and to some extent anachronistic,
for contemporaries rarely spoke of a separate 'professional
interest'. Professional men were sometimes included in the
'urban interest', and at other times they were regarded as
2members of no interest but as the servants of them all.
^Based on biographical details in Appendix IV.
2See, for example, the Empire's editorial, 20 May 1856, which 
assumes a distinction between judges, clergymen and 
professional men, on the one hand, and 'the great colonial 
interests' on the other.
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If we adopt different classifications, then the . 
appearance of a balance of interests is destroyed. 
Contemporaries frequently separated the pastoral from the 
agricultural interest, and if we do the same, then it is 
apparent that the latter was grossly under-represented.
However, no one complained about this state of affairs, for the 
agricultural interest was dominated by small farmers, most of 
them tenants who leased their land from a great landholder.
Such men were not, in conservative eyes, fit to hold seats in 
the Council - they had what representation they needed through 
large landholders like Alexander Berry and Joseph Docker, from 
whom they leased their farms. Moreover, potential liberal 
resentment at the farmers1 lack of representation was subsumed 
into a more general grievance that the Council was the almost 
exclusive preserve of conservative men of property.
If we arbitrarily divide the colony into urban and rural
interests, as many contemporaries did, the appearance of
balance in the Council disappears once more, for two-thirds of
the members were engaged mainly in urban occupations.
Moreover, if we classify the members as urban and rural
according to their place of residence, the imbalance worsens,
for thirty of the thirty-six members lived in Sydney and its
environs. The Council therefore represented the class which
had made up the nominee element in the old Council - the
2colony's urban respectability. The liberals, of course did 
not complain at the over-representation of urban interests, 
for that would have cast doubt on a myth which they were 
assiduously fostering - that the Council was a tool of the 
squatters. Conservatives, too, ignored the imbalance, for it 
enabled them to bring into parliament able men who found it 
difficult to compete with the liberals in urban electorates or 
with well known local squatters in country electorates. 
Moreover, they could have argued truthfully enough that most 
of the professional men had not been appointed as the 
representatives of any economic interest, but had been given
The members' addresses are listed in Executive Council 
Minutes for 9, 13, 26, 27 May, 7 June, 8, 14, 28 July 1856. 
Archives Office of N.S.W., 4/1533.
See Chapter I, above.2
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seats because they had special skills to assist the Council
in its functions as a house of review. The large number of
lawyers brought skills appropriate to the task of technical
revision, but those whose abilities were most needed were the
former government officials - Deas Thomson, Riddell and
Merewether. They were appointed, said Governor Denison,
partly from an idea that their former position 
entitled them to this consideration, and partly 
from a feeling that their knowledge of 
administrative arrangements [and the] mode in 
which the government had hitherto been conducted 
would render their services valuable.1
The judges of the Supreme Court were also appointed to
fulfill a public purpose rather than to represent any specific
interest. No spokesman for the ministry explained in detail
the rationale behind their appointment, but the Empire and the
Sydney Morning Herald agreed that they were intended to bring
their legal skills to the revision of legislation and, in
particular, to ensure that nothing passed into law which was
unconstitutional, contrary to the laws of England, or an
2infringement of the rights of any interest. This seems to 
have meant that the judges, as guardians of the law, would 
preserve the independence of the judiciary and ensure that no 
act contravened the rights of groups like state pensioners and 
the squatters to which the public faith was legally pledged. 
Liberal resentment at the privileges of some of these groups 
seemed to justify the precaution, but in the event, legislation 
affecting them in the following years involved no breach of 
faith.^
The Sydney Morning Herald was prepared to regard the4judicial appointments as 'an experiment', but the Colonial
■^Denison to Labouchere, 22 August 1856, P.R.O./C.O. 201/494.
E^mpire, 20 May 1856; S.M .H ., 15 May 1856. Editorials.
3Robertson's land acts forbade free selection during the 
currency of existing squatting leases or licences,and the 
bill 'abolishing' state aid to religion simply phased it out 
gradually as clergymen receiving state funds died.
.M.H., 15 May 1902, editorial.
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Office thought them unwise"'" and the liberals almost
2unanimously condemned them. The appointments probably
stemmed partly from the desire to duplicate the judicial
elements in the House of Lords and were based on the premise
that the judges would not necessarily become involved in
politics by accepting seats in the Council. Even Darvall,
perhaps the minister least bemused by the conservative
mythology of the Council, said that he thought some judges
should have seats 'so long as [they] did not become involved
in political matters, and so long as their attendance in the
3Council did not interfere with their duties on the bench1 23.
The liberals took a more cynical view, for they regarded any
council nominated by their opponents as necessarily
'political', and feared that by participating in its debates
the judges would lose their reputation for impartiality. The
Empire warned that they would carry their political prejudices
onto the bench and pointed out that since they were already
complaining of too much work, it was foolish to add4legislative duties to their burden. But all three judges 
were frustrated legislators, anxious to take on parliamentary
"''Minutes and reply to Denison to Labourchere, 22, 24 August 
1856, P.R.O./C.O. 201/494.
2See, for example, Empire, 30 May 1856. Liberals criticized
the presence of the judges in the Council until they retired, 
either for personal reasons or through ministerial pressure. Even 
while Donaldson was Premier, the liberals succeeded in having 
the Assembly pass, on the casting vote of the speaker, a 
resolution censuring the judges for accepting seats in the 
Council. Donaldson later managed to have the motion rescinded 
by twenty-three votes to twenty-two. Despite liberal 
pressure, Therry remained in the Council until he left for 
England in 1859, and although Dickinson resigned in April 
1858, it was through pressure of work (Dickinson to Colonial 
Secretary, 29 March 1858, J.L .C ., 1858, p.150). However, the 
Herald attributed Stephen's resignation seven months later to 
'a pressure which no Ministry ought to have exercised, and to 
arguments which no legislator ... should regard'. (S.M.H.,
23 November 1858.) Stephen's health was poor at the time, and 
this may also have influenced his decision.
3S.M.H., 17 June 1856.
^Empire, 30 May 1856.
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functions.* 23 Undeterred by the public outcry, they took
their seats, and when Deas Thompson refused the Presidency of
the Council, the post was offered to the Chief Justice, Sir 
2Alfred Stephen. Stephen must have been pleased at the 
appointment, for it was one which he himself had recommended 
in 1853.3
In his opening address as the first President of the
Council, Stephen said that it was 'assuredly not necessary to
the duties of a legislator, nor naturally incident to the
full and efficient discharge of them, to share in any degree
in the disputes of partisanship, or descend to the contests of
4political warfare'. For two years the course of events in 
the Council seemed to vindicate his judgment. For one thing, 
the composition of the Council did not provide the basis for 
acrimonious divisions. Most of the members had been chosen by 
the Donaldson ministry and most had approximately the same 
political views. Of the Donaldson appointees, only Bligh was 
an outright liberal, although Jones and Hill shared some of his 
beliefs; and members appointed during the remainder of 1856 and 
1857 did little to alter the balance. The Parker ministry
After Stephen retired as Chief Justice in 1873, he entered 
the Council and, despite his advanced years, became its most 
prolific legislator. He bitterly regretted even the short 
absences required by his occasional duties as Lieutenant- 
Governor. (See, for example, Stephen to Parkes, 18 March 1879, 
P.C., vol.34, A904, p.341; Stephen to Parkes, undated, P.C., 
vol.58, A928, p.181; Stephen to Parkes, 2 August [1879], P.C., 
vol.58, A928, p .144.) Therry had been a member of the old 
Council in the 1840s and corresponded freely with James 
Macarthur on political matters (see for example, Therry to 
Macarthur, 1 November 1855, 1, 31 March 1856, 24 May 1861, 
Macarthur Papers, vol.34, A2930, pp.27, 41-2, 43-50, 97). 
Dickinson had shown his interest in the colony's political life 
by publishing his A Letter to...the Speaker on the Formation 
of a Second Chamber..., Sydney, 1953.
2The circumstances are described in Denison to Labouchere,
24 August 1856, P.R.O./C.O. 201/494.
3Stephen, A Letter to.♦.the Speaker..., p.17.
^Empire, 23 May 1856.
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nominated six conservative professional men and one 
conservative merchant, and the first Cowper ministry appointed 
three liberals and one conservative, the latter being James 
Norton, head of the colony's oldest legal firm. He may have 
been appointed under the misapprehension that he would prove 
to be a liberal, for he had been involved in liberal politics 
in the early 1850s.^ When Cowper regained power in 1857, his 
government made no appointments until March 1858, although 
before that it issued one invitation - to Sir William
2Macarthur, a member of the great conservative family.
The emergence of 'parties' in the Council was also 
delayed by the lack of issues likely to bring the Council's 
few liberals into conflict with the conservatives. The 
Donaldson and Parker ministries could not persuade the 
Assembly to pass legislation embodying such issues, and it was 
not until 1858 that the Cowper ministry was strong enough to 
push its reforms through the lower house so that they could be 
considered by the Council. Until then, that body did 
comparatively little business and few votes came to a division. 
Only on one occasion was an 'ideological' issue prominent in 
its debates. This was in February 1857, when a resolution was 
carried asserting the right of the Council to amend money bills. 
Even this did not produce a true division between liberals and 
conservatives, for only one liberal was present; rather, the 
lines were drawn between the moderate conservatives, led by 
Thomson and Douglass, two of the architects of the 
constitution, and the extremists, led by Robert Johnson, who 
had opposed the constitution in 1853. Johnson and his 
supporters claimed for the Council powers over money bills 
never envisaged by those who had framed the constitution, but3their view was confirmed by eleven votes to eight.
It was not until the middle of 1858 that the clashes 
between liberals and conservatives began, despite the
"^ See p.52, n.4, above.
2Executive Council, Minutes, 19 November 1857, Archives Office 
of N.S.W., 4/1536.
Empire, 5 February 1857.3
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allegations of A.J.P. Lutwyche, who had refused the Donaldson
ministry's offer of a seat in the Council. When invited by
Cowper four months later, he had changed his mind and entered
the Council as Solicitor-General in Cowper's first
administration. When Cowper formed his second ministry in
September 1857, Lutwyche once more took office as Solicitor-
General, and fourteen months later became Attorney-General.
In March 1858, he wrote to Cowper complaining that
There is not a single member on whom I can rely 
to second a motion, to speak to a point of order, 
or to support the measures which I may have to 
introduce on the part of the Ministry. It is all 
chance whether one is to be found when wanted for 
any such purpose; and I feel that this is not a 
position in which a Government ought to be 
placed. I heard, indeed, last session many 
assurances, both public and private, that there 
was no wish on the part of members of the Council 
to oppose the present administration; but though 
the voice was Jacob's voice, the hands proved to 
be the hands of Esau. The majority in the Upper 
House repeated the objections and re-echoed the 
arguments of the minority in the Lower House; 
and I have no reason to doubt that they would do 
the same again. What Mr. Donaldson and his 
friends contended for in the Assembly was carried 
by Mr. Deas Thomson and his friends in the 
Council. And if Mr. Donaldson adheres - as he has 
declared he will adhere - to the Parker scheme of 
Electoral reform, which is as different from ours 
as dark is from light; is it likely that Mr. Deas 
Thomson, who had a principal hand in framing the 
Parker Bill, will assent to such a distribution 
of the representation as we mean to propose.1
Lutwyche's accusations were more accurate as a prediction
of the future attitude of the conservatives than as a record
of their behaviour in the past. His letter had probably been
composed at Cowper's request, and it certainly reflected the
political needs of the moment. After the radicals had
combined with the conservatives to defeat his land bill,
Cowper had discarded T.A. Murray, Minister for
Lands and Works and replaced him with John Robertson, the
"*"Lutwyche to Cowper, [ 2 ? ] March 1858, enclosed with Denison to 
Stanley, P.R.O./C.O. 201/503.
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leading radical. Cowper and Robertson strengthened their 
position at an election immediately afterwards and faced the 
new parliament determined to liberalize the electoral law 
and, after a subsequent election, push through a radical land 
reform.^
Realizing that he could expect opposition from the
Council, Cowper had written to Denison on 26 February, asking
him to appoint fifteen new members, so that he could 'calculate
with some degree of certainty upon a favourable reception of
2the measures which the Government may desire to carry'. He
had also argued that the new appointments were necessary for
the maintenance of a quorum during the coming session, but he
had shown his hand and Denison, after claiming that the
initial appointments had 'no reference to the political views
or opinions of the members', had categorically denied that a
ministry was entitled to enlarge the Council at will simply to3ensure a favourable reception for its measures. He had 
therefore asked Cowper to limit his appointments to vacancies 
caused by death or retirement and not to press the matter 
further.
Cowper had then approached the Governor personally,
4taking Lutwyche for support. Their joint approach proved 
fruitless and its only result was that Lutwyche decided to 
compose the formal letter of complaint about the Council quoted 
above, in order to strengthen Cowper's hand. It was a 
political document whose account of the Council's record bore 
little relationship to fact. Contrary to its allegations, the
^Cf. P. Loveday and A.W. Martin, Parliament, Factions and 
Parties, Melbourne, 1966, p.29.
2Cowper to Denison, 26 February 1858, enclosed with Denison to 
Stanley, 17 July 1858, P.R.O./C.O. 201/503. Cowper's request 
for appointments to the Council has been treated in a 
different context by P. Loveday, 'The Legislative Council in 
New South Wales, 1856-70', Historical Studies, vol.ll, no.44, 
April 1965, p.487.
3Denison to Cowper, 26 February 1858, enclosed with Denison to 
Stanley, 17 July 1858, P.R.O./C.O. 201/503.
4 rLutwyche to Cowper, [_ 2? J March 1858, enclosed with Denison 
to Stanley, 17 July 1858, P.R.O./C.O. 201/503.
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government's legislation had always been given a fair and 
cordial response; motions proposed by Lutwyche had never 
failed to find a seconder; and legislation which he had 
introduced was well received. He had brought in eleven bills 
passed by the Assembly, of which four had passed without 
amendment and one with an amendment acceptable to the 
Assembly; the remainder had lapsed when parliament was 
prorogued before the Council could deal with them. Lutwyche 
had originated two bills in the Council, one of which lapsed 
because of prorogation before it could be considered, while 
the other, the District Courts Bill, was freely amended before 
it was sent to the Assembly where it was still being debated 
when the Parliament ended. It was to be expected that the 
Council would amend the District Courts Bill, a complex and 
far reaching piece of legislation with which it was admirably 
qualified to deal, the more so because appointments by the 
first Cowper ministry and the Parker ministry had made the 
legal profession easily the biggest occupational group by the 
Council. This can be seen from Table III.
TABLE III
COMPOSITION OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1857
Category Occupation Number Percentage
( Pastoralists 
Pastoral/agricultural (
(Agriculturalists
10 )
) 11 
1 )
Commercial/
manufacturing
(Merchants
I Other commercial 
v and manufacturing
7 )
) io
3 )
Legal
(Judges 
I Barristers 
(Solicitors
4 )
6 I 17
7 )
24%
22%
38%
(Medical 
(practitioners 
(
f Government 
(officials
Other Professional / „ , .\Retired government
(officials 
(Military officers
1 )
16%
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Where the old Legislative Council had been termed the 
'Squatter's Council' because it went into recess during the 
shearing season,^ the new Council might now have been called 
the 'Lawyer's Council', for the timing of the country circuit 
exercised a far greater influence on the attendance at debates.
A clear majority of the Council's members were now professional 
men, most of them lawyers or judges. There were seventeen 
members of the legal profession in the Council, making up 
thirty-eight per cent of its membership - a far higher figure 
than for any other group. The dominance of the legal 
profession was in fact greater than the figures indicate, for 
they were more consistent in their attendance than most other 
members, particularly the pastoralists. During the session of 
1857, they cast 47 per cent of the total number of votes, and 
in the case of the District Courts Bill they dominated the 
debate and were responsible for 48 per cent of the votes.
The District Courts Bill was, as its name implies, 
intended to set up a system of district courts. It involved 
so many questions of legal principle that if the lawyers in 
the Council had not proposed amendments to it, it would have 
constituted prima facie evidence that the Council was useless 
as a house of technical revision. Moreover, in considering 
the amendments, Lutwyche did not stand alone against a hostile 
legal majority, for he was in a minority in only six of the 
seventeen divisions on the bill. 'Party' was not a factor in 
these divisions, and conservatives were as likely to vote with 
him as liberals. In these respects, voting on the bill followed 
the normal pattern. There were seven divisions on other 
government bills and Lutwyche was in the majority in four. The 
lines of division show no hint of 'party' and on only three 
occasions did Lutwyche gain the support of a majority of the
liberals. In three divisions, most liberals voted against him,
2and in one they were evenly divided. The only validity which 
his complaints against the Council possessed derived from an
"''Russel Ward, Australia, Sydney, 1969, p.49.
2This analysis of voting behaviour is based upon the division 
lists in J.L.C ., vol.2, 1857.
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assumption which he could hardly state - that the 
independence displayed by members of all political opinions 
was an evil, and that government measures should be supported 
as government measures, regardless of their individual merits.
On March 10, Cowper again wrote to the Governor, enclosing 
Lutwyche1 23s letter and pressing for the additional appointments. 
This time Denison conceded a fraction. After protesting 
against 'the establishment of the principle that a Government 
is authorized to override any opposition it may encounter in 
the Upper House', he observed that there were now six vacancies 
owing to deaths or resignations and said he was 'quite prepared 
to fill up these...with such gentlemen as you may choose to 
recommend'. Further, he said that if there were any other men 
whose 'talents and standing in the colony' entitled them to 
the distinction, he would 'not object to increase the number of 
members by adding one or two to the original 45'. In fact, 
Cowper gained three additional appointees, for on 22 March the
Executive Council resolved to offer seats to nine men, all of2 3them liberals. They had been sounded out beforehand, and
all accepted the nomination. By 17 August they had been
joined by four more liberals, three of them appointed to fill
up vacancies caused by further resignations. Thus, more slowly
than he had hoped, Cowper gained thirteen of the fifteen
nominations which he had requested; and, as nine of the
appointments simply filled up existing vacancies, there were
no grounds for accusations that the Council had been 'swamped'.
Greater damage had been done to the ideal of the Council 
as a deliberative body above the strife of party. The primary 
qualification possessed by Cowper's appointees was their 
political standpoint, although an attempt had been made to
^Denison to Cowper, 16 March 1858, enclosed with Denison to 
Stanley, 17 July 1858, P.R.O./C.O. 201/503.
2Executive Council, Minutes, 22 March 1858. Archives Office 
of N.S.W., 4/1536.
3Cf. Cowper to Denison, 26 February 1858, enclosed with 
Denison to Stanley, 17 July 1858, P.R.O./C.O. 201/503: 'I
have ascertained that [Bland | is prepared to undertake the 
duty [of a Legislative Councillor]...and I have reason to 
believe [the others] will act if appointed.'
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appoint liberals of the more respectable sort. A few were
worth their place even by conservative standards. The most
notable of these was William Bland, a former convict, but one
transported for the honourable crime of killing a man in a duel
while a surgeon in the Royal Navy. He had been pardoned less
than two years after his arrival in the colony, and although
he had been imprisoned again several years later, it was a
punishment suffered in a cause popular in respectable circles -
libelling Governor Macquarie. Bland's reputation had grown
through his association with Wentworth in the 'fight for
colonial freedom', through his sympathy with the oppressed, and
through his selfless devotion of time and money to
philanthropic causes. The son of a prominent London physician,
he was described by a fellow medical practitioner as 'an
elegant scholar, a man of science, and a gentleman of that
antique school of urbanity and refinement, which modern
barbarism and ruffianism have almost trampled into oblivion'.
The Donaldson ministry had offered him a seat in the Council,
but he had declined the honour. Cowper, however, induced him
to reconsider, and his years in the Council were marked by
devotion to the democratic cause and the improvement of the
conditions in which prisoners, the inmates of charitable
2institutions and the poor were obliged to live.
The best qualified of the other new appointees, at least
in conservative terms, was John McFarlane, M.D., a member of
the Medical Board of New South Wales and Grand Secretary and3Grand Treasurer of the Provincial Grand Lodge of Scotland.
With Bland, he was one of the few liberals prominent in 
charitable institutions and he served as a medical officer for 
the Sydney Infirmary and Dispensary and as a Gratuitous4Medical Attendant for the Benevolent Asylum. The other
^Dr Evans in Empire, 21 January 1862, quoted in John Cobley's 
article on Bland in A .D .B., vol.l.
2See, for example, motion by Bland on space and ventilation in 
gaols and charitable institutions, S.M.H., 13 November 1858; 
and his argument that the railways should be owned by the 
government and run on a non-profit basis. (S,M.H.,
15 September 1859.)
3Sand's Sydney Directory, 1858-9, Sydney, 1959.
4Waugh's Australian Almanac, Sydney, 1858, p.172.
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appointees had no record of public service, although they were 
sometimes respectable men in a private capacity. Alexander 
Park and Andrew Lang, in particular, were Hunter Valley 
landowners as well qualified as some of Donaldson's pastoral 
and agricultural appointees, although Lang's 'respectability' 
was probably diminished by the fact that he was a brother of 
the Reverend J.D. Lang, in the eyes of at least one 
conservative Councillor 'a disgowned and degraded clergyman'.^ 
Park was, at his death in 1873, the biggest landowner in the 
Hunter Valley, and had joined with other large landowners in 2petitioning for the importation of coolie labour in the 1840s.
He had, however, been involved in politics as a liberal in the 3early 1850s, and this probably induced Cowper to appoint him
to the Council. Cowper's expectations must have been
disappointed, for Park, like many other respectable liberals
of his generation, was by the late 1850s a conservative.
The credentials of Cowper's other nominees were more open
to dispute. When life appointments fell due in 1861, he drew
up a list of proposed members, including four liberals whom he
had appointed in 1858. The Governor discussed the list with a
number of conservatives, including Deas Thomson, the leader of
the conservatives in the Council. Thomson accepted the
reappointment of Dr Macfarlane, but criticized the inclusion
of the three others - Ralph Robey, William Byrnes and Bourn
Russell - not because of their 'moral worth' but because of
4their 'social standing'. All three may have agreed with 
Thomson's estimate of their social position, while not 
regarding it as grounds for excluding them from the Council. 
Certainly, Russell, who had made his fortune as the owner of a
■^ The view of Alexander Berry, M.L.C., in 'Questions for Dr. 
Lang: A. Berry Vs. Lang', manuscript, M.L., Al 4/1.
2S,M.H,, 25 July 1873; petition for Indian Labour, 1842. M.L.,
MSS A2029.
3 k, 2See footnote above.a'4Young to Cowper, 4 June 1861, Cowper Correspondence, Vol.l, 
A676, n.p. Thomson also objected to the reappointment of 
Francis Oakes, whom Cowper had elevated to the Council in 1860.
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boiling down works near Maitland,^ did not pretend to belong
to the exclusive circles in which Thomson moved. He was, he
said, 'not a polished man'; he 'could not pay compliments';
and he had only 'observed Sir William ^Denison] from afar'
because he 'had not been admitted to the private circles of
2Government House'. Even in old age, he retained a
3deferential attitude towards Thomson.
If Cowper had tried to reappoint others who had taken
their seats 'in the liberal interest' in 1858, Thomson's
sensibilities would have been further offended. One of the
appointees, W.G. Pennington, had arrived in the colony in 1849
but had experienced difficulty in building up a practice.
Henry Parkes had come to his assistance by employing him as a
law reporter on the Empire, and by 1853, he had graduated to
writing three leading articles a week. By 1856 Pennington was
dealing with Parkes as a solicitor and in 1857 he was
sufficiently prosperous to be able to guarantee the salaries of
the staff of the struggling Empire for a month. He was also a4Vice-President of the Sydney Mechanics' School of Arts.
Pennington's success was both minor and recent, and it 
was probably not known in conservative circles that he belonged 
to a very respectable British family. Far from flaunting his 
parentage in order to gain admission to colonial 'society', he 
consciously repudiated any concern with social standing and
^Empire, 10 April 1856.
^S .M.H.. 12 January 1861.
^Cf. report of L.C. debates, S,M.H., 20 March 1874; 'Mr. Russell 
felt a delicacy at rising to address the House at that early 
stage of the debate....He knew that there were others who 
should have spoken before him, and whom he should be glad to 
hear. But he thought he had seen some slight hesitation to 
speak on the part of the Hon. E. Deas Thomson and other 
members; and, therefore, he had felt himself bound to rise.
It was from no presumption that he had been moved to do so, 
but merely to prevent any pause in the debate.'
4Biographical details based on Pennington to Parkes, 17 May 
1856, 4 April 1857, 21 July 1873, 26 February 1879, P.C., 
vol.30, A900, pp.397, 164, 288-91, 295-6, respectively; 
Pennington to Parkes, 20 May 1853, P.C., vol.31, A901, 
pp.91-2; and Waugh's Australian Almanac, Sydney, 1858, p.182.
71
expressed scorn for those who thought it important. He
described Sir James Martin, a notorious social climber, as
'the quintessence of a snob';  ^ and when Parkes gained power in
1872, he rejoiced that the new ministry would 'put down the
reign of snobbery which has prevailed in this community and2which Cowper even had not the courage to extinguish'. It was
in Parkes, a man of lowly birth and poor financial reputation,
3that he perceived 'the true instinct of a gentleman*. In 
conservative eyes, Pennington's opinions would have been the 
more inexcusable in the light of his origins; and conservatives 
would have had little sympathy with the circumstances which had 
made him a rebel - his personal association with the academic 
maverick, Goldwin Smith, and the frustrations which he had 
experienced as a young lawyer unable to break into a4conservative and highly competitive profession.
Another Cowper appointee who had been associated with 
Parkes was J.R. Wilshire, a hide and tallow merchant. He had 
been Sydney's second Mayor in 1842-3 and had been prominent on 
the Corporation in subsequent years. However, distinction in 
that city's politics won no favour in conservative eyes, for 
the abilities it indicated were those of a demagogue. At 
first, as James Martin explained in 1853, 'persons of known 
standing, education and respectability' had come forward as 
candidates for the council, but 'they were rejected, and men 
were elected who did not represent the intelligence or 
respectability of the city'. Since then, he said, 'persons of 
education and station had stood aloof' and the Corporation had5fallen into ‘utter contempt'. As a result, it had been
^Pennington to Parkes, 21 July 1873, P.C., vol.30, A900, 
pp.288-91.
2Pennington to Parkes, 23 May 1872, P.C., vol.31, A901,pp.91-2.
3 Ibid.
4A cogent analysis of the way such frustrations can lead to 
radicalism is given by R.S. Neale, Class and Ideology in the 
Nineteenth Century, London, 1972. See also Janet McCalman, 
'Respectability and the Working Class in Victorian London', 
Ph.D. thesis, A.N.U., 1974.
5S.M.H.. 3 August 1853.
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suspended late in 1853 and commissioners had been appointed 
in its place. Some liberals had been incensed, but even the 
Empire, for long the champion of elective municipal bodies, had 
confessed that 'the ordinary proceedings of the Corporation 
have but ill seconded our endeavours to keep the [elective 
principle j above contempt1 *45.'*'
Wilshire had one other claim to eminence, in that he had
been elected to the Assembly in 1856. However, this also
diminished him in conservative eyes, for with three other
liberals, he had stood for the four member seat of Sydney
against the conservative candidate, Plunkett. They had stood
as a 'Bunch', and the liberals had disciplined their vote so
effectively that Plunkett had not won a place. The superior
electoral management which had helped Wilshire's election was,
in conservative eyes, unfair, and they alleged that corruption
2was also involved. They can hardly have been surprised when,
within months of Wilshire's appointment to the Council, he was
twice prosecuted for possessing fraudulent weights, although
3each time he escaped on a technicality.
'Corruption' weighed against other Cowper appointees.
One was Edward Hunt, a businessman of lowly origins, but a 
member of the committee of the New South Wales Auxiliary to the4London Mission Society. As a member of the Council, he 
claimed to be 'guided by his conscience and the light of5Scripture' in deciding how to vote, but some saw reason to 
doubt this when it was revealed in 1860 that houses which he 
owned in Goulburn Street were brothels. His agent was 
sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment for allowing the 
houses to be used for immoral purposes but not until Hunt had
E^mpire, 7 November 1853.
^S.M .H ., 20 May 1856; Moloney, op.cit., pp.233-4.
~^S .M.H. , 14, 17 September 1858.
4Biographical details based on Ford's Australian Almanac..., 
Sydney, 1853, pp.108-9; Waugh's Australian Almanac, Sydney,
1858, pp.188-9; V. «Sc P. (L.A., N.S.W.), 1862, vol.5, pp.1108-13; 
Empire. 26 October 1860.
5S.M.H., 24 April 1861.
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testified to his good character and told the court that he had 
been forced to complain to the police about the harrassment 
to which they were subjecting his tenants. The jury drew its 
conclusions, and in returning its verdict, expressed 'regret 
that the law could not meet Mr. Hunt, as he could not but be 
aware in having received the rent of the houses for five years, 
that they were occupied by persons of bad character1 23
Another Cowper appointee involved in an unpleasant court 
case was John Dickson, who resigned from the Council when his 
schedule was filed for bankruptcy in 1859 and was not
2reappointed in 1861 because of objections by the Governor.
Dickson had been elevated to the Council in 1856 and had
seemed, on the surface, one of the better liberal appointees.
He was a Doctor of Medicine of Edinburgh University, but was
not practising his profession at the time of his appointment.
He described himself as a 'gentleman' and although he held a
squatting run for a time, seems to have lived principally by
his investments. He had also been an elected member of the old3Legislative Council. However, the circumstances under which
his schedule was filed ruined his reputation for probity. His
liabilities were £2,190.13.0, while his assets were valued at
only £10, and for reasons made public when he admitted that in
December 1858 he had made a deed of settlement on his wife and
daughter, and that he had subsequently made withdrawals from
the bank to buy land at Coogee which he had also settled on his
wife. At this point in the proceedings, Dickson seems to have
decided that an arrangement with his family was preferable to
further publicity, for his creditors agreed to settle out of4court and the proceedings were terminated.
^Empiref 26 October 1860. Hunt's testimony may, of course, 
betray the naivete of a religious man, rather than guilt.
2Young to Cowper, 4 June 1861, Cowper Correspondence, vol.I, 
A676, n.p.
3Biographical details taken from Ford's Sydney Directory, 
Sydney, 1854, p.144; Waugh's Australian Almanac, Sydney, 1858, 
p.172; New South Wales Government Gazette, 1868, vol.I, p.593; 
V. «Sc P. (L.A., N.S.W.), 1857, vol.I, p.561; S.M.H. , 9 September 
1858 (speech by Lutwyche), and 3 December 1859.
Based on reports of court proceedings in S.M.H., 3, 10
December 1859, 25 February, 19 April, 5 May 1860.
74
Scandal also besmirched the name of the liberal
Attorney-General, Lutwyche, whose reputation in conservative
circles had declined soon after his refusal of the Donaldson
ministry's offer of a seat in the Council. He had earned the *
enmity of the Sydney Morning Herald by suing its proprietor,
John Fairfax, for l i b e l a n d  after his elevation to the
Council by Cowper, he had offended conservative notions of
parliamentary propriety by becoming a Vice-President of the
Electoral Reform League and leading an agitation designed to
2pressure parliament into extending the franchise. His
acceptance of office as Solicitor-General and then Attorney-
General was regarded cynically by the profession for it was
alleged that he was rendering political service as the price
of judicial place. The accusation probably had substance, for
he told the Council that he had no desire to remain for long
one of its members, as 'his views were bent in a very different 
3direction'. His words were explained only four months later, 
when the Cowper ministry made him Supreme Court Judge at 
Moreton Bay.
Conservative indignation at the appointment was great, not 
only because it involved 'political jobbery', but also because 
of rumours implicating Lutwyche and his wife in sexual 
immorality. Sir Alfred Stephen, for instance, admitted 
Lutwyche's ability but thought him disqualified for office as 
a man 'vehemently suspected of recent and open immoralities - 
and those of a low character - and whose wife's position 
therefore was such as to unfit her for the circle into which4her husband's rank must place her'. Her position must have 
been equally tenuous in circles to which she ought to have been 
admitted by her husband's position as a member of the 
Legislative Council. News of the scandal even reached the
,M.H., 13 May 1856, editorial, and 9 June 1856, report of 
court case.
2Cf. article on Lutwyche by P.A. Howell in A .D .B ., vol.5.
.M .H ., 16 September 1858.
4Stephen to James Macarthur, 7 May 1859, Macarthur Papers, 
vol.28, A2924, p.283. See also Sir Charles Nicholson to James 
Macarthur, 12 September 1861, Macarthur Papers, vol.28, A2924, 
p.2935; Nicholson to W.M. Manning, 29 May 1860, Manning Papers, 
M.L., MSS 246; and S .M .H ., 6 May 1859.
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Colonial Office, where one official commented that from what
he had heard of Lutwyche's 'personal character', he was afraid
it was 'not a very good appointment'.
Rumours of liberal immorality consolidated conservative *
prejudices, but they were more a symptom of conservative
hostility than its cause. Men of conservative principles were
2not blameless. Wentworth had his marital infidelities;
Dr Douglass had taken advantage of a bureaucratic oversight
to avoid paying for seventeen years a debt to the government 3of £700; and conservative chagrin at the abuse of patronage 
merely signified that the power to dispense it had passed to 
other men. Indeed, liberals could have retorted that Deas 
Thomson had been appointed Colonial Secretary in place of 
Alexander Macleay in 1837 only because he was the Governor's 
son-in-law, although such an accusation gives too little credit 
to Thomson's superior abilities; the Macarthur Papers contain4the leavings of patronage; and Sir Alfred Stephen, who had a 
finely developed sense of responsibility to his enormous 
family, became one of the most importunate and successful 
clients at the Colonial Secretary's office when it was
5occupied by Henry Parkes.
Venality was common to both liberals and conservatives, 
but on social grounds, the conservatives were far better
Minute addressed to Merivale on Denison to Bulwer Lytton,
26 February 1859, P.R.O./C.O. 201/508. It should be noted that 
as a judge in Queensland, Lutwyche became a lay reader in the 
Church of England and a noted Synodsman. He was thought by at 
least one clergyman to have influenced a moral revival in 
Brisbane. (J.M. Bennett, 'Sir James Cockle, First Chief 
Justice of Queensland', Queensland Heritage, vol.2, no.6, May 
1972, p.10, n.13.)
2Michael Persse, article on Wentworth in A.D.B., vol.2. 
Wentworth had a child by the wife of Edward Eagar, a fellow 
leader of the Emancipists. Eagar himself had at least ten 
children outside his marriage. See N.D. McLachlan, article on 
Eagar in A .D .B., vol.l.
3K.B. Noad, article on Douglass in A .D.B., vol.l.
4See, for example, J.M. Antill to James Macarthur, 31 January 
1858, Macarthur Papers, vol.28, A2924, pp.14-22.
5Stephen's mutually rewarding relationship with Parkes is 
discussed in Chapter VII.
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qualified as members of the Council. Of the twenty-four
conservatives who were active in the session of 1858, eight
had been members of the Australian Club as long before as
1844.'*' Deas Thomson was the club's president and Dr James
Mitchell, another conservative member of the Council, was
vice-president. Of the remainder, ten were members of the 
2Union Club, which had been founded out of a split in the
Australian Club in 1856. None of the fifteen liberals is
known to have been a member of either club, and of the six
conservatives who are not known to have been members, four had3previously been associated with the liberal movement. The
liberals probably belonged to Cowper and Robertson's Sydney
Club (from 1858 the Victoria Club), whose members were said to4possess a 'general aversion to everything aristocratic'. In
1858, Pennington was one of the club's trustees and in 1861
Henry Prince, also a Cowper appointee, but one who voted
independently in 1858 and as a conservative thereafter, was its
5vice-president. Only one member who voted as a conservative 
in 1858 is known to have been associated with the club. He was
^Berry, Broadhurst, Douglass, Holden, Merewether, Mitchell, 
Park, Thomson. ('Original Founders and Old Members of the 
Australian Club in 1844', manuscript, King Papers, vol.2,
A1977, pp.224-33.)
2Allen, Burton, Comrie, Docker, Douglass, Fitzgerald, Isaacs, 
Lord, Macnamara, Wise. Douglass had been the driving force 
behind the club's formation. See Arthur Dowling, Notes on the 
Genesis and Progress of the Union Club, Sydney, [Sydney?],
1924, pp.4-6; and Union Club, Fees and Subscriptions, 1861-79, 
M.L., Uncat. MSS A4125.
3A'Beckett, Alexander, Lamb and Norton. The first three had 
belonged to the Constitution Committee in 1853 (S.M.H.,
5 September 1853). Norton had been otherwise involved in 
liberal politics. (Seep.52, n.4.) The two conservatives
not known to belong to any club were Judges Stephen and Therry. 
The Union Club's records list a John Macfarlane as a member, 
but Dr Macfarlane, M.L.C., was normally referred to with some 
reference to his title. There are two other 'John Macfarlanes' 
listed in contemporary directories.
4S.M.H., 23 September 1858. Letter from 'A Member of the 
Victoria Club'.
5Waugh's Australian Almanac, Sydney, 1858, p.185; Sands and 
Kenny's Commercial and General Sydney Directory for 1861, 
Sydney, 1861.
77
Wentworth's old associate, Robert Fitzgerald, who, probably 
on personal grounds, had supported Cowper publicly in 1856.
The social gulf between liberals and conservatives is 
dramatically illustrated by their relative prominence as 
office holders in educational, cultural and learned bodies.
TABLE IV2
NUMBERS OF LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE OFFICE HOLDERS IN 
EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL AND LEARNED BODIES, 1858
Organization Offices held by Offices heldConservatives by Liberals
St Paul's College 2
University Senate 4
National Board of Education 2
Sydney Grammar School 1
Australian Museum 3
Philharmonic Society 2
Philosophical Society 3
Australian Library 1
Horticultural and Agricultural
Society 2
Cumberland Agricultural
Society 3
Sydney Mechanics' School of
Arts 3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
TOTAL 26 1
In all, the twenty-four conservatives held twenty-six 
offices, while the fifteen liberals held only one. Some of the 
conservatives held more than one office, so that the positions 
were shared between only ten men, yet even on this basis,
41.6 per cent of the conservatives held office as against
Empire, 30 September 1856. Fitzgerald wrote to Cowper as a 
personal friend on 15 June 1861. (Cowper Correspondence, 
vol.2, CY A677, pp.465-7.) Fitzgerald, one of the richest men 
in the colony, was also a member of the Union Club.
Based on Waugh's Australian Almanac, Sydney, 1858, pp.181-5.2
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only 6.6 per cent of the liberals. The only liberal who was 
represented was W.G. Pennington, a vice-president of the 
Sydney Mechanics' School of Arts. The disparity between 
liberals and conservatives was almost as great with regard to * 
charitable institutions.
TABLE V 1
NUMBERS OF LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE OFFICE 
HOLDERS IN CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, 1858.
Organization Offices held by Offices heldConservatives by Liberals
Society for the Relief of
Destitute Children 6 0
Sydney Female Refuge 5 0
Sydney Infirmary and
Dispensary 4 1
Sydney Opthalmic
Institution 3 1
Benevolent Asylum 4 2
Roman Catholic Orphan
School 1 0
TOTAL 23 4
It can be seen that the twenty-four conservatives held 
twenty-three offices, while the fifteen liberals held only 
four. The positions held by conservatives were distributed 
amongst eight men, or thirty-three per cent of their total 
number, while those held by liberals were shared by two men, 
Drs Bland and Macfarlane, who made up only 13 per cent of 
their party. A similar pattern prevailed in religious 
institutions.
1Based on Waugh 1s♦.., 1858, pp.163, 170-3.
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TABLE VI1
NUMBER OF LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE OFFICE HOLDERS 
IN RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS, 1858
Organization Offices held by Offices heldConservatives by Liberals
Church Society for the 
Diocese of Sydney
Newcastle Church Society
N.S.W. Auxilliary Bible 
Society
Religious Tract and Book 
Society
Sydney Bethel Union
N.S.W. Auxilliary to the 
London Missionary 
Society
4
1
1
0
3 0
3
2
0
0
0
1
TOTAL 13 2
Here, the conservatives held thirteen offices, while the 
liberals could manage only two. The offices held by 
conservatives were divided amongst eight men, or 33 
per cent of their number, while the positions held by the 
liberals were shared by two men, a mere 13 per cent of their 
number. The two liberals were Robey and Hunt. As we have 
seen, the former was a man whom Thomson regarded on other 
grounds as of no 'social standing', and the position of the 
latter was jeopardized when a jury suggested that he had known 
that some of his houses were being used for prostitution.
Not surprisingly, the social differences between 
liberals and conservatives were also revealed in the relative 
prominence of their wives.
1Based on Waugh 's.... 1858, pp.164-9.
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TABLE VII1
NUMBERS OF WIVES OF LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES
HOLDING OFFICE IN RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS
Organization
Offices held 
by wives of
Offices held 
by wives
Conservatives of Liberals
Sydney Dorcas Society 1 0
Society for the Relief of
Destitute Children 6 0
Female School of Industry 2 0
Sydney Infirmary and
Dispensary 3 0
Sydney Female Refuge 2 i (?)
TOTAL 14 i (?)
In all, the wives of six conservatives held fourteen 
offices, while, at the most, only one office was held by the 
wife of a liberal. The woman concerned was a Mrs Dickson, who 
may have been the wife of either James Dickson, M.L.A., or 
John Dickson, M.L.C. If she was the wife of the latter, her 
reputation would have been ruined soon after by her 
involvement in her husband's unsavoury financial dealings 
before his schedule was filed for bankruptcy. 1 o W
Finally, the liberals have been ranked far -Above the
conservatives by posterity. When Burke's Colonial Gentry was
published in the 1890s it included five of the twenty-four
conservatives who had been active members of the Council in
21858, but not one of the fifteen liberals; and although 
eighteen conservatives have been included in the Australian
^Ibid., Waugh ' s . . . , 1858, pp. 169-72.
2The conservatives were A'Beckett, Docker, Norton, Stephen 
and Wise. See Burke's Colonial Gentry, vol.I, London, 1891, 
and vol.II, London, 1895.
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Dictionary of Biography, this distinction has been achieved 
by only five liberals."^
Although the liberals were manifestly inferior, when
judged by the conventional criteria, so great was conservative
contempt for the Cowper government that some found its
appointments better than they had feared. When a list of
Cowper1 2*4s intended appointees was leaked to the press, the
Sydney Morning Herald said that the names on it were 'not so
bad', and that some of them were in fact 'respectable and
highly honourable'. Indeed, it doubted, or affected to doubt,
the list's authenticity, for it could not believe that the men
chosen would prove 'the miserable tools required to do the
2ministerial work'. In the event, two men on the list were
not formally invited to take seats in the Council, and the
behaviour of the rest did not meet the Herald's professed
expectations, for within six months of their appointment, the
paper was lamenting that 'Few men could be considered unfit3after the selections made already'.
The principal reason for this dismay was that in the eyes 
of the conservatives, most of Cowper's appointees had indeed 
proved themselves his 'tools'. The day on which they took 
their seats marked the coming of 'party' to the Council. They 
sat with the government's representative, while the 
conservatives ranged themselves on the other side of the house. 
For the first time, the term 'honourable members opposite' 
crept into the debates. The liberals were soon referred to as 
'supporters of the Government', while the conservatives were4described as the 'Opposition'. The use of the terms was
The fifteen conservatives are Allen, Berry, Broadhurst, 
Burton, Docker, Douglass, Faithfull, Fitzgerald, Holden, 
Isaacs, Lamb, Merewether, Mitchell, Norton, Stephen, Therry, 
Thomson, Wise. The liberals are Bland, Hill, Lutwyche, Robey, 
Wilshire.
2S.M.H., 27 February 1858.
^S.M.H., 23 September 1858.
4The frequency with which the terms were used makes 
references superfluous, but see, for example, the report of 
debates in S.M.H., 6 October 1858, where the terms are used 
by Lutwyche and Hunt (liberal), Wise (conservative) and the 
Herald's reporter.
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never questioned either by the press or by the councillors 
themselves. Deas Thomson was even accorded unofficial 
recognition as the 'leader of the Opposition'.^ He was 
sometimes referred to by that title, or, alternatively, he was 
described as 'the hon. member who sits at the head of the 
Opposition benches'. He was normally the first to speak in 
reply when government business was introduced in the Council. 
His position arose naturally from his ability and the respect 
in which he was held, and it was accepted by both liberals and 
conservatives.
From the time the liberals took their seats, voting in 
the Council revealed a strong pattern based on 'party' lines. 
Of the sixty-three divisions in the session of 1858, the 
strongest 'party' response was revealed by eighteen divisions 
selected by the POLIT programme described in Appendix III.
In these divisions, there was a high degree of polarization 
between two groups, one consisting of liberals supporting the 
government, the other made up of conservatives who opposed it. 
The clarity with which these divisions distinguished the two 
groups is revealed by Table VIII. The figures express the 
number of times each member voted with the government as a 
proportion of the total number of votes which he cast. For 
example, Lutwyche, the government's representative, is given 
a score of 18/18, while Deas Thomson, the 'leader of the 
Opposition', who voted against the government in the seventeen 
divisions for which he was present, is given a score of 
0/17.
See, for example, S .M .H ., 7 October 1858 (Dickson and 
Lutwyche), 16 December 1859 (Eagar, Minister for Works), and 
2 March 1860 (Thomson, speaking 'for himself and for those... 
who usually voted with him....').
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• TABLE VIII1
LEVEL OF AGREEMENT WITH THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT: 
VOTES IN EIGHTEEN DIVISIONS WITH STRONGEST PARTY RESPONSE IN
SESSION OF 1858
Liberals Independents Conservatives
Blake 7/8 Jones 10/15 A'Beckett 0/13
Bland 14/14 Prince 4/8 Alexander 0/17
Bligh 10/11 Allen 0/5
Byrnes 16/16 Berry 0/12
Dickson 14/14 Broadhurst 0/12
Forbes 13/13 Burton 1/9
Hill 12/12 Comrie 1/9
Hunt 15/15 Docker 0/18
Lang 11/12 Douglass 0/7
Lutwyche Faithfull 0/3
(Govt rep.) 18/18 Fitzgerald 0/2
Macfarlane 11/11 Holden 0/18
Pennington 18/18 Isaacs 0/16
Robey 11/13 Lamb 1/11
Russell 12/13 Lord 1/13
Wilshire 11/11 Macnamara 0/1 
Merewether 0/17 
Mitchell 0/18 
Norton 0/17 
Park 0/9 
Stephen 1/9 
Therry 0/12 
Thomson 0/17 
Wise 0/14
The rigidity of the voting pattern makes it possible to 
classify members fairly confidently, and there is good reason 
to believe that Macnamara, Fitzgerald and Faithfull,who cast
1The divisions from which the table has been compiled are 
listed in Appendix III.
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only one, two and three votes respectively, have been
correctly included with the conservatives. The votes cast by
Fitzgerald and Faithfull were against the liberals' electoral
bill and against a bill to increase pastoral rents, both
excellent tests of conservatism, for no liberal opposed them.
Moreover, Fitzgerald voted as a conservative when the Council
clashed with the Assembly over the question of the relative
financial powers of the two houses in 1860 7^  Macnamara had
already given his opinion on such questions when, in 1857, he
had voted with the extreme conservatives against the
moderates to assert that the Council had the power to amend 
2money bills; and Faithfull joined in that final gesture of
conservative defiance, the walk-out which frustrated the3swamping of the Council in 1861.
Only twenty-two of the 525 votes crossed 'party' lines. 
Nine of these 'cross-party' votes were cast by Jones and 
Prince, who have been classed as 'independents'. Jones cast 
two-thirds of his votes with the liberals, and could well have 
been included with them, but the criterion adopted on this 
occasion, as on all others, is that to be grouped with a 
'party', a member had to agree with it in more than two-thirds 
of his votes. Jones could be described with equal accuracy as 
an unusually independent liberal or as an 'independent' with 
liberal inclinations.
The eighteen divisions on which Table VIII is based are
those which showed the strongest 'party' response, but other
divisions revealed a less rigid version of the same pattern.
In another seven divisions, for instance, more than two-thirds
of the liberals voted against more than two-thirds of the 4conservatives, and by this criterion, twenty-five of the
1 S.M.H.. 30 June 1860.
2Empire, 5 February 1857.
3 S.M.H., 11 May 1861.
4Divisions on Municipal Council of Sydney Powers Extension Bill 
(9 April 1858) ; Fraudulent Trustees' and Bankers' Better 
Punishment Bill (17, 24 June - three divisions) 7 Electoral Law 
Amendment Bill (division with majority 16-15 on 7 October 18.58 
and division with majority 20-13 on 13 October 1858) 7 and 
Pastoral Lands Assessment and Rent Bill (17 September 1858).
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sixty-three divisions in the session were 'party' ones. 
Moreover, 'party' was a factor, at least on a minor scale, in 
nearly all the other divisions. In fact, in fifty-three of 
the fifty-six divisions in which government's representative • 
voted, a greater proportion of liberals than conservatives 
voted with him.^
This pattern was duplicated in later sessions of 
parliament. Even in the session of 1858-9, during which few 
ideological issues were raised, more than two-thirds of the 
liberals voted against more than two-thirds of the
2conservatives in seven of the twenty-one divisions, while in
only three of the remainder did a greater proportion of
conservatives than liberals side with the government's3representative. Again, during the Robertson and Cowper
ministries of 1860 and 1861, when the re-emergence of strong
ideological issues brought party solidarity to a peak, more
than two-thirds of the liberals voted against more than two-
thirds of the conservatives in twenty-two of the thirty-nine
4divisions in Council, while many of the remaining seventeen 
divisions revealed clear differences between the parties.
The exceptions were divisions on the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Bill (16 July 1858); Articles of Food Inspection Bill 
(2 July 1858); and Judge's Removal under the Constitution Act 
(16 June 1858).
2The seven were divisions on the District Courts Act 
Amendment Bill (19 January 1859); adjournment of debate on 
motion of Dr Douglass (3 February 1859); unparliamentary words 
by the Attorney-General (3 February 1859); adjournment of the 
House (2 March 1859); Prosecutions for Libel Amendment Bill 
(23 February 1859); adjournment (7 September 1859); 
Representation of the Government (5 October 1859).
3The three divisions were on the Law of Evidence in 
Prosecutions for Bigamy Bill (6, 27 January 1859); and the 
Letters of Registration Act Amendment Bill (24 March 1859).
4The twenty-two divisions were on adjournment (8 March 1860); 
Proceedings in Lunacy Bill and Lien on Wool Act Continuation 
Bill (17 May 1860) ; Shoalhaven Municipality Petition (20 June 
1860); Appropriation Bill for 1859-60 (29 June 1860); 
Address-in-Reply and adjournment (4 divs on 11 January 1861); 
Customs Duties Bill and tabling of estimates (3 divs on 13,
20 February 1861) ; Legislative Council Bill of 1861 (6 divs on 
11, 19, 24, 25 April 1861); Crown Lands Alienation Bill 
(12 April, 6 May 1861); adjournment (24 April 1861); and 
additional days, for despatch of business (26 April 1861).
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For example, in three divisions on the Appropriation Bill of
1859-60, the liberals voted as a solid block, while the
conservatives split, with nearly half their number crossing
the floor to save the bill and prevent a violent clash with •
the Assembly."*" In other divisions, it was the conservatives
who voted as a block while at least one third of the liberals
2crossed the floor. In six divisions, however, the
conservatives showed themselves more in sympathy with the
representatives of the government than the liberals, but four
of those divisions were on Church of England Synods bills,
where Cowper, Robertson and Hargrave sided with the Anglican
conservative majority against a predominantly Nonconformist3minority of liberals and former liberals.
A majority of the strong 'party' divisions were related, 
directly or indirectly, to matters of liberal and 
conservative principle, but a sizeable minority were not.
Some of the divisions reflected the attitude towards the 
government, rather than any ideological position. When the 
house was asked to decide whether Lutwyche, the Solicitor- 
General, had used unparliamentary language, the vote was on4almost straight party lines; and when the conservatives
accused the government of conspiring with the Reverend
J.D. Lang to persecute the conservative Alexander Berry, M.L.C.,5the vote was a party one in which no one crossed the floor.
In such cases, the votes were not a direct test of liberalism 
or conservatism but a measure of confidence in the probity of
"^Divisions on 27, 29 June 1860, J . L . C . 1859-60, pp.113-4, 116 
(div. passed 13-10).
divisions on Appropriation Bill of 1859-60 (14 June 1860) ; 
Chinese Immigration Regulation Bill (2 May 1861) ; Additional 
Judge's Appointment Bill (6 May 1861).
3The six divisions were on the Tolls Amendment Act Repeal Bill 
(25 May 1860); Legislative Council Bill of 1860 (6 November 
1860); and Church of England Synods Bill (11 October,
1 November 1860, 14 March 1861). The minority in the divisions 
on the Synods bills consisted of Macfarlane and Alexander 
(Presbyterians), Hunt (Congregationalist), Eagar (Anglican) 
and Russell (unknown).
4J.L.C., 1858-9, p .14.
5Ibid., 1859-60, p.112.
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liberals who held high office. Liberal members of the Council 
trusted and supported them while the conservatives did not.
Personal association and trust are important explanations
of the tendency of liberals to vote with the representative
of the government even where neither ideology nor confidence
in the administration were directly at issue. Conservative
leaders like Deas Thomson, Stephen, Douglass, Burton, Johnson,
Therry and Mitchell belonged to the same section of the old
'upper class'^ and esteemed themselves, rightly, as an elite.
Together with other conservatives they completely dominated the
leading clubs and the most important charitable, religious,
cultural and learned institutions. With the liberals they had
comparatively little contact. The latter belonged to different
clubs and took small part in organizations devoted to the
'improvement' of the colony. Even when their accession to
political power necessitated their admission to Government
House, they were apparently not invited to the same functions
2as the conservatives where that could be avoided.
The main evidence for this lies in the Macarthur Papers, 
where Stephen, Thomson, Burton, Mitchell, Douglass and Therry 
are all revealed in varying degrees as members of the same 
circle as the Macarthurs and the Macleays. See, for example, 
Mrs Stephen to Sir William Macarthur, n.d. [1861?], Macarthur 
Papers, vol.41, A2937, p.259; Mitchell to Sir William 
Macarthur, 7 November 1860, Macarthur Papers, vol.41, A2937, 
pp.119-21; Burton to James Macarthur, 11 January 1854, 
Macarthur Papers, vol.27, A2923, pp.206-7; Stephen to Sir 
William Macarthur, n.d. [1866?j, Macarthur Papers, vol.43, 
A3939, p.365; Douglass to James Macarthur, 14 April 1860, 
Macarthur Papers, vol.28, A2924, p.372; Therry to James 
Macarthur, 17 September [i860?], 11 January 1861, Macarthur 
Papers, vol.34, A2930, pp.82, 89, respectively, with many 
other letters in the same volume; and Lady Deas Thomson to 
Sir W. Macarthur, 6 August [1870?], Macarthur Papers, vol.43, 
A2939, pp.358-60. In 1857, Deas Thomson's second daughter, 
Susan, married W.J. Macleay. Johnson was a friend of 
Stephen's. (Article on Johnson in A .D .B ., vol.IV.)
2Cf. Sir William Macarthur to James Macarthur, 10 February 
1861, Macarthur Papers, vol.38, A2934, p.418: 'I have been to
Sydney - dined with the administrator of the Government - a 
large party of gentlemen 24 in all - not one of the Ministry 
or anyone connected with them present - a few of the military 
the rest civilians of the old respectable stamp. Nicholson 
Manning, Thomson, Burton, the Judges.... The ministry and their 
friends had their "fad" two days before.'
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The breach between the two camps was not, of course,
complete. The conservative Dr A 1 23Beckett was a friend of the
liberal Dr Dickson,^ and Alexander, Norton and Lamb, who were,
like A'Beckett, conservatives with a liberal past, may have
maintained their traditional social contacts. It has been
noted already that they were not old members of the Australian
Club and that they did not join the Union Club. Similarly,
Robert Isaacs was on terms of personal friendship with
Lutwyche, at least until their bitter clashes in the Council 
2in 1858. Isaacs was also friendly with William Forster, the
friend of dissident liberals like Deniehy, who had supported
3Cowper in 1856 then opposed him on personal grounds.
However, links between conservatives and liberals were 
comparatively rare and even Cowper, the social equal of the 
conservatives and a masterful practitioner of compromise, did 
not lead the life of a political liberal and a social 
conservative. Personal associations therefore reinforced 
political prejudices, so that liberals tended to be 
sympathetic to the views of the government even on matters 
essentially unrelated to ideological principle, while 
conservatives almost automatically suspected opinions 
emanating from this source. Instead, they hearkened to the 
views of men whose reputation for balanced judgment had been 
confirmed by their conservatism and whose social standing and 
education entitled them to respect. Consequently, in all but 
a handful of divisions, the liberals gave more support to the 
government's representative than the conservatives, and strong 
party votes were produced by issues as diverse as a Fraudulent 
Trustees and Bankers' Better Punishment Bill, a Customs Duties 
Bill, a District Courts Act Amendment Bill, a Prosecutions for 
Libel Bill, and procedural questions apparently unrelated to
^A'Beckett in S.M.H., 20 October 1858.
2Cf. S.M.H., 7 October 1858.
3Cf. Frances Devlin Glass, 'Daniel Henry Deniehy, 1828-1865: 
a Study of an Australian Man of Letters', unexamined Ph.D. 
thesis, A.N.U., 1973, ch.7; S.M.H., 12 April 1861; Forster to 
Parkes, 5 May 1859, P.C., vol.52, A922, pp.20-3.
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the fate of measures relevant to liberalism and conservatism."*"
Concerted action by the two parties became a feature of
the Council's politics and, when important matters arose,
meetings were held 'out of doors' to discuss tactics. The most
dramatic instance of this occurred during the battle over the
Electoral Bill in September and October 1858. On 15 September,
the bill was read a second time without opposition from the
conservatives, and Lutwyche, the Solicitor-General, moved that
it be committed the following day. But although it was
customary to allow the government time for the consideration
of its measures, the motion was met by a conservative
amendment that further consideration of the bill be delayed
until 5 October. The amendment was carried on a straight
party vote by twenty-one to sixteen. Lutwyche angrily
described the amendment as 'an attempt to usurp the functions
of Government' and thought it 'unmistakeable evidence that the2question was treated as one of party'. His accusations had 
substance. Even the conservatives admitted that it was normal
3to allow the government to arrange the timing of its measures, 
but they had forced the amendment through because two 
conservative judges and five conservative lawyers were about to 
go on circuit in the country and would be unable to attend 
debates until 5 October. They included some of the most able 
members of the Council, consistent attenders who seldom missed 
a division, and their absence would have endangered the 
conservative majority.
When consideration of the bill had been delayed, four 
conservative country members took advantage of the deferment5to return to their properties, eliminating any chance the
"*"See footnotes 26, 28, 30 above, and Appendix III.
.M .H .. 16 September 1858.
3Cf. Therry, S.M.H., 7 October 1858.
4They were Chief Justice Stephen, Judge Therry, and Messrs 
Broadhurst, Wise, Isaacs, Want and Johnson. (Lutwyche in 
S.M.H., 6 October 1858.)
5Allen in S .M.H., 7 October 1858; cf. Thomson, S.M.H.,
6 October 1858.
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conservatives still had of maintaining a majority in a party 
vote. This was demonstrated on Friday 17 September, when the 
Pastoral Lands Assessment and Rent Bill, which most 
conservatives thought unconstitutional, passed its second 
reading by fifteen votes to nine although only two conservatives 
crossed the floor.^
Encouraged by this test of their strength, the liberals
assembled at Lutwyche1 23s chambers on the following Monday and
decided to move for the rescission of the amendment which had
2postponed the committal of the Electoral Bill. The decision
was approved by the liberal cabinet and Lutwyche again
discussed the matter with his supporters in the Council, who
declared themselves 'decidedly in favour' of the motion3recommitting the bill. He therefore gave notice in the 
Council that he would move that the Electoral Bill should be 
committed.^
Knowing that in any vote they would be beaten, the 
conservatives decided to frustrate the liberal move by 
boycotting the Council's proceedings until their allies had 
returned from the country. When the liberals arrived at the 
Council Chamber on the day when the bill was to be brought on, 
not a single conservative was present, except for the President 
and the Chairman of Committees, who were required to attend by 
their office. The twelve liberals and two conservatives 
present did not form a quorum, which was fixed at one third of 
the Council's membership of forty-eight, and the day's 
business was abandoned. With complete solidarity, those 
conservatives not officially bound to be present boycotted 
every sitting day until 5 October, while the liberals were 
never present in sufficient numbers to enable the Council's
5proceedings to start. Had all the liberals been present at
.M.H., 18 September 1858. The conservatives who crossed 
were Lamb and Alexander, both former liberals.
2Dickson in S.M.H., 7 October 1858.
3S.M.H., 7 October 1858.
^S.M .H., 23 September 1858.
3S.M.H., 24, 29, 30 September, 1, 2 October 1858.
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once, they would have formed a quorum with the assistance of 
the President and the Chairman of Committees, but lack of 
discipline was their downfall. Although only one of them 
objected to the attempt to take advantage of the conservatives' 
weakness/ the others, part-time politicians even in a crisis, 
could not arrange their affairs so that they were all present 
at once.
There were less dramatic examples of the operation of 
'party' in the Council, and when contentious issues arose, 
members often met out of doors to discuss the course they 
would adopt. Such meetings were particularly common amongst 
the conservatives, who frequently had to consider how far they 
were prepared to compromise. The liberals, backed by the 
Assembly, seldom considered compromise as a group, and with 
their course thus simplified, appear to have met less 
frequently.
Conservative meetings were particularly common during the
tumultuous events of 1860 and 1861. For example, in June 1860
a meeting of conservatives approved resolutions protesting
against illegal expenditure, which, on the motion of Deas
Thomson, were appended to the third reading of the
2Appropriation Bill; and when John Robertson took his seat in 
the Council in 1861, he professed to be shocked at the 
influence of 'party', for
There were party meetings of members of that House 
whereat only a certain section of the honourable 
members were present, and where it was arranged 
what course to take upon public questions about to 
come before the House. He owed it to himself to 
say that it would have been, at all times, more 
satisfactory if such hon. members had refrained 
from this, and had allowed everything to go by fair 
and open discussion in the House, rather than in 
private rooms.
Professions of dismay at the workings of 'party' fell strangely 
from Robertson's lips, for he had only recently accused one of 
his government's appointees, Geoffrey Eagar, of 'turning round'
^George Forbes. (S .M.H. , 7 October 1858.)
2The meeting is referred to by Holden, S.M.H., 29 June 1860.
3S.M.H., 17 April 1861.
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on his patrons by joining the Forster ministry. However,
Robertson's allegation that the conservatives held meetings
confined to their own number was undoubtedly correct. When he
repeated the charge the next day, Deas Thomson admitted that
it was true and 'protested against denying hon. members the
right to meet together upon questions that were to be brought
2before the House'.
However, 'party' in the Council must be treated on its
own terms and not confused with party as it exists today or
'party' as it existed in the Assembly. It did not stem from
the quest for office; it was not bolstered by the dispensation
of electoral patronage; and it was not simply an extension of
the politics of the Assembly. It was based mainly upon
differences of ideological principle, which were in turn rooted
in the prejudices and traditions of different sections of
society. The allegiances created by personal associations and,
more particularly, by bitter clashes on questions touching
liberalism and conservatism, meant that even issues with no
ideological implications often provoked a 'party' response.
Lutwyche, who did not try to deny the existence of 'party' in
the Council, described his supporters as men 'who were
generally favourable to electoral reform and who on that3account gave general support to the government'; and while the 
conservatives acknowledged that they formed an 'Opposition', 
they never tried to frustrate the government's legislative 
programme as a whole. Dr Dickson admitted that until the 
conservatives tried to delay the Electoral Bill, they had 
displayed 'the enviable and dignified aspect of a perfectly 
constitutional opposition', and another liberal, Ralph Robey, 
also saw their treatment of the Electoral Bill as their only 
offence when he defended them against charges of obstruction4in 1861. These defences had some point, for Deas Thomson was
~*~S . M .H . , 10 February 1860.
.M.H., 18 April 1861.
.M.H. , 6 October 1858.
^Dickson and Robey, S.M .H ., 7 October 1858, 26 April 1861, 
respectively.
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at pains to prevent extremists like Isaacs from disrupting 
the business of the Council.
Between 1856 and 1861, eleven members of the Council held
ministerial office, and they included Cowper and Robertson,
faction leaders in the Assembly, who sat in the Council in
1860 and 1861 respectively. These men, even when they did not
hold seats in the cabinet, entered into a de facto political
alliance with members of the Assembly, but there are very few
other instances of direct cooperation between members of the
two houses. Amongst liberal members of the Council, Russell
and Wilshire had been elected to the Assembly as liberals in
1856, and in 1860, Blake resigned from the Council to stand
for the Assembly, but there is no evidence that while in the
Council they involved themselves in electoral matters or tried
to influence the fate of governments. Two liberals, Wilshire
and Pennington, had been political associates of Parkes, but
they had been appointed to the Council by Cowper and they gave
his government staunch support although Parkes, hurt by his
2omission from the Ministry, had joined its opponents in the 
Assembly.
On the conservative side of the house, Dr Douglass and
Judge Therry were political associates of James Macarthur and
Douglass, at any rate, continued to correspond with him on3electoral matters after entering the Council. Randolph John 
Want, Robert Isaacs, James Norton, Robert Johnson and Joseph 
Docker, the leaders of the conservatives' extremist wing, were 
on the general committee of the Constitutional Association, a 
largely conservative body designed to promote the return of
See, for example, Thomson's intervention to prevent Isaacs 
from opposing the Electoral Bill 'in every further step' after 
the manhood suffrage clause had been passed. (S.M.H.,
13 November 1858.) The clause had been passed after Thomson 
and the other moderates absented themselves, 
oCf. Parkes to Plunkett, 17 September 1856, Autographs, M.L., 
A63, pp.163-4; Parkes to Cowper, 18 December 1857 (copy), and 
reply of same date, P.C., vol.6, A876, pp.502-7.
2Therry to James Macarthur, 1 November 1855, 3l[?J March 1856, 
Macarthur Papers, vol.34, pp.27, 43-50; Douglass to Macarthur, 
28 April 1856, Macarthur Papers, vol.27, A2923, pp.530-1; 
Douglass to Macarthur, 26 December 1857, and reply [27 December 
1857?], Macarthur Papers, vol.28, A2924, pp.125-6.
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members opposed to Cowper and Robertson at the elections of 
I860.* 24 5 The significance of these ties should not be 
exaggerated. From 1857, the 'conservative party' in the 
Assembly progressively disintegrated as Parker, Donaldson and 
Macarthur withdrew from politics, disrupting the traditional 
links between conservative leaders in the two houses; and 
although Johnson, Isaacs and other extremists allied 
themselves with conservative elements in the lower house, they 
gave support on their own terms and remained pre-eminently 
members of the Council.
In joining the Constitutional Association, the extremists
were motivated by the anxiety of all conservatives at the
outcome of the 1860 elections. The dissolution had been
granted on the free selection issue, which the liberals had
2been able to exploit at the 1859 elections, and in 1860 that
issue proved even more effective, for opponents of the ministry3were reduced to less than a third of their former strength.
How deeply conservative members of the Council felt the loss 
was revealed when the new parliament met in January 1861 and 
Deas Thomson moved an amendment to the Address-in-Reply 
regretting the manner in which the Governor had prorogued 
parliament without explanation. The amendment was carried on4a straight party vote by fifteen to five. It was the first
time that members of the Council had attempted to amend the
Address-in-Reply, and for the next hundred years it remained
5the only attempt. The meaning of the amendment was made quite 
clear in the debates. As Johnson explained with characteristic 
bluntness, Governor Denison should not have granted a 
dissolution
"''Macarthur Papers, vol.39, A2935, p.93. The Constitutional 
Association is discussed in Chapter III.
2Cf. Loveday and Martin, op.cit., p.31.
4 Ibid. , p . 32 .
4J.L.C., 1861, p .9.
5Ken Turner, House of Review?, Sydney, 1969, p.115.
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upon a cry which he must have known would not 
raise a true issue, but would result in excluding 
from the Legislature of the country the greater 
part of those who were most competent to exercise 
Legislative functions.
In other words, Denison had erred in granting a dissolution
upon an issue favourable to the liberals. Denison was about to
leave the colony and the savage attacks on him in the Council
shocked even the conservative Sir Charles Nicholson, who had
never seen any governor relinquish office with 
such manifestations of ill will...[Severalj 
personal attacks have been made upon him in the 
Council, and language exchanged between him and 
that body, certainly not within the bounds of 
ordinary courtesy. Without absolving him from 
all blame I think he has not been fairly dealt 
with. The so-called Conservative party have 
blundered and damaged their cause most signally, 
and I think are upon the whole too much disposed 
to avenge their discomfiture upon the Governor.2
While the conservatives spoke and acted as men opposed to
the Cowper and Robertson governments, their expressions of
positive commitment to other ministries were rare. Like other
conservatives, they cautiously approved of the Donaldson and
3Parker ministries, but the circumstances were never such as to 
elicit avowals of partisan support. Moreover, the decline of 
conservative fortunes in the Assembly meant that no subsequent 
ministry was able to make strong claims on their loyalty. They 
welcomed the Forster ministry, which had a brief term of office 
from October 1859 to March 1860, as preferable to the Cowper- 
Robertson administration, but continued in opposition. The 
government's representatives sat on the liberal side of the 
house, and only two conservatives appear to have crossed the 
floor to signify their support for the new administration -
~^S .M . H . , 12 January 1861.
2Nicholson to James Macarthur, 10 January 1860 [1861?], 
Macarthur Papers, vol.28, A2924, pp.529-32.
3These ministries were a 'compromise' from the conservative 
point of view, as Donaldson and Darvall, members of both 
ministries, favoured an elective upper house. Cf. H.G. 
Douglass to James Macarthur, 28 April 1856, Macarthur Papers, 
vol.27, A2923, pp.530-1; W.M. Manning to James Macarthur,
12 June 1856, Macarthur Papers, vol.27, A2923, pp.542-8; and 
Loveday and Martin, op.cit., p.171, n.40.
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one of them Edward Wise, who took office as Attorney-General
without a seat in the Cabinet on the understanding that the
law officers should maintain their independence. The other
was Forster's friend Robert Isaacs, who 'rejoiced that a
2change in the ministry had taken place1 2*5. But even Isaacs gave
only qualified support. When the government foreshadowed a
bill to make the Council elective, he announced that
he had taken his place on that (the Government) 
side of the house with the intention of giving 
the ministry his support, but that he really 
could not continue to occupy that place if he 
was given to understand that it was the intention 
of the Government to introduce a measure by the 
operation of which the Council was to be made 
elective upon the same basis of representation 
as the Lower House. If he was given to 
understand that...[then] he was sorry to say 
that he should feel compelled to go over to the 
other side.3
Forster was unable to devise a bill satisfactory to the 
Assembly, so that Isaacs was not called upon to cross the 
floor, but from his place on the government benches, he was a 
source of constant irritation to the ministry and was in fact 
cast in the role of an unwilling opponent of many of its 
actions. Individuality verging upon a chronic propensity to 
obstruct was fundamental to Isaacs' political character, and 
he gave the government far more trouble than Deas Thomson, who 
still retained his position as 'the hon. and learned member4who sat at the head of the opposition benches' and who frankly 
confessed that 'on many political questions he entirely5differed from...the Ministry'.
Conservative members of the Council mistrusted the 
Forster government partly because, although it had the support 
of conservatives in the Assembly, it also depended upon the 
support of liberals, who had to be placated by the compromise
.M.H., 27 October 1859, and Wise in S,M.H., 2 December.1859.
2S.M.H., 27 October 1859.
2 S.M .H., 1 December 1859.
^Eagar, Forster's Secretary for Works, S.M .H., 16 December 
1859.
5S.M.H., 2 March 1860.
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of conservative principles.^" The very composition of the
ministry threatened the betrayal of conservatism, for the
Minister for Lands was John Black, President of the Land
League and an advocate of free selection. Consequently, when
the government introduced a land bill to provide that eight
year leases in the intermediate districts should be renewed
for only one year pending land reform the conservatives feared
that it was the prelude to free selection and repeatedly
demanded that the ministry explain its intentions. Four of
them, including Isaacs, voted against the bill; seven tried to
have it emasculated; and the remainder supported it only with 
2misgivings.
Other issues compounded conservative mistrust of the
ministry. Not only did it introduce bills to make the
Council elective, but it introduced them in the Assembly.
Conservative members of the Council viewed this as a breach of
privilege and announced that they would refuse to consider any
3reform which did not originate in the Council. They were also 
angered by the ministry's failure, when the estimates were not 
passed, to authorize its expenditure by a vote of credit from 
the Council as well as the Assembly, and the ministry fell4just in time to avoid censure on the matter. Finally, some 
of them resented the ministry's acquiescence in the separation 
of Queensland. When the government took office, it asked the 
Council to adjourn for ministerial elections, but five
5conservatives including Isaacs, opposed the request mainly 
because they would be unable to debate motions condemning the 
dismemberment of the colony until after the separation had
"^Cf. Loveday and Martin, op.cit., p.30.
,M.H., 15, 16, 21 December 1859. The bill was also opposed 
by George Hill, who had previously voted as a liberal and 
still sat on the liberal benches.
.M.H. , 1, 2, 8 December 1859.
4Johnson had given notice of a motion condemning expenditure 
by votes of credit from the Assembly. (S,M.H., 8,
23 February 1860.)
5Including Edward Hunt, hitherto a liberal, but who from this, 
time usually voted with the conservatives.
98
been accomplished.1 Most members agreed with the President's
ruling that failure to adjourn would be contrary to
parliamentary practice and ministers were saved the
embarrassment of having to explain their policies to the
Council while campaigning in their electorates. However, when
the Council resumed, the issue of Queensland still clouded its
affairs. Johnson and Isaacs, leaders of the conservatives'
extremist wing, immediately expressed concern that the government
seemed to have accepted the separation. They disrupted the
proceedings of the Council by trying to have their motion of
protest given precedence over all other business, although it
was a day on which government matters were customarily given
priority; they insisted that documents on the separation should
be read aloud by the Clerk of the House, a task which occupied
some forty minutes; and when Geoffrey Eagar, the Minister for
Works and the government's principal representative, moved
that the documents be printed, they objected on the grounds
that this might imply that the Council countenanced the 2separation. They were impartial in their obstruction, and 
even a ministry to which they were favourably disposed was made 
to suffer inconvenience.
The second reason why conservatives were cast in the role 
of an opposition, even when the government was as congenial to 
their viewpoint as circumstances allowed, was that they were 
not simply conservatives, but men conscious of their rights 
and dignity as members of the Legislative Council. All 
governments had to heed majority opinion in the Assembly and 
none could repudiate that body's estimate of its own 
superiority. Ministers had to reject, in accordance with the 
view which prevailed in the Assembly, the Council's claim that 
it could amend money bills; they had to maintain that a vote 
of credit from the Assembly, if not strictly legal, was a 
sufficient authorization for expenditure; and when the Council 
claimed the sole right to originate legislation concerning 
itself, they could not agree without seeming to denigrate the 
powers of the Assembly.
1S.M.H., 27 October 1859.
.M,H,, 1 December 1859.
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Moreover, it had been the conventional wisdom of the
constitution's framers that in any protracted difference of
opinion between the two houses, the Council should ultimately
be prepared to give way.'1 23*6' It was partly for this reason that
they had chosen a nominated Council, and in subsequent years
moderate conservatives like Thomson acted upon the same
principle by urging that the Council should submit, rather
than engage imprudently in a contest of wills with the 
2Assembly. But liberals, and governments speaking for the
‘popular’ branch of the legislature, pressed this argument to
its limits. Whenever the Council showed a disposition to reject
the views of the Assembly, they claimed that the Council should
defer to the representatives of the people. In debate,
liberal members of the Council and the representatives of
governments responsible to the Assembly were inevitably cast
in the role of men who denied the Council's right to act
without regard for the views of the Assembly. They adopted
this position not only because it harmonized with liberal
assumptions, but also because it strengthened their position
in debate. Conservative members of the Council, on the other
hand, perceiving the triumph of democracy in the Assembly,
tried to redress the balance by claiming more powers for their
own branch of the legislature. They rapidly developed a view
of their own rights and importance which was repudiated even
3by conservative members of the other house. This conception
■^ See Chapter I, above.
2Thomson, for instance, led the conservative climb-downs over 
the Electoral Bill in 1858, the Appropriation Bill in 1860 and the land bills in 1861.
3Conservatives in the Assembly, with the exception of Martin, 
thought the Council should not amend money bills (cf. Martin, 
Faucett, Alexander Campbell, Kemp, Plunkett, Hay and Darvall in
S.M .H ., 20, 21, 22 June 1860); as members of the Parker and 
Forster ministries, they spent money on the authority of the 
Assembly alone (Executive Council, Minutes, 29 December 1856,
6 February 1857, Archives Office of N.S.W., 4/1534; V . & P. 
(L.A., N.S.W.), 1859-60, vol.I, p.399); and they did not 
object when Forster introduced in the Assembly bills affecting 
the Council. (S.M.H., 7 December 1859, 9, 15, 25 February 
1860.)
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of their power and dignity made them independent of all 
ministries. They were Legislative Councillors first and last.
By the same token, the liberals filled impartially the 
role of supporters of the government. When Forster took 
office, they still sat on the government benches;
J.F. Hargrave, who had succeeded Lutwyche and W.B. Dailey as 
Cowper's Solicitor-General, accepted the same post in the new 
government; Geoffrey Eagar, who had recently been appointed by 
Cowper, became the Minister for Works; and most liberals gave 
the ministry fairly consistent support in divisions and in 
debate.^" They thereby proved their independence of those 
liberals in the Assembly who worked for Forster's downfall.
It was partly consciousness of their independence of all
governments which led members of the Council to deny that they
belonged to any 'party1; and such denials were also a
recognition that men voted 'independently', rather than as
2delegates of an outside body or as men bound by a pledge.
But the denials went further than this and expressed the 
Councillors' determination to maintain that they personally, 
if not their opponents, had remained true to the ideal of the 
Council as a non-party house. To deny that they belonged to 
any type of party was important for those who had defended the 
Council as a body which was 'above party'; and such denials 
were vital for the judges, whose presence had been justified 
by the pretence that they would not become involved in politics. 
They could not even apply to themselves Burke's favourable 
definition of party as 'a body of men united, for promoting by 
their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some
In particular they provided the only support for the Cattle 
Driving Act Amendment Bill and the Land Titles Declaration 
Bill, and they gave better support than the conservatives to 
the Crown Lands Temporary Regulation Bill and the government's 
request that the Council adjourn for ministerial elections.
(S.M.H., 27 October, 21 December 1859, 2, 9 February I860,)
2Thomson, while admitting that the conservatives met outside 
the House to discuss legislation, was at pains to deny that 
they were pledged to follow the course decided upon.
(S.M.H., 18 April 1861.)
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principle in which they are all agreed', ^ although this
description fitted their own case tolerably well.
Consequently, although parties as operational entities
undoubtedly existed, although members on both sides of the
house used the terms 'supporters of the Government' and
'Opposition', and although they sat with 'those with whom they
usually acted', they felt constrained to deny that they
belonged to any 'party', just as members of the Assembly
vehemently repudiated charges of 'faction'.
The tactic most commonly used by those wishing to
dissociate themselves from 'party' was to define the term in
such a way that it was irrelevant to the particular version of
party which existed in the Council. They often defined party
as members of the Assembly defined 'faction' - a group of men
joined together for no higher principle but simply to further
their own base interests. Thus, Deas Thomson was able to
claim, less than three weeks after the conservatives had with
complete solidarity boycotted the Council, that 'He was
himself of no party', for he had come to the discussion of the
electoral bill 'not in any party spirit, but with a wish for2the public good'. He adopted the same line of defence when 
justifying meetings which the conservatives held to determine 
their attitude to the land bills. The meetings had been called, 
he said, 'merely to consider the bills, in their effect upon 3the public interests', not 'to subserve any private purpose'. 
Similarly, Judge Therry thought that 'he was of no party, of no 
faction' because he had acted only for the good of the country 
and he 'defied anyone to attribute anything like personal4motives to himself'. At other times, party was identified 
with rancour and prejudice. By thus narrowing the definition, 
Sir Alfred Stephen was able to defend himself against charges 
that he was involving himself and his office in party politics.
■^ Edmund Burke, The Works. . . , London, 1887, 12 vols, Vol.I, 
p .530.
3S.M.H., 20 October 1858.
3S.M.H., 18 April 1861.
4S.M.H., 7 October 1858.
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He was no party man, he said, because he was actuated solely
by a desire 'calmly to consider, deliberately to investigate,
and impartially and without prejudice or favour of any man or
set of men, to decide'.^ He also argued that, as votes in the
Council could not affect the fate of any ministry (a claim
which, as Lutwyche pointed out, was only technically true),
2such votes were not to be regarded as party ones.
The claims that members belonged to no party were
accurate enough, given the definitions used, but the
definitions were carefully chosen to avoid the issue.
Robertson, Lutwyche and Dickson, liberals with little regard
for the conservative myth of a non-partizan Council, used
different criteria to assert that it was very much a 'party'3chamber, and members and newspapers alike found it impossible 
to describe the proceedings of the Council without using terms 
which implied the existence of party. Even conservative 
members perceived clearly enough partisan behaviour on the
4other side of the house - indeed, they usually exaggerated it -
and the existence of parties was finally accorded recognition
from the impartial vantage of the chair. When, in the debate
over the land bills, Dr Douglass complained that Robertson had
accused him of being actuated by 'party feelings', the
President, Sir William Burton, ruled that the expression was
perfectly in order, for he 'thought that the action of the5parliamentary system was carried on by party'.
,M.H., 13 September 1858.
2S.M.H., 13, 16 September 1858.
3S.M.H.. 20 October 1858, 17, 18 April 1860.
4The conservatives, believing that their arguments had gone 
unanswered in debate, accused the liberals of voting on party 
lines against the dictates of reason. Cf. Docker: '...the
hon. member [Lutwyche] had relied on the power of his phalanx, 
not of arguments, but of voters'; and Isaacs: 'the macedonian
phalanx opposite'. (S.M.H., 6, 7 October 1858.)
5S.M.H.. 17 April 1861.
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CHAPTER III
THE COUNCIL AND THE PATTERN OF POLITICAL CONFLICT,
1853-1861
The emphasis upon the importance of urban conservatism in
the first two chapters of this thesis is at variance with the
verdict of most historians who have studied New South Wales
politics in the 1850s. In nearly all cases, they have
identified conservatism with the country districts and
liberalism with the towns, although the landowners have
sometimes been seen as an addendum to a basically urban
liberal movement. Hawker, for instance, speaks of 'the
liberalism of the agriculturalists and the mercantile and
professional men of urban areas' and in more general terms
argues that the lines of political conflict were drawn between
'the representatives of primary industries in rural areas and
secondary industries in urban a r e a s ' a n d  Baker, while
stating that the liberal land reform movement was led by
wealthy landowners, describes the 'class war' as primarily one
2between 'pastoral wealth and bourgeois wealth*. A few
historians have referred to the existence of urban conservatism 3in the period, but they have not challenged the assumption
.N. Hawker, The Parliament of New South Wales, 1856-1965, 
Sydney, 1971, pp.6, 14.
2D.W.A. Baker, 'The Origins of Robertson's Land Acts', in 
J.J. Eastwood and F.B. Smith (eds), Historical Studies,
Selected Articles, first series, Melbourne, 1964, p.101. For 
similar interpretations see, for example, I.D. McNaughtan, 
'Colonial Liberalism, 1851-92', in Gordon Greenwood (ed.), 
Australia, a Social and Political History, Sydney, 1955, 
pp.108, 110-11; T.H. Irving, 'Some Aspects of Radical Politics 
in New South Wales before 1856', Labour History, vol.5,
November 1963, pp.18, 21, 25; Robin Gollan, Radical and.Working 
Class Politics. Melbourne, 1967, pp.38, 42; Russel Ward, 
Australia. Sydney, 1969, pp.82-7; and K. Buckley, Gipps and the 
Graziers of New South Wales, 1841-1846', Historical Studies, 
Selected Articles, first series, p.101.
3See especially P. Loveday and A.W. Martin, Parliament Factions 
and Parties, Melbourne, 1966, pp•12-13; and Barrie Dyster,
'The Fate of Colonial Conservatism on the Eve of the Gold- 
Rush', J.R.A.H.S., vol.54, pt.4, December 1968.
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that most merchants and professional men were liberals and 
that the conservatives were mostly pastoralists. Political 
conflict has therefore been analysed in terms of a clash 
between vertically defined economic interests; no historian has 
suggested that the conflict was, to a large extent, between 
horizontally defined social strata.
This version of the pattern of political conflict in New 
South Wales in the 1850s cuts diametrically across much of the 
argument of the first two chapters of this thesis. In 
Chapter I, it was argued that although the liberal movement in 
the early 1850s was dominated by prominent Sydney merchants and 
professional men, most of the leading conservatives also came 
from Sydney. It was also argued that the nominated Council was 
preferred to an elective one partly because it seemed likely 
to help urban conservatives gain additional political 
representation. The argument of Chapter II diverged even more 
sharply from the traditional interpretation. It was shown that 
in 1856, most of the Council's members came from Sydney, 
making it what it was intended to be - a body composed 
primarily of urban conservatives. In fact, it would be 
impossible to explain the Council's clashes with the Assembly 
in terms of a conflict between urban liberals and rural 
conservatives, for pastoralists were far better represented in 
the Assembly. Table IX makes the point:
TABLE IX1
PASTORALISTS IN THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND 
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, 1856-61,
AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL MEMBERS WHOSE OCCUPATION IS KNOWN
Year Council Assembly
1856 30.5% 46%
1858 17.5% 45%
1861 25.5% 33.5%
^Based on biographical details in Appendix TV; and on 
A .W . Martin, 'The Legislative Assembly of New South Wales, 
1856-1900', Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol.2, 
1956-7, p.52. The figures for the Council in 1861 are for the 
quinquennial appointees whose terms expired on 13 May 1861. 
When the Council was reconstituted in June 1861, only four of the members were pastoralists.
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Moreover, although historians like Irving have claimed that 
during the 1850s 'merchants and lawyers supplanted shopkeepers 
and artisans in the leadership of the popular, radical 
movement1,  ^the analysis of the composition of the Council 
showed that the patrician liberals of 1853 were virtually 
unrepresented on the liberal side of the house although some of 
them sat with the conservatives. What most distinguished the 
conservatives from the liberals was their relative prominence 
in Sydney's religious, charitable, educational and learned 
institutions, their membership of the 'best' clubs, and their 
general 'respectability'. By these criteria, the conservatives 
were Sydney's social and cultural elite, while most of the 
liberals were men of little significance. The liberals 
included none of the great merchants and, in fact, occupational 
differences between the two parties were trifling. In 1861, 
for instance, eight out of ten pastoralists were conservatives, 
but so were ten out of twelve lawyers and seven out of ten 
businessmen.^
The argument of this thesis clearly raises the question 
of whether previous interpretations of the liberal-conservative 
conflict are erroneous, or whether the Council can be dismissed 
as a political freak, unrepresentative of New South Wales 
conservatism as a whole. This question must be answered if we 
are to see the Council in perspective and if we are to 
understand the social and economic basis of the ideological 
differences between liberals and conservatives which will be 
discussed extensively in later chapters. This chapter will 
therefore analyse at some depth the political structure of New 
South Wales Society.
The most obvious question is whether Cowper's failure to 
appoint liberal merchants and professional men of equivalent 
standing to the conservatives meant that most of the leading 
merchants and lawyers with an interest in politics were 
conservatives. By the late 1850s, it certainly did. Not one 
member of the Committee of the Sydney Chamber of Commerce
^Irving, 'Some aspects of Radical Politics...', p.18.
2Based on the political classification of members in the 
session of 1861 in Appendix III and on the occupational classifications in Appendix IV.
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during the 1850s is known to have been a liberal by I860, 
although a fair number of members were publicly identified with 
the conservatives. Robert Towns and John Lamb, both chairmen 
of the Chamber of Commerce, were conservative members of the 
Legislative Council, and others like John Alexander, Thomas 
Holt, Alexander Campbell, Thomas Whistler Smith, M.E. Murnin,
J.B. Watt and G.R. Hirst were also active conservatives.^ A 
survey of the directors and trustees of companies listed in 
Sands and Kenny's Sydney Directory for 1861 points to the same 
conclusion in an even more striking manner. In all, thirty of 
the directors and trustees were publicly identified with the
2conservatives, but only two are known to have been liberals.
The conservatives held a total of sixty directorships and ten
trusteeships, the liberals four directorships and no
trusteeships. It is clear why Cowper had such difficulty in
finding businessmen suitable for appointment to the Council.
An analysis of the occupations and background of liberal
members of the Assembly confirms the view that by 1861 the3'merchant princes' had deserted the liberal movement. Not 
one of the eleven liberal businessmen who voted for free 
selection before survey in February 1861 was listed as a company 
director in Sands and Kenny's Sydney Directory and only one was 
normally dignified with the title of 'merchant'. He was
Membership of the Committee of the Sydney Chamber of Commerce 
has been taken from contemporary directories and almanacs.
Towns, Lamb and Alexander were conservative members of the 
Legislative Council from 1856 to 1861; J.B. Watt voted as a 
conservative when appointed to the Council in 1861; Campbell 
and Smith were conservatives in the Assembly before 1861;
Murnin was a member of the conservative Constitutional 
Association in 1860; Holt was Treasurer in the Donaldson 
ministry in 1856; and Hirst was a public opponent of the Cowper 
ministry from 1856. (Empire, 30 September 1856, report of 
political meeting.)
2The liberals were R.M. Robey and George Thornton. For the 
identity of the conservatives, see Appendix V.
3Biographical information has been taken from A.W. Martin and 
P. Wardle, Members of the New South Wales Legislative Assembly, 
1856-1901. Canberra, 1959; the Australian Dictionary of 
Biography and its associated files at the Australian National 
University; contemporary directories and almanacs; the 
Bulletin, 30 September 1882, for an obituary of Redman; and 
Mark Lyons, 'Aspects of Sectarianism in New South Wales Circa 1865 to 1880', Ph.D. thesis, A.N.U., 1972, p.228, for additional 
information on Sutherland.
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James Dickson, the son of poor bounty immigrants, who had 
become a Sydney merchant only four years previously after 
making a fortune as a pastoralist and a country storekeeper.
Two other liberals, E.C. Weekes and James Atkinson, were also 
businessmen of the middle rank. Atkinson was a wool stapler 
and auctioneer who had long been active in the colony's 
commercial life, and Weekes, Cowper's Treasurer, was listed in 
contemporary directories as an ironmonger. In later years, he 
became a company director, but in 1861 neither politics nor 
success in business had given him the prestige to attain such 
positions.
The remaining liberal businessmen seem to have been men 
of humble origin who, at this stage in their career, had done 
little more than attain economic independence. John Lucas, a 
builder, was a former carpenter; John Caldwell, a grocer, had 
been a shop assistant in Ireland and had worked for a Sydney 
draper; John Sutherland, a builder and contractor, was a former 
mechanic; James Hannell, a Newcastle publican, was the son of 
convict parents and had once been a policeman; Joseph Eckford, 
a man of little education, was a West Maitland publican; and 
Thomas Garrett, the proprietor of small country newspapers, had 
begun his varied career by running away to sea in a vain 
attempt to escape apprenticeship to a printer. The previous 
careers of the two other liberals, John Peisley and Robert 
Stewart, are not known, but their occupations carried little 
status: Peisley was a storekeeper at Orange and Stewart was an 
undertaker.
In later years, a few of the liberal businessmen who voted 
for free selection before survey in February 1861 prospered, 
but in 1861 not one was a leading figure in the colony's 
commercial life. Most of them were small traders and con­
tractors of the type which had played an important part in the 
radical movement of the late 1840s and early 1850s.^ The 
evidence suggests that the liberal movement had not so much 
absorbed the radicals as been taken over by them.
The view that by 1861 the liberal movement was dominated 
by men of low status is confirmed by the social basis of the
"^Cf. Loveday and Martin, op.cit., pp.20, 17 2, n.56.
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division within the legal profession.'" Most of the lawyers
known to have been liberals in 1861 were young men
comparatively junior in their profession. There were, of
course, a few exceptions. William Redman, an 'aristocratic'
liberal disliked by the radicals, had been in practice as a
solicitor since 1846 and his social connections were good: he
had married the daughter of Melbourne's Crown Prosecutor and
was a member of the Union Club. Similarly, James William
Bligh, who had been registered as a solicitor in 1841, was a
lawyer with considerable seniority. However, the only other
liberal who had been admitted to practice before 1850 was
W.G. Pennington, M.L.C., whose inability to support himself by
his professional earnings until the middle 1850s was noted in
Chapter II. The twelve other lawyers known to have been
liberals had all started practice in the colony in 1850 or 
2later. On the average, the fifteen liberals had been in 
practice for just under eight years and not one was 
sufficiently well established to be listed as a solicitor to 
the public companies in Sands and Kenny's Sydney Directory for 
1861.
The profile of the conservative lawyers is far different. 
They were older, better established, and they included the 
leaders of the bar and the most prominent solicitors. Amongst 
the barristers were John Hubert Plunkett, called to the Irish 
bar in 1826 and to the New South Wales bar as Solicitor-General 
in 1832, the most senior barrister in the colony; Sir William 
Manning, a barrister since 1832, Solicitor-General from 1844 to 
1856, and second to Plunkett in seniority; and J.B. Darvall and 
Edward Broadhurst, barristers since the 1830s and both Queen's 
Counsel ranking high at the bar. The solicitors included 
George Allen, the first solicitor trained in the colony and in 
1822 founder of the oldest legal firm in Australia; James Norton, 
'the father of the profession', a solicitor before he arrived
Biographical information has been taken from the sources 
listed on p.106, n.3. The dates at which the lawyers were 
admitted to practice in New South Wales have been taken from 
Moore's Handbook and Almanac for New South Wales..., Sydney, 
1856, and from details copied from the New South Wales bar 
roll in the files of the A .D ,B.
The twelve are listed in Appendix VI.2
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in the colony in 1818; and G.K. Holden, admitted to practice
before his arrival in the colony in 1831 and solicitor to
leading companies and James Macarthur.
In all, thirty lawyers apart from the judges have been
identified as conservatives in 1861 and twenty of them had been
in practice in the colony before 1850.  ^ The thirty
conservatives had practised for an average of just under sixteen
and a half years, making them more than twice as experienced as
the liberals. Moreover, the solicitors to public companies in
Sands and Kenny's Sydney Directory were nearly all from firms
in which the leading partners were well known conservatives:
Holden and McCarthy; Norton, Son and Barker; Allen and Bowden;
and Spain and Roxburgh. The conservative business elite did
business with the conservative legal elite.
The nature of the support for conservatism in the early
1860s can also be examined through a study of the New South
Wales Constitutional Association, a body which supported anti-
Cowper candidates in the 'free selection' elections of December
1860. The Association was formed in the wake of liberal
attacks on the Legislative Council and, while it made the
conventional claim that it prescribed no particular views, it
in fact demanded that candidates whom it supported be
2favourable to the existence of two houses. One of its
members, Daniel Deniehy, was a liberal opponent of the Cowper
government, but the opinions of the others seem to have been
almost uniformly conservative. The members included Johnson,
Isaacs, Docker, Norton and Want, the leaders of the 'extremist'
wing of the conservative party in the Council; and those whom
the Association tried to persuade to stand for the Assembly
were gentlemen of 'standing and education' like Sir William 3Macarthur. There can be no doubt that the Association was 
justly characterized by the Empire as an essentially4conservative organization.
■''See Appendix VI.
2Morris to Parkes, 23 November 1860, P.C., vol.25, A895, p.259; 
Circular of the Constitutional Association in Macarthur Papers, 
vol.39, A2935, p.91.
3Ibid.
4Empire, 29 November 1860.
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The most striking feature of the Association is that it
was primarily the organ of urban conservatism. It had a
general committee of seventy-six members, of whom sixty-one
have been identified. Twenty-one were lawyers, twenty-seven
were merchants or other businessmen, eleven were pastoralists
with squatting interests and two were landowners. Most of the
members came from a higher social stratum than the liberals in
the Assembly, although there were a few exceptions, such as
Edward McEncroe, a grocer, and Joseph Taylor, the proprietor of
a boarding house. There were also a few young lawyers, but
apart from Deniehy they seem to have been well connected
socially or partners in well established legal firms. For
example, W.V. Wild, M.L.A., a young barrister, was closely ass°t'at«u2with the Macarthurs in the electorate of Camden; F.J. Garrick, 
a solicitor with only a few years’ experience in the colony, 
had entered into partnership with George Rowley and Richard 
Holdsworth, two conservative solicitors with a well established 
practice; and William Barker, admitted to practice in 1851 at 
the same time as Deniehy, was a junior partner in the firm 
headed by James Norton, one of the conservative extremists in 
the Council.
The membership lists of the Constitutional Association and 
the conservative benches in the Legislative Assembly and the 
Council were packed with former liberals. Of the thirty-four 
members of the managing committee of the Anti-Transportation 
Association, a predominantly liberal organization of the late 
1840s and early 1850s, sixteen were later aligned publicly with 
the conservatives and most of the others had died or dropped 
out of politics. Only eight members, including Cowper, Weekes,3Parkes and Lang, seem to have been active liberals by 1861.
"*"See Appendix VII .
2Cf. W.V. Wilde to Sir W. Macarthur [10 September I860?], 
Macarthur Papers, vol.41, A2937.
3The members of the managing committee are given in S.M.H.,
26 September 1850. Those afterwards aligned with the 
conservatives were G. Bowman, W. Bowman and W.H. Suttor, 
conservative members of the Council in 1853 (see Appendix II); 
John Fairfax, proprietor of the Sydney Morning Herald;
G.K. Holden, John Lamb and James Norton, conservative members
Footnote continued on following page....
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Similarly, eleven of the ninety-five members of the liberal 
Constitution Committee of 1853 were members of the conservative 
Constitutional Association in 1860^ and another ten had in 
other ways publicly identified themselves with conservatism by 
1861. Most of the other members were politically inactive, 
although Cowper, Weekes, Parkes, Byrnes, Pennington, Smart and 
perhaps a few others formed a tenuous link between the liberal 
movement of 1853 and that of 1860-61. It is clear that although 
the liberal movement of the early 1850s had some connection with 
the liberal movement of the early 1860s, it had a much stronger 
connection with the conservative movement of that period.
Men associated with the liberal movement of the early 
1850s who had joined the conservatives by 1861 included leaders 
of the business world like John Alexander, John Lamb, Henry 
Prince, J.B. Rundle, G.R. Hirst, J.B. Watt, T.W. Smith, T.S. 
Mort, M.E. Murnin, George Rattray and Thomas Holt; a few 
businessmen of the smaller type, like Edward Hunt and W.R. 
Piddington; leader lawyers like J.B. Darvall, G.K. Holden,
James Norton and George Rowley; and men associated with 
pastoral or agricultural pursuits like Alexander Park. Even 
Sir Daniel Cooper, a wealthy merchant who was the liberal 
speaker of the Assembly from 1856 to 1860, deserted to the
Footnote continued from previous page:
of the Council in the years 1856-61; Thomas Broughton, W.R. 
Piddington, John Campbell and Daniel Cooper, who, as members of 
the Assembly, opposed free selection before survey in 1860;
T.W. Smith, a conservative in the Assembly from 1857 to 1859; 
Thomas Holt Donaldson's Treasurer in 1856; G.R. Hirst and 
T.S. Mort, active opponents of the liberal ministry in 1856 
(Empire, 30 September 1856, report of meeting against Cowper 
ministry); and Robert Tooth, a member of the Constitutional 
Association in 1860.
 ^J .N . Beit, J.B. Darvall, Robert Johnson, Richard Johnson,
John Morris, M.E. Murnin, W.R. Piddington, George Rattray, 
George Rowley, John Watt and Daniel Deniehy - the last a 
liberal on the land question but otherwise in alliance with the 
conservatives by 1861.
2They were Arthur a'Beckett, John Alexander, G.K. Holden,
T.H. Hood, Edward Hunt and Alexander Park, conservative members 
of the Legislative Council in 1860-61; S.D. Gordon, who voted 
against free selection before survey in the Assembly in 1860; 
T.W. Smith, a conservative in the Assembly from 1857 to 1859; 
T.S.Mort, an opponent of the liberal ministry in 1856 (Empire, 
30 September 1856); and H.S. Russell, who voted as a 
conservative in the Council even in 1853.
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conservatives when the free selection issue came before 
parliament in I860.-"
These changes in political allegiance corresponded with a
massive change in the composition of the Assembly as most of
the patrician liberals of 1853 were denounced as conservatives
and driven from political life. Of the thirty-six members who
voted for free selection before survey on squatters' runs on
7 February 1861, only five had been in parliament before the
elections of 1859 and only four - Cowper, Robertson, Arnold
and Parkes - had been in parliament in 1856. Twenty-two had
entered parliament only at the 'free selection' elections held
less than two months previously, which had seen the defeat or
retirement of men like Sir Daniel Cooper, S.D. Gordon and John
Campbell, patrician liberals of the early 1850s who opposed
free selection before survey. They were replaced mainly by
minor professional men, small traders and contractors, and at
least three artisans. In a general sense, A.W. Martin's
figures tell the story. By his count, there were in 1856 eight
wholesale and import merchants in the Assembly, most of them
2liberals, but by 1861 there were only two - one of whom was 
probably Alexander Campbell, a conservative on most issues. 
Similarly, the proportion of members whose occupations Martin 
was unable to ascertain rose as the 'quality' of the Assembly 
declined: in 1856, he was able to list occupations for all but 
7.3 per cent of members, but the percentage rose to 15 per cent3in 1859 and to 20.6 per cent in 1860. When Sir Charles 
Nicholson lamented after the 1860 election that 'There is 
scarcely a man of mark in [the Assembly] of those who formerly 
played the most conspicuous part in public life', he stated a 
fact; and his description of 'a not inconsiderable proportion' 
of the members as 'Publicans - expiree convicts - journeyman
 ^V. & P . (L.A., N.S.W.), 1860, pt.l, p.139. Cf. George Allen's
Journal, 21 February 1865, Uncat. MSS, Set 477.
2Martin, 'The Legislative Assembly...', p.52.
3Ibid.
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mechanics - Wesleyan lay preachers'^  came closer to the truth, 
at least in spirit and direction, than the interpretations of 
later historians.
The changes in the composition of the liberal movement
reflected changes in the issues by which men were judged to be
liberals or conservatives. Advocacy of a 'liberal' franchise
and of a conservative but elective upper house qualified a man
as a liberal in 1853, but such views were the stock-in-trade
of many conservatives at the end of the decade. By the same
token, the liberalism of the late 1850s and early 1860s was,
in most of its essentials, the radicalism of the early 1850s.
2The principal features of the radical creed were:
1. Manhood suffrage, vote by ballot, equal electoral 
districts and annual or triennial parliaments.
2. An upper house which, if it existed at all, 
would be no less 'democratic' than the Assembly.
3. A land reform which would encourage small scale 
settlement.
4. The abolition of assisted immigration.
5. Unemployment relief works.
By 1861, every item on this agenda of reform had been 
incorporated, wholly or partly, into the settled policy of 
liberal governments. Cowper and Robertson advocated triennial3parliaments, although the occurrence of four general elections
Nicholson to James Macarthur, 18 January 1860 [?186l], 
Macarthur Papers, vol.28, A2924, pp.529-32. Cf. S,M.H. 
editorial, 30 January 1861, and James Chisholm to James 
Macarthur, 20 March 1861, Macarthur Papers, vol.28, A2924, 
pp.551-62: 'Universal suffrage and vote by ballot have
deposited the governing power in the hands of the ignorant and 
unthinking multitude.... The recent election for this country 
illustrated in a remarkable degree, the pernicious operation of 
the ballot, the effect of which was to transfer the labouring 
classes from all respectable and property influence.... There 
can be no doubt that the real question at issue during the late 
elections was that of democracy which could only account for 
the rejection of nearly all those candidates who had the 
reputation of being gentlemen, and which in the opinion of many 
of the constituencies was a sufficient reason for their 
exclusion from the assembly.' It would be possible to give 
many more examples of such complaints.
2Based on People's Advocate, 12 January 1850; J.D. Lang,
Freedom and Independence for the Golden Lands of Australia, 
London, 1852, pp.239-41; and Irving, 'Some Aspects of Radical Politics...', p.21, et passim.
~^S .M.H. . 10 September 1858.
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in the first five years of responsible government robbed the 
issue of its urgency; most liberals in the Assembly repudiated 
the notion of the 'balanced constitution1 2345 and were determined 
that the Council should not delay democratic reform;^ land acts 
were passed which, contrary to recent interpetations, were
2designed to favour the small man and help him onto the land;
the government was forced to provide relief works for the 
3unemployed; the vote for assisted immigration was reduced in
4the late 1850s and temporarily abolished in 1860; the bias in 
favour of the pastoral electorates was reduced although the 
Assembly in 1858 was not sufficiently radical to abolish it 
altogether; and vote by ballot and what was regarded as 
manhood suffrage were introduced. In terms of policy, as well 
as in terms of personnel, the radicals had largely taken over 
the liberal movement.
The erroneous interpretation of political conflict in the 
1850s and early 1860s as primarily a struggle between 'urban 
men of substance' and the squatters has been based upon 
empirical studies showing that liberal candidates drew their 
strongest support from urban electorates and that liberal 
organizations in the early 1850s were dominated by merchants5and professional men. As the factual material assembled in 
these studies is accurate, it will be necessary to show how it 
can be harmonized with the interpretation of political conflict 
advanced in this thesis.
The fact that urban electorates usually returned liberals 
and pastoral electorates conservatives is quite compatible 
with the view that political divisions in New South Wales were 
primarily between horizontally defined social strata. The 
principal reason is that a much higher proportion of electors
^See Chapter IV, below.
2See Chapter IV, below.
3T.A. Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia, Melbourne,
1969 (first ed. 1918), pp.697-700.
4Ibid., pp.598, 706, 908-11; and Albert A. Hayden, 'The New 
South Wales Immigration Question and Responsible Government, 
1856-61', J.R.A.H.S., vol.46, pt.6, December I960, pp.349-50..
5The most concise summary of these studies is in Loveday and 
Martin, op.cit., pp.18, 20, 25, 172, n.56.
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was entitled to vote in urban electorates than in rural ones.
In 1856, for instance, 72 per cent of adult males in urban 
electorates were qualified to vote, but in agricultural 
electorates the figure was 48 per cent and in pastoral 
electorates 23 per cent.^ Moreover, the fact that pastoral 
electorates had fewer voters than urban ones made them more 
amenable to the influence of men of substance.
Even after the introduction of 'manhood suffrage', the 
electoral system continued to give rural conservatives 
advantages over urban ones in the contest for parliamentary 
place. Firstly, the itinerant and semi-itinerant sections of 
the rural working class were largely deprived of the right to 
vote by the 'residential clause' of the Electoral Act, which 
specified that men who did not possess enough property to 
qualify as plural voters had to reside in the electorate for 2six months before the annual compilation of the electoral roll.
The residential clause was partly responsible for the fact that
the number of electors was only about 85 per cent of the3British adult male population.
Secondly, many rural labourers were effectively 
disfranchised by the distance which separated them from the 
nearest polling booth. Many could vote only if the employer 
thought it worth his while to provide them with the transport 
and time off to get to a polling place. In practice this must 
sometimes have meant that the only employees who voted were 
those who seemed likely to vote the 'right' way. It is 
impossible to know how far such manipulation affected the vote 
in rural electorates, but it seems certain that working class 
participation in the electoral process was much lower than in 
urban electorates. In 1860, for instance, the turnout in most 
urban electorates was between 40 per cent and 60 per cent of 
those enrolled, but in pastoral electorates, it was usually 
below 25 per cent. In one electorate, the Gwydir, it even fell 
below 10 per cent, only sixty-four of the 688 electors casting
^Peter Loveday, 'The Legislative Council in New South Wales 
1856-1870', Historical Studies, vol.ll, no.44, April 1965, p.483.
^22 Viet., No.20, clause 9.
3The figure is taken from Hawker, op.cit., p.15.
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their votes.^ In such a situation it was possible for a few
well organized pastoralists with transport at their disposal
to determine the result of the poll. It is perhaps for this
reason that they seem to have regretted that some of their
2employees could not vote.
Altogether apart from the effects of distance and the
Electoral Act, the social structure of rural electorates gave
the conservative pastoral elite electoral advantages over the
conservative mercantile-professional elite. The artisan and
small trader classes, more politically aware than the labouring
classes and more radical than the merchants and lawyers, were
largely absent from the pastoral electorates and not strongly
3represented in the agricultural ones. This meant that rural 
electorates lacked any substantial elements of the classes 
which did most to exclude the mercantile-professional elite 
from the Assembly in the elections of 1859 and 1860. The 
urban-rural conflict in the Assembly can therefore be explained 
in terms of a contest between horizontally defined social 
classes in the electorates. It was simply that the most 
radical social classes formed a greater proportion of urban 
electors than of rural ones.
The fact that liberal organizations in the early 1850s 
were supported by many prominent merchants and professional men 
does not prove that most 'urban men of substance* were liberals. 
Had the conservatives formed political organizations 'out of 
doors' it is quite probable that they, too, would have drawn 
much of their membership from the mercantile and professional 
classes. There is no doubt that the material from which such 
bodies could have been formed existed in Sydney: elections 
from 1851, when Wentworth won the third Sydney seat, to 1859,4when four of the eight Sydney seats went to conservatives, 
show that there was a significant minority of urban
'''The figures are taken from the Statistical Register of New 
South Wales, 1861.
2Cf. Docker, S.M.H., 10 September 1858; and Bowen to Newcastle,
6 February 1860, reproduced in C.M.H. Clark (ed.), Select Documents in Australian History, 1851-1900, Sydney, 1955,pp.389-90,
^Based on Census of New South Wales, 1861.
4Namely, James Martin, Peter Faucett, Thomas Broughton and 
John Hubert Plunkett.
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conservatives. That this minority consisted mainly of
prominent businessmen and professional men is indicated by a
study of the 1856 election, which demonstrates that Plunkett,
the defeated conservative candidate, drew most of his support
from the wealthier parts of the city.^ It should be noted,
too, that eight of the eleven lawyers in the Legislative
2Council in 1853 were conservatives.
By 1861, the lines of political conflict were drawn more 
distinctly between horizontally differentiated social strata.
In 1853, there had been a significant liberal faction within 
the 'urban aristocracy', but by the end of the decade, it had 
almost disappeared. The liberal movement was dominated by 
minor professional men and small businessmen who were 
sometimes closely identified with the artisans and miners. In 
1861, there were even at least three working class members of
3parliament. The conservative movement, on the other hand, 
was dominated by 'big men' - merchants, bankers, prominent 
lawyers, great landowners and squatters. There were, of course, 
exceptions to this pattern. The servants of .'good masters' 4often gave a deferential vote in favour of their employers;5young members of old law firms were often conservative; and 
there was probably a strong conservative vote from white collar 
workers who aspired to promotion within well established 
business houses.* 23456 Similarly, there were still a few 'big men'
Cf. P. Loveday, 'The Development of Parliamentary Government 
in New South Wales, 1856-1870', Ph.D. thesis, University of 
Sydney, 1962, pp.463-5.
2See Appendix II.
3D.C. Dalgleish, an engineer; David Buchanan, a blacksmith; 
and James Hoskins, a miner.
4Cf. Bligh, S,M.H., 11 September 1858; Russell, S.M.H..
11 November 1858; and Bowen to Newcastle, 6 February 1860, 
reprinted in C.M.H. Clark (ed.), Select Documents in Australian 
History, 1851-1900, Sydney, 1955, p.390.
5The Constitutional Association included young lawyers like 
Wild, Garrick and Barker who fell into this category. See 
above, this chapter.
^Thus, in 1853, Wentworth extended the franchise to those 
earning a salary of £100 p.a. on avowedly conservative grounds. Cf. Wentworth, quoted Silvester, op.cit., pp.216f; and S.M.H., 
editorial, 13 December 1853.
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like Cowper and Robertson who, for political or personal 
reasons, sided with the liberals. However, such men were 
exceptional. The role of the Legislative Council and the 
debates on the ideological issues discussed in the following 
chapters can be understood only when it is clearly appreciated 
that the political contest between conservatives and liberals 
was not a struggle between rural and urban interests, but 
between the 'wealth, intelligence and respectability' of the 
colony and men of inferior status.
119
CHAPTER IV
ISSUES, INTERESTS AND IDEOLOGY, 1858-1861
Part 1
The Debate on Electoral Reform, 1858
The rapid growth of radical liberalism from the middle
1850s was partly the result of social and economic changes
brought by the gold rush. The increased money supply
encouraged a boom in wages and rents which effectively extended
the franchise at the elections of 1856, and radical changes
in the social structure gave further assistance to the
democrats. Between 1851 and 1861, the number of men engaged
in pastoral pursuits declined from 15,619 to 14,607, but the
numbers engaged in other occupations increased dramatically.
The number of men engaged in agriculture and horticulture more
than tripled from 12,828 to 39,394; the number of mechanics,
artificers and men engaged in trade and commerce almost doubled
from 18,280 to 34,266; and those engaged in mining, who did
not form a separate category in 1851, numbered 21,382 ten years 2later. These changes meant a more radical electorate, for 
the pastoral interest, whose potentially radical elements were
3either disfranchised or subject to 'influence', was now far 
less important.
The flow of immigrants meant that native born 
conservatives had less chance than ever of capturing a section 
of the popular vote by appealing to 'Australian' sentiment, as 
Wentworth had done, but rapid social change had more important 
effects. In particular, it meant that those who had no 
substantial stake in the existing order were more inclined to
^See estimates of wages and rents given by T.A. Coghlan, 
Labour and Industry in Australia, Melbourne, 1969 (1st ed. 
1918), pp.687-706, 791-4.
2Figures taken from Census of New South Wales, 1851 and 1861.
See Chapter III, above.3
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dismiss as irrelevant conservative political theories based
upon the relatively static class structure of British society.
It also meant that the old colonial elites clung the more
strongly to political theories based upon a hierarchic social
order in an attempt to bolster their position.
Anxiety fostered by the rapidity of social and political
change was clearly evident in conservative contributions to the
debate over electoral reform. Their insecurity led them to
view politics in terms of a class war. On one level, the
conflict of the classes was portrayed as one between men of
different status within the middle classes - as one between
the old middle class elite and 'new men' on the way up. This
interpretation, which described accurately the conflict at the
parliamentary level, was perhaps put best by Roger Therry:
When responsible government came, there came with 
it the necessity of a mingling of classes. The 
sudden upraising of persons of subordinate rank 
to a level with the best society of the place 
created a collision that was at first a little 
violent and ungenial [sic] to both parties. Some 
thought it was not pleasant to hear a person 
greet you in the Assembly as 'my honourable friend' 
who, a short time before, took off his hat and in 'whispering humbleness' besought you as a 
magistrate 'to put in a good word on licensing day 
for the renewal of his licence'....^
Conservative complaints about the low character of most
members of the Assembly after 1859 were frequent and reflected
the bitterness of men identified with the old order that
political power had passed to the representatives of a new one.
But, while the conservatives thought it deplorable that
politics should be dominated by new men of inferior station,
they recognized that most of the liberals in parliament were
also, to some extent, identified with the interests of
property? they saw that, in an economic sense, the two groups
belonged to the same class. Isaacs, for instance, warned the
liberals that if manhood suffrage were introduced, they, too,
should 'tremble for their property, as it would be place in 2the balance'. The conservatives were even prepared to grant
. Therry, Reminiscences of Thirty Years' Residence in New 
South Wales and Victoria, London, 1863, pp.67-8.
2S.M.H., 7 October 1858.
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that ‘respectable artisans and labourers' belonged properly to
the body politic'*' although as voters rather than as
parliamentary representatives. Such men were regarded as quite
distinct from the middle classes, but they were thought to
possess sufficient property to allow them some degree of
responsibility under a constitution where men of wealth and
status were protected by the electoral distribution and the
Legislative Council from the influence of 'mere numbers'.
It was not so much the conflict between propertied men of
different status which led the conservatives to oppose the
electoral bill of 1858, however, but their belief in that
deeper class war between those who had property and those who
did not. This struggle had little existence in reality, for
men with no property took little effective part in politics,
but in the minds of the conservatives it was a dreadful
reality. As the conservatives pointed out, 'respectable'
working men in regular employment were often entitled to vote
2even without manhood suffrage, and they painted a dismal 
picture of those who would be enfranchised by the abolition of 
the property qualification. Their vision of the men whom such 
a measure would admit to the body politic derived in part from 
their perspective as lawyers, judges and magistrates - men 
whose acquaintance with the lower orders was wholly one-sided. 
Thus, Judge Therry alleged that an experienced police officer 
had told him that 'from his own quarter alone' the electoral 
bill would admit to the franchise 'no less than 500 persons3who were under the surveillance of the police'. In a later 
argument against the bill, he described this class of people 
in greater detail:
When they considered that in large towns, where 
a great number of persons lived from day to day 
without knowing where they could provide food for 
the morrow - When they knew, also, that people 
abounded in cities of this description - when
^Isaacs, S.M.H., 7 October 1858; A 1 23Beckett, S.M.H.,
11 September 1858.
2A'Beckett, S,M.H., 11 September 1858. Compare Loveday's 
figures on the percentage of adult males entitled to vote. 
(Loveday, 'The Legislative Council...', p.483, cited above.)
3S.M.H., 7 October 1858. Therry later repeated the argument. (S.M.H.. 10 October 1858.)
n ? 2
they remembered the filth and feculance that 
always floated on the surface of society in 
large towns, they would see that there was no 
necessity, nor was it fit or wise, or even 
rational, to extend the representation to these 
persons merely because they have arrived at the 
age of twenty-one years.1
Similarly, Robert Isaacs, who had no quarrel about permitting
'respectable artisans and labourers' to vote, said that the
electoral bill would swamp 'the real people' by enfranchising
'men who, except at election times, would be hidden in the
public houses and stores, and would only'come forward like
horrid creatures brought into existence by the sunshine of 
2party'. He thought manhood suffrage would give votes to men 
who,'having drowned all conscience in gin or other such thing, 
would be brought to the poll to shout at the top of their
3voices "Cowper forever", or whoever might be the candidate'.
It was not that he thought that liberal members of parliament 
were themselves bent upon destroying the rights of property, 
but that they were politically naive and were unable to see 
the likely effects of admitting the propertyless to the4franchise. Of the consequences of such a measure, the 
conservatives professed to have no doubt: Cowper would become 
the captive of political opportunists who would trade upon the 
ignorant and the unintelligent, men who could not understand 
the teaching of the economists that no intervention in the 
distribution of wealth was possible without injury to men of 
all classes. Thomson thought that manhood suffrage 'would lead 
to this - that all property would be taxed to an enormous 
amount, whilst the burdens which were now borne by the general5consumer would be taken off'. Similarly, Edward Wise foresaw 
'class legislation and taxation on wealth and the product of 
industry'and James Norton feared that 'political schemers'
1S.M.H., 13 October 1858.
2s .m .h ., 7 October 1858.
3s .m .h ., 13 November 1858.
4S.M.H. , 7 October 1858, quoted above.
5s .m .h ., 9 September 1858.
6S.M.H.. 10 September 1858.
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would beguile the ignorant with promises of ‘employment for
the unemployed, and all the other etceteras of their political
stock-in-trade 1 . Consequently, a property qualification was
regarded as both a guarantee that the voter had a vested
interest in defending the rights of property and a practical
demonstration that he had the intelligence not to be deluded
2by the nostrums of radicals and opportunists.
Conservative fears as to the results of manhood suffrage 
were not entirely unjustified, for, from their perspective, the 
rights of property were attacked by the action of the liberal 
government in using public funds to alleviate unemployment and 
by land legislation which explicitly discriminated in favour 
of the small man. Yet, as they themselves realized in years to 
come, their fears that the property of the rich would be 
confiscated or taxed heavily were grossly exaggerated - the 
expected dictatorship of the poor did not materialize.
The exaggerated nature of conservative fears was partly a 
reflection of the bookish nature of their beliefs, for they 
quoted freely from authors obsessed with the alleged evils of 
'democracy' as it existed in the ancient world, in 
revolutionary France and in the United States. But, on a 
deeper level, their fears reflected the state of acute anxiety 
which had been created amongst members of the old elites by 
the rapidity of social change in the middle and late 1850s, 
and, in particular, by the accession to political power of men 
who, a decade earlier, had often been artisans and shop 
assistants. They were therefore blinded to the truth 
appreciated by the liberals, that the working classes aspired 
to property only within the existing social order. Indeed, by 
1860, many of the liberals were men who themselves had risen 
from humble origins to a position of modest affluence within 
that order, and they realized clearly enough the aspirations of 
the class from which they came. Their arguments in favour of 
the extension of democracy reflected trust of the classes whom
^Ibid.
2Norton and Docker, S.M.H., 10 September 1858; Broadhurst,
S »M.H., 15 September 1858; Stephen, S.M.H., 13 September 1858. 
Cf. Isaacs, S.M.H., 26 April 1858.
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the conservatives feared. They were confident - and their
confidence was based upon experience - that the lower orders
would vote for men like themselves. Even the comparatively
respectable liberals in the Council strengthened their case by
pointing to the existence of the deferential voter. James
Bligh, for instance, thought that manhood suffrage would only
give votes to servants, but he did not think this 
would increase democracy. On the contrary, he 
believed that the servants in all cases would be 
found voting with, or for their masters.-^ -
Similarly, Bourn Russell
Denied that there was any danger in giving 
servants votes. The good master always found 
his servants acting with him and he thought if 
the people were left to themselves [they] would 
return the best men.^
John Dickson hinted at the same thing when he stated that, even
without formal safeguards, property 'is always certain to be3amply represented'; and David Jones dismissed the conservatives'
fears that manhood suffrage would mean a working class Assembly
bent on plunder, with the observation that 'He for one did not
believe, as was stated by more than one hon. member - that the4democracy would all be found voting the one way'.
Some conservatives went to great pains to argue against
the notions of 'natural rights' upon which, according to their
books, their opponents' position was founded. Isaacs, for
instance, stated that 'It was contended, on the other side,
that all that was wanted was to give men their natural rights‘.
He then argued in terms reminiscent of Locke that 'Men who
entered into civil society gave up a portion of their natural
rights for the protection afforded them' and denied
emphatically that 'there was any natural right for men to have 5a vote'. But his learning was in vain, for it missed the
1S.M.H.. 11 September 1858.
2s.m .h ., 13 November 1858.
3s .m .h ., 9 September 1858.
4S.M.H., 13 October 1858.
5s .m .h ., 13 November 1858.
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point of his opponents' position. Certainly, a few liberals
made statements owing something to the tradition of natural
rights, but they were never systematically developed and came
in the context of speeches stressing more pragmatic arguments.
Bourn Russell, for instance, said that 'Every man was taxed
more or less, and therefore, he thought every man had a right
to a voice in the election of the person who was to tax him'. ^
But Russell believed in 'the rights of property', too, and
thought that they 'might be considered in the number and
distribution of members'; he also argued•pragmatically that the
bill 'was calculated to allay a large amount of irritation in
the public mind...', and that workmen in the colony could be
safely enfranchised because they were better informed than2their counterparts in Britain. William Bland, the veteran
liberal who had once been Wentworth's partner in politics, also
posited a connection between taxation and the right to vote,
but combined this with a pragmatic evaluation of the good3qualities of the lower classes.
Traces of the doctrine of natural rights can be found in 
the speeches of the other liberals, but they never 
predominated, and were even paralleled by explicit repudiation 
of the doctrine. For instance, David Jones, an independent 
liberal, thought that
Every man had the right of being - and of 
exercising his opinion; every man was interested 
in the state in which he dwelled; every man was 
bound to keep the law, and he therefore ought to 
have some share in the making of that law to which 
he was bound to conform....^
Yet he also repudiated 'Tom Payne [sic] with his abominable,
5his blasphemous, principles', and 'did not advocate universal 
suffrage because he believed all men were equal'. Instead, he 
placed most weight on the argument that
1S.M.H., 15 September 1858.
2Ibid.
3S.M.H., 10 September 1858.
4S.M.H., 11 September 1858.
5s .m .h ., 13 October 1858.
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neither political nor social peace would be 
enjoyed until every man felt that he had an 
interest in the welfare of his country by having  ^
a voice in the legislation through the franchise.
So pragmatic was Jones, and so little wedded to the theory of
natural rights, that he voted for Thomson's amendment giving
the franchise only to £5 householders, on the grounds that it
2was 'equal to manhood suffrage'. Liberal adherence to the 
doctrine of 'natural rights', where it existed at all, was 
largely unconscious, introduced haphazardly into speeches 
stressing pragmatic arguments in favour of manhood suffrage.
In a Council where there were fifteen consistent liberals 
and twenty-four steady conservatives, it was inevitable that 
the latter should at first prevail. In committee, the 
conservatives struck out the manhood suffrage clause, 
substituting one proposed by Deas Thomson which confined the 
suffrage to those paying a rent of £5 per annum, or possessing, 
for a period of six months prior to the election, the sum of 
£100 in a bank. This amendment was a genuine attempt at a 
compromise - one which would have satisfied most liberals four 
years previously. However, the Assembly rejected the 
amendment by nineteen votes to seventeen and returned the bill 
to the Council.
Johnson, Isaacs and the conservative extremists had no 
doubt that the Council should persist in its opposition to 
manhood suffrage no matter what the cost, but other 
considerations weighed with the moderates. The Sydney Morning 
Herald had already given them a lead by stating that it would 
prefer to see the bill passed in the form desired by the 
Assembly than to see it lost, so that 'the Constitution may be 
allowed a little rest, and that the Parliament may find time3for some practical legislation'. Moreover, by continued 
resistance the Council seemed likely to strengthen the cause 
of those liberals who saw in a 'swamping' the solution to any 
difference between the houses. Already, a petition had been
~^S ,M,H. , 11 September 1858.
2S.M.H., 13 October 1858.
3S,M,H.. 7 September 1858, editorial. Cf. S,M.H., 23 August 1858, editorial.
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circulated out of doors calling upon the executive and the 
Governor to force the bill through by appointing additional 
members to the Council.^ Such considerations weighed with 
Deas Thomson and the moderate conservatives, who were not 
prepared to press their objections to the point where they 
endangered the stability of the body politic. Consequently, 
although the Governor would almost certainly have demanded a 
dissolution before consenting to swamp the Council, Thomson 
and the moderates abstained from voting when the Council
reconsidered its amendment and it was struck out by fourteen
. 2 to seven.
The Council had already conceded the secret ballot, for
many conservatives thought it a necessary safeguard against
working class intimidation of those of their number who voted
for conservative candidates. As Thomson put it: 'No labouring
man would dare to vote against his class. If he did he would3become a pariah and an outcast.' The Council had to be 
satisfied with two token concessions from the Assembly: an 
increase from three years to five years of the period of 
residence required of foreigners before they could become 
members of the Assembly; and the insertion of a clause giving 
representation to the University of Sydney when it had awarded4the degrees of Master or Doctor to one hundred persons. Thus, 
as the framers of the constitution had foreseen, the Council 
was forced to allow a most distasteful 'reform', but one which 
it could not oppose without arousing bitter resentment and 
damaging its own position and the fabric of the whole society.
In the long term, the 1858 Electoral Act was necessary for the 
preservation of conservative power, but in the short term, it 
was a signal defeat for the conservative cause which helped
1S.M.H., 2 October 1858.
^S .M.H., 30 November 1858.
3S,M,H., 9 September 1858. Cf. Docker, S,M.H., 10 September 
1858.
4Pace Manning Clark, A Short History of Australia, Sydney,
1963, p.127. The Assembly at first refused to accept the clause 
but later relented.
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the growing radical movement outside parliament"*" to gain 
representation within. It also increased the conservatives' 
reliance on the Council as their sole remaining line of defence 
against the depredations of the democrats. Politics was 
polarizing and the conservative and liberal forces were each 
preparing to insist more intemperately upon the rights of their 
respective parliamentary strongholds.
Part 2
The Debate on Reform of the Council, 1859-1861
Between 1859 and 1861, four bills were brought forward to 
make the Council elective, two of them by the Forster ministry 
and two by the Cowper and Robertson ministries. The debate on 
these bills shows clearly the changes in both liberalism and 
conservatism which had taken place since 1853.
The debate on the bills made it clear that, outside the
Legislative Council, there were by the late 1850s few
conservatives who could be found to defend the system of
nomination. Conservative candidates at the elections in 1856,
sensing that advocacy of a nominated Council would be an
electoral liability, had in some cases announced their
conversion to the elective principle and in others adopted an
2equivocal attitude. Their reluctance to commit themselves was 
further displayed in 1857, when Macarthur moved the previous 
question to prevent discussion of a motion by Robertson.in 
favour of elective institutions. Macarthur and Parker, the
As manifested in the operations of the Land League from 1857 
and in the demands of unemployed who conducted frequent 
demonstrations, especially after 1858. (Cf. Coghlan, op.cit., 
pp.696-705; Baker, loc.cit., pp.114-22; and R.H.W. Reece,
'Henry Parkes as 'Parliamentary Martyr for the Working Classes' 
in 1859', Labour History, No.13, November 1967, pp.11-18.
Cf. speeches by Robertson, Parker, Macarthur, S.M.H.,
25 February 1857.
2
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conservatives' principal speakers, did not defend the
nominated Council directly, but simply pointed out that the
construction of an elective upper house would involve great
difficulties and claimed that any discussion of the issue was
premature.“ Macarthur's amendment failed, and the conservatives
allowed Robertson's motion to pass without a division.
By May 1858, Cowper's elevation to the Council of liberals
of little social standing had combined with the threat of an
Assembly elected by manhood suffrage to produce a conservative
consensus in favour of elective institutions. This was
revealed when Macarthur moved that the second reading of the
Electoral Bill be postponed for several weeks
in order that the Government may introduce a 
measure for the re-construction of the Legislative 
Council on such Elective Basis as may secure that 
body due weight in the Constitution. ^
The amendment was supported by all the leading conservatives,
3but was defeated by thirty-six votes to fourteen.
The trend of conservative opinion towards an elective upper
house was also apparent when Forster's Legislative Council reform
bills were brought forward in 1859 and 1860. Forster himself
was a man with liberal convictions on most issues, but one
bitterly opposed to Cowper and Robertson on personal grounds.
Writing to Parkes in 1859, he fairly summarized his position:
as you know I cordially agree in the principle 
of our political changes...[but] these changes, 
as yet, have resulted in the predominance of a 
class of mere mountebanks and imposters, who 
profit by the labour of others, and in which they 
have but slightly assisted. I say frankly, if 
responsible Govt, is to mean Govt by Cowper and 
his lot, I have done with public life....For all 
his associates and supporters, except Jones, I 
have nothing but contempt.^
When Forster came to power in 1859, his main support came 
from the conservatives and he was forced to frame his 
Legislative Council reform bills accordingly. He himself
^Macarthur and Parker, ibid.
2V. & P. (L.A., N.S.W.), 1858, pt.I, pp.159-60.
3Ibid.
4Forster to Parkes, 5 May 1859, P.C., vol.52, A922, pp.20-23.
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favoured the abolition of the Council,"' and he made no
pretence that his bills, which were designed to secure a
moderately conservative Council by democratic means, embodied
his convictions. The main principle of the bills had
originated with the Governor, Sir William Denison, an avowed
conservative. Forster and his ministers gratefully accepted
his suggestion because, as Denison noted, it provided 'a mode
of meeting a difficult question, which would unite the
2suffrages of a large body of their supporters'.
Forster's first bill, which was introduced in the Assembly
on 1 December 1859, was based upon a plan which Denison had
3recommended to the Colonial Office as long before as 1858.
It provided for a Council of thirty members elected on the 
same franchise as the Assembly. However, the members were not 
to represent local electorates, for the whole colony was to 
form a single electorate; and each elector was to have only4one vote. That this would produce a Council more conservative 
than the Assembly few doubted, for it seemed likely that one 
or two 'democratic' candidates would pile up enormous and 
wasteful majorities, allowing conservative candidates to be 
returned on the votes of a small minority. It was also 
pointed out that only wealthy candidates could afford to canvas 
throughout the whole colony. Moreover, there was a disposition 
on the part of conservatives to imagine that few men outside 
their own circle enjoyed high reputations throughout the 
colony, and that most of the liberals, men of unknown 
reputation, would fail to gain more than local support. In 
this, the conservatives may have been correct: with the 
exception of Cowper, Robertson, Arnold and Parkes, very few of
^Forster in S,M,H,, 25 February 1860.
2W.T. Denison, Varieties of Vice-Regal Life, London 1870, 
vol.I, p.468, diary entry for 31 October 1859.
3Denison to E. Bulwer Lytton, 8 September 1858, in Varieties..., 
vol.I, p.446. Cf. Denison to Bulwer Lytton, 10 June 1859, 
ibid., p.461.
4Forster's bill and the bills brought forward by Cowper and 
Robertson are printed in A Collection of Acts, Bills and Papers 
relating to the Constitution of the Legislative Council of New 
South Wales, Sydney, 1879.
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those who were by then liberals in the Assembly were men well 
known in public life, and prospective liberal Councillors were 
unlikely to be more prominent. Lack of finance would probably 
have prevented most of them from trying to compensate for 
their lack of 'reputation' by campaigning throughout the 
colony in order to publicize their 'popular' views.
But Forster's ministry depended not only upon conservative
support, but upon the favour of a minority of liberals,
including the radical Robertson, who had promised the ministry
a 'fair trial'.^ It became apparent that the proposal that
the whole colony should form a single electorate would not
gain their support, and Forster thereupon withdrew the bill
and introduced a new one identical with the first except that
it reduced the number of members to twenty-eight and increased
the number of electorates to four. This proposal, however, did
not mollify the liberals. The electorates were still
sufficiently large to serve a conservative purpose and they
were weighted heavily in favour of the country districts. One
liberal, John Lucas, put the number of electors in the Sydney
electorate at over 17,000 and the number in each of the three
2country electorates at only about 6,000. The liberals 
therefore combined with several conservatives who opposed the 
bill because it lacked a property qualification and it was 
defeated by twenty-nine votes to twenty-six on the second 
reading.
The bills introduced by Cowper and Robertson were very 
different. They provided for twenty-six single-member 
electorates and two two-member electorates, whose members were 
to be returned by the same electors who voted for the Assembly, 
except that possession of a miner's right did not confer the 
vote. In the single-member electorates the possibility of 
members being returned on a minority vote did not arise, and 
it was minimized in the two-member electorates by the fact that 
every elector was apparently intended to have two votes, as in3the two-member seats in the Assembly. The Council was to be
■^Loveday and Martin, op.cit., p.30.
2S.M.H., 25 February 1860.
3Cf. Loveday, 'The Development of Parliamentary Government... p.334.
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subject to a dissolution in order to keep it responsive to
changes in the popular mood, but if no dissolution occurred,
its members would sit for a maximum of six years, with one
third of them retiring every two years.
As the conservatives pointed out, such a Council would not
have been appreciably more conservative than the Assembly. The
liberals admitted this quite freely, for most of them had
discarded the notion of the 'balanced constitution' as
inapplicable to Australia and become the advocates of 'unmixed
democracy'. The changed temper of liberalism was personfied
by Cowper who, in 1853, had opposed the nominated upper house
partly on the grounds that it would be insufficiently
conservative.^ In 1861, he could still tell James Macarthur
that he was not personally opposed to a Legislative Council
2returned on a conservative franchise, but his public stand,
reflecting the changed nature of his political following, was
very different. On the second reading of the 1861 bill he
explicitly repudiated the notion that the Council should be
different from the Assembly:
he might repeat what he had said over and over 
again, that he had no wish to see any great 
difference between the electors of one Chamber and 
those of the other; because he was firmly 
persuaded that if from the present chamber forty 
gentlemen were taken and placed in one room and 
thirty in another, and all legislation submitted 
to them, the colony would derive from that 
division all the advantages that could spring from 
two Chambers.... It had been objected that the 
members of the two houses would be chosen by the 
same classes of electors....He was aware that 
there were those who desired to see a very high 
qualification, but he himself had no such wish...  ^
he thought the principle open to strong objection.
Cowper thought, however, that some element of difference
might be allowed by having the Council elected from larger
electorates than the Assembly, but the size of the electorates
Cowper in E.K. Silvester (ed.), The Speeches in the 
Legislative Council of New South Wales on the Second Reading 
of the Bill for Framing a New Constitution for the Colony, 
Sydney, 1853, pp.119-21. Cf. Chapter I above.
2Cowper to James Macarthur, 22 June 1861, Macarthur Papers, 
vol.28, A2924, pp.601-4.
~^S ,M.H, , 25 January 1861.
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proposed was not such as to give an advantage to conservative
candidates. He thought the larger electorates might, in some
degree, help to ensure that the members of the Council were
not the prisoners of local interests, but this in no way
touched the question of whether they were liberals or
conservatives. He had, at least in public, entirely rejected
the idea that in constitutional affairs a balance had to be
struck between 'popular' elements and conservative ones, and
he regarded the Council as merely a house of technical revision.
Cowper's statement that the purpose of an upper house
would be served by taking thirty members of the Assembly and
placing them in another room showed that his position did not
differ substantially from the radical Robertson's. Robertson
thought that the Council should be abolished altogether and
replaced by a single house of one hundred members, twenty-five
of whom would form an elected committee of revision, which
would examine bills for defects after the committee stage.
The committee would then suggest amendments which would be
2debated and voted upon by the full house of one hundred.
In all, probably half, or nearly half, of the liberals 
shared Robertson's belief that the Council should be abolished. 
When Forster had moved the second reading of his bill in 1860,
the Reverend J.D. Lang had proposed an amendment in favour of
3a single house. It had been defeated by forty-three votes to 
ten, but most of those in the majority were conservatives. If 
we define as liberals members who are known to have favoured 
free selection before survey - and in the context of politics 
in the Assembly in 1860-61 this is the best working 
definition - then ten of the twenty-three members in this 
category voted for the abolition of the Council. Those who 
favoured this course included Robertson and Arnold, two of the 
four members of the land reform cabinet of 1861. They were 
spared the dilemma of deciding whether to vote for a similar 
amendment on the second reading of their own ministry's bill
1Ibid.
2S.M.H., 25 April 1861.
3V. & P. (L.A., N.S.W.), 1859-60, Vol.l, p.503; S.M.H.,
25 February 1860.
134
in 1861 when the vote on the second reading came on earlier
than expected.''“ While no one pretended that such an amendment
had any chance of success, it would probably have had much
stronger support than it had obtained in I860, for the election
of that year had produced a more radical Assembly and opinion
against the Council had been strengthened by the clashes over
2the Indemnity Bill and the Appropriation Bill of 1859-60.
There was, however, still a small minority of liberals 
whose ideas on the Council were similar to those of the 
liberals of 1853. Two members favourable to free selection
before survey, Moriarty and Haworth, still favoured a restricted3franchise for the Council, and William Redman, who was
4probably a liberal on the land issue, also wanted a property
5qualification imposed on the candidates. These were the only 
liberals who clearly avowed the Whiggish liberalism of 1853, 
and during Redman's speech a large number of liberals left the 
house in a body in protest.^
Several other liberals, notably Henry Parkes, adopted an 
equivocal position. Cowper and Robertson had gained the 
allegiance of nearly all the liberals with their skilful use of 
the land issue and had established a monopoly of most of the 
radical ground. In an effort to establish himself as something 
more than just another of their followers, Parkes found it 
necessary to align himself with the conservatives on some 
issues, although he usually found 'liberal' reasons for doing 
so. In 1861, Parkes assumed the role of leader of the 
'conservative' opposition to the Legislative Council Bill.
,M,H., 25 January 1861.
2See below, this chapter.
3On 3 April 1861, they voted for a conservative amendment to 
introduce a property qualification.
4Redman voted for free selection on squatters' runs after 
saying he would vote against it. (Cf. V . & P . (L.A., N.S.W.),
1861, p.433; and S .M .H . , 8 January 1861.) On the second reading 
of the Crown Lands Alienation Bill, he had spoken in favour of 
its general principles and an obituary described him as a 
confirmed liberal. (S,M.H., 31 January 1861; Bulletin,
30 September 1882.)
5S .M.H., 25 January 1861.
^Ibid.
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He openly expressed his desire to have a 'thoroughly 
conservative' Council, but what he meant by that he shrouded 
in ambiguities and platitudes. He said he would make it 
conservative
in the only sense in which that term ought to be 
understood in this colony, in a sense altogether 
foreign to the sense of all those persons who 
wished to attain that end by restrictions and [a] 
high property qualification....He would endeavour 
to make that body to consist of the highest class 
of capacity, of the most tried public virtue, and 
the most matured judgment, in the public life of 
the colony.1
At times, he seemed to envisage a Council whose existence was 
not justified by the need to check specifically 'popular'
impulses, but by the fact that any single legislative body was
liable to error. He admitted that the error was as likely to
lie with one house as with the other, but argued that it was
2better to have good laws delayed than to have bad ones enacted. 
But, to satisfy those who wanted the Council to act 
conservatively in the commonly understood sense, and to 
demonstrate his 'consistency', he quoted a series of resolutions 
which he had drafted for the Constitution Committee in 1853, 
which, although ambiguous, clearly implied that the Council3should be less 'democratic' than the Assembly.
In practice, Parkes sided with those conservatives who 
wanted to make the Council conservative without resorting to 
property qualifications. He moved that the number of 
electorates be reduced from twenty-six to eight, a move which 
nearly all the conservatives supported for reasons identical 
to those which had led them to support Forster's proposals in 
1860. However, the only liberals who followed Parkes were 
Windeyer and James Dickson.1 234 He also tried unsuccessfully to 
provide that candidates should have lived in the colony for at5least three years. He succeeded, however, in removing from
1Ibid.
2Ibid.
3S.M.H., 3 April 1861.
4V. & P. (L.A., N.S.W.), 1861, p.482.
3 Ibid., p .483.
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the bill the provision for dissolving the Council. Cowper had
announced that he would still proceed with the bill if the
Assembly decided that the provision for one third of the
Council's members to retire every two years was sufficient to
keep it abreast of public opinion. However, he strongly
opposed Parkes' amendment only to see it passed by twenty-eight
to twenty when eleven liberals sided with the conservatives.^
It was the only 'Whiggish' amendment which gained the support
of even a third of the liberals, and it was a very pale
reflection of the Whiggism of 1853. By 1861, the main question
being debated in liberal circles was not how best to make the
Council conservative, but whether a second chamber could fulfill
the role of technically revising legislation more
satisfactorily than a special committee of the Assembly.
When the bill passed the Assembly it was not, however,
sufficiently 'democratic' for the radicals. They had failed to
have the period for which the members of the Council were to
hold their seats reduced from six years to four; they had not
been able to make the possession of a miner's right a
sufficient qualification for the vote; they had not succeeded
in reducing the age limit for candidates from thirty-five to
thirty; and they had narrowly failed to have it specified that
2the Council could not amend money bills in any material way. 
Cowper had resisted these amendments, not because they would 
make the upper house more 'liberal', but because they were 
unnecessary and would only ruin whatever chances the bill had3of passing the Council.“ The division between Cowper and the 
radicals was one between men publicly agreed on basic 
principles. Both parties were agreed that the Council should 
be 'democratic', and the difference between them was that 
Cowper was an experienced politician willing to compromise on 
matters of style to win the day on matters of substance, 
whereas the radicals were men new to politics and less prepared 
to distinguish the reality of democracy from its symbols.
1S.M.H.. 3 April 1861.
2V. & P. (L.A., N.S.W.), 1861, pp.482-3, 491.
3See, for example, Cowper in S.M .H ., 11 April 1861.
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The radicals' insistence upon having all their views
incorporated in the bill was also, to some extent, a reflection
of the fact that the Council seemed likely to reject the bill
anyway. Liberal fears in this respect proved justified and the
Council agreed to the bill's first reading only after an appeal
from the Governor.“ In the debate on the second reading, a few
of the conservatives argued for an elective Council, but most
still wished to avoid the trials of the hustings. They
2therefore held out for the principle of nomination and the 
Council decided by twenty-two to six that the bill should be 
read a second time on 14 May - the day after all members were 
to vacate their seats owing to the expiration of the 
quinquennial appointments. It was not until the Council was 
swamped that most of its members doubted their ability to act 
as a conservative check on the Assembly.
Part 3
The Debate over the Financial Powers 
of the Council, 1859-61
Although by 1861 most liberals had adopted views on the 
upper house almost identical with those of the radicals of the 
early 1850s, they rarely advanced a case explicitly based upon 
any theory of natural rights. Most seemed to assume that the 
existence of an aristocracy in Britain was sufficient 
justification for the existence of the British House of Lords; 
but, by the same token, they argued that because there was no 
aristocracy in Australia whose ancient privileges needed 
protection, there was no need to 'check' the democratic chamber 
with a conservative upper house. The liberals were therefore 
able to maintain their position on the Legislative Council 
without denying the relevance of the theory of the 'balanced
^Young to Newcastle, 19 April 1861, P.R.O./C.O. 201/517.
2S.M.H., 20, 25, 26 April 1861.
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constitution' to political life in Britain. Only a few 
extremists like the republican David Buchanan extended their 
attack on the Legislative Council to the House of Lords.^  It 
took the clash with the Council over the Indemnity Bill in 1860 
to elicit from most liberals statements based upon a theory of 
natural rights. Their statements in that controversy harked 
back to the English revolutionary tradition which asserted the 
right of revolt in the face of statutes, and made conservatives 
fear that the liberals were intent upon attacking the rule of 
law.
The origins of the clash over the Indemnity Bill lay in 
the constitution's failure to specify that the Council could 
not amend money bills. It stated that all money bills should 
be initiated in the Assembly by a message from the Governor,
but it technically allowed the two houses equal legislative2powers in all other respects. Plunkett, Thomson, Douglass,
Macarthur and Wentworth, the leading members of the select
committee which drafted the constitution, had all assumed that
the Council, as a nominated chamber modelled on the House of
Lords, would follow the example of the Lords by refraining from
3substantial amendments to money bills. To them, the analogy 
with the Lords was so obvious that specific definition of the 
Council's powers seemed unnecessary.
However, many of the conservatives who had followed their 
lead in 1853 were not represented in the Council after 
responsible government, and the 'conservative party' there was 
composed mainly of men outside the tiny group who had designed 
the constitution. Where Thomson, Douglass, Wentworth, Plunkett
^For Buchanan's attitude, see S.M.H., 25 January 1861.
Contrast the speech of another radical working man,
D.C. Dalgleish. (Ibid.)
^18 & 19 Viet., c.54, clause 1.
3Thomson and Douglass in Empire, 5 February 1857; Macarthur, 
Empire, 25 February 1857; and Plunkett in S.M.H., 22 June 1860. 
In 1861, as President of the Council, Wentworth ruled that it 
could not amend the financial clauses of bills as it was bound 
by the analogy of the House of Lords. He later changed this 
ruling, but only after it had been pointed out to him that the 
Council had in 1857 passed a resolution by which he was bound, 
asserting the power of amending money bills. (J.L.C., 1861-2,
pp.22, 127.)
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and their close associates were usually men with a background 
in government and politics which had imbued them with the 
spirit of British constitutional practice, this was not true of 
most of the conservatives who entered the Council after 1856. 
Although eminently respectable, these 'new men' took a more 
restrictive view of constitutional matters. The most important 
amongst them were Johnson, Isaacs, Norton, Want and Docker, all 
but the last lawyers with a background in the technical 
interpretation of the law. This element in their background 
was not balanced by that deep acquaintance with the unwritten 
principles of 'statesmanship' which influenced Wentworth,
Thomson and their associates. Consequently, they insisted upon 
the literal interpretation of the constitution. Their position 
was clearly stated by Johnson, their acknowledged leader in such 
matters, who 'denied that they were governed by the practice of 
the mother country, and whatever the Constitution Act enabled 
them to do, they ought to do. It was not a matter of option, 
but of bounden duty.'^
That the lawyer's interpretation of the constitution was
to prevail over the statesman's became apparent as early as 1857,
when the Council made a purely verbal amendment to the Loan
Bill for that year. Such amendments were in conformity with
British practice, and the Assembly accepted it with the request
that it should not 'be drawn into a precedent to authorize the
Legislative Council to alter or amend in any manner whatever,
2any Money Bill passed by this House'. Johnson interpretea
this message as an attack upon the Council's powers, and moved
that this council having taken into consideration 
the message from the Legislative Assembly... 
asserts its privilege of amending all bills sent 
up from the Legislative Assembly for its 
concurrence in such manner as this council may 
deem expedient for the peace, welfare and good  ^
government of the colony in all cases whatsoever.
The motion was opposed by six of the seven members of the
old Legislative Council who were present, but supported by all
the other conservatives. Consequently, when Thomson moved the
^Empire, 5 February 1857.
2J.L.C,, 30 January 1857.
3Empire. 5 February 1857.
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previous question, his motion was defeated by eleven votes to 
eight. Then after an attempt to have the matter referred to 
a select committee had failed, Johnson's motion was carried on 
the voices.^
For over two years, the Council's powers in financial 
matters were discussed little, for it never attempted to make 
more than verbal alterations to money bills. However, after 
the Electoral Act of 1858 had produced a more radical Assembly 
and strengthened conservatives in the view that their only 
remaining line of defence was the Council, the two houses moved 
towards confrontation.
From 1857, the Assembly had been unable to pass in advance
the estimates for the coming year. Under these circumstances,
expenditure was made on the authority of the Governor's warrant,
sometimes after a vote of credit by the Assembly and sometimes
with no parliamentary approval at all. The failure to pass ehe
estimates on time was regretted by all members of the Assembly,
but while some criticized expenditure without any parliamentary
sanction, it was not until 1860 that expenditure after votes of
credit was seriously questioned. The only member of the
Assembly who seems to have questioned their validity before
1860 was James Martin, and he did so in order to justify the
Cowper government's occasional practice of spending money with
2no parliamentary approval at all.
The implications of votes of credit for the powers of the 
Council were perhaps first made clear in August 1858 by the 
Sydney Morning Herald. It pointed out that appropriation was 
not the function of the government or the Assembly alone, but 
of the whole parliament, so that expenditure upon votes of
credit '[trenched] deeply upon the rights of the other branch
3of the legislature'. Since the Herald was also of the opinion 
that the Council should not attempt to amend money bills,* 234 its 
point was that expenditure on the authority of the Assembly's
^J.L.C., 4 February 1857; Empire, 5 February 1857.
2S,M,H,, 7 August 1858. Contrast the views of Donaldson, Hay 
and Forster in the same debate.
3S .M .H ., 9 August 1858.
4S.M.H., 9, 23 June 1860.
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votes of credit was both technically illegal and an act of
discourtesy towards the Council.
To men like Johnson, the question was more than a matter
of technicalities and courtesy. The practice of seeking votes
of credit from the Assembly alone cut directly across their
contention that the two houses had equal powers in financial
matters except that all money bills had to originate in the
Assembly. Consequently, when the Cowper government spent money
on the authority of votes of credit during the first three
months of 1859, the practice was questioned in the Council.
However, the passage of the Appropriation Act a short time
later removed the possibility of a clash for another year.
A collision between the two houses was foreshadowed in
December 1859, when Johnson moved that the Council refuse to
consider any bill not laid upon the table by 28 December,
saying that 'he had in view the appropriation bill' for the
2following year. The fall of the Cowper ministry two months
previously had caused delays which made it certain that the
Appropriation Bill would not be passed on time, but Johnson,
impatient of the inefficiencies of responsible government,
would accept no excuses. He maintained that 'in point of law,
that bill must be passed into an Act before the expiration of
the present year; and unless it was on the table of this house
by the 28th, at the latest, there could be no time for its3consideration'. That the Council should have time to consider 
the bill Johnson thought important, for any attempt to rush it 
through the Council after it had been debated for months in 
the Assembly seemed to imply that the Council had no right to 
consider the details of the bill in committee. Geoffrey Eagar, 
the Forster government's representative, replied that there was 
not 'the slightest chance' that the Appropriation Bill would 
reach the Council before the end of the year. He appealed to 
the good sense of the house and, in particular, felt sure that 
'the hon. and learned member who sat at the head of the
1S.M.H., 9 April 1859.
3S.M.H., 16 December 1859.
3Ibid.
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opposition benches, with his experience of parliamentary 
proceedings, with his knowledge of parliamentary law, would 
not support the motion1 2*45. J o h n s o n  thereupon withdrew his 
motion, but
He could not, however, understand why the 
government should rake it for granted that they 
should not be able to pass an Appropriation Bill 
in time; or that they should necessarily get a 
vote of credit; and he was sorry to hear from the 
exponent of a ministry claiming common sense and 
common honesty, that a vote of credit of one house 
would be deemed sufficient by them to justify 
expenditure of the public money.2
When the Appropriation Bill was not passed and the 
Forster government authorized its expenditure for February 1860 
by a vote of credit, Johnson immediately gave notice of a 
motion protesting
That the practice which has prevailed of spending 
the public monies upon votes of the Legislative 
Assembly only, is illegal, and subversive of the 
rights and privileges of this House, and ought 
not to be continued.^
The Forster government fell on the day the motion was due to be 
debated, so that Johnson had it postponed, expressing the hope 
that ‘whoever assumed the reins of government, their first 
measure would be one for the legalization of public4expenditure1. However, the new ministers, headed by 
Robertson, were bound to resign their seats upon taking office 
and seek endorsement from the electors, and they did so 
without gaining supply for the coming month. Johnson thereupon 
asked the Council to refuse the ministry's request for an 
adjournment until it obtained votes of credit from both houses. 
The adjournment was refused by ten votes to seven, but when the 
Council met the next day, the President ruled that to continue 
sitting in such circumstances was contrary to the practice of 
parliament. The conservatives thereupon deferred to his 
judgment.
^Ibid. The reference was, of course, to Deas Thomson.
2Ibid.
2S .M.H.. 9, 23 February 1860.
4S.M.H., 2 March 1860.
5S.M.H., 9, 10 March 1860.
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Matters came to a head when parliament resumed on 3 April
1860. The Council immediately passed on the voices Johnson's
resolution condemning expenditure authorized by one house alone,
with the extremist party using the occasion as a platform to
assert that except for the right of initiating money bills, the
two houses had 'co-ordinate' powers, and that the Council had
'as much right to interfere in money concerns as the Assembly
itself'. Thomson, for the moderates, denied that the Council
2had the 'right to deal with all the details of money bills', 
but substantially agreed with Johnson's motion. Thomson's case 
against the expenditure complained of rested upon the argument 
that expenditure without the consent of the whole parliament 
was illegal, and that those who maintained that the Assembly's 
votes of credit were a sufficient authorization for expenditure 
were denying the Council its undoubted right to assent to 
money bills.
The conservatives had prepared their case much better than
the liberals and in some respects their position was easier to
defend. In this debate and subsequent ones, they were able to
show that when the British Government spent sums comprised in
the estimates before the passing of the Appropriation Act, the
expenditure was met by exchequer bills authorized by act of
3parliament, or by a partial appropriation act. The colonial 
habit of using votes of credit in these circumstances was 
undoubtedly contrary to British practice and the liberals were 
unable to produce a single precedent in its favour. In Britain,
1S.M.H., 4 April 1860.
2Ibid.
3The British practice was described thus by May: 'In order to
make the grants of the Commons available, and to anticipate the 
legal sanction of an Appropriation Act, clauses are inserted in 
the Acts passed at an earlier period of the session, for the 
application of money out of the Consolidated Fund, and for 
raising money by exchequer bills for the current year; which 
authorize the Treasury "to issue and apply, from time to time, 
all such sums of money as shall be raised by exchequer bills, 
to such services as shall have been voted by the Commons in 
this present session of Parliament". By these enactments, 
immediate effect is given to the votes of the Commons....'
(May, 3rd ed., 1855, p.424). In practice, this meant that a 
partial appropriation act was passed every year to cover expenditure until the estimates were passed. (See, for example, 
17 & 18 Viet. cap.2 and cap.3. See also Commons Papers, 1857, 
Session II, vol.9, pp.520-1.)
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the use of votes of credit was confined to emergency
expenditure outside the estimates, and Thomson was able to
quote Erskine May to the effect that
Where a vote of credit on account of war 
expenditure or other special grant not comprised 
in the Estimates is desired, a message is generally 
sent by the Crown, under the sign manual to both 
Houses. -1 234
In fact, votes of credit were sometimes given by the Commons 
2alone, ‘ but this was not made clear in works on parliamentary
practice. The liberals' failure to research their case
adequately by going beyond the standard authorities cost them
dearly, for it enabled the conservatives to argue against the
propriety of all votes of credit from a single house and not
simply against the propriety of spending by this means money
comprised in the estimates. Had the liberals been able to
show that the vote of the Commons was in principle a sufficient
authorization for expenditure, their position would have been
stronger. As it was, Cowper was forced to admit that the
expenditure of public money without the express sanction of
3both houses was 'irregular', or even 'illegal'; and Hargrave, 
the Attorney-General, admitted that 'the public expenditure 
complained of was certainly illegal, and most decidedly4unconstitutional'.
The liberals' most telling rejoinder was that the Parker 
ministry, to which Thomson had belonged, and the Forster 
ministry, in which Geoffrey Eagar had been Minister for Works, 
had spent money on the authority of the Assembly's votes of 
credit. Cowper was also able to show clearly that all 
governments sometimes spent money without even a vote of credit
'S,M.H., 9 June 1860. (Emphasis added.)
2'For example, in 1851, the House of Commons passed a vote of 
credit of £300,000 for unusual expenses incurred by the Kaffir 
War. (Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol.CXVII, 3rd Series, 
pp.738, 1102.)
3S.M,H ., 4 April, 28 June 1860.
4S.M.H.. 4 April 1860; Cf. Hargrave's statement in S,M,H.,
30 June 1860: 'It appeared to him that money should, for the
future, be expended not even on additional votes of credit, 
but should first be appropriated by the Legislature.'
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and to produce from the files of the Colonial Secretary's
office a list in Thomson's handwriting giving precedents for
such expenditure."'' But, while this argument shifted the focus
from his own ministry's failures - where the conservatives
tried to direct it - it could not be pressed too far without
implying that financial irregularities were of no consequence
and that one regrettable illegality justified another. To the
conservative claim that expenditure in anticipation of the
estimates required the consent of both houses Cowper had no
effective reply and his government admitted as much in 1861 by
following the British practice of incorporating the lower
house's vote of credit in a partial appropriation bill, which
2was then passed by both houses. The government's capitulation
was a result of its belated recognition that all ministries had
departed from British practice. As Elias Weekes, the
Treasurer, said when he announced the government's new policy:
It had hitherto been the practice, made necessary 
by the late periods of the year when the estimates 
were] passed, that they should have votes of 
credit, sometimes for three months supply, and 
sometimes for one month; but he thought the 
impropriety of that course had generally been recognized, and this was a step which would take 
them back to the proper course.^
Six months previously, however, many liberals had 
repudiated this moderate attitude, repudiating the claims of 
law and precedent and arguing that the vote of the Assembly was 
a sufficient authority for expenditure. The circumstances 
which provoked these outbursts had been provided by the 
government's decision to introduce an indemnity bill to protect
1S.M.H.. 9, 30 June 1860.
224 Viet. No.4. This act, which became law on 31 January 1861, 
authorized the expenditure of £253,087 to cover the government's 
expenses during the first three months of 1861 and included the 
supplementary estimates for 1860. Cf. Kempt to Newcastle,
4 February 1861, P.R.O./C.O., 201/517.
3S,M .H., 25 January 1861. Governor Denison may have influenced 
the Ministry's decision not to resort to the vote of credit 
system of former years. R.J. Want and William Forster both 
claimed that Denison had told the ministry he would refuse to 
sign warrants for expenditure without parliamentary sanction 
after the current year. (S.M.H., 22, 28 June 1860.) Denison's 
term of office expired two days before the partial appropriation bill was introduced.
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its members from prosecution for spending money illegally in
the month of March when they had resigned their seats for the
ministerial elections without obtaining supply. The bill
covered only the illegal expenditure for which the new ministry
was responsible, and this expenditure had been authorized by
neither house. The bill could therefore be taken to imply that
there was no need to indemnify governments for expenditure
authorized by the Assembly alone, and the ministry itself
seemed to make this point when, on the day before the indemnity
bill was introduced, it obtained a vote of credit for the
following month and proceeded to spend the money without
further authorization.'^ If the government was not then aware
of the implications of its actions, it was soon enlightened,
for six days later the Governor told Cowper that his
Bill of indemnity doesn't go far enough it ought 
to cover all the payments which have been made 
since the commencement of the year - unless it 
does this there is the certainty that it will be 
amended by the Council and there will be a chance 
of a collision between the two Houses.1 2 3
However, the ministry ignored the Governor's advice and refused
to extend the bill.
Their decision to persevere in a course of action certain
to provoke a clash with the Council makes it necessary to
enquire whether the government had introduced the bill in order
to provoke such a conflict. That such could have been its
intention is suggested by the fact that in 1858 the Cowper
government had for three months spent money without the
authority of even a vote of credit and had dismissed suggestions
3that an indemnity bill was necessary. Its attitude had been 
accepted by a majority of members in the Assembly, and in 1860, 
there seems to have been little or no pressure from the 
Assembly for an indemnity bill. In fact, several members said
1S.M.H ., 5 April 1860.
2Denison to Cowper, 11 April 1860, Cowper Correspondence, 
vol.l, A676, n.p. Punctuation as in original.
3Cowper in S.M.H., 19 June 1858. Six weeks later, Cowper said 
that the government would accept an indemnity bill if the house 
passed one, but made no effort to have one introduced.
(S,M.H., 7 August 1858.)
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later that they had not wanted such a bill.^ The ministers 
also had an obvious motive for provoking such a conflict with 
the Council, for they did not have sufficient supporters in the 
Council to safeguard the land bills which they intended to 
introduce some six months later. One solution to the problem 
was to goad the Council into rejecting the Appropriation Bill 
so that even a conservative governor like Denison would be 
forced to sanction a swamping. A cabinet in which two of the 
four members advocated the abolition of the Council may not have 
been averse to such stratagems.
However, such an interpretation is implausible. It assumes
that the ministry foresaw that many conservatives in the Council
would favour the suicidal step of rejecting the Appropriation
Bill in retaliation for the government's implied attack on its
powers. Even allowing for the fact that the extreme
conservatives had already shown remarkable inflexibility and
lack of political judgment, such a degree of prescience on the
part of the government seems improbable. Moreover, the fact
that the ministers departed from the precedent which they had
set in 1858 and introduced an indemnity bill not demanded by
the Assembly can be explained satisfactorily as an attempt to
appease the Council and avoid endangering the passage of the
land bills by constitutional brawling. The issue over which
the Council had refused to adjourn when the ministers took
office was their failure to obtain supply before resigning to
contest the ministerial elections. Thomson himself suggested
that they protect themselves with an indemnity bill, although
2the suggestion came after they had already decided to do so. 
Thomson's bill would presumably have covered all expenditure 
not authorized by an act of parliament, even that incurred by 
previous governments. However, he did not specify what 
expenditure should be included in the bill and it is not 
surprising that the government did not anticipate his desires, 
for the Council's refusal to adjourn centred around its own 
misdemeanours.
"^Gordon, Hoskins and John Campbell in S .M .H . . 21, 22 June 
1860.
Thomson in S,M.H,, 4 April 1860.2
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Once it had introduced the Indemnity Bill, the government 
could not follow Denison's advice and extend it to meet the 
Council's objections without incurring the wrath of the 
radicals in the Assembly. The government was by no means 
secure, and the power which the more radical members wielded 
over it was shown when they forced Cowper to retreat from 
another attempt to conciliate the Council. On 25 April, Cowper 
announced that future expenditure in anticipation of the 
Appropriation Act would be sanctioned by both houses.'*' In 
fulfilment of this undertaking, he gave notice eight days later 
of a motion
That this Council concurs in the expenditure of a 
sum not exceeding £78,000 to defray the expenses of the various government departments and services 
of the colony for the month of May 1860, at the 
rates sanctioned for the past year, and a sum not 
exceeding £1400 for the construction of roads and 
bridges and buildings during the same month.2
Cowper thereby conceded the Council's demand that it should be
asked for votes of credit, and Geoffrey Eagar noted with
satisfaction that his motion 'distinctly recognized the right3of the Council to deal with money questions'. But liberals in 
the Assembly objected that to ask the Council for a vote of 
credit would be 'a practical recognition' of its co-ordinate4powers in granting supply. They forced Cowper to ask leave to
amend his motion to read
That this Council is willing to concur in any 
measure for legalizing the expenditure necessary to 
meet the exigencies of the public service for the 
month of May 1860.^
Had the Council carried such a motion it would have constituted 
a clear recognition that it had no business with matters of 
supply. It therefore refused Cowper permission to make the 
amendment, and he withdrew the motion altogether.^
XS.M.H,, 26 April 1860.
2S.M.H., 4 May 1860.
3S.M.H., 28 June 1860.
^Windeyer in S.M.H,, 22 June 1860.
5Eagar in S.M.H., 28 June 1860. Cf. S.M.H,. 10 May 1860. 
6S.M.H., 10 May 1860.
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The Indemnity Bill had already been sent up from the 
Assembly, but the second reading was delayed for some six 
weeks while the Council waited for the government to table 
papers detailing all illegal expenditure since the last 
Appropriation Act had been passed.^" When debate on the bill 
eventually began early in June, the rationale behind the 
conservatives' hostile response to it became increasingly clear. 
It was not simply that to pass the bill without amendments 
would imply the validity of the Assembly's votes of credit; it 
was also that the conservatives interpreted the bill in the 
light of the growing radicalism of the Assembly and the known 
hostility of at least two ministers to the Council. As Docker 
put it:
It was well known that the opinion of the 
honourable gentleman who held the post of Premier 
in the present administration was against the 
Council, that honourable gentleman holding the 
oxDinion that it would be for the good of the 
country if there were no second chamber....
Knowing this he (Mr D.) looked upon this attempt 
of the honourable secretary [CowperJ to force on 
his bill as one of a series of attempts to destroy 
the standing of this Council, by gradually 
bringing about its degradation. ^
Other conservatives agreed with this pessimistic version of the
intentions with which the bill had been introduced. Thomas Hood
3described it as 'an insult to the House'; Robert Johnson
thought that it 'affected the stability of their political
institutions by threatening the permanence of this branch of
4the Legislature'; and, when the controversy reached its peak 
several weeks later, Thomson warned the conservatives that 
'there was a hope that the Council would be induced into 
playing the game of the Ministry, so that there might be a5pretext for sweeping them away'. Consequently, it was with 
every manifestation of ill feeling that the conservatives
1S.M.H., 26 April 1860. 
2S.M.H., 9 June 1860.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
5S.M.H.f 28 June 1860.
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amended the bill to cover all money spent after the passing of 
the Appropriation Act of 1859, including money spent on the 
authority of the Assembly's votes of credit.
When the bill was returned to the Assembly, it became 
apparent that most liberals were equally mistrustful of the 
motives of the Council. It was quite clear that Johnson and 
his supporters were bent upon effectively expanding the 
Council's financial powers at the Assembly's expense. One of 
their number, the renegade Cowper appointee, Geoffrey Eagar, 
had even attacked the basis of responsible government by 
arguing that ministries should have to answer to both the 
Council and the Assembly for their expenditure and take care 
'how they undertook the formation of governments without a 
majority of either House of Legislature to back them'.^ 
Moreover, to liberal fears of conservative intentions was added 
a widespread, if mistaken, belief in the validity of the 
Assembly's votes of credit. Members of the lower house had 
hitherto accepted almost without question that it was in order 
for governments to make payments on the authority of that house 
alone. They did not yet appreciate the strength of the 
Council's objections to such practices, and this is not 
surprising, for most of the conservatives had confused the 
issue by introducing extraneous polemics into the debate.
By the time the amended Indemnity Bill was returned to the 
Assembly, the liberals had become locked in an escalating 
pattern of conflict. They did not seek merely to maintain the 
validity of votes of credit, but carried the war to the Council 
by declaring that the Indemnity Bill was a money bill which the 
upper house could not amend. This constituted a massive 
expansion of the definition of a money bill and, had it become 
established, it would have prevented the Council from altering 
many bills which it had previously been entitled to amend.
There was not the least justification in law or precedent for 
regarding the Indemnity Bill as a money bill. It was simply a 
measure to protect the members of the government from the 
consequences of their illegal actions. It did not meet the 
constitution's definition of a money bill as one for 
'appropriating any part of the public revenue, [or] f°r
~S .M .H ., 9 June 1860.
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imposing any new rate, tax, or impost'7  ^ it had not been
introduced into the Assembly by a message from the Governor,
the only way in which a money bill could be brought in; and
when the bill was returned from the Council, the Speaker,
following the practice of the Speaker of the House of Commons,
certified that it was not a money bill, so that the amendments
2could be considered without breach of privilege. Nevertheless, 
the Assembly resolved by thirty-one votes to sixteen not to 
consider the bill on the grounds that it was a money bill or 
tantamount to a money bill. The vote was followed by loud 
cheering.* 23 45
The division in the Assembly was very much one between
liberals and conservatives as defined by their position on the
4land issue, and it must be doubted whether many liberals 
genuinely believed the arguments which they advanced in favour 
of the view that the Indemnity Bill was a money bill. Elias 
Weekes, the Treasurer, for instance, certainly knew that the 
Council could not originate money bills, yet he stated in 
consecutive sentences that the Indemnity Bill was a money bill 
which the upper house could not amend, and that the Council
should have introduced a new indemnity bill incorporating its5amendments. The same view was expressed by John Campbell.
How seriously Campbell took the arguments which he expressed 
in the debate can be guessed from the fact that he deliberately 
played for laughs at the expense of his own case. After 
calling the bill a money bill because it 'contained in it items 
of pounds, shillings and pence', he proceeded to parody this 
statement, which formed the basis of his argument, by observing 
that 'in the same measure a promissory note, which contained
^18 & 19 Viet., C.54, schedule I, clause 1.
2S.M.H., 22 June 1860.
3Ibid.
4All of the members who voted to consider the Council' 
amendments opposed free selection before survey. Only five of 
those who voted against considering the amendments opposed free 
selection before survey, although two others, Egan and McArthur, 
cast inconsistent votes on the land issue.
5S,M.H., 20 June 1860.
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the same figures, was a money bill'. An appreciative house 
roared with laughter
Men solicitous of their reputations on constitutional
matters could not afford to argue in public that any bill
containing 'items of pounds, shillings and pence' was a money
bill. Their efforts to justify their position on other grounds
involved them in many difficulties. Sir Daniel Cooper, the
former Speaker, still aligned with the liberals, argued that
the bill was, 'to all intents and purposes, a money bill...
although, perhaps, in a strictly legal point of view, it might
2to some hon. members appear to have another aspect'. He later
'admitted the point that this was not originally a money bill',
but claimed that the amendments in the Council (which had simply
increased the amount of illegal expenditure covered by the
3Indemnity Bill) had made it one. Still later, he conceded 
that 'The amendment of the bill, was, it was true, of an 
apparently harmless Character', but justified his opposition to 
it by claiming that 'there was an ulterior end in view' 
Similarly, Isidore Blake, a barrister, argued variously that 
the bill could not have been a money bill when it was 
introduced into the Assembly because it was not accompanied by 
a message from the Governor, that it was such a bill because it 
was 'a matter connected with supply', and that it had been made5into a money bill by the amendments in the Council. He also 
had difficulty with Erskine May, whom he twice quoted against 
his arguments on the use and standing of votes of credit.^ *
Examples of the strange arguments used in favour of the 
view that the bill was a money bill could be multiplied, but to 
no purpose. Their influence was ephemeral, for they merely 
served the political tactics of the moment. The liberals had 
decided to treat the Indemnity Bill as a money bill and all
1S.M.H., 21 June 1860.
2s .m .h ., 22 June 1860.
3Ibid.
^Ibid.
5s .m .h ., 20 June 1860.
6Ibid.
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arguments which helped to obscure the transparent fact that it 
was not one were equally useful. They had their origin partly 
in a sense of outrage that the Council's amendments attacked 
the Assembly's vote of credit system, which members of the 
lower house had hitherto regarded as acceptable, and partly 
in the fear that all the Council's actions on financial matters 
had some hidden motive.'1- But, although adopted partly for 
defensive motives, the position taken up by liberals in the 
Assembly in fact constituted a very dangerous attack upon the 
established rights of the Council, for if the Indemnity Bill 
could be regarded as a money bill, there would in future be few 
bills outside this class.
If the attitude adopted by the Assembly towards the 
Indemnity Bill implied a revolution in the respective powers of 
the two houses, but the arguments used by many liberals in the 
debate seemed to conservatives to threaten a more basic 
social revolution. Many liberals were not content merely to 
argue that the Council should conform to British precedent by 
refraining from exercising the power of amending money bills 
which it possessed according to the letter of the constitution. 
Instead, they poured contumely upon the written law as embodied 
in the constitution and appealed to vague doctrines of 'natural 
rights'. W.C. Windeyer, for instance, by no means a radical, 
argued that
there were times and occasions when any nice 
adherence to law became an abrogation of moral 
duty, when it became the bounden duty of every 
citizen who valued the rights he possessed, and 
especially when it became the representatives of 
the people who were guardians of those rights not 
to be too nice in the literal construction of any 
acts of parliament. [Here there was laughter, 
presumably from the conservatives.j Hon. members 
might laugh, but he would like to know how all 
constitutional rights and liberties were won.
Were they not won in the face of statutes, in the 
face of the decisions of Judges?...Those rights 
and liberties were obtained by the English people,
See the references to the Council's motives and attempts to 
extend its powers by Blake, Cooper, Parkes, Arnold, J. Campbell 
and Weekes, S.M .H., 21, 22 June 1860.
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by the Commons of England in the face of the 
subtle distinctions of the lawyers, and the 
servile and contemptible constructions of the 
churchmen.^
2Windeyer's friend, Parkes, argued a similar case, and 
although the tradition in which they stood was undeniably 
British, it was none the less radical for that. Theirs was the 
tradition of the English revolution, in which men overthrew 
established law and custom to obtain what they claimed as their 
rights. Elsewhere, Windeyer drew out the radical implications 
of the doctrines which lay behind the extension of the powers 
of the House of Commons.
As a matter of right...what was the necessity of 
an Appropriation Act at all? (Hear, Hear.) Would 
it not be competent for this House to vote in the 
supplies without any reference to the other branch 
of the Legislature? (Hear, Hear.) He was told 
that this was what the present proceedings meant.
If so, he was not afraid of it. He did not see 
why this House should not have the right, if the 
legislature chose to assert the principle of 
voting the supplies, irrespectively of the other 
House at all? (Hear, hear.)
Similarly, John Campbell, who 'believed lawyers could argue
black and white', contended that 'money bills should not be
4referred to the other House'; and W.M. Arnold, the Minister for 
Works, argued that 'The rights and powers of the other House 
were not to be construed by the Constitution Act alone, but 
connected with a consideration of those rights which, as British5subjects, they had brought from the old land'. But he went 
beyond the rights claimed by the Commons in England and said 
that the Council did not even have that right of assenting to 
money bills which was possessed by the House of Lords. These 
bills were referred to the Council not as a 'right', but as a 
'courtesy'.^ Such opinions had firm roots in doctrines of
1S.M.H., 22 June 1860. 
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4S.M.H., 21 June 1860. 
3Ibid.
6Ibid.
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natural rights, but they were in direct opposition to the 
colony's constitution.
Even in the Council, liberals were driven to disparage
statute law. Cowper noted legal opinion that the Constitution
Act allowed the Council greater powers than the House of Lords,
but instead of simply arguing like Thomson that the Council
should not exercise those powers out of deference to British
precedent, he dismissed legal opinion with the observation that
'He paid very little attention to the construction of the
lawyers upon Acts of Parliament, and since he had been in this
House he had paid less attention to their construction than
before he entered it'. Hargrave, the Attorney-General, would
not allow the rights of the people to be overridden by legal
technicalities. In his view, 'a much larger question came in
here than any mere question of the construction of a sentence...
the source of this Council's origin being the Crown, it had not
that inherent right of dealing with all matters, particularly
as regards money measures, that the other House had through its2connection with and origins from the people.' This statement
brought cries of protest from the conservatives, and at the end
of Hargrave's speech, Thomson said that 'he had never been more
astonished in his life than at the doctrines just enunciated
3by the hon. and learned Attorney-General'. He must have been 
much more disturbed by the views of James Hoskins, one of the 
few genuine radicals in the Assembly who spoke in the debates. 
Hoskins said that he would refuse to consider the amendments in 
the Indemnity Bill because they were made by a body which was 
unnecessary and which did not represent the people. He then 
used the occasion to warn of the consequences of delaying land 
reform:
he had no hesitation in saying that if the 
legislation [sic_; of this country continued to 
show themselves insensible to the demands and 
necessities of the people in regard to a Land 
Bill, he would not be at all surprised at an 
appeal by the people to physical force, and he 
thought the people would be justified in taking 
such a course ("Oh, oh") ....A very high authority 
had stated that when oppression reached a certain
1S.M.H.. 9 June 1860.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
156
point resistance became a duty (Hear, hear.)
Then he would put it whether, if the people were 
prevented from getting possession of the public 
lands and acquiring homes for themselves, they 
would not be justified in appealing from the 
Legislature who had refused to concede justice to 
them, to the higher law of justice - right, equity, 
and even force. (Ironical cheers. ) -^
Conservatives regarded the views of men like Hoskins as
symptomatic of a general breakdown in the bonds of law and
custom which had once sustained society, and their fears are
more easily explicable in the context of the repudiation of
statute law by even moderate liberals. Consequently, where once
conservative complaints about illegal expenditure had been muted,
they became strident, for such irregularities were increasingly
seen as part of a wider disrespect for the law. Darvall
outlined the catastrophic consequences of illegal expenditure:
If they could break the law in this respect, they 
could break it in any other way - they might do 
gross injustice, they might rob one man to 
benefit another - they might squander the public 
money without being answerable to any tribunal.
In short, if they once broke over the barrier of 
the law, they would leave the country at the 
mercy of any Government who dared to violate the 
law. New South Wales would then be a most unhappy 
place and he would have to leave it....He looked 
with deep apprehension at any attempt to violate 
the law and the usurpation of all power by the 
Assembly.^
The revolution in the balance of political power had 
shaken the conservatives. Their fears arose not simply from 
distaste at seeing radical doctrines triumph, but from personal 
anguish at the loss of power and at an apparent change in the 
moral quality of political life. They had been deprived of the 
satisfaction of helping to determine the future destinies of 
their society; they had lost the power to dispense patronage 
and, not unnaturally, were indignant that the liberals
XS .M.H,, 22 June 1860. 
2S.M.H., 20 June 1860.
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sometimes used it for political purposes;^ and they could not stop
radical attacks, many of them successful, on the pensions of
2worthy conservatives, on the salaries of officers of the
3Legislative Council, on the stipends of state-paid clergy and4on the security of the Church and School lands.
The attacks on these 'vested interests' were parallelled
by attacks on some of the leading conservatives as individuals.
The Chief Justice, Sir Alfred Stephen, a former President of
the Council, was the victim of politically motivated attacks in 
5the Assembly, and his salary was arbitrarily reduced when,
^For conservative complaints at 'political' appointments to the 
magistracy, the judiciary and other public offices, see S.M .H., 
22 February 1858, 2 March 1860, 18 January 1861, editorials;
Want in S,M.H., 25 April 1861; Black in S.M.H., 22 June 1860; 
and the discussion of Lutwyche's elevation to the Supreme 
Court in Chapter II, above.
2Especially H.H. Browne, immigration agent for 20 years, who 
had been given reason to expect that he, like other public 
servants employed before responsible government, would be 
awarded a pension when the post was abolished. Cowper argued 
strongly that the government's commitment amounted 'in fact to 
a contract', but nearly all the liberals combined against him 
to block the pension. (S.M.H., 18 April 1861; cf. article by
'Spectator' in S.M.H., 24 April 1861.) Browne was an old member
of the Australian Club and had been associated with the 
colony's conservative leaders in such activities as founding a 
Church of England College at Sydney University. (Empire,
1 November 1853; 'Original Founders and Old Members of the 
Australian Club in 1844', manuscript, King Papers, vol.2,
A1977, pp.224-33.)
3See, for example, the reduction by £100 of the salary of the 
Clerk of the Council in V . & P. (L.A., N.S.W.), 1861, pt.l,
p.477. The motion was carried against the government.
^Despite government opposition, the liberal majority in the 
Assembly passed a bill to declare these lands, which were 
vested in the defunct Church and Schools Corporation, waste 
lands of the Crown. It lapsed in the Council for want of a 
seconder. (S.M.H., 23 February, 13, 20 April 1861.) On state 
aid to religion, see Chapter VI, below.
5See, for example, the debate on the appointment of a select 
committee to investigate an alleged breach of privilege by 
Stephen. The debate was characterized by attacks on Stephen's 
political views and the charge against them, as the committee 
was forced to report, had no foundation. Cowper had refused 
to sit on the committee and had expressed doubts as to the 
propriety of appointing it. See S.M .H ., 4 April 1861 (debates) 
and 11 April 1861 (editorial).
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'broken down by overwork^ he took leave of absence. As a
result, he was forced to take his son from university and his
2wife had to dispense with the services of a governess. He
tried to leave the colony and applied for the position of Chief3Justice at Madras, but was rebuffed because he was too old.
Many years later Parkes compensated him for his loss of salary, 
but the events of 1860 remained Stephen's most bitter memory4when he made his peace as he awaited death in 1894. Similarly, 
old Alexander Berry was the victim of vicious attacks by the 
Reverend J.D. Lang, who not only libelled his character but was 
the inspiration behind the inclusion of some of his rural 
property in the Shoalhaven Municipality so that it would be 
subject to rates. The liberal Attorney-General, Lutwyche, 
insisted upon conducting Berry's prosecution of Lang himself, 
and in conservative eyes, he did not do his best to secure a
5conviction; and a conservative-dominated select committee 
reported that the liberal government had connived in Lang's 
attack on Berry's lands when it allowed the Shoalhaven 
Municipality to be incorporated illegally and ignored all pleas 
for redress/* 23 45*7 Unlike Stephen, Berry was never compensated, and 
seems to have gone to his death over a decade later suffering 
paranoiac delusions that his political enemies were still7persecuting him.
^Stephen to Parkes, 25 July 1894, P.C., vol.35, A905, pp.423-8.
2Ibid. Stephen had eighteen children, but nine were by a 
previous marriage and most were grown up.
3Therry to James Macarthur, 11 January 1861, Macarthur Papers, 
vol.34, A2930, p.89. Therry called Arnold, the Minister for 
Works, a 'very low & vulgar bully' for supporting the attacks 
on Stephen.
4Stephen to Parkes, 25 July, 22 August 1894, P.C., vol.35, A905, 
pp.423-8 and 226-8, respectively.
5Cf. Berry to Young, 8 July 1861, enclosed with Young to 
Newcastle, 3 October 1861, P.R.O./C.O., 201/519.
^S.M.H., 20, 21 June 1860. Cf. article by 'Critic', S.M.H.,
28 June 1860. The report of the select committee and the 
evidence presented to it are contained in J.L.C., 1859-60, 
vol.2, pp.699-784.
7Cf. Berry to Mitchell, 1 August 1868, Papers of Dr James 
Mitchell, A2026, p.273.
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For the conservatives, the personal consequences of
political change were acutely painful. Some of them left the
country, many would have left if they could, and others,
feeling with T.A. Murray that 'The post of honor... is a private 
2station1, withdrew from public life. In this context, their 
extreme and only partly rational response to the Assembly's 
stand on the Indemnity Bill becomes explicable. For them, that 
stand embodied all the evils of a society governed by men 
heedless of law and custom and drove them to a display of lofty 
defiance mingled with petulance and despair. In the Assembly, 
the eloquent Darvall was provoked to a characteristic 
exhibition of truculent self-indulgence as he contemplated 
the fate of a society where politicians proclaimed their lack 
of respect for the law:
woe to that country where the laws were broken....
They were now exhibiting the spectacle of a 
country governed by universal suffrage, given up 
to despotism. (Ironical Cheers.) This Assembly 
was falling lower and lower. (Hear, hear, and 
cheers)...though honourable gentlemen had received 
his opinions with ridicule, he could preserve his 
own self-respect.3
In the Council, the conservatives reacted with suicidal 
defiance and made a foredoomed attempt to force upon the 
Assembly the adoption of regular financial procedures and to 
insist upon the supremacy of the written constitution. Led by 
Isaacs, Johnson and Eagar, they announced that they would not 
pass the Appropriation Bill until an indemnity bill covering 
all expenditure not authorized by act of parliament had been 
passed. Johnson admitted that when the Appropriation Bill was 
passed it would, for all practical purposes, indemnify the 
Cowper, Forster and Robertson governments for their illegal 
expenditure; but it was for this very reason - that 'it would 
be a condonation of irregularities which had taken place' -4that he opposed it. He wanted an indemnity bill which would
^Cf. George Allen's Journal, 21 February 1865, Uncat. MSS, 
Set 477.
2Murray to James Macarthur, 27 April 1859, Macarthur Papers, 
vol.29, A2925, pp.271-9.
3s .m .h ., 20 June 1860.
4S.M.H. , 30 June 1860.
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explicitly recognize that any expenditure made without
sanction by act of parliament was illegal. Other conservatives,
including the moderate Thomson, had made it clear that not only
did they want such an indemnity bill, but they would refuse to
indemnify governments for illegal expenditure after the current 
1year.
In demanding such rigid financial practices, the
conservatives adopted a position which could not be justified
by an appeal to British practice. This, as much as the
uncompromising attitude of the Assembly, made their defeat
inevitable. Governor Denison warned Thomson that the threat to
reject the Appropriation Bill was 'absolutely insane' and
2threatened to swamp the Council if it was carried out. Thomson 
had already formed the same opinion and, after communicating3the Governor's warning to the President, Sir William Burton, 
he told the Council that it should not give its opponents a4pretext for sweeping it away. With seven other conservatives, 
he then crossed the floor to vote with the liberals, and the 
Appropriation Bill passed its third reading by thirteen votes 
to ten.
In order to give the conservatives a way out of the corner 
into which they had backed themselves, Thomson had drafted 
resolutions which declared that the Appropriation Act did not 
indemnify previous illegal expenditure and condemned such 
expenditure as 'derogatory to the principles of Parliament, and5subversive of the Constitution'." This expenditure included 
not only money spent in 1860 in anticipation of the 
Appropriation Act, but also money spent in 1859 which had not 
been covered by the Appropriation Bill for that year. Such 
illegal expenditure occurred almost annually in both New 
South Wales and Britain, and it was always sanctioned
^Want and Thomson in S.M.H., 13 June 1860.
2Denison, op.cit., vol.l, p.487, diary entry for 1 July 1860; 
Cowper to James Macarthur, 22 June 1861, Macarthur Papers, 
vol.28, A2924, pp.601-4; S.M.H., 29 June 1860.
3s.M.H.. 29 June 1860.
4S.M.H., 28 June 1860.
5S.M.H., 30 June 1860.
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subsequently by inclusion in supplementary estimates inserted
in the Appropriation Act for the following year. Thomson's
resolutions therefore condemned the traditional way in which
British governments had met emergency expenditure not envisaged
when the Appropriation Act was passed. Even in the debates,
where numbers and learning usually told in their favour, the
conservatives were forced onto the defensive by Cowper, who
produced telling precedents for expenditure not authorized by
iact of parliament."“ The resolutions found no favour with the 
2Governor, although he had supported the conservatives in their 
objections to the way in which the Assembly had used its votes
3of credit to give approval to money comprised in the estimates; 
and officials at the Colonial Office thought the Council's 
attitude unreasonable. Gardner observed that although there 
was no legal authority for spending money not voted by the 
legislature, the 'necessity for so doing, in anticipation of a 
future sanction, constantly arises in all Governments, and, if 
the expenditure is necessary, the sanction is not withheld4except from factious motives'. Officials at the Colonial 
Office were also of the opinion that the Council was bound by 
the analogy of the House of Lords, and that it should not 
exercise its technical right of amending money bills. In 
Rogers' view, a collision between the Council and the Assembly 
provoked by such an amendment would 'only be capable of 5settlement by swamping or threatening to swamp the former'.
Thus the Council, both in its attitude towards illegal 
expenditure and in its definition of its powers with respect to 
money bills, had taken a stand which could not be justified by 
British constitutional theory and practice. Reacting to 
distressing changes in their society, the conservatives had 
come to deny the relevance of British example to Australia.
1Ibid.
2Denison to Newcastle, 13 July 1860, P.R.O./C.O., 201/513.
3Want and Forster in S.M.H., 22, 28 June 1860.
4Minute on Denison to Newcastle, 13 July 1860, P.R.O./C.O., 201/513.
5Ibid.
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The radicalism of the electorate and the Assembly had found its 
reflex in the intransigence of the Council, where men who had 
once based their arguments on the solid grounds of precedent 
now adopted any position which gave hope of survival in a 
world where old theories did not apply.
Part 4
The Debate on Land Reform. 1861
D.W.A. Baker has argued that the liberal land legislation
of 1861 was the joint creation of 'wealthy landowners who owned
freehold estates' and 'the colonial middle classes'. These
men, he says, had no intention of promoting small scale
settlement, for 'clearly middle class business men and
land-owners would not provide for the dissolution of the
colonial proletariat by enabling it to become a class of
independent yeomen'. On the contrary, 'land reform was an
expression of the liberals' ideal of equality of opportunity...
a necessary stage of capitalist development by which the middle
classes established their superiority over the squatters'.^"
Most historians have discarded Baker's Marxist terminology
but have accepted much of his argument, for it is one of the
best expositions of the traditional view that New South Wales
politics was dominated by a clash between the squatters, on the
one hand, and the landowners and the urban middle classes on
the other. However, it has already been shown that this model
of political conflict is erroneous. By 1861, the leaders of
the business world and the most prominent lawyers were allies
of the squatters, and most of the urban liberals were men of
2inferior status. Similarly, most big landowners were
D.W.A. Baker, 'The Origins of Robertson's Land Acts', in 
J.J. Eastwood and F.B. Smith (eds), Historical Studies,Selected 
Articles, first series, Melbourne, 1964, pp.lll, 113, 124, 126.
See Chapters II and III above.2
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conservatives who opposed the land acts. In the Council, the
only big freeholder who supported them was John Robertson,
their principal sponsor;'" and in the Assembly they were again
opposed by most of the big landowners, although the majority
2was less impressive.
Most of the large freeholders also had squatting runs in
the unsettled districts, but some, like Robertson, T.A. Murray,
the Macarthurs, Joseph Docker, Arthur Hodgson, J.N. Oxley and
Alexander Park, were not squatters in this sense. They leased
Crown land near their properties in the settled districts
3(which by 1861 included the old intermediate districts), but 
these leases were subject to annual renewal and gave no 
security of tenure. If we confine our analysis to landowners 
of this type, then a similar but less definite pattern of 
opposition to the land bills emerges. In the Council and in 
the parliament as a whole, a majority of such landowners 
opposed the bills, but in the Assembly they favoured them by4six to four. The explanation for the slight majority in
Those members who are known to have held large amounts of 
freehold land and who opposed the land bills in the Council 
were Docker, Douglass, Mitchell, Park, Thomson, Allen, Berry, 
Towns, Fitzgerald, Faithfull and Lamb.
2Big freeholders who supported land reform in the Assembly were 
Cowper, Arnold, Scott, Flett, Gray and T.A. Murray. Robertson 
sat in the Council for most of 1861 and has been listed with 
the landowners in that chamber. Big freeholders who opposed 
the land acts included Farneil, Rotton, Jamison, Hamilton, 
Hodgson, Jenkins, Mort, Cummings, W. Russell, Broughton, Irving 
and J. Campbell. Some of the other pastoralists opposed to the 
land acts may also have been big freeholders.
3Cf. New South Wales Act, 23 Viet. no.4, and Robertson in 
S.M.H., 19 April 1861.
4In the Council, big landowners with no squatting interests in 
the unsettled districts who opposed the land acts were Docker, 
Douglass, Mitchell, Park, Thomson and Allen. Jamison, Farnell, 
Rotton and Hamilton were their equivalents in the Assembly.
Big landowners with no squatting interests in the unsettled 
districts who favoured the land acts were Robertson in the 
Council and Cowper, Arnold, Murray, Scott, Flett and Gray in 
the Assembly. Information on members' landed interests in this 
section of the thesis has been taken from squatting lists in 
V. & P. (L.A., N.S.W.), 1857, pt.l, pp.559-62; 1859-60, pt.III, 
pp.635-708, 891-902; the Australian Dictionary of Biography and 
its associated files.
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favour o.f land reform in the Assembly was probably that by 
1860 two-thirds of the agricultural electorates returned 
liberal members/ so that local landowners of conservative 
opinions found it much more difficult to gain election than did 
those who held liberal views. Moreover, it will be shown later 
that landowners who supported Robertson's land bills usually 
did so to the detriment of their own economic interests.
The conservative alliance of merchants, landowners and 
squatters was founded partly upon strong economic ties, for 
membership of the three groups overlapped to a considerable 
extent. There were numerous examples of big landowners with 
squatting interests in the unsettled districts, and men like 
the Macleays, the Cox family, J.M. Antill, Thomas Icely, 
Alexander Berry, William Russell, William Cummings, William Lee, 
Clark Irving and Robert Towns are only the most obvious.
Irving and Towns were also leaders of the business world - 
Towns as a big merchant and shipowner, Irving as a merchant and 
director of six companies. Such diversity of interests was not 
unusual, for most of the colony's 'merchant princes' were also 
squatters. John Alexander, Henry Prince, Gordon Sandeman,
Robert Tooth, T.S. Mort, Henry Mort, J.B. Rundle, David Jones, 
Thomas Holt, F. Ebsworth, S.K. Salting, John Gilchrist,
J.B. Watt, John Campbell and John Lamb are only some of the
2leaders of the business community who had squatting interests.
As Sydney-based capitalists with diversified economic 
interests, the merchant-squatters resented the way in which men 
like Wentworth and George Leslie pressed the claims of the3pastoral interest to the exclusion of all others, and they 
certainly did not want the colony converted into 'one great 
sheep walk'. In the early 1850s, some of them had been liberals, 
supporting mild land reform and opposing transportation and
Thirty-three members who voted on the issue of free selection 
before survey on squatters' leases in 1861 came from 
electorates which, according to the census of 1861, had a 
substantial agricultural component. Twenty-two of these 
members favoured free selection before survey on squatters' 
leases and only eleven opposed it.
2Based on the sources listed in footnote 4, p.163, above.
See above, Chapter I.3
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Wentworth's constitution. By 1861, however, they were nearly 
all united with the squatters in opposition to a liberal move­
ment which had introduced constitutional changes increasing the 
power of the 'little man1 2# and which was now promoting land bills 
designed not only to break the squatters' alleged monopoly over 
the public lands, but to give ‘little men' advantages over all 
classes of 'big men'. The land bills embodied the economic 
ideals of the class of small capitalists and minor professional 
men who rose to power at the elections of 1859 and 1860, and 
for that reason became the classic symbol of conservative defeat 
in the years following responsible government.
The difference between Robertson's land acts and the type
of land reform advocated by most of the patrician liberals of
the early 1850s was exemplified by the change in the Cowper
government's land policy after Robertson's appointment as
Minister for Lands and Works in January 1858. Until then,
Cowper and the most influential liberals had based their land
policy on the reports of select committees of the old
Legislative Council, which in 1847 and 1849 had argued that
the squatters were able to 'lock up' the Crown lands because
the high minimum price of £1 per acre made freehold ownership
uneconomic.'1' In 1857, with T.A. Murray as Minister for Lands
and Works, the Cowper government had introduced a bill whose
central feature was that it reduced the minimum price of land
to 5/- an acre in order to encourage freehold possession. Such
a bill was congenial to landowners who wanted to round off their
estates and to business and professional men who wanted to
become landowners, but it was anathema to both the squatters
and the radicals. The former feared that they would be forced,
for the first time, to make significant use of their pre-emptive
right of purchase in order to protect their runs against buyers
2attracted by the low price. The latter foresaw that while the 
auction system remained intact, the small man would not 
benefit by the low minimum price for, even where the squatter 
did not exercise his pre-emptive right, the big man would
1V. & P. (L.C., N.S.W.), 1847, pt.2, pp.513-20; 1849, pt.2, pp.543-60.
2Cf. S.M.H ., 10 December 1857, 'Political Summary'.
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always win at auction. Robertson thought that the clause in 
the 1857 bill reducing the price of land was 'introduced to 
afford facilities to the rich man to take possession of the 
country, to the exclusion of the poor man'; and he could not 
'consent to the reduction of the price of land, seeing that 
there was no chance of the poorer classes being benefited by 
it' . ^ His own proposal was to bypass the auction system by 
allowing men to take up land at a fixed price before it had 
been surveyed.
It is obvious that Robertson's type of land reform bore
little relationship to that proposed by the Cowper ministry in
1857. Robertson's scheme was designed to protect the little
man from the rigours of free competition, while the latter was
aimed at enabling men to purchase freehold estates at auction
and at forcing the squatters to pay for their land by
exercising their pre-emptive right of purchase. The gulf
between the two types of land reformers was revealed when
Robertson tried to amend the 1857 bill to allow free selection
before survey at a fixed price near towns and cities and to
2allow payment on credit. The proposal was less radical than
the one which he brought forward in 1860-61, but it was thrown3out by twenty-two votes to nine. Robertson then sided with 
the conservatives to defeat the bill.
The rejection of Robertson's amendment produced an angry 
reaction from radicals outside parliament, but Cowper initially 
set himself against the demand for change. 'With reference to 
moonlight or torchlight meetings', he said, 'he must say that 
he for one would never submit to the abolition of the auction4system, or the introduction of a clause for credit payments.' 
But the failure of his own land bill showed that he could not 
govern without the support of the radicals, and on 13 January 
1858 Robertson took office as Minister for Lands and Works on 
the condition that the government should introduce a land bill
4S.M.H., 4 December 1857.
2The amendment is printed in S.M.H., 25 November 1857.
3V. & P. (L.A., N.S.W.), 1857, p.278.
4S.M.H., 10 December 1857.
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based on the principle of free selection before survey."'" At
an election which began on the same day, the liberals made
gains at the conservatives' expense and Cowper, who in 1856 had
only hesitantly refused the positions of Colonial Secretary and
2Treasurer in Donaldson's government, was henceforth committed
to an alliance with radical liberals like Robertson.
Cowper supported Robertson's land bills in 1860-61 more
because he was a politician than because he was a landowner.
The same was probably true of W.M. Arnold, Minister for Works
and the third landowner in the ministry responsible for the
land acts. In 1857, Arnold had put forward in opposition to
the land reform schemes of Cowper and Robertson a proposal that3land should be sold cheaply on credit. He did not advocate free
selection before survey and was generally thought to oppose it,
but in 1860 Robertson became Premier and made Arnold Minister
for Works so that he was bound to support the land bills as
the ministry's principal legislation. When the bills were
introduced, Arnold's political enemies gleefully awaited the
recantation of his former views and prepared to charge him with
inconsistency. As Forster said:
the hon. member had in his public speeches 
expressed opinions so totally at variance with 
those of the Premier with whom he presumed he 
should vote on this occasion, that it was very 
natural that they should wish to hear how he would 
reconcile his vote w^th the opinions he had 
expressed in public.
It is not necessary to adopt Forster's censorious tones to agree 
with his basic point. There is no reason to reject the 
circumstantial evidence that Arnold's changed attitude towards 
free selection before survey was politically motivated.
If Cowper and Arnold should be regarded as politicians 
rather than as landowners, what of Robertson himself? The 
sincerity of his commitment to land reform is unquestionable, 
but it should perhaps be attributed to a radicalism born of his 
education and personal associations: he had been educated at 
the Reverend J.D. Lang's Australian College and was a lifelong
1S.M.H.. 8 January 1861.
2John M. Ward, article on Cowper in A .D .B., vol.3.
3S.M.H., 2 December 1857.
4S.M.H., 5 October 1860.
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friend of the radical clergyman. Robertson's views on the 
land question were certainly not the result of his economic 
interests as a landowner, for his Crown Lands Alienation Bill 
was inimical to the economic interests of that class. It was 
not mere conventional insincerity which led him to claim at 
least twice that 'There was no gentleman in that House whose 
estate might possibly suffer more than his by the operation of 
that bill'.* 2 34S
According to Baker, a 'really radical land law - one which
really did aim at establishing a multitude of small settlers -
would have enabled land to be sold at a very low price to
selectors, and it would have had stringent provisions (probably
of a quite arbitrary character) to prevent squatters and
3capitalists from buying at the reduced rates'. In fact, most
squatters, landowners and great capitalists thought that
Robertson's land acts were radical in this sense, and a close
examination of their provisions shows why.
In the first place, they made agricultural land available
at a very low price. Robertson's tenant farmers paid an annual4rent of between 10/- and £1 an acre and W.M. Arnold said that
agricultural land near his property was often rented at from
5£2 to £3 an acre, yet still returned a handsome profit. In
some cases, agricultural land was much more valuable.
T.A. Murray claimed in 1857 that squatters at Broulee were
letting land at £30 per acre - a price which they were able to
command because each acre yielded ten to twelve tons of
6potatoes, whose value 'on the ground' was £12 per ton. Under 
Robertson's acts, the ostensible cost for the full freehold 
title was £1 an acre, but in fact it was much cheaper. Only 
5/- an acre was to be paid when the land was taken up, and the 
rest could be paid only after three years. This was, in effect,
^Gollan, Radical and Working Class Politics, p.42.
2S.M .H.. 27 April 1861; cf. S.M.H., 5 October 1860.
3Baker, ‘The Origins of Robertson's Land Acts', p.124.
4S.M.H., 17 April 1861.
S .M . H. , 11 October 1860.
,M.H.. 4 December 1857.
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an interest free loan of three quarters of the price for three 
years. Even then, payment was not compulsory, for the free 
selector retained possession of the land provided that he paid 
interest on the remainder at the low rate of 5 per cent per 
annum. As this was below the ruling rate of interest in the 
colony, the wise free selector would never repay the 'loan' but 
invest his money elsewhere, paying the interest with a portion 
of the proceeds.“^ If he adopted this course, he would not 
receive the freehold title to the land, but his claim to it was 
secure and he could leave it to an heir.
In the second place, the land acts did have a stringent
provision which effectively prevented most squatters, big
landowners and wealthy capitalists from becoming legal free
selectors. The fact that it was sometimes circumvented by
fraud and perjury is as much a tribute to its stringency as to
the laxity with which it was enforced. As members of the
Council frequently complained, the land acts effectively
fjrevented men with large fortunes from becoming legal free
selectors by compelling bona fide residence for three years on
2the land selected.“ Established landowners and squatters 
already had homesteads which for purposes of economy and 
convenience they could not leave, and merchants and lawyers 
could not live on a free selection in the country.
Such men were sometimes driven to make illegal use of the 
free selection provisions of Robertson's land acts because the 
free selector was given privileges not possessed by those who 
had to buy at auction. On the one hand, the privileges were 
financial: those who bought land at auction were given no credit 
but had to pay the full price within three months of the date 
of purchase. If anyone bid against them at the auction, they 
also had to pay more than the minimum price of £1 an acre. On 
the other hand, the privileges meant that the claims of the 
free selector took precedence over the claims of the person who 
wanted to buy at auction. This meant that if a man requested 
that land should be put up at auction, a free selector could 
still claim it at any time until it was actually sold. As there
lS.M.H.. 18 April 1861, editorial.
^25 Viet., No.1, clause 18.
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was usually a gap of six to twelve months between an
1application and the auction, 'big men1 23 legally disqualified
as free selectors awaited the auction day with considerable 
2anxiety. Consequently, squatters, in particular, tried to 
circumvent the law by getting their employees, their children, 
and even the insane to select land on their behalf. The 
residence provisions in such cases usually remained unfulfilled, 
and the free selector retained the land illegally through 
perjury and the connivance (bought or unbought) of local land 
agents.
If the land acts discriminated against big men in general 
because they were unable to fulfill the requirement of bona fide 
residence imposed on free selectors, in at least three more 
ways the acts hurt the interests of big landowners in particular. 
Firstly, the acts extended to small landowners the pre-emptive 
right of leasing three times the area of their freehold 
possessions, £:>rovided that the land leased was adjacent to 
their property. This right had previously been enjoyed only by 
those owning at least one square mile of land - double the 
amount of the largest possible free selection.
Secondly, landowners who held such pre-emptive leases had 
in the past been able to defend them against 'peacocking' by 
outbidding other men at auction. As Robertson's acts gave 
priority to the claims of free selectors who could take the 
land without competition, the big landowner was left 
defenceless. Joseph Docker, the principal spokesman for the 
landowners in the Council, illustrated the danger by pointing 
out that there were two pieces of land near Robertson's own 
property which contained 'all the permanent water of the 
district'. He argued that if those lands were thrown open to
G.A. Price, 'Genesis of the Robertson Land Acts of 1861: a 
Study of the Evidence in the Liverpool Plains', M.A. thesis, 
University of New England, 1963, pp.91-2.
2Cf. Dan Coward, 'Free Selecting on the Eumerella Shore',
J.R.A .H.S., vol.55, pt.4, December 1969, pp.369, 371.
3Cf. ibid., passim; Sir Stephen H. Roberts, History of 
Australian Land Settlement, 1788-1920, Melbourne, 1968, (first 
edition, 1924), pp.238-42; and A. Morris and G. Rankin, in 
C.M.H. Clark (ed.), Select Documents in Australian History, 
1851-1900, Sydney, 1955, pp.126-34.
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free selection, Robertson's interests would 'materially
suffer'.'*' Robertson agreed.
Thirdly, big landowners, including Robertson, often
subdivided their estates and let portions to tenant farmers.
They thereby gained an income from rents and saw the value of
their property increased by the tenants' improvements.
Robertson found that it was good propaganda to pretend, at
times, that the free selectors would be the 'teeming masses of
the towns', but like other landowners he knew that the most
successful free selectors would probably be tenant farmers who
2wanted independence. Even in the 1850s, landowners frequently
3lost tenants who had purchased their own land. Under
Robertson's acts, which positively encouraged men to become
small proprietors by offering them the land of their choice
without competition and on generous terms of credit, landowners
seemed likely to lose their tenants much faster. As Robertson
pointed out, his own tenants, who had cleared the land, improved
it, resided on it and paid him 10/- to £1 an acre rent, would
be better off selecting land at 5/- an acre, paying no rent for
three years, then either paying 15/- an acre for the freehold
4title or paying rent at 5 per cent or 9d an acre. They would 
also gain the benefit of their own improvements.
It is only when it is appreciated that the land acts 
drscriminated against big men in general, although against 
squatters and landowners in particular, that the Legislative 
Council's stand against them can be understood. Only a minority5of the conservatives had squatting interests and they did not 
seek merely to defend the squatters. All conceded that pastoral
1S.M.H,, 27 April 1861.
2“See the evidence of Robertson and Edwin Hickey before the 
Select Committee on the State of Agriculture, V . & P. (L.C.,
N.S.W.), 1855, vol.3, pp.303, 312. See also the views of
W.M. Arnold, S.M.H.. 8 May 1861.
3See the evidence of Edwin Hickey, V . & P. (L.C., N.S.W.), 1855,
vol.3, pp.302-4.
4Cf. Robertson, S.M.H ., 17 April 1861.
5Of the twenty-eight conservatives who were active members of 
the Council in 1861, nine had squatting interests. (Based upon 
squatting lists in V . & P. (L.A., N.S.W.), 1857, pt.I,
pp.559-62 and 1859-60, pt.3 , pp.635-708.
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occupation should give way when land was required for
agricultural purposes. As G.K. Holden explained:
The unquestionable principle admitted by all 
parties was this - that pastoral occupation must 
lead to agriculture when the land was required....
That pastoral occupation must yield to agriculture 
appeared to him to result from the same law of 
society which justified us in superseding the^ 
aboriginal tribes from their hunting grounds.
Even Robert Johnson admitted the great truth that pastoral
occupation should give way to agriculture and endorsed a
proposal by Deas Thomson that a levy be raised from the
squatters themselves to compensate those whose lands were
2resumed for agricultural purposes.
The conservatives' opposition to the bills was three-fold.
They were concerned, as Holden said, ‘that as little injury was
done to the pastoral interest as was compatible with the
3beneficial occupation of the land'; they denounced the bills
as 'class legislation in favour of what was called the “poor
4man" in preference to what was called the "rich man"'; and 
they argued that 'artificial legislation' to 'encourage 
agriculture, against manifest and acknowledged disadvantages,
5must be futile and must of necessity result in disappointment'.
They thereby invoked in opposition to the bills precisely the
principles of justice, equality of opportunity and economic
laissez faire which the liberals often adduced in their support.
The conservatives accepted the verdict of the people at
the elections of December 1860 that a bill should be passed
allowing free selection before survey. Thomson led the way by
announcing that he would accept the principle of free selection 
6before survey' and even the extremists said that they would
1S.M.H., 13 April 1861.
2S.M.H., 17 April 1861.
3S.M.H., 13 April 1861.
^Johnson in S . M . H ., 17 April 1861; cf. his views and those of
Isaacs, S .M ,H ., 24 April 1861; and the opinion of Docker, S.M.H.,
13 April 1861.
^Holden in S .M .H ., 13 April 1861. Cf. Johnson, S .M .H .,
17 April 1861.
 ^S .M .H . , 11 April 1861.
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support the bill: Johnson said that he would submit to the will
of the majority in order to allay the unhealthy suspense;"*" and
Docker agreed to the principle of free selection because 'the
country had spoken out in favour of it in a most unmistakeable 
2manner'." Consequently, the bill passed its second reading 
without opposition.
In committee, the conservatives showed that while they 
accepted the principle of free selection, they wanted to limit 
the extent of its application. They were all prepared to allow 
free selection before survey in the first class settled 
districts, which consisted of the comparatively well populated 
areas called the settled districts under the 1847 Order-in- 
Council. Some of the moderates were also prepared to allow 
free selection in the second class settled districts, which 
embraced the old intermediate districts described in the 1847 
Order-in-Council. The view of the moderates^ prevailed when 
some of them combined with the liberals to allow free 3selection in both the first and second class settled districts. 
However, all the conservatives remained opposed to free 
selection on runs in the unsettled districts except on specially 
declared reserves. This proposal would still have allowed the 
alienation of most of the land needed for agricultural 
purposes, for even before 1861, such reserves allowed those who 
could purchase agricultural land at auction a reasonable4choice; and until the first leases or licences expired on
, 17 April 1861.
2S.M.H., 13 April 1861.
3J .L .C ., 1861, p.210. The conservatives who crossed the floor 
were Hunt, Park, Prince, Holden, Lamb, G.W. Allen, and Lord. 
Nearly all of them were former liberals. The majority was 
fifteen votes to twelve.
4This was the claim of the conservatives. It was denied by the 
liberals, who argued that the land on the reserves was 
unsuitable for agriculture. This was no doubt true in some 
cases, but the only detailed study of a local area has shown 
that the complaints made there were generally unfounded.
(Price, 'Genesis of the Robertson Land Acts...', pp.III, 27-33, 
44-52, et passim.) Moreover, it seems unlikely that the 
numerous reserves declared by the Cowper and Robertson 
governments contained much infertile land, and even if they did, 
intending buyers had only to petition the Surveyor-General to 
have the reserves extended or have new ones proclaimed. Price 
has found no evidence that such claims were refused in the 
Liverpool Plains district. (Ibid., p.33.)
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31 December 1865, nearly all land bought in the unsettled
districts was selected on reserves because Robertson decided
to 'keep faith' with squatters who had taken up land before he
had won office and given notice of changes in the land law.'*'
The conservatives were thus prepared to go a long way towards
meeting Robertson's views - and indeed, Robertson had been
prepared to accept identical limitations on free selection in
the Assembly in 1860 until it became apparent that he would
2alienate his supporters by doing so.
The conservatives also tried to extend the length of 
leases in the unsettled districts from five years to ten or 
fifteen years, but all the other changes which they introduced 
were not designed to help the squatters in particular but to 
give advantages to 'big men' in general and reduce the 
advantages which Robertson had given to the 'little man'. The 
changes, which were all opposed by Robertson, had the effect of:
1. Banning free selection on lands under application for 
purchase at auction, provided that the applicant had 
paid a deposit of 50 per cent. (Docker, who thought 
the clause necessary to defend the pre-emptive rights 
of landowners, wanted no deposit, or, alternatively,
a deposit of 10 per cent. Some conservatives wanted3a deposit of 25 per cent.)
2. Raising the deposit required of free selectors from 
25 per cent of the total price to 50 per cent. (The 
conservatives argued that the low deposit would 
encourage men with 'insufficient' capital to go onto 
the land.)* 234
3. Eliminating the free selector's option of paying 
interest at 5 per cent per annum if he did not wish 
to pay the whole price after three years. (This 
amendment, like the previous one, made it more
^Ibid., p.31, footnote 2.
2Rotton, Robertson and Egan in S.M.H ., 8 February 1861; Cowper 
and others, S.M.H., 8 May 1861.
3
J .L .C., 1861, pp.213-4, 220-1; Docker in S.M.H., 27 April,
1 May 1861.
4J.L.C., 1861, pp.212-3; S.M.H., 27 April 1861.
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difficult for the man with little capital to become a 
free selector. Debate on the amendment was very 
brief, but the conservative who proposed it argued 
that it would lead to defalcations.)^
4. Allowing land to be sold at auction in lots of up to 
640 acres instead of in lots of up to 320 acres.
(Robertson defended the 320 acre maximum on the 
grounds that it would help the small capitalist who 
could afford to bid for 320 acres but not for 640
v 2acres.)
5. Allowing appeal in cases of dispute from arbitrators
to the Supreme Court. (This amendment would have
given advantages to those with the wealth and
knowledge to go to law. Robertson, expressing
characteristic liberal mistrust of the predominantly
conservative legal profession, bitterly opposed the
change because it would hand the free selector over to3'the harpies of the Supreme Court'.)
6. Repealing only those parts of the 1847 Order-in-Council 
inconsistent with the land acts, instead of repealing 
the whole Order-in-Council and inserting in the acts 
clear and specific safeguards for the legal rights of 
squatters. (This amendment would have introduced many 
legal complications into the interpretation of the acts, 
once again helping those able to use the processes of 
the law. Robertson did not give his reasons for 
opposing the change, but Cowper's objection was that it4would necessitate 'frequent applications to lawyers'.)
In the debates on the bills, both liberals and 
conservatives protested vehemently when accused of favouring a 
particular class. Such denials were undoubtedly sincere, but
ui—1 1861, pp.214-5; Want in S.M.H., 1 May 1861.
2J.L.C., 1861, p.216; Robertson in S.M.H., 1 May 1861.
3j .l .c . , 1861, pp.221-2; Robertson in S.M.H., 4 May 1861.
Hargrave, the Attorney-General: 'it would be better to leave
the settlement of the points at issue to arbitration rather 
than to hand them over to the tender mercies of the Supreme 
Court'. (Ibid.)
^J.L.C., 1861, p.219; Cowper in S.M .H., 8 May 1861.
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all views on the land question inevitably reflected assumptions 
as to the extent to which men of substance should be allowed 
to utilize the advantages of wealth. Both liberals and 
conservatives simply identified the interests of their favoured 
class with the interests of society as a whole. The 
conservatives contended that the 'natural' advantages of wealth 
should be allowed free play, while the liberals sought to limit 
them and to give special privileges to those willing to fulfill 
the conditions of residence imposed upon free selectors - most 
of them men with only a little capital. Partiality was 
inevitable and, alongside the denials, it crept into the 
debates. The conservatives openly argued the case of the 
squatter, the landowner and the wealthy, inserting amendments 
which favoured them; and although Robertson repeatedly stated 
that the bills were intended to remove the special privileges 
of the squatters, he said just as often that they were intended 
to favour the little man and to encourage small scale 
settlement.^ In the first case, he was appealing to the 
conventional doctrine that the state should not legislate in
For example, the following expressions are all taken from his 
speech on the second reading of the Crown Lands Alienation Bill 
in the Assembly in 1861, conveniently reproduced in M. Clark 
(ed.). Sources of Australian History, London, 1957, pp.342-51: 
'...desirous in every way to facilitate the permanent occupation 
of the country by freeholders.. . ' ; '...a moderate and practical
solution of the land question as should... afford opportunities 
to the mass of the people to make homes for themselves and 
settle down on the land.. . ' ; 'The next great duty of the 
Government would be to facilitate the occupation of the public 
lands of the colony by freeholders...'; '...the best way to
obtain the largest amount of production for a given amount of 
soil, would be to place that soil as soon as possible in the 
hands of freeholders'; 'He had always considered it one of the 
most important duties devolving upon the Government to 
facilitate and to encourage freehold occupation.' The speech 
from which these extracts are taken placed little emphasis 
upon the removal of the squatters' privileges, but at other 
times this argument was given greater prominence. However, the 
removal of these privileges was regarded not only as good in 
itself, but was justified with reference to the beneficial 
effects which it would have on agriculture. Robertson's most 
detailed enumeration of 'unjust' squatter privileges, which 
Baker has drawn on extensively, illustrates the point perfectly. 
See his evidence before the Select Committee on the State of 
Agriculture, V . & P . (L.C., N.S.W.), 1855, vol.3, pp.311-16.
See also his speeches in S .M .H ., 5 October 1860 and 17 April 
1861.
177
favour of any class; in the second case, he was appealing to 
the popular ideal of a virtuous and independent yeomanry. He 
did not see any contradiction between the two because he 
believed that squatter privileges were the major impediment to 
the creation of a yeomanry. Neither he nor his supporters 
dreamed of the distinction which modern historians have made 
between the desire to remove squatter privileges and the desire 
to put the small man on the land. That small scale settlement 
would inevitably follow once impediments to it had been removed 
was the logical consequence of belief in the principles of 
laissez faire.
Yet, in practice, the belief in laissez faire and the
desire to create a yeomanry became antagonistic, although
liberals who cherished both were able to rationalize the
contradiction sufficiently well to ignore it. That the desire
to create a class of small scale agriculturalists was dominant
had been revealed in 1857, when Robertson's original land reform
proposal had specified that the free selector would lose his
land if, at the end of five years, he had not brought a quarter
of it under cultivation. ‘ The proposal had been strongly
attacked by the Sydney Morning Herald on the grounds that:
To force a man to till a certain proportion of his 
land under the threat of depriving him of the 
freehold, is an interference with the principles 
of free trade, and the history of commerce bears 
uniform testimony to the loss to the community 
that is occasioned by such interference....All the 
wisdom of all the economists put together can 
contrive nothing more judicious than just letting 
people alone.
The criticism exposed the contradiction in Robertson's 
position - a contradiction which was especially dangerous in a 
colony where the principles of laissez faire dominated economic 
thought. He therefore tried to circumvent this type of attack 
in his later reform proposals. His land acts in 1861 merely 
specified that within three years the land had to be improved
The proposal is printed in S.M .H ., 25 November 1857. The 
amount of land to be brought under cultivation was left open, 
but Robertson had in mind the figure of 25 per cent. (S,M.H., 
29 November 1857.)
^S.M .H ., 10 December 1857 (editorial) .
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to the value of £1 an acre and limited the size of a free
selection to 320 acres. He repeatedly emphasized that the acts
were intended to encourage the creation of a class of small
scale pastoralists, as well as to boost small scale
agriculture. He may have convinced himself that this would be
the case, but, as the conservatives pointed out, pastoral
2enterprises were not viable on such a small scale. Most
liberals seemed to agree, for Robertson was almost alone in
asserting that the acts would form the basis of a small scale
pastoral industry. Since the acts also sought to protect the
little man from the rigours of economic competition, the
conservatives were able to claim with some justification that
the bills were a negation of the principles of laissez faire
3which were often adduced in their support.
The principles of laissez faire were used to justify both 
support for the land acts and opposition to them, but they 
explain neither. They were invoked, as popular beliefs, to 
rationalize and vindicate positions adopted for deeper reasons. 
The nature of these reasons is suggested by the revelations of 
class bias in the debates, which reflected the different social 
and economic profiles of liberals and conservatives. For the 
conservatives, the land acts were discriminatory legislation 
which would drive 'men of capital' from the colony; they were 
the first instalment of the 'class legislation' to be expected 
from the men of inferior status who had risen from impotence to 
political dominance since responsible government; they were the 
first fruits of manhood suffrage. For the liberals, the acts 
were a rejection of established wealth and privilege; they 
reflected the economic interests and ideals of the small 
capitalists, tenant farmers and frugal artisans whose 
parliamentary representatives defended the legislation as 
'classless'; in short, the acts expressed in economic terms the 
revolution in the balance of political power which followed 
'responsible government.
^See, for example, S .M .H . , 17, 19 April 1861. 
2Cf. Docker, S .M .H ., 13 April 1861.
3Cf. Holden, S .M .H ., 13 April 1861.
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Measures which so precisely embodied the liberal-
conservative conflict in New South Wales were bound to bring
the Council into collision with the Assembly. The conservatives
in the Council, seeing that the elections of December 1860 had
ensured liberal dominance in the Assembly, had decided to
concede much; the liberals, elated by their new strength, were
determined to concede nothing. Consequently, when the Crown
Lands Alienation Bill was returned to the Assembly, that body
rejected every substantial amendment. When the bill was sent
back to the Council, the conservatives seem to have believed
that they could force Robertson to accept the type of
compromise which he had agreed to in 1860 until confronted by
the possibility of a revolt. They therefore insisted upon
their amendment limiting the right of free selection in the
unsettled districts to reserves proclaimed by the government.
When they had also insisted upon several other amendments,
Robertson, believing that they were adamant in their
opposition, requested that further consideration of the bill be
postponed until the next day in order to give him an opportunity
to consult his colleagues.^ Thomson thought that some clauses
of the bills could be discussed further that night and
suggested that the Council meet at 10 a.m. the next day or hold
2a conference with the Assembly. Robertson however, brushed 
aside Thomson's suggestions, claiming that he had 'submitted to 
all kinds of defeats on the Bill; defeats almost amounting to3indignity on any Government'. Angered by the Council's refusal 
to accept the land scheme on which he had set his heart, he 
seems to have already decided upon a swamping. Some months 
later, Hargrave, the Attorney-General, justified the swamping 
in terms which suggested that the ministers had been so 
incensed by the Council's conduct that they had never 
entertained the thought of compromise:
Empire, 10 May 1861. The Empire1s account of the adjournment 
of the debate on the land bills has been preferred to the 
Herald's as it contains additional detail confirmed by other 
evidence. i
"Empire, 10 May 1861.
^Ibid.
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He remembered well his feelings during the months 
of opposition and obstruction they had to endure - 
he said obstruction, for such he conscientiously 
believed it; and he welcomed the approach of the 
day, then at hand, when those gentlemen must retire 
from their places. And did [those] gentlemen, 
almost within a few hours of retiring from their 
seats - did they imagine that the Government meant 
to treat them to a conference with the Assembly?
If they did, the Government, at all events, never 
entertained such an idea.^
When Robertson adjourned the debate to consult his
colleagues, he had to assume that there was only one sitting
day left before the quinquennial appointments to the Council
expired. Another sitting day could have been gained only if the
Council consented to sit on a Saturday, something which it had
2refused to do only two weeks previously.* 24- *12 As Thomson pointed
out, one day was sufficient to allow a conference between the
houses, but before accepting his suggestion, the ministers had
to be sure that it would result in rapid agreement or they
would lose the chance of passing the bills by a swamping. Ten
days earlier, the Council's President, Sir William Burton, had
3told the Governor that the bills would 'certainly' pass, and 
other conservatives claimed later that if a conference had been 
held, they would have been prepared to concede all, or nearly
4all, of the Assembly's demands. This was no doubt true. Such
^Hargrave, S .M .H ., 13 December 1861.
2J.L.C., 1861, p.147. (26 April.)
^Young to Newcastle, 19 July 1861. P.R.O./C.O., 201/518.
4Cf. Thomson to Young, 7 June 1861, Deas Thomson Papers, vol.2,
pp.499-506: 'Those of us who were members of the late Council
were prepared to yield...if a conference had been demanded';
Sir W. Macarthur to James Macarthur, 15 May 1861, Macarthur
Papers, vol.38, A2934, p.508: 'the Ministry prevailed on the
Governor... to swamp the majority - and this without any attempt 
at a conference, or to ascertain how far the Council would 
concede (and they were prepared to concede much)1; Augustus 
Morris, S .M .H ., 11 May 1861: 'they would have been prepared if 
there had been a conference to have yielded every point but 
one, and that one not of a very material nature'; S .M .H ., 
editorial, 13 May 1861: 'a majority of the Council would have
finally yielded to all the demands of the Assembly'; and 
T.H. Mate said that the only point on which the Council would 
not have given way was the clause allowing free selection on 
land under application for purchase at auction. (S.M.H.,
12 September 1861.)
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a course would have been consistent with their behaviour in
every previous clash with the Assembly; it was widely
appreciated that the government was contemplating a swamping;
and the Sydney Morning Herald, a reliable guide to moderate
conservative opinion, had advised the Council to register its
opposition, then to 'permit the fools who had surrendered their
understanding to the Dictator... to enjoy the benefit of their
political slavery, and to have the bill, the whole bill, and
nothing but the bill'.'*' But whatever the private intentions of
the conservatives, the decisive manner in which they had until
then insisted upon their amendments convinced Robertson that
they would remain obdurate. The ministers had to carry the
2bills because 'their honor was at stake' and, faced with the
choice of a conference or a swamping, they chose the latter as
the more certain means of having the bills passed intact. They
therefore told the Governor, Sir John Young, that if he did not
3swamp the Council, they would tender their resignations.
Young had little alternative but to accept their advice.
No other ministry would have been acceptable to the Assembly, 
and he could not hope to solve the problem by dissolving 
parliament because it was a dissolution on the land issue less 
than six months previously which had given the government its 
enormous majority. As Young realized, either course 'would 
only have involved the Crown in a contest, certain to end in
4defeat, with the Legislative Assembly and the constituencies'.
5Moreover, as Loveday has pointed out, Young appreciated that 
from a conservative point of view it was better to swamp a 
Council due to expire in three days than to have the 
nominations for life made with the advice of a ministry anxious 
to placate the Assembly by appointing supporters of the land
~*~S . M. H . , 24 April 1861, editorial. The 'Dictator' was, of
course, Robertson.
"Young to Newcastle, 19 July 1861, P.R.O./C.O., 201/518.
3 Ibid.
4Ibid.
5Peter Loveday, 'The Legislative Council in New South Wales, 
1856-1870', Historical Studies, vol.ll, no.44, April 1965, 
pp.489-92.
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bills. He therefore agreed to summon twenty-one new members
to the Council, on the condition that this would give them no
claims to reappointment for life.
Less than a year previously, Sir William Burton had
publicly stated that if the Council were swamped, he would
continue as its President, 'even if the Gaul was at the gate,
and the Gaul's sword pointed at his throat'.^ When that day
arrived, he waited upon the Governor only forty minutes before
the Council was due to meet, but was told nothing of the new
appointments. He then went to the Council chamber, where he
heard rumours of a swamping. He refused to believe them.
Then Robertson entered his room and asked 'Have the Commissions 
2come?' Offended at the Governor's failure to give him the
customary notification of new appointments, and shocked that
the constitutional alternatives to swamping had not been
exhausted, Burton immediately wrote to the Governor resigning
both his position as President and his seat as a member of the 
3Council. He then entered the Council chamber to make his 
action public and, with nineteen other conservatives who had4already decided to resign, walked out. Thus an excellent and 
impartial President who had compromised with the liberals 
whenever possible, was brought to the fold of the Johnsons, the
XS,M.H., 8 June 1860.
2Burton to Newcastle, 1 July 1861, enclosed with Young to 
Newcastle, 19 July 1861, P.R.O./C.O., 201/518.
3Burton to the Administrator of the Government, 10 May 1861, 
copied in Burton to the Secretary of State, 1 July 1861, which 
is enclosed with Young to Newcastle, 19 July 1861, P.R.O./C.O., 
201/518. Young had arrived in the colony only a short time 
previously and was not aware that it was customary to notify 
the President of nominations. See Turville to Burton, 11,
14 May 1861, Governor's Letters, Archives Office of N.S.W., 
4/1666. At the time of the swamping, Young was technically 
Administrator of the Government, as he was not sworn in as 
Governor until 15 May 1861. To avoid confusion, I have 
referred to him as the Governor throughout.
4An article in S.M.H., 10 May 1861, was able to predict that if
a swamping took place it would be in vain. The fact that they 
had already decided to frustrate the swamping does not, of 
course, mean that the conservatives would have refused to agree 
voluntarily to the Assembly's stand on the land bills at a 
conference.
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Isaacs and the Dockers. Forgetful of his promise to carry on
with the Gaul's sword at his throat., he joined the other
conservatives in one last gesture of defiance, frustrating the
purpose of the swamping by depriving the Council of a quorum.
it was only a gesture. The 'upper or richer classes', as Young
called the conservatives/ had been vanquished. Burton, who
had hoped to end his days serving the people of New South Wales,
now saw no future in that place. He advertised his house and
2property for sale and hastily left the colony.
^Young to Newcastle, 19 July 1861, P.R.O./C.O., 201/518.
2Ibid. Burton had been a Supreme Court Judge in New South 
Wales from 1832 to 1844, and from then until 1857, Puisne Judge 
at Madras. He then retired to New South Wales, where he wanted 
to devote himself 'to the good of the community in a 
conservative, and Christian spirit'. His preferred mode of 
service was as President of the Legislative Council, an office 
which he solicited. (Burton to James Macarthur, 11 January 
1854, Macarthur Papers, vol.27, A2923, p.206.) See also 
article on Burton in A,D.B ., vol.l, and Burton's farewell 
address to the St Leonard's School of Arts, S .M .H ., 24 June
1861.
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CHAPTER V
COWPER AND THE COUNCIL, 1861-1862
Sir John Young's decision to swamp the Council was 
technically a breach of constitutional convention. The classic 
precedent was William IV1s agreement to swamp the House of Lords 
if such a step proved necessary to pass the 1832 Reform Bill.
On that occasion, the bill had been the subject of a 
dissolution which had returned the reform ministry with an 
increased majority; the Lords had already rejected it once; and 
the swamping was threatened only when a second rejection seemed 
imminent. That an upper house was to be allowed one rejection 
of a matter upon which the popular will had been tested was 
deemed essential to its conservative function as a 'delayer' of 
the 'rash' measures expected of the democratic chamber.
What so angered the conservatives in New South Wales was 
that the Council was not even allowed to exercise its right of 
rejecting the land bills once. The Governor's complicity in 
the swamping seemed worse, in their view, because the Council 
had been prepared to pass the bills the first time, but had 
been prevented from doing so by the government's failure to 
arrange a conference of the houses. It was for this reason 
that, when Wentworth was invited to become President of the 
reconstructed Council in 1861, he accepted only on the 
condition that
the Council is not to be swamped... until the 
rejection by it of some vital question upon which 
the opinion of the country has been previously 
taken, after a dissolution of the Assembly for 
that express purpose.2
Young's answer to the charge that he had violated 
constitutional precedent was that the position in which he was 
placed, with the Council about to expire, was without precedent 
and could never recur. He therefore felt able to depart from
"*"Cf. Merewether, S .M .H . , 6 December 1861; Wentworth, S .M.H. , 
11 September 1862.
2Wentworth to Young, 14 June 1861, Wentworth Papers, A756, 
p p .221-4.
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established practice as 'No precedent could be founded on the
proceedings'. ^ His positive incentive to make such a departure
was pragmatic: he wanted the land bills out of the way so that
he would not be pressed to appoint to the reconstructed Council
a large number of liberal nominees whose task it would be to
2ensure the safe passage of the land bills.
3Young's defence has won the approval of later historians,
but most contemporaries either did not understand it or thought
it irrelevant. He was reproved by Newcastle, Secretary of
State for Colonies, for having sanctioned 'a proceeding which
is not creditable to the cause of Constitutional Government in 4Australia'. Most conservatives in Australia were more bitter 
in their reproaches. Wentworth, dismayed that the government 
had departed from 'the principle which guided the proceedings 
in reference to the House of Lords', pronounced his5constitution 'a failure'; Merewether described the swamping as 
‘a violent outrage...on British constitutional practice';^ and 
Sir William Burton condemned Young as a party to an act which 
had the effect of 'insulting and degrading' the Council. The 
conservatives did not accuse Young of acting from malice, but 
agreed with the Sydney Morning Herald that he had become the 
tool of his ministers. The Herald was at times inclined to 
regard this as an evil inherent in responsible government as it
^Young to Newcastle, 21 May 1861, P.R.O./C.O., 201/518.
2Ibid.; cf. Young to Newcastle, 19 July 1861, P.R.O./C.O., 
201/518.
3Cf. C.H. Currey, 'The First Proposed Swamping of the 
Legislative Council of New South Wales', J.R.A.H,S., vol.15, 
pt.5, 1929, pp.282-91; Peter Loveday, 'The Legislative Council 
in New South Wales, 1856-1870, Historical Studies, vol.ll, 
no.44, April 1965, pp.481-98; Neil I. Graham, 'The Role of the 
Governor of New South Wales under Responsible Government, 1861- 
1890', Ph.D., Macquarie University, 1973, pp.59-73, 77.
4Newcastle to Young, 26 July 1861, Government House Papers, 
Despatches from the Secretary of State, 1861. Cf. Newcastle to 
Young, 25 July 1861 (private), Newcastle Papers, vol.B-2, 
microfilm A-308, Public Archives of Canada. (Originals in 
Nottingham University Library.)
JS.M.H., 11 September 1862.
kS.M.H .. 18 October 1862.
^Burton to Newcastle, 1 July 1861, enclosed with Young to Newcastle, 19 July 1861, P.R.O./C.O., 201/518.
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existed in the colony,^ at other times as the product of the
2Governor's personal deficiencies. Other conservatives had no
such doubts: Sir Charles Nicholson thought Young had displayed3a 'lamentable want of firmness'; and Sir William Macarthur said
that he was 'evidently a weak man' and probably 'an insincere 
4one'. Burton, who had led the walkout which frustrated the 
swamping, was lionised as a hero by the conservatives and some, 
led by Isaacs and James Martin, immediately tried to hold a 
dinner in his honour. However, more prudent conservatives like 
Sir William Macarthur declined the invitations because they 
'thought the excitement of a public dinner just now...might 
have a most injurious tendency...' and | could only excite the 
democratic influence'. They thought it 'better to let sleeping 
dogs lie ' .
Few liberals understood that Young had consented to swamp
the Council from conservative motives: for them the enactment
of the land bills was an end in itself, not the means to a
conservative set of life appointments. The Empire
congratulated Young on an auspicious beginning to his
administration and claimed that 'In every family which our
issue of today reaches, a jubilate will be sung over the death
6of the sworn aristocracy of Australia'. But while it did not 
divine Young's conservative intentions in aiding the liberal 
cause, it confirmed his shrewd assessment of the colony's 
politics by rejoicing as much that the swamping had failed as 
that it had been attempted. It argued that by their mass 
resignation, the conservatives had
1Cf. S.M.H., editorials, 11, 15 May 1861.
.M.H. editorial, 21 June 1861.
3Nicholson to James Macarthur, 12 September 1861, Macarthur 
Papers, vol.38, A2934.
4 .Sir W. Macarthur to James Macarthur, 15 September 1861, 
Macarthur Papers, vol.38, A2934, p.500.
5Sir W. Macarthur to James Macarthur, 15 May 1861, Macarthur 
Papers, vol.38, A2934, p.510. Cf. the praise of Burton in 
S.M.H. editorials, 11 May, 21 June 1861. Sir William 
Macarthur's letter implies that Isaacs'and Martin's attempt to 
organize a dinner failed, but shortly before his departure, the 
St Leonard's School of Arts, with which he was connected, held 
a dinner in his honour. (S.M.H., 24 June 1861.)
^Empire, 11 May 1861.
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relieved the present administration from a 
difficulty which, it was feared, might have 
tramelled them in the appointment of an Upper 
House.... The Governor j might have thought - 
without some such convincing proof of their 
unfitness...that Sir William Burton and others of 
the obstructive faction had certain claims to 
reappointment. I Burton, in fact, was one of the 
most moderate conservatives, and his only 
obstructive act was his resignation, j The 
principal difficulty of Mr. Cowper and his 
colleagues, in the opinion of those who had well 
considered the matter, lay precisely in this 
direction. If the Council had passed the Land 
Bills and the other measures sent up by the 
Assembly, we should, inevitably, have been 
saddled by many of them in the life appointments.
By their late conduct, however, they have made 
this impossible.^
It concluded that by frustrating the swamping the conservatives 
had blundered.
Although the swamping had failed to secure the passage of
the land bills, it still enhanced Young's chances of securing
conservative appointments to the reconstructed Council. He
calculated correctly that the government's success in
persuading him to make the emergency appointments had
enormously increased its prestige within the liberal movement.
In the Empire‘s words, Cowper had, by the time the appointments
were made, been 'elevated to a position rarely occupied by a
3statesman in any country', giving him great power with his 
followers. He was therefore in a position to keep, at least in 
part, an earlier promise to Young that he would ‘keep himself
free and not entangle himself with his colleagues or his
. , 4party .
Cowper had positive incentives to make concessions to 
Young on the subject of the new appointments. In the first 
place, the Council had occasionally proved useful in defeating 
legislation passed by the Assembly against the government's
Empire, 13 May 1861, editorial.
~Cf. Young to Newcastle, 21 May, 19 July 1861, P.R.O./C.O., 
201/518.
3Empire, 6 June 1861, editorial; cf. Empire, 21 June 1861, 
summary of news for England.
^Young to Newcastle, 19 April 1861, P.R.O./C.O., 201/517.
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wishes, and it would do so again. In particular, before the
swamping the government had encouraged the Council to defeat a
bill to declare the Church and School lands waste lands of the
Crown, although it had passed the Assembly by a large majority.
Cowper opposed the bill on principle and Robertson opposed it
mainly because he feared that, if the Church and School lands
were declared waste lands and therefore potentially open to
free selection, it would complicate the passage of his land
bills.^ When the Assembly passed the bill a second time in the
session of 1861-2, the government again abetted its rejection
2by the Council; it adopted the same course when the radicals
succeeded in passing through the Assembly a bill to reduce the
3salary of future Governors; and, like subsequent ministries,
it was suspected of welcoming the destruction of bills
reducing taxation. It could thereby pose as the champion of
retrenchment while satisfying demands for a high level of
expenditure on public works. When the Council rejected a
customs duties bill early in 1861, for instance, Sir William
Burton said that there was a 'general impression' that the4government did not want the bill to pass. The impression may
have been correct, for the government was already in financial
difficulties and, although the bill increased the duty on rum,
it was not certain that this would compensate for the revenue 5lost from tea. Opposition to the tea duty had long been a 
liberal cry, for the tax consumed a far greater proportion of 
the income of the poor. The conservatives, of course, favoured 
the duty because it joressed so lightly on the wealthy, and 
argued that men should as far as possible pay the same amount
Empire, 2 February, 13 April, 1861. Cf. Naomi Turner, Sinews
of Sectarian Warfare? Canberra, 1972, pp.232-3; and R.B. 
Walker, 'The Later History of the Church and School Lands', 
J.R.A.H.S., vol.47, pt.4, pp.237-40.
^S.M.H.. 21 November 1861.
 ^S.M .H., 11 October 1861.
4Burton to Newcastle, 1 July 1861, enclosed with Young to 
Newcastle, 19 July 1861, P.R.O./C.O., 201/518.
5Cf. allegations in the Legislative Council, S.M.H.,
21 February 1861.
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of tax, irrespective of their incomes. The government was
therefore able to satisfy the radicals by introducing a bill
to reduce the duty, confident and perhaps hopeful that it would
be rejected by the Council. If, indeed, it was insincere in its
professions of support for the bill, its attitude merely
foreshadowed that of some later ministries on the gold duty, a
tax opposed by the radicals because it was a 1 2*4class' tax upon
their favourite economic interest. The Council rendered
successive ministries sterling service by rejecting bills to
reduce or abolish the gold duty. Ministers spoke only feebly
in support of the bills and the Council customarily accepted
the implied invitation to reject them until declining gold
2production robbed the tax of its usefulness.
Other factors, however, were probably more important in 
persuading Cowper to make concessions to Young in advising the 
life appointments than the occasional usefulness of a 
conservative Council - a usefulness which had little to do with 
the desire for a Council as a check on democracy but much to do 
with the political convenience of governments. Cowper was 
indifferent to the intrinsic merits of most matters of liberal 
and conservative principle. The central tenet of his political 
philosophy was the preservation of a coherent social and 
political order and it was a matter of indifference to him 
whether that order was aristocratic or democratic. He never 
fully articulated this philosophy, but it was implicit in his 
frequent justification of liberal measures on the grounds that 
they were expedient or necessary to allay discontent; in his 
habit of avoiding, as far as possible, reference to 'abstract' 
principles; in his faintly cynical attitude to the 'popular
^Cf. S .M .H ., 14 September 1855 (L.C. debates); 5 January 1860 
(report of meeting); and 21 February 1861 (L.C. debates).
2The Council rejected bills to abolish or reduce the gold duty 
in 1866, 1875, 1876 and 1877. For an example of half-hearted 
support by the government's representative see the speech by 
Samuel, S .M .H ., 7 June 1877. In 1862, however, the Council 
consented to a reduction in the gold duty as part of its 
general policy of conceding most liberal demands. The 
government was under heavy pressure to abolish the duty 
altogether, but it refused to do so although most of its 
members had previously advocated such a step. (See S .M .H .,
4 September 1862, and the act reducing the duty, 26 Vic. no.5.)
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cries' which he used so successfully during his period of
office;'^ and in his admission to James Macarthur that he cared
little, in principle, whether the Council was elected on a
2liberal franchise or a conservative one. This 'pragmatic'
attitude to politics was portrayed as an indifference to
principle by those who defined principle in terms of a self-
righteous devotion to their own ideological position, but
Cowper could easily have defended his position in terms as
moralistic as those in which it was attacked had it been in his
nature to do so. Men of all political persuasions admitted the
desirability of the stable government which their adherence to
'ideological' principle often endangered; and, as even hostile
observers admitted, Cowper offered the best hope of such 
3stability. On that level, Cowper's political interests 
coincided with what most contemporaries defined as the 
colony's interests, and his flexible political philosophy 
enabled him to rationalize with less inconsistency than most 
the compromises which were the price of stability.
Cowper's approach to politics was not, however, simply a 
result of adaptation to the necessities of political success.
It reflected his temperamental preference for conciliation to 
confrontation, and it was admirably displayed in his attitude 
towards the reconstruction of the Council. He was anxious to 
heal the wounds of the conservative social groups to which his 
family belonged, but from which he was now largely estranged 
because of his politics. Above all, he faced the necessity of 
preserving a sound working relationship with the Governor. 
Cowper owed Young a heavy political debt for his consent to the 
swamping; he also sympathized with his predicament. He knew 
that the Duke of Newcastle had instructed Young to endeavour to 
secure the reappointment of the former members of the Council
Cf. Cowper to Parkes, 22 January 1862: 'The session has just
closed....We shall meet again about 31 May - & then Education - 
State aid - & [illegible, & Expenditure will be the cries.' 
P.C., vol.6, A876, pp.394-401.
2Cowper to Macarthur, 22 June 1861, Macarthur Papers, vol.28, 
A2924, pp.601-4.
3Cf. the implicit recognition in Sir W. Macarthur to 
J. Macarthur, 15 September 1861, Macarthur Papers, vol.38,
A2934, p.515.
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and that he had to succeed in this to vindicate his consent
to the swamping;“^ he also knew that Young had to restore his
standing with the conservatives, amongst whom he was cast for
most of his social intercourse. To ease the Governor's
position, Cowper made implicit appeals on his behalf to the
conservatives. He told Burton that Young 'felt the state of
2things very much', and explained to James Macarthur that the
Governor was 'very intensely anxious to come well out of the
affair' and that he did not wonder at 'a total stranger'
3feeling somewhat nervous. Most important, Cowper consented to 
the nomination of a conservative majority to the new Council.
The mechanics of the reconstruction of the Council have 
been the subject of different interpretations. The most 
recent account, by Neil I. Graham, has argued that although 
conservatives feared that Young would merely follow ministerial 
advice, he
did nothing of the kind. He in fact set up an 
advisory committee of men of various political 
opinions, under the auspices of Wentworth who had 
recently returned to the colony. Working with them 
and consulting other 'gentlemen of social standing 
and leading political position' he drew up a list 
of twenty-seven names, presented the list to the 
ministry in executive council, and asked for their 
comments. The ministry, as expected, stood out for 
a fair working majority in order to pass the land 
bills and accepted Young's nominees, with Wentworth 
as the new council president, only on condition 
that they passed the bills without delay.^
In other words, the list was drawn up by Young without
ministerial advice and accepted in toto by the ministers when
it was presented to them in executive council. They also agreed
Newcastle to Young, 4 February 1861, Government House Papers, 
Despatches from the Secretary of State, 1861. The importance 
of the despatch in governing the appointments was a matter of 
public knowledge. Empire, 5, 21 June 1861.
2Reported in Sir William Macarthur to James Macarthur, 15 May 
1861, Macarthur Papers, vol.38, A2934, p.509.
3Cowper to Macarthur, 22 June 1861, Macarthur Papers, vol.28, 
A2924, pp.601-4.
4Neil I. Graham, ‘The Role of the Governor of New South Wales 
under Responsible Government, 1861-1890', Ph.D., Macquarie 
University, 1973, pp.69-70.
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to accept Wentworth as President. In return, they stipulated
that the land bills should be passed quickly by Young's
nominees. This account supports Graham's thesis that
'Whiggish' historians have underestimated the importance of
colonial governors, but it is much less accurate than an
earlier analysis by Loveday.^ It is worth while touching upon
the main objections to it only because there are other signs of
an excessive reaction against the orthodox interpretation of
2the role of the governor.
The first objection is that Cowper shares with Young at
least joint responsibility for persuading Wentworth to accept
appointment as President - perhaps the sole responsibility.
Cowper told James Macarthur that Burton's decision to leave the
country made it impossible to reappoint him, and 'opened the
way for nvy negotiations with Wentworth, whose arrival amongst
3us was very opportune'. It is unlikely that Cowper claimed
for himself credit which belonged to Young. Only five days
after the swamping, Sir William Macarthur reported that
Wentworth...has had repeated interviews with 
Cowper...Cowper pays him great court and he has 
been sweetened by a very liberal payment for the 
land...for the military station in Parramatta - 
£3500 besides imparting gt value to the rest of 
the property - £10000 so W. himself assured me....
Like a wise man he receives the advantage with
acknowledgement and is about to sell the rest of , 4the property.
Radicals like David Buchanan may have thought Wentworth's land 
dealings with Cowper reminiscent of his attempt to 'purchase
5half of New Zealand for some blankets', but such concrete
^Loveday, 'The Legislative Council...', pp.492-4.
2See, for example, J.A. Ryan, 'Faction Politics: a Problem in 
Historical Interpretation', Australian Economic History Review, 
vol.8, 1968, p .43.
3Cowper to J. Macarthur, 22 June 1861, Macarthur Papers, vol.28, 
A2924, pp.601-4.
4Sir W. Macarthur to J. Macarthur, 15 May 1861, Macarthur 
Papers, vol.38, A2934, p.515.
5Empire„ 4 September 1861.
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marks of esteem were probably necessary to dispell the 1 23*5strong 
prejudices' with which Wentworth was imbued.
The remainder of Graham's interpretation of the 
appointments is no better founded in the sources. It is true 
that Young told Cardwell that when the Council was reconstructed 
he took advice from ‘gentlemen of social standing and leading 
political position', and that at least some of these were 
'called into counsel under the auspices of Mr. Wentworth'.^* 
However, this description falls short of the 'committee1 which 
allegedly advised the Governor on the appointments; and Young 
also stated that he 'consulted the liberal party...that is, the 
Ministers then in office', and that it was 'with their
2cognizance' that he asked Wentworth and others for their views.
The surviving correspondence indicates that there were 
extensive negotiations between Young and Cowper in the week 
before the Executive Council formally approved the list of 
proposed nominees on 11 June. On 4 June, for instance, Young 
told Cowper ‘I am sorry to find the list you handed me...so3materially altered'. Cowper had omitted six names from it and
added four new ones. Four of the six omitted were, in Young's
view, opponents of the ministry. He managed to have two of
them, Allen and Merewether, restored to the list. Cowper
probably did not object because they were the sort of moderate
conservatives whose claims to reappointment even the Empire
recognized. Young also succeeded in having Dr Dickson, one of
the additions to the list, omitted. He had, as we have noted,
been involved in unsavoury bankruptcy proceedings and Young5thought his name would 'justly excite animadversion'.
^Young to Cardwell, 16 February 1865, P.R.O./C.O., 201/533.
2 Ibid.
3Young to Cowper, 4 June 1861, Cowper Correspondence, vol.l, 
A676, n.p. This paragraph and the following one are heavily 
indebted to Loveday, 'The Legislative Council...', pp.292-4.
^Cf. Empire, 11 June 1861, editorial.
5Young to Cowper, 4 June 1861, Cowper Correspondence, vol.l, 
A676, n.p. Cf. Chapter II, above.
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The correspondence also indicates that subsequent requests
by Wentworth and Deas Thomson for alterations in the list were
unsuccessful. Their representations were made directly to
Cowper, or to Young who then approached Cowper with them. They
both tried to no avail to have certain names removed from the
list;'" they failed to secure the appointment of a number of
conservatives including Sir William Macarthur and Sir Charles
Nicholson, although Young tried to reinforce the claims of the
2latter by telling Cowper that he was 'Lady Young's friend';
and they were not able to have the number of appointments
increased from a maximum of twenty-seven to thirty or more,
despite the fact that Young, too, expressed some exasperation
3at Cowper's determination to keep the Council so small.
Cowper's role in reconstructing the Council was obviously
crucial. He spoke personally with some candidates to ascertain
their course of action if appointed and communicated through
4intermediaries with others; he consulted his fellow ministers 
who seem to have been prepared to accept the line which he
5pursued; and the extant correspondence indicates that in the 
final stages of the negotiations, Cowper's was the decisive 
voice. However, none of this correspondence is dated before 
4 June, by which time the names of those to be invited to the 
Council had in most cases been determined. It is likely that 
in negotiations before that date, Cowper had made many 
concessions. An authoritative list of proposed nominees, which
^Wentworth 
p p .2 21-4 ;
to Young, 14 June 1861, Wentworth Papers, A756, 
Young to Cowper, 7 June 1861, Cowper Correspondence,
A67 6, n .p .
"Wentworth to Cowper, 12 June 1861, Cowper Correspondence, 
vol.2, A677, pp.461-3; Thomson to Young, 7 June 1861, Deas 
Thomson Papers, vol.2, pp.499-506; Young to Cowper, 7 June 1861, 
Cowper Correspondence, vol.l, A676, n.p.
3Young to Cowper, 10 June 1861, Cowper Correspondence, vol.l, 
A676, n.p.; Thomson to Young, 7 June 1861, Deas Thomson Papers, 
vol.2, pp.499-506; Wentworth to Cowper, 12 June 1861, Cowper 
Correspondence, A677, pp.461-3.
4Executive Council, Minutes, 20 June 1861, A.O.N.S.W., 4/1540; 
Cowper to Polding, 28 May 1861, Cowper Correspondence, vol.l,
n.p.
5Cf. Cowper to Young, 8 June 1861, Cowper Correspondence, vol.l, 
A676, n.p.; Empire, 5, 21 June 1861.
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substantially resembled that finally decided upon, appeared in
the Empire on 5 June. Only ten of the twenty-five names were
those of unequivocal liberals. The list was published to
correct 'imperfect and partly erroneous statements' and,
probably, to test public opinion. The answer from the liberals
was unambiguous. The proposed nominations created
consternation, and the Empire cautioned Cowper that if he
betrayed the trust he had won he courted destruction. This
strengthened^his hand with Young, whom he told:
I have pouring in upon me from various quarters 
friendly warnings of my fate - inevitable as it 
is said - from yielding too much to yr. Exy and 
the suggestions made by those who tender 
irresponsible advice.* 2 34
From the time the list was published Cowper conceded little,
but this was because he had previously conceded so much.
Most of the pressure upon Cowper had obviously come from
Young, who was bound to implement Newcastle's instruction that
he try to have the former members of the Council reappointed.
The articles in the Empire emphasized the importance of
3Newcastle's despatch in guiding the appointments. However, the 
article which contained the list of proposed nominees also 
intimated that pressure from Wentworth, whom Cowper was trying 
to persuade to accept the post of President, played some part. 
Wentworth apparently 'indicated a very strong opinion in favour 
of certain of those appointments as a condition of his assent'. 
The article also stated that Thomson had made stipulations4before the list was finally agreed to. The Governor's 
unconstitutional advisers seem, therefore, to have had some 
influence on the appointments, but it was probably small. It 
was clearly subordinate to Young's general desire to carry out 
Newcastle's instructions to secure the return of as many of the
"'"Empire, 6 June 1861.
2Cowper to Young, 8 June 1861, Cowper Correspondence, vol.l,
A67 6, n.p.
3Empire, 5, 21 June 1861.
4Empire, 5 June 1861.
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former members of the Council as possibleand it in no way 
rivalled the influence possessed by Cowper, the only man who 
could carry on the government.
Having consented to advise the appointment of a 
conservative Council, Cowper and his ministers tried to assure 
themselves a 'fair working majority' by other means. To each 
of the letters of invitation sent to potential councillors was 
appended a copy of the minute of the Executive Council dealing 
with the offers of seats. It listed the principles underlying 
the choice of members as:
1. The speedy reconstruction of the Council on an elective 
basis.
2. Acceptance of the land bills as agreed to by the 
Legislative Assembly.
3. Provision of a 'fair working majority' in the Council 
for the government.
The minute then said that the Executive Council was prepared to
advise that seats be offered to those on the list 'in the
expectation that the gentlemen named in it will adopt these
principles in deference to public opinion and in a generous 
2spirit'. This was not a direct demand for a pledge, but the 
implication was clear that any appointee who acted contrary to 
the three principles of the minute had violated the 
understanding upon which his seat had been offered.
The conditions posed no problems for the liberals and only 
one conservative repudiated their substance. He was John Lamb, 
a liberal of the early 1850s and a moderate conservative in the 
Council before 1861, who proclaimed his intention of 'opposing3the land bills and generally the policy of the ministry'. His
4reply was deemed unsatisfactory and he was not appointed. Two 
conservatives were amongst the five men who declined the
"''For Young's determination to try to carry out Newcastle's 
instructions, which harmonized with his own convictions, see 
Young to Newcastle, 19 April 1861, P.R.O./C.O., 201/517.
^Executive Council, Minutes, 11 June 1861, A.O.N.S.W., 4/1540.
3Young to Newcastle, 20 July 1861, P.R.O./C.O., 201/518.
4Executive Council, Minutes, 20 June 1861, A.O.N.S.W., 4/1540.
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nomination 'on grounds of a personal and private nature', but
the rest saw their way clear to 'accept seats in the spirit in
2which they were offered' without making an actual pledge. They
sometimes stated explicitly that their appointment was to be
unconditional, but they all gave at least a vague indication
that they had 'independently' arrived at opinions coinciding
with the principles laid down in the minute. Wentworth, for
instance, did not object to the conditions 1 *3457solely on the
grounds that they are in accordance with my own views' so that3he made 'no sacrifice of principle... in subscribing to them'; 
Robert Fitzgerald, an old friend of Cowper's, was able to 
satisfy him with the less explicit assurance that 'With regard 
to the Land Bills - I was not much against them before as you4are aware nor shall I be now'; another conservative, Charles 
Kemp, had already told Cowper that he favoured an elective 
Council and quite agreed that 'the sooner the Land Bill as it5left the Assembly is passed the better'; and while Sir William 
Manning said he would accept appointment only if 'unfettered by 
any pledges or conditions' he referred the Governor to a letter 
by Deas Thomson for a fuller explanation of his position.^ 
Thomson's letter, speaking for Manning, Merewether, and Holden 
as well as himself, declared that they would only accept seats 
if no conditions were attached, but gave an assurance that they 
had already decided that the Council should be made elective 7and the land bills passed in the form desired by the Assembly.
■^ Young to Newcastle, 20 July 1861, P.R.O./C.O., 201/518.
■"Executive Council, Minutes, 20 June 1861, A.O.N.S.W., 4/1540.
3Wentworth to Young, 14 June 1861, Wentworth Papers, A756, 
pp.221-4.
4Fitzgerald to Cowper, 15 June 1861, Cowper Correspondence, 
vol.2, A677.
5 r -iKemp to Cowper, n.d. [probably early June], Cowper
Correspondence, vol.2, A677.
^Manning to Turville [Young's private secretary], 14 June 1861, 
Manning Papers, vol.4, MSS 246/4, pp.25-6.
7Thomson to Young, 7 June 1861, Deas Thomson Papers, vol.2, pp.499-506.
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Darvall, Mitchell and John Campbell sent replies which
the ministry thought required 'special considerations'.^ Only
Mitchell's reply has survived. He made the usual declaration
that he held himself 'in all respects unpledged and unfettered',
but neglected to state whether his own conscientious opinions
2happened to coincide with those in the minute. Cowper sought 
out Mitchell, Darvall and Campbell to ascertain their opinions 
and was able to tell his colleagues that he had 'every reason 
to believe' they would pass the land bills and a bill to make
the Legislative Council elective. They were therefore
3appointed.' This brought the total number of members to 
twenty-one. Four others were appointed before the Council met 
in September bringing the total to twenty-five. This was two 
short of the maximum of twenty-seven which Cowper had chosen 
and which he assured Young he would not under normal 
circumstances exceed.^
Reaction to the appointments was predictable. The Sydney 
Morning Herald, recalling the swamping, said Young's second
"''Executive Council, 20 June 1861, A.O.N.S.W., 4/1540.
oMitchell to Turville, 14 June 1861, Papers of Dr James Mitchell, 
A2026, pp.256-7.
^Executive Council, Minutes, 20 June 1861, A.O.N.S.W., 4/1540.
4It is clear from the correspondence referred to in footnote 3, 
p.194, above, that it was Cowper who insisted on appointing 
only twenty-seven members. He told James Macarthur that there 
was only 'a limited amount of proper material' to choose from, 
and his intention seems to have been to redress the balance in 
favour of the liberals by excluding conservatives, rather than 
by including new liberals 'unfit' for the Council. (Cf. Cowper 
to J. Macarthur, 22 June 1861, Macarthur Papers, vol.28, A2924, 
pp.601-4.) Young later insisted that the number of twenty-seven 
chosen by Cowper be the ‘usual limit' and stated that Cowper 
had agreed to this. This was almost certainly true, but in 
1869 Cowper denied having agreed to a limit. This seems to 
have been a convenient equivocation whereby he referred to an 
absolute limit rather than the 'usual' one. Cf. Young to 
Newcastle, 19, 20 July, P.R.O./C.O., 201/518; Young to 
Cardwell, 16 February 1865, P.R.O./C.O., 201/533; Robertson to 
Cowper, 29 June 1869, with reply 30 June 1869, V . & P. (L.A.,
N.S.W.), 1872, vol.I, p.491; Young to Cowper, 3 July 1865,
Cowper Papers, D60, n.p.; and Loveday,'The Development of 
Parliamentary Government in New South Wales, 1856-1870', Ph.D., 
Sydney University, 1962, pp.364-7.
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decisive step was 'entitled to more confidence than the first'
and thought that if the ministry had helped to influence the
appointments it was 'an indication of returning sanity' 7 James
Macarthur thought the nomination of ‘men of experience and
respectability', together with the return of conservatives at
recent by-elections, gave 'some hope that reasonable and
2salutary influences are again coming into play' 7 T.A. Murray
was 'very much surprised but at the same time very much pleased'
by the appointments, which he thought superior to the original
3nominations in 18567 and at the Colonial Office, Newcastle
expressed much pleasure at observing amongst the appointees 'so
4many names of gentlemen of eminence and tried abilities'.
What conservative misgivings existed were focussed mainly on
the 'pledge' which those appointed so strenuously denied having 
5given.
Liberal reaction was predominantly hostile. The Empire 
claimed that more than two-thirds of the appointees were 
'steady and consistent opponents of that policy which the 
existing government had hitherto been believed to represent'.^ 
It reserved particular scorn for the appointment of Wentworth, 
qualifying its criticism only with the hope that ‘the ministry 
are in possession of a hidden ground of assurance that an 
appointment so ostensibly subversive of liberal policy was in 
reality and effect a move in the right direction'. The
XS .M .H ., 21 June 1861.
2J. Macarthur to Charles Campbell, 2 November 1861, Macarthur 
Papers, vol.24, A2920.
3Murray to Parkes, 18 September 1861, P.C., vol.55, A925, 
pp.276-83. Murray mistakenly dated the first nominations at 
1855. The error has been corrected to avoid confusion.
4Draft of reply by Newcastle to Young to Newcastle, 20 July 
1861, P.R.O./C.O., 201/518.
5See, for example Burton to James Macarthur, 25 February 1862, 
Macarthur Papers, vol.29, A2925, pp.25-8.
^Empire, 27 June 1861. Graham alleges that the Empire1 2345s 
response was initially favourable, but his view is based upon 
a reference to the issue of 14 May 1861 which praises the 
swamping, not the life appointments.
^Empire, 18 June 1861.
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conservative W.R. Piddington thought, with much justification,
that no other government 1 2345could have nominated so conservative
a body of Councillors' and drew additional satisfaction from
the fact that 'the nominations have given great offence to2some of the Cowper mob'. To bear him out, the radicals, led 
by Buchanan, bitterly attacked the ministry as soon as 
parliament met, combining with the conservatives, who approved
2of the appointments but disliked the 'pledge' attached to them. 
Cowper had warned Young that he faced such a conjunction of his3enemies and erstwhile supporters, and at first considered4resigning." However, not only did this ministry still retain 
some credit for having swamped the Council, but it included 
almost every experienced liberal politician in the Assembly. 
Parkes had been despatched as an immigration lecturer to5Britain, Forster had destroyed his standing with the liberals 
by opposing free selection, and, with the land question still 
not settled, a conservative government would have fallen the 
moment it faced the parliament. The ministry survived mainly 
because there was no alternative Premier outside its own ranks, 
or, as Sir William Macarthur put it, because of 'the 
impossibility of their being succeeded by any but the lowest 
and most unscrupulous radicals'.^
■“Piddington to Parkes, 20 August 1861, P.C., vol.56, A926, 
pp.382-5. Cf. Murray to Parkes, 18 September 1861, P.C., 
vol.55, A925, pp.276-83.
2Empire, 4 September 1861.
3Cowper to Young, 8 June 1861, Cowper Correspondence, vol.l, A676, n.p.
4Cowper to Young, 14 September 1861, Cowper Correspondence, 
vol.l, A676, n.p.
5Cf. P. Loveday and A.W. Martin, Parliament, Factions and 
Parties, Melbourne, 1966, p.33.
^Sir W. Macarthur to James Macarthur, 15 September 1861, 
Macarthur Papers, vol.38, A2934, p.560.
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When the reconstructed Council met on 3 September 1861, 
there was immediate proof of liberal allegations that Cowper 
had nominated a majority of his opponents. The members ranged 
themselves on government and opposition benches and, as shown 
by Table X, a majority sat with the opposition.
TABLE X1
SEATING ARRANGEMENTS IN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 
3 SEPTEMBER 1861
Government benches
Robertson (Minister for 
Lands)
Hargrave (Attorney-General)
Robey 
B. Russell 
Byrnes 
Macfarlane 
Butler 
A. McArthur 
J. Campbell 
Gordon
Ten members sat with the government and eleven with the
opposition, and the conservative majority was in fact greater
than the table indicates. When Wentworth was not in the chair,
2he sat with the opposition and of the three members who were
3absent, two were conservatives. Moreover, one of those who sat 
with the government was Alexander McArthur, whose liberalism
Opposition benches
Holden
Manning
Darvall
Thomson
W. Russell
Allen
Ward
Watt
Kemp
Mitchell 
Merewether
■^Based on Empire, 4 September 1861.
“Cf. Wentworth, S,M.H., 10 October 1861: 'his hon. friend
opposite (Mr Robertson)...'.
3Plunkett and Fitzgerald. The liberal was Scott, who was 
incorrectly described by the Empire, 4 September 1861, as a 
member of the opposition. The Empire had twice previously 
classed him as a ministerialist (5, 21 June 1861), and when he 
took his seat he consistently supported the government.
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was far from consistent,“ and two others on the same side of
the house were in fact conservatives on most issues. They were
John Campbell and S.D. Gordon, former members of the Assembly
who had been regarded as liberals until late I860, when they
opposed free selection before survey. In the Council, they
also opposed other popular reforms. Gordon declared that he
had always opposed manhood suffrage, advocated a conservative
upper house and criticized the government's legislation on the 
2Chinese. Campbell stayed with the liberals on the Chinese
question, but otherwise voted with the conservatives, stating
that 'He felt very differently now to what he did before his3experience of an Assembly elected on universal suffrage1 2*45. His 
changed views did not go unnoticed by Deas Thomson, who 
expressed great pleasure at his 'recantation of the radical4opinions he entertained some years ago'.
Both Campbell and Gordon made occasional genuflections5towards their former liberalism, but the fact that they still 
sat with the liberals had more to do with past associations 
than current ideological commitment. As men until recently 
associated with the liberal cause, they had few friends amongst 
the conservatives; and Campbell probably found the prospect of 
sitting with the opposition particularly distasteful, for, 
although he was a wealthy merchant and pastoralist, some 
conservatives had expressed the view that he had insufficient 
intelligence to be a legislator.^*
“McArthur had given inconsistent votes on free selection before 
survey as a member of the Assembly in 1860; and in the Council 
voted with the conservatives on the Chinese issue.
2S.M .H., 13 December 1861, 4 September, 24 October 1862.
2S.M .H ., 5 September 1862.
4Thomson in S.M.H,, 11 September 1862.
5For example, they were the only two members who voted for a 
bill to reduce the salaries of future governors. The bill had 
no chance of being passed, for other conservatives and the 
government both opposed it. Campbell and Gordon may not have 
been serious in their support for the bill, for the latter said 
he moved its second reading simply 'out of courtesy to the 
other house'. (S.M .H,, 11 October 1861.)
^Cf. Manning to Donaldson, 19 June April? ! 1856, Letters, 
Donaldson Ministry, A731, pp.106-10; 'C.C.L.' in S.M.H., quoted
Molony, op.cit., p.226.
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Only nine of the twenty-five members of the Council,
including McArthur, were liberals, but the position of the
government was stronger than it had been before the swamping.
To begin with, none of the extreme conservatives had been
reappointed. The Council was spared the interminable, if able,
speeches of Isaacs and Johnson, and the debates lacked some of
their former rancour. Moreover, 'party' meetings outside the
Council seem to have ceased - or largely so. None appreciated
the change better than the liberals. Three months after the
Council resumed, Hargrave gloated over the good effects of the
swamping, saying that the conservatives had 'never pretended to
act as a party since';* 3 and some months later, Bourn Russell
expressed pleasure that the liberals were no longer ridiculed
and insulted, remarking that the Council had been held in
greater esteem 'since the obstructive element, which formerly
2was so strong, in that chamber, had been disposed of'.
Surveying the history of the Council thirteen years later, he
saw no reason to revise that judgment. He admitted that the
swamping was 'something extreme', but claimed that
it could not be denied that it did good, for the 
business of that House had since been carried on 
in a much more amicable and courteous manner than 
before that event....If the Opposition at that time 
had shown the consideration and courtesy to those 
who differed from them which all were wont to 
manifest now, there never would have been any 
attempt to swamp that House.3
Yet 'party' still existed in the Council along the lines 
set down before 1861, albeit in an attenuated form. Newspaper 
reports and the politicians themselves described the Council's 
proceedings in terms suggestive of a 'party' system arising 
from similarities of ideological commitment, which were in turn 
rooted in the clash of social classes; issues with no apparent 
ideological implications still sometimes provoked a 'party' 
response; and, although 'party* meetings out of doors were no 
longer reported, there were still tactical manoeuvres on party 
lines within the house. In September 1862, for instance, the
~^S .M.H. , 13 December 1861.
3S .M .H ., 5 September 1862.
3S.M.H., 20 March 1874.
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liberals repeatedly tried to delay the second reading of their 
bill to abolish state aid to religion until some of their 
number had returned from their own business and their opponents 
had been weakened by Wentworth's return to Britain. The 
conservatives, however, took the matter out of the government's 
hands and brought on the second reading at a time to suit 
themselves, resisting liberal attempts to have the vote 
coincide with a call of the house. Their tactics failed when 
the bill passed its second reading by ten votes to nine after 
several of the absent liberals put in an appearance and one 
conservative crossed the floor.
The conservatives1 23 inability to use their numbers
effectively in the crucial votes on the state aid abolition
bill reflected a growing lack of cohesion in their ranks. This
was partly a result of the changed nature of conservative
leadership. In the old Council, Deas Thomson had been
recognized by all as unofficial 'Leader of the Opposition',
although an element of bipolarity had been introduced into the
leadership when Johnson, Isaacs, Docker, Norton and Want chose
to act together as the principal spokesmen for the extremist
wing. Cowper's refusal to reappoint the extremists did not,
however, confirm Thomson's dominance. He still probably sat at
2the head of the opposition benches and he still spoke first on3the Address-in-Reply; but he was less influential than before, 
particularly during the session of 1861-62, when he was present 
for fewer than a third of the divisions. This encouraged the 
emergence of other sources of leadership on the conservative 
side of the house.
The material for multi-polar leadership from within the 
ranks of the moderate conservatives had been supplied by Cowper. 
His appointees included John Hubert Plunkett, Attorney-General 
before responsible government, one-time President of the
For the tactical manoeuvres over the bill, see J.L.C., 1862, 
pp.85, 94; Thomson and Scott, S.M .H ., 25 September 1862; Thomson 
and Hargrave, S.M.H., 1 October 1862.
2Thomson, for instance, referred to Manning, perhaps the 
conservative who most nearly approached him in prestige, as 
'behind' him. (S.M .H., 2 October 1861.)
3S.M.H., 4 September 1861.
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Council, and a man whose standing and ability gave him much
influence; Sir William Manning, Solicitor-General before
responsible government and Attorney-General in two
administrations since; and G.K. Holden, prominent before the
swamping and now the Council's dominant figure in matters
affecting its own constitution.
These men held no formally recognized position, but with
Thomson they customarily took the lead in debates. To them
also fell the responsibility of giving a lead when matters of
tactics arose in the house. But they exercised their talents
individually, rather than collectively, so that for want of a
common approach they sometimes helped to fragment conservative
opinion. Plunkett and Holden, in particular, were
exceptionally 'independent' conservatives whose political
idiosyncracies sometimes made them leaders of a minor exodus to
the liberal side of the house.“
The conservatives' disarray was compounded by
disorientation in the wake of rapid social change and
demoralization at the defeats which they had suffered since
1856. Wentworth's despondency was typical, although other
conservatives did not admit so openly that they had lost touch
with the times. Discussing a radical proposal to stop the
issue of miners' rights to Chinese not holding one by
31 July 1862, he said that
He knew there was a great clamour against these 
men [the Chinese ; and if he were a member of the 
Government, it would be too much for him; but 
then he was not responsible, thank God. It might 
indeed be better for him to remain in retirement 
and not put forward his opinion; but then, when 
such propositions were put forward, he could not 
help it. * 2
He may not have been entirely unconscious that this confession 
of defeat was an implicit tribute to Cowper, who shared his
^See their voting patterns below, Tables XI and XII.
2Empire. 18 October 1861.
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horror at aspects of the anti-Chinese agitation,^ but found
ways to cope with it. Many conservatives, as well as liberals,
realized that failure to legislate on the Chinese issue would 
2be disastrous, and the bulls which Cowper ultimately got 
through parliament were the least restrictive which the 
Assembly would accept. With no viable alternatives of their 
own, conservative opponents of the government's Chinese 
legislation lacked resolution, and some of them, having 
signified their opposition in debate, acquiesced in the passage 
of the Chinese Immigration Bill by absenting themselves from 
the house.^
The lack of cohesion amongst the conservatives resulted 
not only from fragmented leadership and demoralization, but 
from the emergence of new ideological issues such as those 
involved in the debate over the Chinese. In previous sessions, 
the conservatives had all opposed democratic reforms and 
Robertson's land bills; and, although they had split on the 
question of whether the Council should assert its right of 
amending money bills, they had unanimously rejected the4Assembly's view of their powers. In the sessions of 1861-62 
and 1862, however, when the Chinese issue and the question of 
whether to abolish state aid to religion became important, 
there was less unanimity. Both the Chinese issue and the 
state aid issue involved matters of liberal and conservative 
principle, but they also raised specifically racial and5religious questions. Consequently, although in general terms 
these issues produced a division between liberals and 
conservatives, a minority of members on both sides of the house 
were led to depart from their customary voting pattern.
"''See, for instance, Cowper in S.M.H. , 11 September 1861.
2Cf. Holden and Manning, S.M .H., 24 October 1861; Kemp, Gordon 
and Manning, S.M.H., 10 October 1861.
3S,M.H., 24 October 1861. See Chapter VI, part 1, below.
4See Chapter IV, above.
5The Chinese question and the state aid issue are discussed 
in Chapter VI, below.
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Moreover, although the conservatives remained unanimous 
in their detestation of the land bills, their votes on that 
issue were now split. Some voted with the liberals in order to 
settle an issue which had been a rallying point for radical 
political agitation and which had led to the decimation of the 
conservatives in the Assembly.^ Others, although no doubt 
mindful of the conditions under which they had been offered 
seats in the Council, persisted in trying to force amendments 
to the bills in the hope that the Assembly would relent. 
Conservative fragmentation on the land bills, together with the 
unsteadiness of some conservatives on the Chinese and state aid 
issues, ensured that Cowper usually gained the 'working 
majority' which he desired.
The disparity between overall ideological commitment and
voting behaviour in the sessions of 1861-62 and 1862 is
illustrated by Tables XI and XII. Analysis by the POLIT
programme showed that in the session of 1861-62, important
divisions on the land bills, the Chinese question and a few
2minor issues provoked a single 'patterned' response. In the 
session of 1862, a similar voting pattern was produced by the 
Grants for Public Worship Prohibition Bill, the Legislative 
Council Bill and several less important matters. In both 
sessions, the representatives of the government displayed the 
paradigmatic 'liberal' voting pattern, and the scores in 
Table XI indicate the number of times a member voted with the 
government's representatives as a proportion of the total 
number of votes which he cast in the relevant divisions. The 
table also compares each member's voting pattern with his 
general ideological orientation as determined by his professed 
attitudes towards democracy, land reform, state aid to religion
For the anger felt by conservatives in the Council at the way 
in which the liberals had used the land issue to defeat 
conservative candidates at the 1860 elections, see the 
discussion in Chapter II, above, of the conservatives' 
amendment of the Address-in-Reply in 1861.
2For an explanation of the POLIT programme and an explanation 
of how the voting tables were compiled, see Appendix III.
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and the Chinese question - the issues by which contemporaries 
classed members of the Council as liberal or conservative.-
TABLE XI2
VOTING RECORD OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCILLORS 
IN SESSION OF 1861/2,
COMPARED WITH GENERAL IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION
Liberal voters
Butler 10/11 
Byrnes 7/7 
Hargrave 9/9 
Macfarlane 10/10 
Robertson 11/11 
B. Russell 9/9 
Plunkett 10/10 
W. Russell 9/10
'Independent1 voters
Robey 5/8 
McArthur 6/10 
Campbell 3/8 
Allen 1/3 
Kemp 5/10 
Ward 5/8
Conservative voters
Darvall 0/2 
Fitzgerald 0/1 
Gordon 1/4 
Holden 1/11 
Manning 0/11 
Merewether 0/7 
Mitchell 0/11 
Thomson 0/7 
Watt 2/8 
Wentworth 2/9
Ideological Orientation
lib. 
lib. 
lib. 
lib. 
lib. 
lib. 
cons. 
cons.
Ideological Orientation
lib. 
lib? 
cons. 
cons . 
cons. 
cons?
Ideological Orientation
cons. 
cons . 
cons . 
cons . 
cons . 
cons. 
cons . 
cons. 
cons . 
cons .
It can be seen that although most members voted in 
accordance with their general ideological orientation, there 
were some exceptions. In particular, two conservatives,
The classification of members according to their opinions on 
these issues presents few problems, for all members had long 
been active in colonial politics. Documentation of the 
political opinions of every member would be redundant, as their 
opinions can easily be checked by examining parliamentary 
debates on dates when the relevant issues were discussed. See 
also the classifications of members in the Empire. 5, 21 June
1861.2Based on divisions listed in Appendix III.
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Plunkett and Russell, voted consistently with the liberals.
Both were personally opposed to the land bills, but they did 
their best to expedite their passage in order to settle the 
land question once and for all. They also supported the 
government's Chinese immigration and goldfields bills, not 
because it seemed expedient to let the liberals have their way, 
but because they thought the bills both just and necessary.
In this they differed from most conservatives.
The large number of six 'independent' voters was 
symptomatic of the fact that the 'parties' in the Council were 
less cohesive than before. Two of the 'independents' were 
liberals who disagreed with their party's attitude to the 
Chinese question, and the remaining four were conservatives. 
Allen, Kemp and Ward waived their personal opposition to the 
land bills in order to have done with them as quickly as 
possible, but, unlike Plunkett and Russell, they opposed the 
liberals' attitude to the Chinese. John Campbell, on the other 
hand, objected to the presence of Chinese in the colony, 
but persisted in trying to force amendments to the land bills 
in the hope that the liberals would make concessions. Voting 
across 'party' lines by Campbell, Allen, Kemp, Ward, Plunkett 
and Russell, together with the occasional unsteadiness or 
absence of other conservatives, ensured that the vital land, 
Chinese immigration and goldfields bills were passed in the 
session of 1861-62.
Cross-voting again did much to offset the conservative 
majority in the session of 1862. The conservatives maintained 
almost complete solidarity on the Legislative Council Bill, 
which tested attitudes towards democracy, but some of them 
crossed to the liberals on the Grants for Public Worship 
Prohibition Bill,which dominated the session. As a result, one 
conservative voted consistently with the liberals and three 
more voted as 'independents', as shown by Table XII.
XS.M.H., 10, 17 October 1861.
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TABLE XII1 23
VOTING RECORD OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCILLORS 
IN SESSION OF 1862
COMPARED WITH GENERAL IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION
Liberal voters Ideological Orientation
Butler 13/13 lib.
Byrnes 16/16 lib.
Hargrave 20/20 lib.
Macfarlane 12/12 lib.
B. Russell 13/13 lib.
Robey 12/12 lib.
Scott 19/19 lib.
McArthur 8/8 lib?
Murray 6/7 lib.-cons.
Ward 15/15 cons?
Independent voters Ideoloqical Orientation
Allen 3/8 cons.
Watt 8/12 cons.
Holden 7/12 cons.
Conservative voters Ideoloqical Orientation
Campbell 0/16 cons.
Kemp 0/16 cons.
Manning 0/18 cons.
Merewether 0/18 cons.
Mitchell 0/17 cons.
Plunkett 0/20 cons.
W. Russell 2/9 cons.
Thomson 0/17 cons.
Wentworth 0/3 cons.
E.W. Ward, whose appointment to the Council had bee:2bitterly attacked by the Empire, voted consistently with the 
liberals on the state aid issue, as did the President of the 
Council, T.A . Murray, a man whose unique combination of 
political views makes it impossible to classify him as either3liberal or conservative. Watt and Holden were conservatives 
who voted as 'independents' because on the single issue of
^Based on divisions listed in Appendix III.
2Empire, 13 June 1861, editorial.
3Murray was perhaps the only politician in the colony who 
favoured Robertson's land bills while remaining bitterly 
opposed to democracy. He replaced Wentworth as President in 
October 1862.
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state aid they tended to side with the liberals; and Allen was 
brought into 1 234independence1 because he voted with the 
liberals in two tactical divisions although he favoured state 
aid. His 'liberal' votes may have stemmed from a desire, as 
Chairman of Committees, to avoid identifying himself too 
strongly with the conservatives. Since three other 
conservatives were absent throughout the session/ the liberals 
were able to push through the abolition of state aid by a 
narrow majority.
Liberal fears that Cowper's nomination of a conservative
majority to the Council would result in the rejection of his
programme proved groundless, for the conservatives' successes
were modest. They rejected bills to reduce the salary of
future governors and to declare the Church and School lands
waste lands of the Crown, but they did so with government 
2support. They also moderated government legislation 
affecting the Chinese, but their major amendments had strong 
liberal backing and were defended by the government in the 
Assembly.^ The conservatives' most striking victory was their 
frustration of a liberal attempt to establish a democratically 
elected upper house, but the liberals were not disposed to 
press their demands and the Assembly thwarted the conservatives' 
own plan for an upper house/
The Council's refusal to make itself democratic aroused 
some indignation amongst the radicals but, with their other 
demands largely conceded, their opinions on the upper house had 
mellowed. Even their anger at the conservative nature of 
Cowper's appointments cooled, except where it was kept alive 
for political purposes. As early as November 1861, David 
Buchanan, who had led the criticism of the appointments two
Darvall, Fitzgerald and Gordon. It should be noted, however, 
that Gordon probably favoured the abolition of state aid, for 
he was a Presbyterian and had supported a bill to declare the 
Church and School lands waste lands of the Crown. (Empire,
15 November 1861.)
2Empire, 15 November 1861.
3See Chapter VI, below.
4See Chapter VI, below.
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months previously, was moved to defend Cowper against an attack 
led by an opportunistic triumvirate consisting of the radical 
Hoskins, the conservative Faucett and the politically 
eccentric Forster. Buchanan pointed to the victory that had 
been won:
The purpose for which the gentlemen had been 
appointed [to the Council] was attained. The land 
bills, the Chinese Bills, and the Goldfields Bills 
had all been passed. The Ministry had moulded the 
members of the Council into a form; therefore, 
however much he might dissent from those 
appointments, he could not deny that they had 
adopted the opinions of the majority of the 
people's representatives. They had, therefore, 
reason to congratulate themselves on the power and 
tact of the Ministry that had brought about that 
result...he did not know what more was wanted.
'Empire, 20 November 1861.
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CHAPTER VI
ISSUES AND IDEOLOGY. 1861-1862
Part 1
The Debate on the Chinese Issue, 1861
In the sessions of 1861-62 and 1862, 'party' in the 
Legislative Council rested upon the same foundation as in 
former years. Political groupings were based mainly upon 
ideological differences which were themselves rooted in the 
interests, aspirations and anxieties of different sections of 
society. Some of the ideological issues were old ones raised 
by the land bills and proposals for reform of the Council, but 
other issues were new. In the session of 1861-62, the most 
important new issue concerned the right of the Chinese to enter 
the colony and enjoy there the same privileges as Europeans.
In order to explain why conservatives and liberals clashed over 
the rights of the Chinese, it will be necessary to relate 
attitudes towards that race to wider political attitudes and to 
the anxieties of different social classes.
The debates on the Chinese question revolved around an 
immigration restriction bill designed to curb the entry of 
Chinese into the colony and prevent them from becoming citizens; 
and around a goldfields bill, designed to limit the issue of 
further miners' rights to the Chinese and allow the government 
to restrict them to certain parts of the goldfields while 
giving them the sole right to mine there. It would be 
difficult to explain why most liberals favoured the bills and 
most conservatives opposed them simply by referring to some of 
the main arguments in the debates. The liberals justified the 
bills by saying that they were necessary to prevent racial 
conflict on the goldfields and preserve the 'British' character 
of the colony, the latter objective being explained by some in 
terms of the need to preserve the colony from racial and 
social contamination by an 'inferior' race. The conservatives 
condemned the legislation because it was 'unjust' to an
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oppressed minority and because it would hinder the economic 
development of the colony. These arguments, however, appealed 
to values common to both liberals and conservatives. The 
liberals were certainly no more concerned to prevent social 
disorder than the conservatives; both groups were committed to 
preserving the 'British' character of the colony;'*' the 
conservatives were no more concerned about justice than the 
liberals, who on other occasions made talk about human rights 
and justice their own catch-cry; and the liberals, as much as 
the conservatives, were anxious to promote the economic 
development of the colony. As with the land bills, the 
principles most emphasized in the debates were simply 
rationalizations of positions adopted on other grounds.
The most obvious way to explain the division would be to
assert that the conservatives were men of property who wanted
cheap labour and that the liberals were not. The argument
that the Chinese promoted development could then be interpreted
as an expression of class economic interest and other arguments
could be dismissed as rationalizations of peripheral importance.
This seems to be the view adopted by R.B. Walker, who has
concluded, on the evidence of the debates, that there was little
concern for the 'natural rights' of the Chinese. Instead he
has emphasized that 'Conservative opinion, strongly entrenched
in the Legislative Council and well expressed by the Sydney
Morning Herald, was inclined to see the advantages of the
Chinese presence in promoting the economy and providing a cheap 
2labour force'. If this were correct, then it would be a simple 
matter to explain the division of opinion on the Chinese issue. 
It is difficult, however, to accept this version of the debates.
The Herald did not argue that the Chinese were desirable 
as a source of cheap labour and it dwelt little upon the other 
economic benefits which they brought. Instead, it viewed the 
matter almost entirely in moral terms, often in the context of 
its disapproval of Western imperialist activity in China. It
^See, for instance, Darvall, Manning, Gordon and Holden,
S .M.H,, 24 October 1861.
2R.B. Walker, 'Another Look at the Lambing Flat Riots, 1860- 
1861', J.R.A.H.S,, vol.56, pt.3, September 1970, pp.199, 204, 
n. 55.
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pointed to the imperial government's hypocrisy in demanding
access to China and protection for British subjects, while
allowing British colonies to curtail Chinese immigration and
oppress their Chinese minorities:
We have talked loftily of the right of commerce 
and of free intercourse, of the duty of 
enlightened nations to constrain the barbarians 
to admit all the world, and to protect from insult 
the often ruthless subjects of the Christian states.
But the same people who claim this free ingress 
and egress as a natural right are the first to deny 
it. England allows her colonies to brand the 
Chinese as an inferior race, and to punish their 
enterprise and industry with insulting and 
oppressive restraints. No upright Englishman can 
feel that his country is entitled to the suffrages 
of the world in her pretentious crusade against 
Chinese restrictions.1
The Herald thought the Chinese morally and culturally superior 
to the colonial radicals and members of the lower orders who 
demanded their exclusion, and it took its stand upon the maxim 
'Do unto others as ye would they should do unto you'. This, 
it said, was 'the law of nations as well as individuals - and 
it will make itself heard above the sound of the cannon, not
less than above the tyranny of a petty legislature like our
, 2 own .
The Herald was unusual in its distaste for imperialist
activities in China, but others echoed the moral emphasis of
its arguments in favour of the Chinese in New South Wales. Its
editor, the Reverend John West, joined eighty other Protestant
clergymen, including the Anglican Bishop of Sydney, in signing
a manifesto which appeared to accept the activities of the
Western powers in China but strongly condemned colonial
3intolerance of the Chinese. This manifesto, which confirmed 
radical opinion that most clergymen were on the side of the
~^S . M. H . , 7 August 1858. Cf. S ,M.H. , 13 March, 2 August, 
13 September 1861.
2S.M.H., 7 August 1858.
Printed in S.M.H., 21 September 1861.3
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conservatives,^  dwelt upon the achievements of Chinese 
civilization and stressed the fact that the Chinese were equal, 
because 'God made of one blood all the nations of men’. With 
an eye to missionary activity, the signatories feared that 
oppression of the Chinese was a poor advertisement for 
Christianity and applied to their own race 'the awful reproof 
that "The name of God is blasphemed among the gentiles through 
you"'. The manifesto did not mention any economic advantages 
stemming from the extension of Christian tolerance to the 
Chinese.
Economic arguments were mentioned more often in the 
Council, but were never dominant. More common were arguments 
connected directly or indirectly with notions of law and 
justice. The conservatives defended the Chinese against the 
charges of lawlessness and immorality with which the miners and
2radicals sought to bolster demands for restrictive legislation.
In particular, the conservatives argued that the Chinese who
had been attacked on the goldfields were the innocent victims
of the brutality and prejudices of a section of the colonial 3lower orders. It was unjust, therefore, to penalize them for 
violent disturbances for which others should be made to pay.
They also argued that to stop Chinese immigration completely 
would be hypocritical in the light of European demands for 
access to China, and that it would infringe Britain's treaty 
obligations. Deas Thomson laid particular stress on this 
argument, quoting at length the treaty of Peking, whose fifth 
clause stated that 'Chinese choosing to take service in the
The theme that a squatter-clergy bloc was opposed to 'the 
people' had been bruited by liberals and radicals during the 
'free selection' elections in 1860. Cf. Naomi Turner, Sinews 
of Sectarian Warfare?, Canberra, 1972, pp.224-9. As far as the 
Anglican and Catholic clergy were concerned, the accusation 
probably had some substance, for their devotion to the 
continuance of state aid to religion made it very difficult to 
support liberal candidates, for nearly all of them favoured 
abolition.
2“See, for instance, defences by Darvall, Gordon and Holden,
S.M .H ., 24 October 1861. The conservatives' good opinion of 
the Chinese was based partly on a report of a select committee 
in 1858. (J.L.C., 1858, pp.325-6.)
3Cf. Darvall, Holden, S.M.H ., 24 October 1861; S,M,H. editorials, 
11 February, 21 September 1861. Some liberals admitted that the 
Chinese were 'more sinned against than sinning'. (Cf. Robertson and Butler, S.M.H., 17 October 1861.)
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British colonies... are at perfect liberty to enter into any
engagement with British subjects for that purpose, and to ship
themselves and their families on board any British vessel at
any of the open ports of China'. ~ The clause was not precisely
relevant to the Chinese gold-rush immigrants, for it referred
to persons who wished to 'take service' in the colonies and
'enter into any engagement for that purpose'; and in any case,
while the treaty was awaiting ratification, the Colonial Office
had consented to an amendment to Victoria's immigration
restriction act, which effectively banned the entry of Chinese 
2by sea. But the merits of Thomson's argument are not at issue
here: its significance lies in the fact that it was an attempt
to construct an argument against anti-Chinese legislation
based upon morality and law, not upon economic grounds.
One reason for the lack of emphasis on the advantages of
cheap Chinese labour was that few members of the Council were
in a position to use it. Before the swamping, Robert Towns,
merchant, agriculturalist and pastoralist, had claimed in the
Council that he had 'saved' Moreton Bay by introducing the
Chinese there, and he testified that they were 'excellent 
3servants'. Towns had, in fact, heard many reports that the 
Chinese were unsatisfactory as pastoral workers, but as he 
employed some in other jobs and paid them approximately half
.M.H., 17 October 1861.
2See the Victorian Act, 22 Vic., no.8, Clause 7 specified 
that if any Chinese were on board a ship, the owner, charterer, 
or master would be liable to a penalty of £10 for every person 
on board, whether passenger or crew and whether Chinese or 
European, in excess of one person to ten tons. As there was 
approximately one crew member to every twenty tons, and as the 
British Passenger Act allowed four passengers to every ten 
tons, the presence of a single Chinese on the ship would 
normally have resulted in very heavy fines. (Cf. the comments 
by Burton on a similar bill rejected by the Council before 
the swamping. Burton to Newcastle, 1 July 1861, enclosed 
with Young to Newcastle, 19 July 1861, P.R.O./C.O., 201/518.)
3S.M.H., 3 May 1861.
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the European rate, his enthusiasm is understandable.^ This
emphasis on the virtues of the Chinese as labourers was
unusual, and in any case Towns was not in the Council when the
anti-Chinese legislation was passed in 1861. Most of those
appointed after the swamping were professional men or Sydney
merchants who had no need of Chinese labour, particularly since
2there was chronic unemployment in the metropolis.“ In most
cases, those few members who might have been suspected of
hankering after Chinese labour clearly did not want it. John
Robertson, who had pastoral and agricultural interests, guided
the anti-Chinese legislation through the Council; John Campbell
merchant, pastoralist and member of a family which had used3Chinese labour in the 1850s, was one of the strongest 
opponents of Chinese immigration, as was William Russell, a 
conservative landowner with pastoral and agricultural interests 
Wentworth, who had once employed Chinese coolies, had like many 
other squatters changed his mind on their merits, for many 
Chinese were unwilling to accept low wages and absconded at the
"''See the agreements between Towns and Chan Lee, Aug Kian,
Tan What and Ke Yan in R. Towns & Co., Miscellaneous Papers, 
1832-1885, M.L., MSS 1279/10, pp.169, 171, 183, 185. The 
agreements bound the Chinese to work for Towns for five years 
for wages of £12 per annum plus rations. In the first year, 
the cost of their passage was deducted from their pay. The 
normal rate of pay for Europeans in comparable jobs was £18 
to £24 per annum plus rations (Coghlan, op.cit., pp.687, 692). 
For Towns' opinion that most of those who employed the Chinese 
found them unsatisfactory, see his evidence before the select 
committee of the N.S.W. Legislative Council on Asiatic labour, 
V . & P. (L.C., N.S.W.), 1854, pt.II, p.12 of the minutes of
evidence.
2Only four of the twenty-five members of the Council were 
engaged primarily in pastoral and agricultural pursuits, and 
two of them were liberals. Of the remainder, eleven were 
professional men and nine were engaged primarily in commerce 
or manufacturing. Three of the businessmen and one of the 
professional men are known to have had pastoral interests as 
well. (Based on Appendix IV.) On metropolitan unemployment, 
see T.A . Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia,
Melbourne, 1969 (first published 1918), vol.II, pp.696-706, 
1018-1031.
3See the agreements of Robert Campbell and Frederick Rosten 
with Chinese labourers in R. Towns & Co., Miscellaneous 
Papers, 1832-85, M.L., MSS 1279/10, pp.173, 175, 177.
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first opportunity.“ He told the Council that
He was not in favour of an unrestricted 
importation of Chinese. He was one of the first 
to import them, and he had had enough of them, 
and had long ago made up his mind to have no more 
of them.*-
Wentworth probably thought that the Chinese brought
economic advantages to the colony as producers of capital and
3consumers, not as suppliers of cheap labour. With other
conservatives, he seems to have realized what most liberals were
not prepared to admit until liberal-conservative conflict had
died down six years later: that the Chinese benefited the
colony as petty producers - goldminers, storekeepers, market
gardeners and fishermen - far more than as labourers. As the
Reverend J.D. Lang said when he moved for the abolition of
restrictions on Chinese immigration in 1867:
Few of [the Chinese v r e r e J hired as servants either 
in the towns or in the country. They preferred 
for the most part to work for themselves, in a 
spirit of self-reliance and independence which he 
would be glad to see exemplified among our own 
people.4
Chinese immigrants in New South Wales therefore conformed to 
the pattern set by the overseas Chinese in other countries: 
they provided an energetic class of small capitalists, not a 
servile source of cheap labour. Moreover, they tended to take 
up occupations in which direct competition with Europeans was 
minimal, supplying needs that had previously been imperfectly 
fulfilled. Even on the goldfields, they often confined 
themselves to diggings which white miners thought uneconomic, 
or reworked the 'tailings' on fields which others had abandoned
See report of select committee on Asiatic labour in V . & t . 
(L.C., N.S.W.), 1854, vol.II, p.923: 'It is admitted on all
hands that the experiment of Chinese [immigration] has 
disappointed the expectations of those who at one time strongly 
advocated their introduction.' Cf. Sir Stephen Roberts,
'History of the Contacts between the Orient and Australia', in 
I. Clunies-Ross (ed.), Australia and the Far East, Sydney,
1935, quoted A.T. Yarwood, Attitudes to Non-European 
Immigration, Melbourne, 1969, p.9; and Coghlan, op.cit., vol.II, pp.774.
^S.M.H., 17 October 1861.
3Cf. Wentworth in Empire, 18 October 1861.
^S.M.H., 21 September 1867.
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in the belief that they were exhausted.''' They then spent money
in buying food and provisions, and even when they exported
their gold to China, they added to the colonial revenues by
paying the gold export duty. As J.B. Darvall said:
No class of men could possibly come to this 
colony who would so largely benefit all classes 
of the community without competing with any.
They came here poor, and as they accumulated 
means they expended them freely; they were given 
to good living in every way; they consumed our 
produce, they employed our carriers; they were 
good customers to the merchants; in short, they 
benefited all.
Neither Darvall nor any other conservative in the
reconstructed Council mentioned the Chinese as a source of
cheap labour. There is no reason to believe that this was mere
dissimulation. Conservative councillors, unlike members of the
Assembly, rarely spoke to appease wage earners outside
parliament; they spoke mainly to each other, confirming their
belief in political and economic doctrines which were under
challenge. They proclaimed their hatred of radicals and their
mistrust of the lower orders in general; they unashamedly avowed
their anti-democratic prejudices; they openly argued the 'big
man's' case in the debates on the land bills, identifying his
interests with the 'general good'; and, on occasion, they spoke
approvingly of low wages because they left more money for3capital investment. They were not ashamed to affirm their 
belief in such doctrines, for they were merely the orthodoxies 
of British conservative thought. Conservatives in the Council 
did not argue in favour of the Chinese as a source of cheap 
labour partly because, personally, they had no use for them in 
that capacity; and partly because, as goldminers, the Chinese 
were not fulfilling the role of labourers and gave no 
indication that they were prepared to do so.
■''See the evidence of Assistant Gold Commissioner, P.L. Cloete, 
J.L.C.. 1858, p.336; and D.L. Carrington, 'Riots at Lambing 
Flat, 1860-1861', J.R.A.H.S., pt.4, October 1960, pp.224-5.
2S.M.H., 24 October 1861.
3In 1867, Thomson repudiated the idea that immigration greatly 
affected wages, claiming that despite the great fall in the 
rate of immigration in the 1860s, it seemed quite likely that 
real wages had been reduced 'and thus improvements carried out with the capital taken up in wages'. (S.M.H., 17 October 1867.)
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Although the Chinese miners were not regarded as a source 
of cheap labour, those who championed them were still, in a 
more general sense, influenced by their economic position in 
the community. Conservative unwillingness to impose 
restrictions on Chinese immigration must be seen in the context 
of the propertied classes' enthusiasm for immigration in 
general as a means of developing the colony. Unlike the 
radicals, conservatives had no need to take note of the 
problems which immigration sometimes caused working men 
searching for employment. Moreover, conservative prejudices 
against the Chinese had not been heightened by the importation 
of coolie labour in the 1840s and early 1850s, a measure which 
some conservatives had thought undesirable on social and 
racial grounds,“ but which did not subject them to injurious 
competition.
It would be misleading, however, to press too far the
connection between attitudes towards the importation of coolie
labour and opinions on the immigration of Chinese anxious to
mine gold. Coolies had been cheap if often unsatisfactory
labour for white capitalists but the Chinese miners were not.
Instead, they were a source of competition for the European
miners, who were generally regarded as belonging to the
working classes, but who were nevertheless a class of small,
independent producers. Liberals and radicals concentrated upon
this threat to the mining interest, not upon any danger to the
majority of working men who were wage-earners. In fact, most
of the radicals showed themselves oblivious to the interests of
wage-earners when they tried to have the Chinese banned from
mining, despite warnings that this would flood the urban labour
2market, forcing down wages and boosting unemployment. The 
radicals refused to admit that there was any conflict of
^It was condemned by a select committee of the Legislative 
Council, chaired by Bishop W.G. Broughton, in 1841. Relevant 
sections of the committee's report are printed in Yarwood, 
op.cit., pp.12-15. Similarly, many urban conservatives opposed 
the renewal of transportation in the late 1840s. Cf. Barrie 
Dyster, 'The Fate of Colonial Conservatism on the Eve of the 
Gold-Rush', J.R.A .H.S., vol.54, pt.4, December 1968, pp.331, 
334f.
2See debate on motion to exclude the Chinese from the 
goldfields by Wilson, S.M.H., 11 September 1861, and on 
amendment to clause 4 of the goldfields bill, S,M,H.,
12 September 1861.
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interests between the petty producers and wage-earners within
the working classes, but their policy clearly favoured the one
at the ex|oense of the other. This reflected the fact that the
miners, like the squatters in 1844,  ^had forged an alliance of
heterogeneous interests which served their own ends. They
traded upon their presumed community of interest with the
wage-earners; they took advantage of the historical association
of the Chinese with coolie labour; and they appealed to the
2racial prejudices prevalent in most sections of society. The 
solidarity of the front which supported them against the 
Chinese would no doubt have disintegrated had they succeeded 
in driving the Chinese from the goldfields into other areas of 
employment, just as the anti-Gipps alliance of 1844 fell to 
pieces when it was realized that it served squatter interests 
only. Unity was preserved when the miners failed to gain their 
objective, but this should not obscure the fact that the 
agitation was raised in their interests, not in the interests 
of the wage-earners who had been threatened by coolie labour.
Conservative attitudes towards the miners and their 
assessment of the nature of the anti-Chinese movement were of 
great importance in determining their stand on the Chinese 
question. To understand why this was so, it will be necessary 
to examine the anti-Chinese legislation in the context of the 
events on the goldfields and in Sydney which provoked it.
Some conservatives had always regarded the miners as a
3disturbing element in society, but it was the miners' reaction 
to the Chinese which gave them their greatest notoriety as 
symbols of social anarchy. Between 1856 and 1861, there were 
at least nine anti-Chinese riots on New South Wales goldfields, 
seven of them at Lambing Flat between November 1860 and4September 1861. No Chinese seem to have been killed, but many 
were badly beaten, and they were reduced to penury when they
T.H. Irving, 'The Development of Liberal Politics in New South 
Wales, 1845-1855', Ph.D. thesis, Sydney University, 1967, 
pp.28, lOOf.
2“The anti-Chinese agitation is discussed in detail below.
3See Chapter I, above.
4Cf. Carrington, loc.cit., passim.
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were robbed of their valuables and had their other belongings 
destroyed. The riots were a clear denial of the rule of law, 
the more so because of the context in which they occurred.
On the one hand, they took place amidst increasing crime on 
the goldfields,-1" the prelude to the epidemic of bushranging in 
the early 1860s. They were therefore seen as part of a 
general rise in lawlessness. On the other hand, the riots were 
accompanied by rhetoric and organization which implied the 
substitution of 'miner law' for the law of New South Wales.
The attacks on the Chinese were essentially acts of 
vigilantism designed to crush elements which had no place in 
civilized society as the miners conceived it, and whose very 
presence on the goldfields was a denial of the rule of 'miner
k i slaw' . The riots were placed most clearly in t-ho context by the
disturbances at Lambing Flat in December 1860, when the miners
formed themselves into a vigilance committee and attacked
criminal elements as well as the Chinese. The most notable
such 'police action' occurred on 8 December, when the diggers
marched through Lambing Flat 'burning and destroying shanties,
2sparring saloons and other haunts of criminals'. The attacks 
on the Chinese were only part of a more general attempt to 
expel from the goldfields all elements antagonist to miner 
interests - action which the Yass Courier described as one of
'the first steps in self-government - the administration of the
3natural law of self-defence'.
Vigilantism was given full institutional form with the 
formation of the Miners 1 23 Protection League after another
Cf. ibid., pp.229f, 232, 235; R.B. Walker, 'Another look at 
the Lambing Flat Riots, 1860-1861', J.R.A.H.S., vol.56, pt.3, 
September 1870, p.202; P.A. Selth, 'The Burrangong (Lambing 
Flat) Riots, 1860-1861: A Closer Look', J.R.A.H.S., vol.60,
pt.l, March 1974, pp.50-52, 64, 69, n.108.
2Carrington, loc.cit., p.229; Selth, loc.cit., p.50. Walker, 
'Another Look...', p.203, n.8, points out that Carrington should 
have dated the riot on 8 December, not 12 December.
3Quoted Selth, loc.cit., p.50. In 1858, the white miners at 
Rocky River had explicitly set their attitude towards the 
Chinese in the context of vigilantism by declaring in a 
petition to the Assembly that unless Chinese immigration were 
stopped they would 'arm themselves for their own defence, and 
establish a Committee of vigilance in aid of the civil power....' 
The petition is reproduced by Yarwood, op.cit., pp.31-2.
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disturbance on 27 January 1861, when several thousand Chinese
were driven from their claims. The League purported to 'unite
all the great labouring classes - the mining community - in
fact every member of the great working body - in one grand
harmonious federation'.^ Its principal object was the
expulsion of the Chinese and its other aims were repeal of the
gold duty, protection of native industry, land reform,
representation of mining interests on a population basis,
increased police protection and ‘Promulgation of the word of
2God throughout the mining districts of the colony'. Pending 
the arrival of the police to enforce laws of which the miners 
approved, the League was prepared to assume police functions 
itself. This was evidenced, for instance, by its request to an 
allegedly pro-Chinese storekeeper to deliver up his arms, 'as 
the diggers do not permit firearms to be held by tradesmen and 
townspeople'.* 23
At times, the miners were brought into direct confrontation 
with the government by their determination to have their way; 
at other times, the police and other officials were powerless 
to prevent the enforcement of 'miner law'. Conflict with the 
authorities came to a head on 30 June 1861, after a mob of 
about three thousand drove the Chinese from their claims. The 
police stood by helpless, and it was not until reinforcements 
arrived two weeks later that they were able to make their first 
arrests in an effort to re-establish their authority. The 
diggers reacted by marching on the police camp to secure the 
release of the prisoners. They were prepared to do this by 
force, and when negotiations had failed, they closed in upon 
the camp. Warning shots failed to check their advance and the 
police were fired on. The mob was repelled only after the 
mounted police had charged several times with their cutlasses, 
supported by fire from the foot police. The battle took place 
in darkness, but one miner was shot dead and about twenty were
^From the League's prospectus, quoted Selth, loc.cit., p.53.
2Carrington, loc.cit., p.231.
3Ibid.
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wounded. Two policemen were shot, but not fatally, and another 
suffered other wounds. "*"
The police had won, but they were weary, short of
ammunition and hopelessly outnumbered. Consequently, they
decided to abandon the field to the miners and withdrew to Yass.
They had been preceded by some of the local storekeepers and
they were followed by the managers of the local banks, who
2brought all the gold and money in their care. Their fears of
anarchy and a general confiscation of property were groundless,
for, although the miners held sway until the arrival of troops
two weeks later, miner law was in some respects more rigid than
the law of New South Wales: Spicer, the miners' leader, decreed
that anyone who tried to plunder or maltreat the local
3inhabitants would be executed.
The arrival of the military brought the miners to heel, 
and the Chinese were reinstated on their claims. They were not 
evicted again, for the troops remained on the goldfields for the 
next twelve months. The focus of conservative anxiety now 
switched to Sydney, where the miners were lobbying for support. 
The agitation in their favour was impressive. It was supported 
by radical politicians of predominantly working class origins
like Lucas, Allen, Dalgleish, Stewart, Harpur, Buchanan and
4 5Love, and by an Anti-Chinese Association. Over six thousand
citizens petitioned the Assembly in the miners' favour and over
The above account is based on Carrington, loc.cit., pp.235-6, 
and Selth, loc.cit., pp.58-60. Selth accepts uncritically the 
claim advanced by some contemporaries that 'genuine miners 
played little part' in the riot and that it was the work of 
criminals. This claim is impossible to reconcile with the. 
large number of rioters involved (about 3,000), with the implied 
threats of violence by the miners' leaders which preceded the 
riot (e.g. S.M.H., 2 April 1861), or with their retrospective
failure to dissociate themselves from the rioters. Instead 
they blamed the government for not acceding to the miners' 
demands (e.g. S.M.H .. 30 August 1861.)
2Selth, loc.cit., pp.59-60; Carrington, loc.cit., p.237.
^Selth, loc.cit., p.60.
4These were specially thanked by the miners for their advice 
and encouragement. (S.M.H., 30 August 1861.)
5Empire, 5 September 1861.
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five and a half thousand signed petitions to the Council.* 234 At 
the same time, the Empire sought to inflame anti-Chinese feeling 
and publicized a series of meetings, including a great
2torchlight assemblage organized by a tailor called West. The
government feared that the anti-Chinese movement in Sydney had
the same violent potential as its goldfields counterpart. It
called out the troops, issued them with fifty rounds of ball
ammunition apiece, and placed heavy guards on the Treasury and 
3the Mint. Its fears proved groundless, but they showed that
S  u teven some liberals misconstrued the nature of the agitation and
conjured up visions of wider social disorder.
For conservatives, the anti-Chinese agitation embodied the
spirit of lawlessness which both radicals and moderate liberals
had seemed to countenance, however briefly, in the debates on
the Indemnity Bill in 1860. The handful of rioters who were
brought to court were in most cases acquitted, and even the
liberal Edward Butler said that anti-Chinese feeling was 'so4strong that trial by jury had become an absolute farce'. The 
Herald saw the acquittals in a broader context, alleging that 
they were 'symptomatic of our political and social condition' 
in that the courts could no longer be regarded as a guarantee5of life and property. It damned 'those screaming orators who, 
with the cant of equality and fraternity on their lips, have 
been lately preaching an intolerant crusade against millions of 
their fellow creatures'; and it claimed that if the legislature 
were coerced into conceding the miners' demands, this would 
mean that
Petitions presented in the Assembly on 18, 20, 24 September 
1861; and in the Council on 18 September and 3 October 1861. 
There may have been considerable overlap between the petitions 
to the Assembly and the Council. Another 1,443 signatures were 
obtained on petitions from the goldfields.
2Cf. Hoskins in Empire, 27 September 1861. See other reports 
of meetings in Empire, 1, 6 August, 9, 10 September 1861.
3See the accounts by Hoskins and Harpur, Empire, 27 September
1861. Cowper did not dispute their accuracy.
4S.M.H., 17 October 1861.
~^S .M.H. , 21 September 1861, editorial.
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The lowest and most unworthy section of that 
class of the community least entitled to claim 
consideration as permanent colonists are to rule 
the roost! What they order is to be law; their 
rant is to be echoed as public opinion!
This is the upshot of all our democratic 
reforms, by which an enlightened public opinion 
was to lead to self-government! It is to be a 
reign of terror after all, and the rowdy is to be 
king.^
Conservatives in the Council took up the cry, sympathizing
with the Chinese as fellow victims of democratic oppression and
harping upon the theme that to give in to the miners' demands
for anti-Chinese legislation would be to countenance mob rule.
Darvall deprecated the Chinese immigration bill because it 'had
been introduced in submission to a clamour - a cry of antipathy;
the clamour of those who had first resorted to violence - taking
the law in their own hands, and who now wished to justify their
unlawful acts'. He thought aspects of the bill motivated by
'the same spirit as that which would preach a crusade against
property', the spirit exhibited in a recent coal miners' strike
at Newcastle, where 'the industrious miner' was prevented from
2working 'because some lazy vagabond would not exert himself*.
Similarly, Wentworth condemned the goldfields bill as a
'concession to the prejudices of a population which was well-
known to be of a most turbulent character, people who had of late
3been calling meetings, roasting oxen and so forth'; Holden 
thought that the government's legislation was 'merely a con­
cession to ignorance, made for the sake of the peace of the4colony'; and even Alexander McArthur, who had 'liberal' opinions 
on many questions, warned that 'they were now yielding to a clamoui 
raised by turbulent men who, he was sorry to think, were not more5severely punished'. The legislation was, as Charles Kemp said,
6the result of ‘a mere labour cry', and it was condemned partly
,M,H., 13 September 1861, editorial.
2S,M.H.. 24 October 1861.
3Ibid.
^Ibid. Debate on Chinese immigration bill.
“’ibid. Debate on goldfields bill.
^Empire, 10 October 1861.
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because of the low status and 'turbulence' of those who 
demanded it. Conservatives could not approve the bills without 
also seeming to countenance the unruly working class and 
petit-bourgeois agitation which had produced them.
The liberal government, too, condemned the agitation, for 
to it fell the task of preserving order. But although Cowper 
said the government would not submit to intimidation,"*' he had 
little choice but to concede much of what was demanded. He 
depended upon the support of the radicals, some of whom were 
actively involved in the agitation, and he had to achieve some 
accommodation with their views. The ministry consequently 
introduced a Chinese immigration bill and a goldfields bill soon 
after parliament met in September 1861. The goldfields bill 
was very moderate. It gave the government power to restrict 
the Chinese to certain areas and prevent other races from 
mining there. The immigration bill was more stringent. Its 
principal features were:
1. An effective ban on the immigration of Chinese by sea.
2. A tax of £10 per head on all Chinese entering the 
colony by land and on any who managed to evade the 
virtual prohibition on entry by sea.
3. A residence fee of £4 p.a. to be paid by every Chinese 
in the colony.
4. A ban on the naturalization of Chinese.
The bills were generally well received by the Assembly.
The radicals' attempt to amend the goldfields bill to ban the
Chinese from mining was defeated, and they only succeeded in
securing an amendment to stop the issue of miners' rights to
2those Chinese not holding one before 31 July 1862. The
immigration bill was actually made more moderate. Some of the
liberals combined with the conservatives to strike out the 
3residence fee; and although the clause regulating entry by sea 
made it practically impossible for ships to carry Chinese 
without incurring penalties, those penalties were reduced.^
S .M . H . , 11 September 1861.
2S.M.H., 12, 19 September 1861.
2S,M.H., 26 September 1861.
4Ibid., amendment by Rusden; speech by Windeyer.
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The Council's response to the bills was ambiguous. Most
of the liberals fully supported them, as did three
conservatives - Plunkett, William Russell and John Campbell.
The other conservatives condemned the legislation but most did
not think that it should be rejected out of hand because it was
obvious that some action had to be taken to deal with the crisis
on the goldfields.^  Wentworth's reactions exemplified the
conservatives' dilemma. He denounced the legislation
immoderately, but his positive contributions to finding a
solution to the problem ranged from a frank admission that he
2did not know what to do, to a wild suggestion that the
Government should send to Britain for another regiment to keep
3the miners under control.
It was the Chinese immigration bill which aroused the most 
bitter opposition and the conservatives tried to have it 
referred to a select committee on the second reading. The 
attempt was narrowly defeated when Wentworth gave his casting 
vote with the liberals, but the conservatives were able to 
greatly modify the bill in committee. The most drastic 
amendment was to the clause regulating immigration by sea.
That clause, which was obscurely worded, had simply been taken 
over from the Victorian act and the ministers do not seem to 
have realized that it would in practice have imposed a complete4prohibition on Chinese immigration. When its legal
implications had been explained in the Council, Robertson
consented to a conservative amendment altering the clause so
that it merely specified that each ship should carry no more
5than one Chinese to every ten tons of its weight. With the 
£10 entry tax, this was held to be a sufficient bar to Chinese
^Cf. speeches by Kemp, Manning, Gordon, and Thomson, S.M .H ., 
10, 17 October 1861.
2Empire, 18 October 1861.
3S.M.H., 20 October 1861.
4Cf. Cowper's incorrect interpretation of the clause in his 
second reading speech, S.M.H., 26 September 1861. For an 
explanation of the equivalent clause in the Victorian act, see 
footnote 2, p.216, above.
5S.M.H., 17 October 1861.
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immigration. The conservatives failed, however, to alter the
clause forbidding the naturalization of Chinese and they were
not satisfied with the bill even in its amended form.
It passed its third reading after some of the conservatives
absented themselves from the chamber and others who had
announced their opposition to it did not call for a division.^
Thus amended, the bill was returned to the Assembly for
concurrence, together with the goldfields bill, which had been
altered by the removal of the clause which forbade the issue of
2new miners' rights to the Chinese after 31 July 1862. The 
government supported the Council's principal amendments, and 
they were praised by the Reverend J.D. Lang, who thought them 
merely technical and confessed that 'The intellect of the other3House is not to be despised'. A hard core of nine or ten 
radicals held out against the changes, but with one minor4exception they were accepted.
Such was the passion against the Chinese out of doors, it 
is unlikely that legislation of a much less restrictive nature 
would have been accepted. If the conservatives themselves had 
been compelled to devise legislation, it would probably not 
have been much different. To judge by the recommendations of 
a conservative dominated select committee of the Council in 
1858, it seems likely that the ban on naturalization would have 
been relaxed and the penalty of confiscation for ships with 
illegal immigrants moderated, but that the bills would5otherwise have been largely unchanged. Freed of executive 
responsibility, however, the conservatives were permitted the 
luxury of violent criticism, which was expressed largely in 
terms of the bipartizan principles of economic progress and 
justice. This criticism, however, did not mean that these 
principles were more characteristic of conservatives than 
liberals. Rather, it reflected the conception of justice and 
progress characteristic of a class which had reaped only
1S.M.H., 24 October 1861.
2 Ibid.
3Empire, 31 October 1861.
^Ibid.
5Cf. report of select committee on Chinese immigration, J.L.C., 1858. ------
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benefits from immigration. Above all, the conservative 
criticism expressed sympathy with a minority which, like 
themselves, had fallen victim to the 'unruly1 forces in New 
South Wales society, and it expressed resentment that the 
colony's legislation was now, of necessity, dictated by the 
demands of the mob.
Part 2
The Debate on State Aid to Religion, 1862
Most 'party' divisions in the Council in the session of 
1862 were provoked by the Grants for Public Worship Prohibition 
Bill which, when passed into law, provided for the phasing out 
of state aid to religion in New South Wales. The split on that 
bill between liberals and conservatives in the Council reflected 
a similar division of opinion amongst politicians in the colony 
at large. This had been demonstrated at the elections in 
December 1860 when sixty-seven candidates gave their views on 
both Robertson's land bills and the state aid question in the 
Herald. Of the fifty-three who favoured land bills, forty 
wanted the abolition of state aid, six wanted it given only to 
the outlying districts and seven advocated it unconditionally.
Of the fourteen candidates who opposed Robertson's bills, only 
four favoured the abolition of state aid, one wanted it limited 
to the outlying districts, and the remaining nine proposed that 
it should be given without restrictions.""
To some extent, the division between liberals and 
conservatives coincided with differences between Anglicans and 
Nonconformists. In England, the antagonism of devout Anglican
conservatives and radical Nonconformists was an outstanding
2feature of politics" and it was duplicated, on a much smaller
■^Naomi Turner, Sinews of Sectarian Warfare?, Canberra, 197 2, 
p . 225 .
oCf. J.R. Vincent, Pollbooks: How Victorians Voted, Cambridge, 
1967, pp.67-70.
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scale, in the New South Wales Legislative Council. We know
the religious affiliation of eight of the nine members who
voted as conservatives in the session of 1862. Seven were
Anglicans, one was a distinguished Roman Catholic layman, and
none was a Nonconformist.^ The religious affiliation of nine
of the ten members who voted as liberals is known, and only
three were Anglicans. One of the Anglicans was the son of a
devout Wesleyan, and the other members who voted as liberals
consisted of four Nonconformists, a young Roman Catholic, and
an anti-clerical Christian who held aloof from all 
2denominations.
This makes it necessary to ask whether the liberals tended
to favour the abolition of state aid and the conservatives to
oppose it simply because of the relative influence of
Nonconformists in their ranks. Did the liberals favour the
abolition of state aid as liberals, or as Nonconformists andothe friends of Nonconformists? The answer is that they did so 
in both capacities. There was, as is well known, a strong 
Nonconformist tradition of opposition to state aid on the 
religious grounds that a church dependent upon the state for 
financial support would inevitably become the servant of that 
state. However, the state aid issue also had links with the 
fears, aspirations and ideas which men held as liberals and 
conservatives.
On one level, the connection between state aid and 
political ideologies was a matter of analogy, for state aid 
raised the issue of democracy within the churches. If 
clergymen were paid by the government, they could remain
^Kemp, Manning, J. Campbell, Merewether, Mitchell, Deas Thomson 
and Wentworth were Anglicans. J.H. Plunkett was the Roman 
Catholic.
2The Anglicans were Scott, Ward and Hargrave. Hargrave's 
father had been a prominent Wesleyan. Byrnes, Robey and 
McArthur were Wesleyans and Macfarlane was a Presbyterian. 
Butler was a Roman Catholic. Murray had been brought up as a 
Catholic but ostentatiously refused to give his allegiance to 
any church. He identified himself strongly with European 
liberalism and greatly admired Garibaldi. See Murray to Sir 
William Macarthur, 12 November I860, Macarthur Papers, vol.41, 
A2937, p.121; Murray in S.M .H ., 22 November 1866; and 
Gwendoline Wilson, Murray of Yarralumla, Melbourne, 1968, 
pp.172-3, 287-8, 293, 299-300, et passim.
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independent of their congregations. If, however, they received 
their stipends from voluntary contributions they were, in 
theory, subject to economic sanctions. The state aid issue 
therefore raised the question of whether authority in the 
churches was to filter down through a hierarchy or to reside in 
the congregations. This had important practical implications 
in conflicts between the clergy and the laity; and, on a more 
theoretical level, attitudes to state aid implied a stand on 
whether the churches should be governed on the principles of 
monarchy or democracy.
Protestant Dissent was in theory democratic. It was not 
simply an expression of opposition to state interference in 
religious matters, but also an expression of revolt against the 
structure of authority in the episcopal churches. It was 
natural for radical Nonconformists to incorporate this 
'democratic' aspect of their religious thought into their 
general political outlook. The Reverend J.D. Lang, for 
instance, made it a proud boast that his church was in 
principle a republic and he found scriptural as well as 
political reasons for holding his democratic views.^
The clash over democracy in the churches was exemplified 
not only in the conflict between Anglicanism and Dissent, but 
also in a split between liberals and conservatives within the 
Anglican communion. The conflict had been brought into the 
open in 1858, when liberal Anglicans had founded the Church 
Sentinel in order to
watch against and resist the pretensions of the 
hierarchy, which seeks to claim as its own 
exclusive and individual possession, rights and 
privileges which belong to the Church - thus 
making the Church a sort of appendage to the 
hierarchy, not the hierarchy to the Church.^
The Church Sentinel viewed its challenge to the Anglican
hierarchy in the context of political liberalism, justifying
its stand with reference to secular doctrines. It claimed that
'while the popular element is thus infusing itself everywhere',
R.B. Walker, 'The Abolition of State Aid to Religion in New 
South Wales', Historical Studies, vol.10, no.38, May 1962, 
p.176; cf. Robin Gollan, Radical and Working Class Politics, 
Melbourne, 1967, p.10.
Quoted Turner, op.cut., p.182.2
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no exception should be made in church matters.^ It therefore
argued for the abolition of state aid partly on 'democratic'
grounds: aid fostered an ecclesiastical despotism and patronage
'which originated in the days of nomineeism'; it was an
anachronism in 'the days of responsible government and almost
2universal suffrage'; and it was used to build up
an overweening prelacy...to endow pet benefices 
for pet parsons in fashionable and would-be 
aristocratic localities - to raise up a priestly 
influence in our most populous districts and by 
the agency of this influence to establish and 
perpetuate hierarchical pretensions.3
In the Church Sentinel's view, the voluntary system would result
in the election of bishops and the appointment of clergy by the
people. Victory was certain, for 'Nothing can keep the people4out of power; have it they will, it is the law of our race'.
The question of 'popular control' of the churches was one 
theme in the debates on the abolition of state aid in the 
Council. It was emphasized most by Charles Kemp, a leading 
Anglican who took the conservative side in the internal disputes 
of his church, and John Hubert Plunkett, the Catholic Church's5most prominent layman. Both quoted authorities to show 'the 
tyranny exercised by the laity over the clergy, and the 
miserable state of vassalage in which the clergy stood in 
respect of their people' where the voluntary system prevailed. 
Their examples were drawn from the United States, where civil 
war showed the consequences of the related evils of voluntaryism 
and democracy. Plunkett thought that in the United States it 
was dangerous for the clergy to tell unpopular truths and that
^"Quoted ibid., p.211.
2Quoted Robert Withycombe, 'Church of England Attitudes to 
Social Questions in the Diocese of Sydney, c .1856-1866' , 
J.R.A.H.S., vol.47, pt.2, June 1961, p.98.
3Quoted Turner, op.cit., p.209.
4Quoted Withycombe, loc.cit., p.98.
5For Plunkett, see John Molony, An Architect of Freedom, 
Canberra, 1973; for Kemp, see A,D.B ,, vol.2, and K.J. Cable, 
'Saint James' Church, King Street, Sydney, 1819-1894', part II, 
J.R.A.H.S,, vol.50, pt.5, November 1964, pp.363, 369.
^Plunkett in S .M .H ., 17 September 1862; Kemp in S,M,H.,
25 September 1862.
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'many imposters passed themselves for religious men, preaching
in the style that was most palatable to their hearers'. His
argument simply transposed to a different context the familiar
conservative complaint that political democracy enabled
charlatans to ride to power by flattering the people and
pandering to their prejudices.
While conservatives had few warm feelings for the United
States, the best known example of the workings of the voluntary
system, most liberals had little affection for the state paid
clergy in Britain. The Anglican bishops in the House of Lords
had been numbered among the opponents of nearly every popular
reform, including the abolition of slavery and the 1832 Reform 
2Bill, and the Anglican clergy in general had a poor reputation
with the radicals. David Buchanan, M.L.A., expressed a radical
Presbyterian's distaste for their political record:
The State-paid clergy had in England always taken 
the side of king-craft and of aristocracy; and 
aided to keep down the people....In the great 
corn-law agitation the State-paid clergy had 
sided against the people, while the dissenting 
clergy had supported them.^
Liberals in the Council, however, were not so indelicate as to 
voice such criticisms, and satisfied themselves by strenuously 
and successfully resisting a conservative attempt to insert an 
amendment into the bill implying state recognition of the4powers of ecclesiastical authorities.
The moral effects of religion were praised by both liberals 
and conservatives, but it was only the latter, driven by 
anxiety at the triumph of radicalism, who hinted that religion 
was also a means of political control. The point was made in 
its crudest form by John Campbell, who argued that state aid
1S.M.H., 31 October 1862.
2Donald Southgate, The Passing of the Whigs, London, 1962, 
pp.81, 88-9; Edith F. Hurwitz, Politics and the Public 
Conscience: Slave Emancipation and the Abolitionist Movement 
in Britain, London, 1973, pp.71-2.
^Quoted Walker, 'The Abolition of State Aid...', p.176; cf. the 
accusation by the liberal Anglican, Windeyer, that reform in 
England had been obstructed by 'the servile and contemptible 
constructions of the churchmen'. (S,M,H., 22 June 1860.)
4S.M.H., 30 October 1862.
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financed the teaching of religion amongst poor people who
could not afford voluntaryism, and who said:
He looked to the effects of religion in the 
mother country - there was no open resistance to 
authority, no riding down of the people by horse- 
guards - because the people now, instead of 
rebelling, suffered in patience, trusting to ^
future reward. This was the effect of Christianity.
Other conservatives were less explicit, but they, too,
sometimes placed the moral function of religion in a political
context. When Deas Thomson was confronted with the evils of
revolutionary France and republican America, he implied that
religion might have saved those countries from disorder and
quoted Judge Storey's doubts
whether any free government can be permanent, 
where the public worship of God, and the support 
of religion, constitute no part of the policy or 
duty of the State in any assignable shape.
Anxiety at the changes in colonial society also produced a 
reaction in favour of state aid from conservatives who had
previously opposed it, such as J.B. Darvall, F.L.S. Merewether,
3George Allen and Sir William Manning. Manning, for instance,
was still inclined to oppose state aid in principle but argued
for its retention because he feared that the constitution might
not stand further 'organic' changes. As he put it:
It was at present the Constitution of the country 
that the State should give aid to religion, and 
he did not think they were justified in making a 
change in the constitution unless they saw clearly 
that such a change would be advantageous. He 
confessed that he did not like tearing our 
Constitution to rags. It almost seemed that of 
this constitution, which everyone approved some 
six years ago, they were soon to have not one 
shred remaining. The constitution of the Assembly 
had been totally changed; it was proposed to change 
the constitution of this House, and there was a 
proposal to make another change, of vital importance, 
in a matter in which a few years ago the whole 
community was unambiguous. He repeated, he did not 
like these constant changes....4
1S.M.H., 31 October 1862.
^S.M .H ,, 25 September 1862.
3For their previous opposition to state aid, see Turner, op.cit., 
P-146, et passim.
.M.H., 25 September 1862.
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The conservatives also related the abolition of state aid
to their general political ideology by claiming that it
constituted a breach of faith with 'vested interests'. Concern
for such interests was as characteristic of conservatives in
Australia as in Britain, for in both countries those who
benefited by them were usually conservatives. Vested interests
were well represented in the Council, where Thomson, Plunkett,
Manning and Merewether, government officials under the 'old
regime', belonged to the 'Unpopular Class of Political
Pensioners' whose privileges, despite liberal protests, been
enshrined in the constitution.^
The allegation that the Grants for Public Worship
Prohibition Bill affected vested interests had no strict
justification in law, for the bill merely provided for the
withdrawal of state aid as the clergymen who received it died
or retired. The vested interests of the clergy were therefore
thoroughly protected. Conservative claims that the bill
attacked vested interests rested upon the argument that the aid
had not simply been given to clergymen, but to congregations
who had built churches 'on the faith that stipends would be
2permanently paid to the Clergymen'. The withdrawal of aid was
therefore depicted as a breach of faith with the congregations.
This reasoning had no legal weight and its moral force was a
matter of individual perspective. The conservatives may have
accepted the argument partly because liberal criticism of the
financial privileges given by the constitution to displaced
officials of the 'old regime' had made them hyper-sensitive3about the rights of vested interests.' However, the suspicion
^Cf. Cowper to Young, 8 June 1861, Cowper Correspondence, vol.l, 
A676, n.p. Resentment at the granting of liberal pensions to 
displaced government officials had been one reason for popular 
opposition to the constitution in 1853. (See report of public 
meeting, S.M.H., 16 August 1853.)
^Quoted from the protest against the abolition of state aid 
signed by seven conservative members of the Council, J.L.C.,
1862, pt.l, p.135.
3The conservatives had often demonstrated extreme sensitivity on 
this point. They had, for example, opposed the Pastoral Lands 
Assessment and Rent Bill on the grounds that it breached the 
government's obligation to the squatters, although many of them 
thought the bill otherwise a very good one. The bill was 
passed, and although there was a prima facie case for regarding 
it as illegal, it was upheld by the Supreme Court. See Douglass, Merewether, Allen, Burton, Holden, Thomson, S.M.H., 18 September 1858; Robertson, Empire, 2 October 1861.
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remains that their concern for 'vested interests' was more a
result of opposition to the abolition of state aid than a
reason for it. Conservatives seem to have believed that the
cessation of aid involved a breach of the public faith because
they wanted to, while liberals rejected that argument because
it suited their case to do so.
There were, of course, major themes in the debates
unrelated to liberalism and conservatism as distinctive
ideologies. As with the land bills and the Chinese bills, both
liberals and conservatives made much of arguments appealing to
assumptions common to both sides. In fact, each party used
arguments based upon assumptions more characteristic of the
other. For example, when the liberals claimed that the
abolition of state aid was necessary to allay discontent,"1 2345" they
echoed the major reason which conservatives had given for
conceding previous reforms; when the conservatives, on the
basis of the large number of petitions in favour of state aid,
defended it in the name of the people, they usurped the
2accustomed role of the liberals; and it was equally ironic
when opponents of state aid alleged that it fostered religious 
3animosity, for the voluntaryist churches were the backbone of4Protestant sectarianism. Such arguments do not explain why 
liberals took one side and conservatives the other; they simply 
represent attempts to justify a position adopted for other 
reasons.
Three men who were conservatives on most issues voted with
5the liberals to abolish state aid, and it is not contended that 
the lines of division can be explained entirely in terms of
^See, for example, Russell in S .M .H ., 25 September, 31 October 
1862; and Butler, S .M .H ., 1 October 1862.
2Cf. protest against abolition of state aid signed by seven 
conservative members of the Council, J.L.C., 1862, pt.I, p.135; 
and Deas Thomson in S.M.H,, 25 September 1862.
3See, for example, McArthur in S.M.H., 31 October 1862.
4Cf. Mark Lyons, ‘Aspects of Sectarianism in New South Wales 
Circa 1865 to 1880', Ph.D. thesis, A.N.U., 1972, pp.l9f, 22f, 
esp. n.4.
5G.K. Holden and E.W. Ward, Anglicans, and J.B. Watt, a 
Presbyterian.
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liberalism and conservatism. Opposition to state aid was 
strengthened by the specifically religious tradition of 
opposition to Erastianism amongst Nonconformists and some 
Anglicans; and conservative support for aid was strengthened by 
an authentically religious tradition in its favour within the 
episcopal churches.
In the Catholic Church, the connection between Church and
State was being reasserted with new vigour in opposition to
liberal tendencies within the Church.'1 23' That connection was
soon to receive one of its strongest affirmations in the
Syllabus of Errors, which specifically rejected the doctrine of
separation of Church and State, renewed the Church's claim to
temporal power, denied the proposition that civil law should
prevail over ecclesiastical law and condemned as erroneous the
notion that 'in our age it is no longer expedient that the
Catholic Religion should be regarded as the sole religion of
2the State, to the exclusion of all others'. The Catholic 
hierarchy in New South Wales supported state aid to all 
denominations as second best to state aid for the Catholic 
Church alone, the more so because Catholics tended to be drawn
disproportionately from those sections of the community which3could least afford voluntaryism. In the Council, Plunkett 
gave another reason for Catholic opposition to the abolition of 
aid when he complained that it would leave the Church of England 
as 'the only church endowed by the State' because that church, 
unlike the others, had been given 'large and numerous grants of 
glebe and other lands...all of which will, at no distant day, 
be capable of yielding a large and increasing revenue' /
See Austin Gough's contributions to a debate in Prospect, 
vol.6, nos 1, 2 and 4, 1963; and his review article of Henry 
Mayer (ed.), 'Catholics and the Free Society', in Historical 
Studies, vol.10, no.39, March 1961, pp.370-78.
2Quoted E.E.Y Hales, Pio Nono, London, 1954, p.260. See also 
The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol.XIV, New York, 1912, p.369.
3Cf. Walker, 'The Abolition of State Aid...', p.174.
^Protest by Plunkett, J.L.C., 1862, pt.I, p.135.
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The Church of England, of course, rejected the Catholic
Church's claim that it should be 'the sole religion of the
State', but made that assertion on its own behalf. The
established church in England, it had in practice been virtually
the established church in Australia until the 1830s.^ When
Bourke1 23s Church Act of 1836 had formally placed the major
Christian denominations on an equal footing by giving them
state aid in proportion to the numbers of their adherents, the
Anglican Bishop of Sydney, W.G. Broughton, had criticized the
2abandonment of the Anglican establishment. Even in 1862,
Broughton's more cautious successor, Bishop Barker, spoke not
of the State's obligation to support Christianity but of its3obligation to support the Church of England.
Conservative Anglicans in the Council were no doubt 
confirmed in their support for state aid by their church's 
favourable attitude towards it, but, unlike Broughton and 
Barker, they did not think that it should be confined to their 
own denomination. Indeed, their attitude towards state aid was 
not so much religious in origin as political. The belief that 
the State should support religion was part of the heritage of 
British conservatism, whose doctrines were reasserted with 
ever-increasing vehemence by colonial conservatives as they 
looked for support in their fight against the growing menace of 
liberalism. This combination of a conservative constitutional 
tradition and conservative anxiety in the face of the liberal 
challenge was far more important to conservatives in the 
Council than the attitude of the Church of England. The 
political derivation of their opinions on state aid was 
apparent in Thomson's speech on the second reading of the bill, 
which emphasized that state aid was an essential part of the 4British constitution - and, indeed, of all stable constitutions. 
The speech also stressed the complementary argument that aid 
had beneficial moral and social effects. In support of this
^Cf. J.S. Gregory, 'Church and State in Victoria to 1872', in 
E.L. French (ed.), Melbourne Studies in Education, 1958-9, 
Melbourne, 1960, pp.5-11.
2Ibid., pp.16-18.
3Cited Turner, op.cit., p.241.
^S,M.H., 25 September 1862.
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case, Thomson did not refer to the works of Anglican divines, 
but to the authors whom he usually cited on constitutional 
matters, Burke and Storey. He also quoted at length from 
Dr Chalmers, a Presbyterian divine who himself referred to 
Burke.
The political basis of conservative opposition to the
Grants for Public Worship Prohibition Bill was even more
apparent in the case of Manning and the other conservatives who
had come to favour state aid only when the pace of political
and social change had made them fear all liberal reforms.
Manning clearly defended state aid from conservative motives
rather than religious ones, because he admitted that he still
favoured its abolition in principle. He favoured its
continuation on the practical grounds that abolition would lead
to the complete destruction of a constitution which had already
been changed too much.* 2- His opposition to the state aid
abolition bill reflected the growth in conservative solidarity
as colonial politics polarized between radical liberals bent
on changing the political and social order which had existed
before responsible government and conservatives who were driven
to an increasingly undiscriminating defence of that order. The
one-time opponent of state aid now became one of its strongest
supporters and when the Grants for Public Worship Prohibition
Bill was passed, he joined six other leading conservatives in
signing a formal protest against a measure which seemed 'contrary
to sound policy' and certain to prove 'deeply injurious in its
2effects on religion morality and social order'.
^Ibid. See above, p.2 36.
2J.L.C., 1862, pt.I, p .135.
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Part 3
The Debate on the Council's Financial Powers,
1861-1862
The question of the Council's financial powers was again 
a major issue in the sessions of 1861-62 and 1862, although the 
divisions which it provoked were not 'party' ones in which most 
liberals opposed most conservatives. Instead, most liberals 
sided with the conservatives and most conservatives themselves 
expressed opinions which differed markedly from those which 
they had espoused in previous years.
The question of the Council's right to amend money bills 
was raised early in the session of 1861-62, when Robertson 
decided to originate the land bills in the Council. This was 
a perfectly legitimate course, for it had never been suggested 
that the land bills, which simply regulated the disposal of 
Crown Lands, were money bills. They had not been introduced as 
money bills in the Assembly when Robertson had first brought 
them forward; and when they had previously been amended by the 
Council, not even the radicals had suggested that a breach of 
privilege was involved.
However, when Robertson tried to originate the bills in
the Council after the swamping, Manning objected on the grounds
that they were ones which 'would affect the revenue'.  ^ Thomson
immediately agreed, saying that he 'entertained not the
slightest doubt that, to a certain extent, these were revenue 
2bills'. The point was raised carelessly, with no regard to 
the implications. Obstruction was the motive, and Thomson and 
Manning probably wished to repay the liberals for their 
behaviour over the Indemnity Bill by delaying the land bills 
through a similar expansion of the definition of a money bill. 
They realized too late that they would be the principal victims 
of this strategem. Their blunder was pointed out by another 
conservative, Charles Kemp, who saw that if the Council extended 
the definition of a money bill it would be unable to alter bills
'“Empire, 5 September 1861. 
^Ibid.
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which it had hitherto been entitled to amend. Like Thomson and
Manning, Kemp believed that the Council should not exercise its
technical right of amending money bills, and most other members
probably shared this view. Johnson, Isaacs and the other
extremists who had led the Council in asserting its right of
amendment had been excluded, and at least nineteen of the
twenty-five members appointed after the swamping were on record
as opponents of their claims." Not one of the remaining six
members is known to have supported the extremists' view of the
Council's powers. The conservatives therefore took to heart
Kemp's warning that if the land bills were money bills they
'might find themselves in a dilemma,' for they would have to
'either take them [the land bills] or reject them'.* 23 4
Seeing his mistake, Manning now began to back down. He
still thought the bills might more properly have been
originated in the Assembly, but said that
He certainly had been struck with the observation 
of the honorable member who had just spoken 
[Kemp] and he was now inclined to say, that 
nothing in the bills could be construed into the 
meaning of rates, taxes or imposts.3
Robertson and Hargrave had initially dismissed the
suggestion that the land bills were money bills as preposterous.
Robertson pointed out that they did not impose taxes or
appropriate money but simply regulated
The disposal of certain public property and the 
use of that property....He took it that there was 
a great difference between selling the property of 
the Crown and levying a tax upon the property of 
the people.4
"The following conservatives and 'independents' had previously 
denied that the Council should amend money bills: Thomson, 
Plunkett, Darvall, J. Campbell, Gordon, Kemp, McArthur, Allen, 
Holden. (See Empire, 5 February 1857; S,M.H., 20, 21, 22 June 
1860.) According to Plunkett, Wentworth had not intended that 
the Council should amend money bills, and Wentworth's first 
ruling on the matter in the Council bears this out. (Plunkett 
in S .M.H. , 22 June I860; J.L.C. , 1861-62, p.22.) Manning's 
statements in the Council on 4 September 1861 are explicable 
only on the assumption that he thought the Council should not 
amend money bills. In addition to these eleven conservatives 
and 'independents', the eight consistent liberals thought that 
the Council should avoid such amendments.
2Empire, 5 September 1861.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
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However, further consideration brought home to him the
tactical advantages of pretending that the land bills were
money bills, and he withdrew them saying that 'very grave
doubts might exist as to whether they ought not to be brought
in in the other House of the Legislature1 *345.x The bills were
thereupon withdrawn and introduced in committee in the
Assembly - the customary method for originating money bills.
Kemp's fears were finally brought to fruition by Wentworth,
2a sincere and impartial President, but one hampered by deafness
and a life-long inability to think clearly. He was asked to
decide on the status of the Crown Lands Alienation Bill when it
reached the committee stage in the Council and Holden proposed
the conservatives' principal amendment, which was designed to
prevent free selection on lands under application for purchase
at auction by persons who had paid a deposit of ten shillings
an acre. Robertson immediately objected that the Council could
not consider the amendment because 'it involved a question of 3Money*. Manning, too, had by now accomplished a complete
reversal of opinion on the bill's status, and he argued
strongly against the point of order on the grounds that
they were not upon a bill either of supply or 
taxation. It was a matter only of dealing with 
the lands of the Crown, not with taxation.^
However, when the question was referred to Wentworth he ruled
that the bill was a money bill, and that the Council was bound
by its standing orders to follow the practice of the House of5Lords so that it could not make the amendment. He gave a 
similar ruling on the Crown Lands Occupation Bill.^ Robertson 
was then able to use these decisions to block all amendments to 
clauses which mentioned money or which materially affected the 
main objects of the bills.
E^mpire, 12 September 1861.
^Murray to Parkes, 18 September 1861, P.C., vol.55, A925, 
pp.276-83.
3J.L.C., 1861-62, p .22.
4Empire, 2 October 1861.
5J.L.C.. 1861-62, p .22.
^Ibid., 11 October 1861.
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Wentworth's decision had wider implications. First, it
seemed to reinforce the position of those radicals in the
Assembly who wished to emasculate the Council by expanding the
definition of a money bill. They claimed, for instance, that
the Council was not entitled to amend the Chinese Immigration
Bill because it imposed charges and financial penalties, but
were deserted by the government and the moderate liberals, who
combined with the conservatives to affirm the Council's right
to amend it.^ Whether to invoke such a broad definition of a
money bill was for most liberals a matter of expedience. They
were not willing to raise it to the status of a genuine
constitutional principle, but simply applied it when it suited
them. Since they favoured the Council's principal amendments
2to the Chinese Immigration Bill, they saw no reason to pretend
that they were ultra vires, although that bill had at least as
strong a claim as the land bills to be considered a money bill.
Secondly, the extension of the definition of a money bill
strengthened the hand of those conservatives who contended that
the Council should be entitled to amend such bills. At the
beginning of the session, they had been unrepresented in the
Council, or almost so, but the attractions of their point of
view now grew rapidly. After Wentworth's ruling that the land
bills were money bills, Thomson moved that the powers of the
Council in such matters be referred to the Standing Orders
Committee. In so doing, he commented that
Every hon. member would admit it to be desirable 
after certain circumstances, that the powers of 
this House, with regard to money bills should be 
definitely settled....Until very recently the 
powers of this House with respect to money bills 
had not been so much restricted as they had been 
within the last few days, and much inconvenience 
seemed to have arisen from that restriction.^
Such re-thinking on the part of Thomson was especially
significant, for he had previously led the moderate
"Empire, 31 October 1861. Cf. Robertson's attempt to have the 
President rule that the goldfields bill was a money bill. 
(J.L.C,, 1861-62, p .54.)
E^mpire, 31 October 1861.
3S.M.H., 18 October 1861.
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conservatives in opposing the claims of Johnson, Isaacs and
others who had taken an extreme view of the Council's financial
powers. It portended a mass conversion to the viewpoint of the
old extremist party. Early in 1862, Wentworth reversed his
ruling that the Council could not amend money bills, and
immediately voted for an amendment reducing the amount of a
loan bill by £500,000.“ His change of mind was endorsed by
nearly the whole Council. This was revealed when his
successor, T.A. Murray, reversed the ruling yet again some nine
months later, only to have the House dissent by sixteen votes 
2to three. The majority included Thomson, Manning, Kemp and 
nearly all the liberals. Only Hargrave, Bourn Russell and the 
conservative Plunkett stood out. Plunkett had been prominent 
on the select committee which drafted the constitution in 1853 
and Murray had played a minor part in its deliberations. With 
the two liberals, Russell and Hargrave, they remained true to 
the select committee's intention that the Council should not 
amend money bills. Thomson, Manning and Wentworth, other 
members of the committee, had been driven by changed 
circumstances and their own mistakes to abandon their former 
position.
Part 4
The Debate on Reform of the Council, 1861-1862
The changes in conservative opinion on the financial powers 
of the Council were parallelled by changes in conservative 
attitudes towards reform of that body. It has already been 
shown that although conservatives in the Assembly were 
convinced of the desirability of an elective upper house by 
1858, most of their counterparts in the Council continued to
1J.L♦C.f 1861-62, pp.127, 141-2. 
2J.L.C., 1862, p.125.
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favour the nominee system.“ They did not think that the 
Council's failure to reject the 1853 Electoral Bill constituted 
an argument against the principle of nomination, and even 
Denison's threat to swamp the Council if it rejected the 
Appropriation Bill for 1859-60 did not shake their faith. 
Consequently, less than three weeks before the swamping of 
1861, they overwhelmingly rejected a bill to make the Council 
elective.
What enabled them to remain loyal to the principle of
nomination was faith in the Governor. They believed that he
would not consent to a swamping except on the conditions which
had led William IV to threaten to swamp the House of Lords in 
21832, or unless the Council committed the extraordinary folly
of refusing supply to a ministry which possessed the confidence
of the country. Moreover, although Deas Thomson thought that
he, personally, was not likely to retain his seat after the3quinquennial appointments expired on 13 May 1861, the 
conservatives felt that Sir John Young could be trusted to 
ensure that the Council was reconstructed on a conservative 
basis. Wentworth, for instance, defended the nominated Council 
less than a week before the swamping and said that he hoped and
expected that Young would not nominate unsuitable people for
1 • 4life.
The 'unconstitutional' swamping on 10 May 1861 destroyed the 
conservatives' faith in the nominated Council, and their 
confidence was by no means fully restored when Young succeeded 
in having it reconstituted on conservative lines. Merewether, 
who before the swamping had defended the principle of 
nomination in one of the greatest speeches ever heard in the 
Council, said that 'Having been once so utterly deceived in his5hopes and expectations, he would not trust again'.
Consequently, although he still wanted a nominated Council, he
"''See Chapter IV, part 2, above.
2These conditions are outlined in Chapter V, above.
~^S .M.H. , 14 February 1861.
4S.M.H., 6 May 1861.
.M.H♦, 18 September 1862.
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thought that the Governor1s choice of men should be limited to
'persons who by their services in positions of high public
trust had obtained the confidence of the people'. He admitted,
however, that this change would not be accepted by the Assembly,
and, rather than perpetuate the existing nominated Council
which had so demonstrably failed, he was prepared to make the1upper house partly elective.
Wentworth, too, thought that the Governor had betrayed
his trust, so that it was no longer possible for the colonists
to enjoy their right as British subjects to have an elective
lower house and a nominated upper house, thereby carrying out
2'the precedent of the English Constitution'. Accordingly, he
changed his mind on the vexed question of what constituted
'English precedent' and gave the following description of the
type of upper house which he would have preferred had he been
given sole responsibility for devising a new Council:
I should probably have insisted upon the English 
precedent - (Hear, hear) I should have created 
a high property qualification, most likely a 
freehold qualification alone - I should have 
divided the colony into four or five electorates....
I should have provided for open voting....I would 
have left this machine to work in the usual way.^
Elsewhere in his speech, Wentworth pleaded for a return to
the old constitution in which there had been a single, mixed
chamber containing both nominees and elected members. He must
have known, however, that such a proposal had no chance of
acceptance. Indeed, no conservative seriously opposed the
proposition that there should be two houses, with the upper
house at least partly elective. Some members still had a
personal preference for a nominated Council, but, perhaps
mindful of conditions under which they had been offered their
seats, they did not insist on their views. Dr Mitchell, for
instance, wanted the Council to continue in its existing form
except that its membership should be limited to not less than
XIbid.
3S,M,H,, 11 September 1862. 
3Ibid.
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one half nor more than two-thirds the membership of the
Assembly, but he made no attempt to have his proposal adopted;3-
and, while Sir William Manning complained that the existing
Council had not yet been given a fair trial, he said that he
would accept the elective principle out of deference to 'what
2was sard to be public opinion'.
A few members agreed with Wentworth's suggestion that the 
upper house should be elected by those who could meet a high 
freehold qualification, but this proposal had little chance of 
winning majority support, for the Council was now, more than 
ever, the representative of urban conservatism. Table XIII 
makes this clear:
TABLE XIII* 3
OCCUPATIONS OF LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES IN THE COUNCIL,
SESSION OF 1861-62
Categorv Occupation Liberals Conservatives
Pastoral/ ( Pastoralists
| Mixed pastoral/ ^
 ^ agricultural
2
agricultural 1
Commercial/ ( Merchants 2(
( Others 3
3
manufacturing 2
( Barristers 2 3
Professional
| Solicitors 
( Medical
( practitioners 1
! Retired govt.
| officials
( Govt, officials
2
2
1
TOTAL 9 16
3S .M.H., 12 December 1861.
3 Ibid.
3Based on the classifications by ideological orientation in 
Chapter V, above, and on the occupational details in 
Appendix IV.
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It can be seen that all but three of the sixteen conservatives
followed urban occupations, and indeed, all but one of them
lived in or near Sydney.'“ Such men naturally agreed with the
Sydney Morning Herald's complaint that if the Council were
elected on a 'merely freehold suffrage', it would exclude
half the property of the country. It would indeed 
admit some very small landed interests, but it 
would exclude that large class - pastoral, 
monetary, commercial, manufacturing, and trading - 
which wields the chief capital of the colony.^
Most conservatives in the Council therefore took steps to ensure
that the 'urban aristocracy' remained well represented when the
government introduced bills to reform the upper house in the
sessions of 1861-62 and 1862.
The liberal's Legislative Council reform bills were
identical to the one rejected by the Council shortly before the
swamping, and were referred to select committees chaired by
Wentworth. On both committees, seven of the ten members were
conservatives, all of whom lived in Sydney. Wentworth was the
only conservative on them who was a pastoralist. The first
committee did not report, and although the second committee's
report was signed by Wentworth as chairman, he had little3influence upon its recommendations. Instead of restricting the 
franchise to freeholders, the committee proposed a wide range 
of qualifications. In addition to those owning land to the, 
value of £300, those enfranchised included short term lessees 
paying £50 per annum, those holding leases worth £20 per annum 
which had an unexpired term of twenty-one years, householders 
paying a rent of £50 per annum, and men with 'professional or 
personal' qualifications - university graduates, barristers, 
solicitors, medical practitioners, ministers of religion, and 
officers or retired officers of Her Majesty's land or naval
"The addresses of most members are given in the Minutes of the 
Executive Council for the date on which they were offered 
seats or the day on which they were appointed. The relevant 
minute books are in the Archives Office of N.S.W., locations 
4/1533 to 4/1541.
,M.H., 6 September 1862.
^Cf. Wentworth, S.M.H., 11 September 1862.
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forces who were not engaged on active service. These 
qualifications would have allowed most urban conservatives to 
vote, but would have disfranchised most of the artisans and 
labourers whose votes did much to make the liberals supreme in 
Sydney and the large country towns.
The prospects of urban conservatives were further enhanced 
by the fact that the colony was to form a single electorate, 
so that there would be no bias in the electoral distribution 
in favour of country districts. Thirty members were to be 
elected by the colony as a whole under Hare's system of 
proportional representation, with ten members retiring every 
three years. The conservatives' loss of electoral advantage 
through the removal of the weighting in favour of country 
districts was to be offset by a provision to facilitate plural 
voting. In elections for the Assembly, the effectiveness of 
plural voting was limited by the fact that many plural voters 
were unwilling to incur the trouble and expense of travelling 
to all the electorates in which they held sufficient property 
to qualify them to vote. In elections for the proposed 
Council, those who held plural voting rights in elections for 
the Assembly were to be allowed up to five votes, depending on 
the number of lower house electorates in which they were 
qualified. They were, however, to be allowed to cast all their 
votes in the one polling place, so that the ability of 
'property' to exercise its right to additional voting power was 
greatly enhanced.
Urban conservatives would have had an excellent chance of 
being elected to the type of Council proposed by the select 
committee. However, a wholly elective Council would not have 
given representation to eminent men who were unwilling to 
indulge in electoral politics. To remedy this defect, the 
committee also proposed that the Council should contain up to 
ten members nominated for life. They were to be drawn 
exclusively from the ranks of retired Supreme Court judges, men 
who had been members of the Executive Council for at least two 
years, those who had served as elective members of the
Section 8 of the bill proposed by the select committee. The 
bill is printed in J.L.C., 1862, pp.553-70, and the report 
of the select committee is in ibid., pp.535-41.
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legislature for at least seven years, and former Presidents of 
the Council, Speakers of the Assembly and Chairmen of 
Committees in both houses.
This clause had been introduced at the instigation of
Merewether, Auditor-General before responsible government and
perhaps the most able defender of the nominee principle in the
old Council. He thought that while the elective members would
bring sound judgment and conservative instincts to the proposed
upper house, they would not be 'qualified to do justice to
their opinions in debate, and to place them before the country
in their true light'. The nominated members, he thought, would
supply this deficiency, for they would be 'practised orators
and statesmen, [who] would supply the defective organ of
speech, and make the body perfect in its functions'.^
Merewether was a polished speaker and, as a member of the
Executive Council before responsible government, he was
eligible to become a life nominee in the proposed Council. The
liberal Edward Butler questioned his motives in proposing the
nominee clause, but Merewether denied that it had been inserted
'in deference to the feelings of the old regime, for whose
delicate frames the "bracing air" of an election was too 2rough'. However, while he claimed that 'his eye was fixed
steadily on the future, and for the future he had proposed this
clause', he confirmed Butler's suspicions when he admitted that
he had in mind members of the 'old regime' as suitable
candidates for appointment. It was his view that
If his hon. friends by his side, who were 
qualified under the clause, were selected as 
life-members, their selection would be regarded 
by the whole community as an honour justly due to 
their long and able public services. 3
Indeed, Merewether, Thomson, Manning and Plunkett, leading
members of the ‘old regime', would almost certainly have been
~S .M. II. , 18 September 1862.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
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made life members, for, not only were they moderate
conservatives whose claims for public office were recognized
even by many liberals,'1- but, as Plunkett pointed out, there
were so few men in the colony qualified for appointment that
there would have been considerable difficulty in filling up the
2ten places for nominees in the Council.
The conservatives had been careful to ensure that the upper
house would not be reduced to a stronghold of the landowners,
but, more than ever, they regarded the Council as necessary to
defend the 'aristocratic' interests of the community as a whole.
Shaken by the changes in their society, they attempted to stem
the advance of democracy by producing arguments in favour of
'property' which in 1853 they had taken for granted. The Herald
asserted that preservation of the rights of property was 'by far
the most elaborate task of government', for the accumulation of
property was the basis of civilization. Property gave
'security in times of war, - food in times of dearth, - and
employment in times of commercial distress'. It was therefore
necessary to protect the 'enormous personal and exclusive
interests which grow up in a highly civilized state' by 'special
legislation' in the form of a conservative upper house, for it
was not 'safe to trust ten poor men to vote with one rich [man]
3as to the disposal of his property'.
Conservatives in the Legislative Council made a similar
connection between property and civilization. Dr Mitchell
thought that 'manhood suffrage and civilization could not go
together' and that unless 'education, talent, [and] property
were to be considered as something...we should go back to a
savage state'. In his view, the government's proposals for
reform of the Council took away 'the security of capital' and
4so struck at the very basis of society. Similarly,
J.B. Darvall held that the Council should represent the 
propertied minority, for
"'‘See, for example, Empire, 10 May 1861, editorial.
.M,H., 18 September 1862.
^S,M.H., 6 September 1862.
4S,M.H., 12 December 1861.
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the ignorance of majorities had disputed the 
movements of the heavenly bodies, and indeed, 
nearly all the advances of science and 
civilization. If the ignorant majorities had had 
their way, all discovery would have been at an 
end. And to hand over their fine country to the 
will of a majority would be to condemn it to too 
sad a lot.l
But while the conservatives produced intellectual
justifications for the Council in terms of the beneficial
effects of giving representation to 'property', they were not
simply trying to defend their economic interests. Rather, they
were defending the total political, social and economic position
of a class. In their eyes, property was linked with the
intelligence, education and experience needed to govern wisely,
and it formed the best practical test for distinguishing the
old colonial elites which were held to possess these qualities
in the highest degree. 'Property', particularly urban
'property', had been largely driven from the Assembly, and it
had to find a secure home in the Council or be banished
altogether from political life.
The threat to men of property had implications for
conservative economic interests, but in 1861-62, these were not
the interests most immediately threatened. Certainly, the land
acts had discriminated against men of property, and
conservatives frequently claimed that capital was being driven
from the country by fear of democratic excesses. Darvall, for
instance, recounted how he had 'heard an old colonist, who loved
the country well, say as he left it, "Thank God I do not leave
2a shilling in New South Wales"'. Yet, in context, this story
was a rhetorical flourish designed to reinforce Darvall's wider
objections to majority rule. For him, as for most other
conservatives, the economic threat was simply one of a number
of causes of conservative anxiety, and it was certainly not the
most pressing. Darvall was one of the victims of the 'free3selection' elections of 1860, and he lamented that democracy 
had diminished
.M.H., 13 December 1861.
^Ibid.
3He had not been defeated, but had withdrawn from the contest in disgust when subjected to 'indignities' on the hustings.
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that respect for character, intelligence, and 
education, which ought to mark the people...[itJ 
had destroyed the intellectual status of the 
country, because it had caused the ostracism of 
those whose intelligence and independence ^
qualified them to take part in public affairs.
For Darvall, the sense of personal injury at being driven from
a position of power and honour was uppermost, and his speeches
in this period form one long denigration of the qualities of
the men who had replaced him. In his case, as in most others,
the threat to conservative economic interests did not form the
basis of his political position. It was simply one of many
arguments embodying elements of both explanation and
rationalization which he advanced to justify his opposition to men
and doctrines which threatened to relegate his class to obscurity.
In opposition to the conservatives, the liberals argued
that the constitution of the upper house could only be settled
safely upon the basis of manhood suffrage and that any other
solution would only be a 'stop-gap'. In proposing a democratic
upper house, they were advocating a constitutional innovation,
but this did not deter them from accusing their opponents of
basing their scheme upon 'speculative' theories and ignoring
traditional British constitutional doctrines. Their criticisms
in this respect were directed primarily towards the conservative
suggestion that the colony as a whole should form one electorate
and that the Councillors should be elected by Hare's system of
proportional representation. Robertson dismissed Holden, under
whose influence the scheme had been introduced, as 'a well
informed but particularly crotchetty hon. gentleman - more
2theoretical than practical'. Hargrave condemned Hare himself 
in much the same terms. He had known Hare many years 
previously, and while he allowed that he was a 'barrister of 
great learning, and of great seriousness of thought', he 
balanced this by saying that he seemed to have little 'knowledge 
of the working of the details of an election beyond what he had 
gathered from the authors he cited in his book'. This work, 
said Hargrave, 'might have been written by a philosopher in his 
study', for it was deficient both in practical details and in a
1Ibid.
^S.M .H,, 6 December 1861.
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sound knowledge of British constitutional principles. In
particular, he argued that Hare's system prevented the personal
contacts and canvassing for votes which bound a member to his
constituents under the traditional electoral procedures, and
that it destroyed the principle that the member represented his
electorate and all the people within it, making him instead the
representative of a grouping drawn from the whole colony.
Thus, the liberals were able to pose as the champions of
traditional constitutional principles, while the conservatives,
in their anxiety to preserve the position of their class, had
become the proponents of a scheme which they themselves2admitted was 'new and experimental'.
The large conservative majority in the Council easily
passed the bill proposed by the select committee, and it was
sent down to the Assembly, which showed little inclination to
debate it and finally threw it out. Few liberals were now
willing to make reform of the Council a major political issue.
Unlike the liberals of 1853, they did not want a strong,
conservative upper house, and their opinion of the nominated
Council had been improved by the swamping and the passage of
the main liberal reforms. Moreover, some advocates of a
unicameral legislature like Robertson were acutely conscious
that 'two elective houses would sooner or later come to a dead 
3lock'; and, since the status quo now favoured the liberals, they
had little desire to change it. Robertson, a radical since his
youth, summarized the transformation in his position which had
been wrought by the political events of the past few years:
He had had a long experience of what it was like 
to be in a minority. For twenty years he had 
taken some part in the public business, not always 
in the position he now occupied....He, and those 
who thought with him, submitted to exclusion from 
every position of honour and emolument; they did 
not endeavour to rule the majority, but they did 
endeavour to fuse into the minds of the people 
those principles and ideas which they believed to 
be correct; and they had succeeded, and had become 
the majority.4
1s.M.H., 13 December 1861.
2J.L.C., 1862, p.537.
3S.M.H., 6 December 1861.
^Ibid.
257
CHAPTER VII
THE DECLINE OF LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE CONFLICTf 1863-72
It was the completeness of the liberal victory in the years
1861 and 1862 which made possible a partial revival of
conservative political fortunes. After the swamping of May
1861 had demonstrated the inevitability of liberal victory,
political agitation subsided and most of the more able
conservatives who had been defeated at the 1860 elections were
re-elected to the Assembly. Amongst those returned at
by-elections before the end of 1861 were Thomas Holt,
Donaldson's Treasurer in 1856; A .T. Holroyd, Chairman of
Committees in 1856-7 and a future Minister for Public Works;
Peter Faucett, soon to be Solicitor-General; and William Forster,
Premier in 1859-60, whose desire to abolish the Legislative
Council had not saved him from defeat when he sided with the
conservatives on free selection before survey. The year 1862
saw the return of Saul Samuel, Treasurer in 1859-60, and of
James Martin, soon to be Premier and the most gifted
conservative in the parliament. In 1863, Geoffrey Eagar, the
renegade liberal who had been Forster's Minister for Works, was
re-elected, as was J.B. Darvall, Solicitor-General and Attorney-
General in 1856-7. By 1865, the trend had gone so far that
Robert Isaacs, one of the leaders of the ultra-conservative
faction in the Council before 1861, was returned to the
Assembly where he became Solicitor-General from 1866 to 1868,
despite liberal accusations that he was so unpopular that it
would be impossible to make him a judge.^
Most of those re-elected were urban conservatives of
greater ability than the pastoralists who had been almost the
only survivors on the conservative benches when parliament met2after the 1860 elections. The conservatives were heartened, 
for it was clear that there was now a viable alternative to the
^Empire, 2 June 1865.
2Fifteen of the twenty-one members who voted against free 
selection on squatters' runs in February 1861 were pastoralists.
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Cowper government. When James Macarthur heard the results of
the first by-elections in 1861, he described the news as 'most
satisfactory' and saw in it a portent of salutary influences
which would 'to some extent neutralize the ultra-democratic
action of Universal Suffrage'.^ Similarly, W.R. Piddington
noticed that 'a few rich men' had been returned to the Assembly,
and was so encouraged by the changed temper of the electorate
that he began to hope for a dissolution and told Parkes that
1 if the people who ran away were here many of them would be
2[returned] at the next opportunity'.
In September 1861, Cowper had been kept in office by the
fact that there was no one outside his cabinet who could have
formed a government, but by 1863, the situation had changed
markedly. The opposition now included a number of men of
recognized ability, and the passing of the land bills, together
with the abolition of state aid to religion, had cleared the way
for an alliance between the conservatives and Cowper's radical
critics. His government was attacked over its handling of
patronage, its failure to quell an outbreak of bushranging, and
the state of the colony's finances. Consequently, although
Cowper had silenced his leading radical critic, James Hoskins,3by making him superintendent of minor roads, his government was 
forced to resign in October 1863. The new government, formed 
by James Martin, contained only one minister who had been 
returned to parliament at the general elections of 1860. He 
was J.B. Wilson, a goldfields representative whose inclusion 
was a token of the fact that the ministry was supported by most 
of the radicals. The six other ministers consisted of Martin, 
Faucett, Holroyd and Plunkett, all conservatives, and of 
Forster and Eagar, equivocal liberals who had lost their seats 
in 1860.
^James Macarthur to Charles Campbell, 2 November 1861, 
Macarthur Papers, vol.24, A2920.
^Piddington to Parkes, 21 October 1862, P.C., vol.30, A900, 
pp.14-21.
3P. Loveday and A.W. Martin, Parliament Factions and Parties, 
Melbourne, 1966, pp.33, 173, n.27. For the view that Hoskins
was the leader of Cowper's radical critics, see Murray to 
Parkes, 18 September 1861, pp.276-83.
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Some conservatives wishfully misinterpreted their 
recovery as a sign that the electorate was turning against 
democracy. However, as the Empire noted, any hopes that the 
new government would try to reverse the liberals' reforms were 
'doomed to miserable disappointment‘,^  for the return of a 
predominantly conservative ministry simply showed that 
liberalism and conservatism were becoming increasingly 
irrelevant to the politics of the Assembly. Nevertheless, old 
resentments lingered, and the conservatives welcomed Martin's 
ministry because it was basically conservative and provided an 
alternative to government by Cowper. They hoped, moreover, 
that Martin would be able to cure some of the maladies 
afflicting the colony - evils which they attributed to liberal 
misrule over the preceding six years. It was not until the 
late 1860s that most of the conservatives became sufficiently 
reconciled to the new order to forget entirely the ideological 
differences which had held them apart from the liberals.
Behind many of the conservatives' complaints was a basic
dissatisfaction with the working of responsible government.
They were intolerant of its ‘inefficiencies' - the changes of
ministry, frequent elections, the compromises and the tactical
manoeuvres which were the price of power. They regretted, too,
that time had been wasted in lengthy debates on 'theoretical'
issues such as electoral reform. The parliament's output had
been impressive from the liberals' point of view, for after
immense labours most of the liberal programme had been put into
effect. These achievements, of course, were lost on the
conservatives, who alleged that 'practical' legislation was
2being neglected. The complaints were accurate enough, if 
viewed from the perspective of those who made them, and they 
are the more understandable when it is noted that there were 
fewer acts passed in the first six years of responsible 
government than in the last three years under the old 
constitution.
The drop in legislative output, at least in a crude, 
statistical sense, was parallelled by a deterioration in the
E^mpire, 26 November 1863.
2See, for example, S,M.H,, 23 August 1858, editorial.
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colony's financial position as governments increased
expenditure on public works.^  The conservatives placed the
blame for this squarely on the liberal government. They had
long warned that one result of combining responsible government
with a liberal franchise would be to expose ministries to the
temptation of buying the support of the legislature by
rewarding supporters with patronage and expenditure in their
electorates. In 1861, for instance, R.J. Want had told the
Council that, because of manhood suffrage,
political corruption had become rampant... - 
judgeships, prosecutorships, and other public 
offices of trust and emolument had been given 
away to individuals as the reward of political 
services, and whole constituencies had been so 
bought that they could be counted upon as pocket 
boroughs, which would always return the candidate 2 
who appeared on behalf of the ministerial interest.
He also complained that universal suffrage had lifted duties
from tea and sugar, removing taxation from the working classes,
and that democracy had resulted in a deficit of £200,000 the
previous year. Want was suffering from the sense of deprivation
which had afflicted the liberals when they had 'suffered
exclusion from every position of honour and emolument' during3the long years of conservative rule, but his concern at liberal
'abuse of power' was genuinely felt. His indignation must have
been even greater by the time Cowper lost power in 1863, for by
then there were much stronger grounds for believing that
liberal 'corruption' and mismanagement threatened the colony
with financial ruin. At the end of 1861, the government had
conciliated a group of members in the Assembly by finding a
'surplus' of £400,000 and introducing a Loan Bill spending an4additional £500,000 on railways. The bill was criticized in 
5the Council, but it became law in 1862. In 1863, there was a
■*~See figures on revenue and expenditure in G.D. Patterson,
The Tariff in the Australian Colonies, Melbourne, 1968, p.22.
2S.M.H., 25 April 1861. Cf. S «M.H. editorials, 27 February,
9 April 1858.
3Cf. Robertson in S.M.H., 6 December 1861.
4Cf. Loveday and Martin, op.cit., p.34.
5S.M.H., 18 January 1862; J.L.C., 1862, pt.l, pp.141-2.
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steep rise in expenditure and T.W. Smart, Cowper1 234s Treasurer, 
told parliament that there was a deficit of approximately 
£500,000. He was, however, contradicted by Cowper, who argued 
that the figure was exaggerated. It was clear that, whatever 
the state of the Treasury was, the government could 
not agree upon it, and it fell when the Assembly rejected its 
financial proposals.
To concern over the colony's finances was added anxiety at
the epidemic of bushranging which swept New South Wales in the
early and middle 1860s. In the twelve months 1861 to 1862,
there were fifty armed robberies in the colony, and in the next
two years the number rose spectacularly. In the twelve months
1863 to 1864, there were 113 armed robberies, and the number
1showed no significant decrease until 1867. This dramatic
upsurge in lawlessness hardened conservative prejudices against
the working classes - the section of society which seemed most
prone to disorder and violence and least respectful of the
2rights of property. In particular, bushranging revived fears
3that 'The old leaven of convictism [was] not yet worked out',
a possibility which made the recent concession of manhood
suffrage seem incredibly foolish.
Conservative anxieties were increased by the fact that a
section of the lower orders patently sympathised with the
bushrangers - something which was made clear by the rejoicing
which occurred in 1864 when the notorious Frank Gardiner was
found not guilty of wounding a policeman with intent to murder.
The Herald supported Mr Justice Wise, a former member of the
Council, in the view that 'the people of New South Wales were
disgraced by the demonstrations of joy at the acquittal of
Gardiner' and that there was 'deep in the heart of the
community - penetrating to its lowest stratum - an antipathy to
4law, and especially to constables'. Robertson's description
4R.B. Walker, 'Bushranging in Fact and Legend', Historical 
Studies, vol.ll, no.42, April 1964, pp.206, 211, n.50.
2See the discussion of conservative attitudes towards the lower 
orders in Chapter IV, part 1, above.
3The Chief Justice and former President of the Council, Sir 
Alfred Stephen, quoted ibid., p.206.
4S.M.H., 25 May 1864.
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of Ben Hall as 'king of the bushrangers' was misread as proof
that he countenanced the lawless sentiments of the 'mob' which
had raised him to power. The Reverend John Morison, a
conservative Presbyterian clergyman, observed that
[The J love of applause is common to young men in 
the bush...and it must have been highly pleasing 
to these desperadoes to find their names, with 
accounts of the robberies which they had committed, 
prominently mentioned in the public press, with no 
less a personage than the Hon. John Robertson, 
who had been premier, pronouncing one of them to 
be 'king'.1
On a more general level, Morison attributed bushranging to the
progress of liberal reforms.
Bushranging had not been heard of for about thirty 
years previously, and was not resumed until after 
the advent of manhood suffrage. It broke out when 
the people's passions were excited in the 
universal cry of 'Free selection before survey' - 
the right to go and settle anywhere they liked; and 
when the Legislature of New South Wales, pandering 
to the passions of the people, passed a law for 
them to go and settle anywhere they liked.2
Morison believed that instead of scattering the population by
allowing free selection, the government should have encouraged
concentrated settlement so that young men 'might be brought
within the healing influences of society, and receive the
3benefits of education and religion'.
Conservatives frequently accused the liberal government of 
encouraging a breakdown of law and order by its own corruption 
and, in particular, by the fact that it had appointed 
magistrates and justices of the peace on political grounds.
The Herald alleged that some of the appointments had been 'so 
gross, as greatly to detract from the honour of the commission, 
and to destroy public confidence in those whom it includes', 
and it argued that the poor reputation of the justices had 
impaired the efficiency of the police - for 'Confidence in the 
magistracy means confidence in the police, and the co-operation
^ 'A Clergyman thirteen years resident in the Interior of New 
South Wales' [Rev. John Morisonj, Australia as It Is..., London, 
1867, p.228.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
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of both is essential to the quiet and submission of the 
people'.1 That the liberals had made appointments on political 
grounds was generally acknowledged, and the conservatives could 
take little consolation from remembering the days when 
patronage had been theirs to distribute, or from contemplating 
the fact that Cowper justified his conduct in terms of English
precedent:
What was the object of placing Parliamentary 
patronage in the hands of the Ministry if it was 
not that they should bestow it upon their friends. 
(Hear, hear.) So long as they made good 
appointments to the offices, the Government had a 
right to appoint a friend in preference to an 
opponent. (Hear, hear.) This was the view always 
taken in England....^
Conservative dislike of radical miners gave them another 
scapegoat for the wave of bushranging. The Herald argued, 
sensibly enough, that the existence of a large mining 
population afforded criminals cover, for the 'bushranger may 
assume the character of a miner, and who shall challenge him?'
However, the argument was often put in a more extreme form. The 
Herald itself implied that the 'desultory' habits of mining life 
had turned a section of the mining population into criminals,^ 
and Deas Thomson went further, charging the liberal government 
with causing the bushranging epidemic by its weakness in the 
face of the miners' attacks on the Chinese:
Those disgraceful riots at Lambing Flat ought to 
have been put down in another way. If proper 
measures had been taken, bushranging which 
afterwards was so rife in this colony, would never 
have existed. Hall and his associates first learned 
to rob the Chinese, and then they practised on the 
English.5
R.B. Walker has shown the inadequacy of the conservatives' 
explanations of the bushranging epidemic, but their attempt to 
explain the outbreak in terms of their hatred of the liberals
1S,M.H., 25 June 1863.
2Quoted Walker, loc.cit., p.211.
3S.M.H., 25 June 1863.
4Ibid.
^Empire, 17 October 1867.
6Walker, loc.cit., especially pp.206-9.
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and their reforms was understandable enough. They saw'
bushranging as the first instalment of the social disorder
which they had predicted would be the result of democracy, just
as they viewed the state of the colony's finances and the
decline in the volume of 'practical' legislation as the
fulfilment of their warnings that a liberal triumph would bring
financial ruin and legislative chaos. The wounds inflicted
upon the conservatives by their loss of political power were
deep, and healing was delayed by the satisfaction which they
derived from attributing the colony's ills to the ineptitude
and corruption of those who had displaced them. As late as
1865, George Allen, the Council's moderately conservative
Chairman of Committees, could indulge in the sort of gloomy
estimates of life in a democracy which had been a commonplace
in the days immediately after the swamping:
The English mail left here yesterday Sir Daniel Cooper left by her, he only arrived about 2 mths 
ago - many of our old colonists have left lately 
and more seem inclined to go indeed I believe few 
who have property would stay if they could dispose 
of their possessions - there is certainly much... 
dissatisfaction at the altered state of the Colony - 
the democratic spirit which now prevails and which 
is evidently increasing has a tendency to make 
persons of respectability and wealth very much 
disgusted.^
In the Council, most conservatives continued to make
Cowper and Robertson the focus of their resentment, and this
ensured that the 'party' divisions which had existed in the
Council from 1858 to 1862 would not completely disappear with
the settling of the major ideological issues which had provoked
them. Consequently, Martin's accession to power was joyfully
received in the Council, and nearly all the conservatives
2crossed to the government benches.
The government's representative in the Council was 
Plunkett, Attorney-General before responsible government, who 
had decided to afford the new administration 'all the support
George Allen, Journal, 21 February 1865, uncat. MSS, set 477. 
Cooper, one time liberal speaker of the Assembly, had sided 
with the conservatives in 1860 and left the colony in 1861.
The quotation's errors of punctuation are in the original.
Empire, 26 November 1863, editorial.2
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in his power' even before he was invited to join it. The main
source of the feeble opposition to the ministry was Hargrave,
Cowper1 234s Attorney-General, who defended the record of the late
government and told the Council that to judge by the new
ministers' past conduct and announced policies, it seemed that
2they would make no worthwhile reforms.
Martin enjoyed an enormous body of support in the Council.
Shortly before he fell from power, Cowper had appointed four3conservatives who probably opposed his government, and when4Martin took office, he appointed four more. The new members 
included Robert Johnson and Joseph Docker, leaders of the 
extreme conservative faction in the old Council. At the same 
time, one liberal supporter of the Cowper government, Edward 
Butler, had resigned, and two more, Ralph Robey and Alexander 
McArthur, had gone to Britain. Consequently, conservative 
supporters of Martin had an overwhelming majority.
In the session of 1863-4, however, 'party' preferences had 
little influence on voting patterns in the Council, for Martin 
had his most important legislation rejected. Moreover, the 
government was in a minority in those divisions which exhibited 
most strongly the only significant 'patterned' response - one 
which revealed polarization for and against the position 
adopted by Plunkett, the government's representative.
Table XIV shows the number of times members voted with 
Plunkett in these divisions as a proportion of the number of 
times they voted.
^Empire. 3 December 1863.
2Empire, 19 October 1864.
3G.H. Cox, E.H. Lloyd, Robert Towns and William Walker.
4John Blaxland, Robert Johnson, E.D.S. Ogilvie and Joseph 
Docker.
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TABLE XIV1
LEVEL OF AGREEMENT WITH REPRESENTATIVE OF MARTIN GOVERNMENT; 
VOTES IN THIRTEEN DIVISIONS WITH STRONGEST 'PATTERNED1 RESPONSE,
SESSION OF 1863-4.
Government Voters 'Independents' Anti-Government Voters
Blaxland 10/10 Kemp 8/13 Allen 0/3
Byrnes 6/6 Macfarlane 6/9 G.H. Cox 0/2
J. Campbell 10/10 Walker 2/5 Docker 0/10
Hargrave 7/7 Johnson 1/13
Gordon 1/1 Lloyd 0/4
Murray 12/12 Manning 0/10
Ogilvie 5/5 Mitchell 0/11
Plunkett 13/13 B. Russell 1/8(Govt, rep.) Scott 1/7Ward 6/6 Thomson 1/11
Towns 2/10.
Watt 2/11
It can be seen that Hargrave, a declared opponent of 
Martin's government, voted with it consistently, and that men 
like Thomson, Mitchell, Johnson and Docker, who supported the 
government in principle, nevertheless voted against it. In 
fact, those who voted with the government included most of those 
who had voted with Cowper in the previous session, while most of 
those who had opposed the Cowper government now voted with 
Martin. Clearly, attitudes towards the government were not the 
main factors which shaped this pattern of response.
Most of the 'patterned' votes were on the government's 
Customs Duties Bill, which increased tariffs upon a wide range 
of goods. The government's representative in the Council,
The method by which the divisions have been selected is 
explained in Appendix III, where the divisions are listed. Some 
of the divisions were on a scab in sheep bill, and the question 
involved was the same as that raised by the Customs Duties Bill - 
the right of the Council to amend money bills. Three divisions 
were on a bill concerning insolvency which provoked a 'party' 
response because it had been introduced by the Cowper government 
and was regarded by some conservatives as a suitable issue on which to refuse to submit to the Assembly. Cf. Manning, Empire, 10 December 1863.
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Plankett, claimed that the bill was not protectionist,^  but was
sinply designed to raise additional revenue to compensate for
the deficit incurred by the previous government. However,
Martin favoured protection and the bill was praised by the
pretectionists as one embodying their views and condemned by
free traders for the same reason.
Protectionist doctrines had their greatest appeal amongst
the small manufacturers and artisans who provided much of the
backing for the liberal movement. Petitions in favour of
protection were signed mainly by cabinet makers, coach makers,
saddlers, harness makers, curriers, tanners, tailors and men
2described less precisely as 'mechanics and producers'. Free
trade petitions, on the other hand, were generally signed by
merchants, bankers, and people who revealed their comfortable
social and economic position by complaining that 'The Colonial
rates of wages and the absence of suitable workmen' had caused3a shortage of some types of shoes. Protectionist rallies 
outside parliament saw the artisans well represented and had a 
strong radical orientation. Martin's Treasurer, Geoffrey Eagar, 
was praised and Cowper, the working man's erstwhile hero, was 
condemned as the ally of conservative merchants. At one 
meeting, a Mr Vickery alleged that 'many of the merchants who 
had opposed Charles Cowper now banded together in one clique4to replace the former ministry in power'; and the radical
young cabinet maker, Ninian Melville, provoked an enthusiastic
response with the claim that
They, as mechanics, had a far greater stake in the 
country than the merchants had (Cheers) ... the late 
Premier was in league with the merchants against 
the mechanics. (Cheers.) And the merchants dared 
to say that if the present Government sought to 
impose on them the tariff they would put them out.
(Cheers.) Were they prepared to give up the 
country to the merchants? No, they must say rather 
'we will fight you inch by inch'.5
1S.M.H., 13 February 1864.
2V. & P. (L.A ., N.S.W.), 1863-4, pt.II, pp.1009, 1011, 1013, 
1015, 1017, 1019, 1021, 1023, 1029.
3Ibid., 1025, 1027, 1031, 1033, 1035.
4Empire, 7 December 1863.
5Ibid.
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In the Assembly, the Customs Duties Bill was strongly 
supported by radicals like W.B. Allen, D.C. Dalgleish, Robert 
Wisdom and Robert Stewart, who had close links with the small 
manufacturers and artisans who were agitating for protection; 
it was also supported by most of the conservatives, who 
generally disclaimed protectionist sympathies and seem to have 
voted for the bill just to keep the government in office.^
Thus, the protection issue had consolidated Martin's radical 
support and not alienated the conservatives, so that the bill 
passed its third reading by twenty-seven votes to twenty-four.
The bill was assured of a hostile reception in the Council,
which supported Martin for his conservatism but does not seem
to have contained a single avowed protectionist. Four of the
five liberals opposed the bill on the second reading, but it
was passed by twelve votes to ten with the support of most of
the conservatives, who declared that they would remove all its
protectionist tendencies in committee. When the bill reached
the committee stage, the strong voting pattern recorded above
in Table XIV emerged. This pattern was not primarily a
reflection of different attitudes towards protection, for all
members were more or less united in opposition to that doctrine,
and most claimed that the bill had protectionist elements which
they abhorred. Instead, the main question involved in the
divisions was whether the Council should choose to exercise its
'right' of amending a money bill by striking out its
protectionist elements, or whether it should avoid the
possibility of conflict with the Assembly by rejecting the bill
outright. Thus, Hargrave, a staunch free trader and an
opponent of the Martin government, voted consistently with the
government in order to prevent amendments in committee. In
fact, of the nine members who consistently supported the
government in the 'patterned' divisions on the bill, four
explicitly argued that the Council should not amend it because
2it was a money bill, and one more presumably took the same
^See the divisions on the second and third readings, V . & P. 
(L.A., N.S.W.), 1863-4, pt.l, pp.1001, 1038; and the 'Political 
Summary' in S.M.H ., 21 May 1864.
2Hargrave, Murray, Plunkett, Gordon. See S.M.H., 1, 13 February 1864.
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view, for he opposed the bill on its second and third
readings. The four other members who sided with the
government included Charles Campbell, who denied that the bill
2was protectionist, and E.W. Ward, who may have taken the same
3view because he thought the Council entitled to amend the bill 
but voted for it in Committee. The opinions of the remaining 
two are not known.
Fifteen members chose to assert the Council's right of
amending the bill in committee, and its 'protective' features
were largely eliminated. However, some of those who voted for
the amendments were content simply to make a symbolic assertion
of the Council's financial powers, and they had no desire to
bring about a clash with a conservative government on the issue.
Others were dissatisfied with the amended bill because it
would have made them pay more for champagne and sparkling wines
'rich men's' drinks for which a tariff had been retained after
Plunkett had argued that the lower orders would take it badly
if such beverages were untaxed while the poor man's rum and gin4were subject to heavy duties. Consequently, most of the 
conservatives joined with the liberals to oppose the bill on 
the third reading and it was thrown out by fifteen votes to five 
The Council's destruction of Martin's financial policy 
obscured the fact that all but a few of its members supported 
his government. When Cowper was returned to power in 1865, he 
told the Governor that his colleagues had complained of their 
weakness in the Council, but Young said that this did not 
constitute grounds for additional appointments, observing that 
'the financial scheme of the late ministry was rejected in the 
Council, while yours was passed with only the amendments which5you were able to adopt'. What Young said was true, but there 
was substance in the ministers' complaint that they lacked 
support in the Council. In the session of 1863-4, most members
■^Byrnes.
2S.M.H., 1 February 1864.
^S.M.H., 13 February 1864.
4Cf. Plunkett, S.M.H., 19 February 1864.
5Young to Cowper, 3 July 1865, Cowper Papers, D60, n.p.
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of the conservative majority had voted against Martin on the 
tariff question as a matter of principle and economic self- 
interest, all the time expressing friendly intentions towards 
the government. When Cowper regained office, however, attitudes 
towards the government and towards controversial parts of its 
legislation coincided, for its bills sometimes touched upon 
matters of liberal and conservative principle. 'Party' in its 
old form became once more the basis of 'patterned' voting in 
the Council, the government gaining its main support from the 
few liberals and the conservatives generally voting against it, 
in some cases confessing their hostility to the government as 
well as to its measures.'1' The weakness of the government is 
revealed by Table XV, which shows the proportion of votes which 
members cast with the government1s representative in those 
divisions which exhibit the most strongly 'patterned' response.
TABLE XV2
VOTING RECORD OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCILLORS IN TEN DIVISIONS
SHOWING STRONGEST 'PARTY' RESPONSE. SESSION OF 1865
'Ministerialists ' 'Independents' 'Opposition'
Gordon 5/5 Allen 1/2 A. Campbell 2/8
Hargrave 
(Govt, rep.)
Macfarlane
B. Russell
Scott
10/10
5/5
4/4
1/1
Blaxland 4/7 
Byrnes 2/3 
Murray 3/5 
Plunkett 3/7
J. Campbell 
J. Chisholm 
G.H. Cox 
Docker 
Icely
2/7
2/8
0/3
0/10
0/9
Johnson 0/7
Lord 0/3
Unclassified W. Macarthur 0/5
Watt 1/1 ManningOgilvie
0/8
0/2
Thomson 0/7
Towns 0/3
Walker 0/4
^See below, this chapter.
2The divisions are listed and the basis of their selection discussed in Appendix III, below.
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Members have generally been classified as 'ministerialists'
if they cast more than two-thirds of their votes with the
government's representative, and as members of the 'opposition'
if they cast more than two-thirds of their votes against him.
However, J.B. Watt has not been classified as he cast only a
single vote, and it was not consistent with his previous
political record. Moreover, in 1865 he joined other
conservatives in deploring the effects of responsible government
and condemning the land law.^ In all other cases, the
classification of members according to their voting record seems
to be an accurate indication of their opinions. All those who
voted as members of the opposition had long been identified
with the conservative cause, and all the ministerialists except
Gordon had been consistent liberals. Gordon had been a liberal
until 1860, when his opposition to free selection before survey
had made him a strong opponent of democracy. However, he seems
to have remained a supporter of the Cowper government, and
sometimes showed that he retained residual liberalism on issues
2not touching land and democracy. Such issues were to the fore
in 1865, and, as a wine and spirit merchant, he had been
confirmed in his support for Cowper by Martin's attempt to
impose duties on imported wines and champagne. He therefore
gave Cowper consistent support in 1865.
Unlike Gordon, most members voted with those with whom
they had acted in 1860-61, for the session of 1865 revived some
issues which had been the source of acrimonious division in the
past. One such issue was the Berry affair. It has already
been noted that in 1859-60, the Reverend J.D. Lang had inspired
the inclusion of part of Alexander Berry's great rural estates
in the Shoalhaven municipality, so that it would be subjected 3to rates. The Conservatives believed, perhaps correctly, that 
the government had tacitly supported Lang's attack by allowing 
the municipality to be incorporated illegally and by ignoring 
Berry's pleas for redress. Consequently, most of them 
sympathized with Berry when he refused to pay his rates and
^Empire, 1 June 1865.
2Gordon is discussed in Chapter V, above.
See Chapter IV, part 3, above.3
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took the mayor and the bailiff to court for seizing some of his
property in lieu of rates. Their sympathy turned to applause
when, in a series of court cases, the Supreme Court ruled the
collection of rates invalid on the grounds that the
municipality had been incorporated illegally and issued an
order restraining it from making further claims on Berry.
The court's ruling threw into doubt the legality of other
municipalities and, after the Council had rejected a bill to
rectify the situation,-" the government decided that the
defendants should appeal to the Privy Council. Since they were
poor men, the government paid their costs, and it also met the
expenses which they had incurred in the Supreme Court, stating
that they had been the victims of a mistake in the municipal
boundaries for which the government alone could be held 
2responsible. This money was spent in the anticipation of
parliamentary approval and was included as part of the
supplementary estimates in the Appropriation Bill for 1865.
In the opinion of most conservatives, these payments were
simply part of a continuing campaign of persecution which the
liberals were conducting against Berry, and there were bitter
exchanges when the Appropriation Bill reached the Council.
Robert Johnson, Berry's solicitor, recited the long history of
'persecution' to which his client had been subjected, and moved
that the sum compensating Berry's opponents for their expenses
3should be struck from the bill. Hargrave, defending the
government, accused Johnson of playing upon Berry's 'sensitive'
mind for pecuniary gain. He alleged that Johnson, who had
already received fees of £1,700 for his services in the case,
was one of those 'who derived very great benefit from the
agitation of this matter', and that there was no telling 'how
much more the honorable member might draw, in his professional
capacity, from other actions that Mr. Berry might be influenced 
4to bring'. Hargrave was in his turn made the subject of a
1S.M.H., 8 May 1861.
2Hargrave in Empire, 10, 15 June 1865.
3Empire, 15 June 1865.
4Ibid.
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malicious attack by Joseph Docker, who surmised that 'they
would have a judge on the bench that would support a case of
oppression by a legal decision' - a reference to rumours that
Hargrave was about to be appointed to the Supreme Court.'*'
Other conservatives agreed with Johnson and Docker that
the government had acted badly, but they were not prepared to
provoke a conflict with the Assembly by amending the
Appropriation Bill. Indeed, it must be doubted whether Johnson
had ever had any intention of pressing his amendment, for, after
several members had expressed their opposition to it, he
withdrew it with the comment that he was 'quite satisfied with
2the debate that had taken place'. What further satisfaction
he required must have come little more than a week later when
Hargrave received his anticipated elevation to the Supreme
Court and suffered the humiliation of having his swearing in
3boycotted by every barrister in the colony.
Clashes between liberals and conservatives were also
provoked by another case of 'injustice'. The matter had arisen
when proprietors of coal fields at Minmi in the Hunter Valley,
who were absent in Britain, ordered their agent to stop all
payments to men working in the mines. Payment was not even to
be made for work already done. The miners had suffered heavy
losses in recent floods, and the loss of pay left them in
severe distress. In an effort to enforce payment, they
appealed to the courts, only to discover that they could not
gain justice under the Masters and Servants Act until the
mine-owners had appeared in person before the bench to show
cause why they should not be forced to pay. Since the mine
owners were in Britain and could not be compelled to return,4redress was impossible.
In order to remedy the situation, a liberal member of the 
Assembly, A.A.P. Tighe, introduced a Coal Fields' Regulation
^Ibid. For rumours of Hargrave's appointment, see Empire,
2 June 1865.
2Empire, 15 June 1865.
3Article on Alfred Cheeke in A,D.B,, vol.3.
4The clearest explanation of the case is in Empire, 5 June 
1865, editorial.
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Act Amendment Bill to enable miners to enforce just claims on 
absentee proprietors by applying to the courts for an order of 
payment which could, if necessary, be enforced by the sale of 
mining machinery or any other goods which the proprietors had in 
the colony. Supporters of the bill argued that such special 
legislation was necessary in order to put the miners on the 
same footing as employees who could enforce payment under the 
Masters and Servants Act, and the bill passed the Assembly with 
little difficulty.
When the Bill reached the Council, Joseph Docker, a Hunter 
Valley landowner, took charge of its emasculation. He denounced 
it as 'class legislation' and, professing a desire to put the 
miners on the same footing as all other employees, moved that 
the provision for the recovery of wages should be struck out in 
favour of a simple statement that the provisions of the Masters 
and Servants Act applied. The amendment was approved by most 
conservatives who were present and was carried by eight votes 
to three. ^
In the Assembly, the amendment met a bitter reception.
One member alleged that he had information that the colliery
owners had lobbied the Council, and it was pointed out again
that the miners, unlike most other employees, were not properly
2protected by the Masters and Servants Act. The Empire, too,
made an impassioned appeal on behalf of the hundreds of miners
and their families who were suffering 'cruel hardships from a
cause that does not affect any other class of men' and who
would be made 'the victims of injustice and want during these
winter months, to satisfy the imaginary requirements of a
3perfect theory of jurisprudence'. Docker, however, still 'did
not see why there should be special legislation for coal 4miners' and the bill was discharged when it was returned to 
the Council.
1S.M.H., 00 1—1 May 1865.
2S.M.H., 3 June 1865.
^Empire, 5 June 1865.
^Empire, 10 June 1865.
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Most members of the Council thought the plight of a few 
hundred coal miners a minor affair in comparison with the 
government's financial policy. In an effort to reduce the 
accumulated deficit, which amounted to perhaps £800,000, and to 
meet payments on loans from the banks, the government introduced 
three measures to raise additional revenue: a Customs Duties 
Bill, which raised the existing tariff on all items except tea, 
sugar, brandy and gin by 20 per cent; a Package Bill, which 
imposed an additional duty of one shilling per 'package' on all 
imports except livestock, flour, wheat, sugar and tea; and a 
Stamp Duty Bill, imposing taxes on a wide range of business 
transactions, down to the issue of promissory notes.
The conservatives conceded, albeit grudgingly, that these 
bills were necessary to save the colony from ruin, and they did 
not oppose them in principle. However, the debates which took 
place crystallized conservative dissatisfaction with the conduct 
of public business since responsible government and led to 
strong outbursts of 'party' feeling. John Campbell, for 
instance, thought the 'deplorable condition of their finances' 
made the Stamp Duty Bill necessary, but he regarded it as 'a 
hateful inquisitive measure', and his speech on the second 
reading developed into a diatribe on the evils of responsible 
government:
He wondered what they were drifting into under 
responsible government, which was ruining the 
country. He was disappointed with the working of 
responsible government. In Italy [another example 
of liberal misrule] they were in the same way 
running rapidly into debt. Under responsible 
government there was a tendency to run into great 
extravagance....The country was not now what it 
was seven years ago. He did not object to free 
selection, but let it be so controlled as to let 
other parts of the country that would be 
profitably occupied be not interfered with, so 
that some profits might be made, for without 
profits there could not be a revenue.... It came to 
this, that the Upper House had more of the 
confidence of the public than the Assembly.
In Campbell's mind, responsible government, European liberalism,
Robertson's land acts and the colony's financial state were a
jumble of inter-connected evils, and a debate on a financial
1Empire, 1 June 1865.
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measiure like the Stamp Act was always likely to elicit a stream
of ciomplaints about the condition of the colony as a whole. ^
Other members also connected the colony's parlous state
with popular government, land reform and the 'incompetence' of
liberal ministries over the preceding three years. S.D. Gordon
consistently supported the government in divisions, but he was
still enough of a conservative to 'agree with Mr. J. Campbell
in the view that those who had nothing ruled those in the
country that had something', to criticize the 'extravagant
system of expenditure of the past few years', and to express the
view that 'had their revenue been properly administered their
2income would have been found amply sufficient'. Another 
merchant, J.B. Watt, thought that Campbell 'had hit the nail on 
the right head' and said that 'their financial position was a 
just retribution on them for the political course they had been 
pursuing for the past few years'. In particular, he thought 
the colony's revenue would be increased by giving the squatters 
longer tenure or extending to them the advantages enjoyed by 
free selectors.^
Watt's suggestion was no doubt approved by Deas Thomson,
who thought 'the present financial difficulties were due to the4alteration in the land law' and to government extravagance. 
Thomson joined other conservatives in condemning Cowper and in 
frankly confessing that he was 'an admirer of the Martin5Ministry more than the present Government'. Blame for the 
current difficulties was bandied back and forth across the 
house as the conservatives tried to pin it upon 'the corruption 
and maladministration'^ of the liberals while Hargrave argued 
that the deficit was due to the fact that he and his colleagues
^For another example of this, see Campbell's speech on the 
second reading of the Customs Duties Bill, Empire. 10 June 1865.
^Empire. 1 June 1865.
3Ibid.
4Empire, 10 June 1865.
5Empire, 1 June 1865.
^Johnson, Empire, 10 June 1865.
277
had been preceded in office by a government of 'utter 
incapacity'.^
The polemics shrouded the fact that members on both sides
of the house were determined to remedy the colony's financial
situation. It only remained to decide which classes should bear
the burdens. The conservatives uniformly lamented the fact
that tea and sugar, the poor man's 'luxuries', were exempted
from the increased charges in deference to ‘the clamour of the 
2mob'. However, following British precedent, they refused to 
amend the bills to impose duties upon those commodities, for 
that would have been tantamount to asserting that the Council 
had the right to originate a tax - a claim which no conservative 
had ever made. They were not so reticent when it came to 
reducing charges. On the motion of Joseph Docker, ever the 
defender of the propertied interests of the Hunter Valley, the 
package duty on 'ores for smelting' was struck out, and three 
amendments were made to the Stamp Duties Bill. The provision 
that existing promissory notes should be stamped was omitted 
after the merchant, Alexander Campbell/had pointed out that it 
would cost the banks between £7,000 and £8,000. The action was 
bitterly criticized by Hargrave, who pointed out that Campbell 
and two of his supporters were bank directors, and that 'they3had, therefore, a pecuniary interest in the vote taken'. His 
point of order was dismissed by the Chairman of Committees, who 
told the house that he himself was 'a shareholder and chairman 
of one of the banks', so that he 'was in much the same position4as those honorable members objected to'.
The second amendment to the Stamp Duties Bill provided 
that it should expire on 31 January 1868, a move designed to 
ensure that it would be used only to remedy the existing 
difficulty and not become a permanent imposition. The third 
change, introduced on the motion of Sir William Manning, 
transferred some powers from the minister of the day to a
1Ibid.
2Towns, ibid. Cf. speeches on the same day by Thomson,
Plunkett, Docker, A. Campbell and Johnson.
3Empire, 7 June 1865.
^Ibid.
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commissioner - a step in line with the conservative desire to
limit the 'evils' of ministerial responsibility by delegating
to boards and permanent officials powers which liberal
politicians could be tempted to use for political purposes.^
Hargrave described Manning's purpose accurately enough when he
said that he 'hated responsible government, and therefore he
2would have those duties to be performed by a commissioner'.
When the bills were returned to the Assembly they were, of 
course, immediately laid aside on the grounds that the Council 
had committed a 'breach of privilege' by amending them. However, 
the government then introduced two new bills embodying all the 
Council's amendments except the one which reduced ministerial 
powers under the Stamp Duties Bill. This course of action was 
condemned by some liberal politicians and by the Empire as a
3piece of 'undignified truckling... to the nominated chamber', 
but the bills rapidly passed both houses. Thus, while the 
Council and the Assembly had kept their respective privileges 
intact, the colony gained two measures which, with the increased 
tariff, helped to restore the public finances and lay the ground­
work for conservative acceptance of the new order.
The session of 1865 was the last in which 'party' in the 
old sense formed the basis of political divisions in the Council. 
Martin had reduced government expenditure in 1864 and Cowper
continued the process in 1865, so that the colony's finances for4that year showed a surplus - the first since 1859. In the 
session of 1865-6 there were therefore fewer grounds for 
conservative complaints, the more so as Cowper was now 
represented in the Council by a veteran of the 'old regime',
John Hubert Plunkett, whom the Governor had persuaded to accept5the post of Attorney-General. Plunkett was slightly 
embarrassed by the appointment, and took pains to explain to his‘
^See, for example, S,M,H., 13 November 1857, editorial.
2Empire, 3 June 1865.
3Empire, 13 June 1865.
4See the table in G.D. Patterson, The Tariff in the Australian 
Colonies, 1856-1900, Melbourne, 1968, p.22.
5Plunkett to James Macarthur, 2 September 1865, Macarthur Papers, vol.30, A2926.
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friend James Macarthur that he had accepted it only 1 for the 
honor of the Bar and the credit of the Country' for fear that 
the government might be forced to appoint an attorney or an 
'unfledged' barrister.“
Plunkett no doubt dreaded the prospect of being called 
upon to defend liberal legislation in the Council, but the
situation did not arise, for the ministry was disintegrating
6and fell in January 186X before any controversial legislation
had been debated. Cowper was succeeded by Martin, who headed a
coalition much more liberal than the ministry which he had
formed in 1863. His coalition partner and Colonial Secretary
was Henry Parkes, and four of the seven ministers had supported
2most liberal reforms during the previous decade. However, the 
Postmaster-General and representative of the government in the 
Council was Joseph Docker, and it was to that arch conservative 
that fell the task of securing the passage of the last major 
reform whose shape was inspired by the liberalism of the late 
1850s and early 1860s - Parkes' Public Schools Bill of 1866.
The Public Schools Bill resurrected some of the issues 
which had been debated during the contest over the abolition of 
state aid to religion in 1862, for it placed new restrictions 
on the granting of aid and brought those schools which accepted 
public funds largely under the control of the state. The bill's 
main features in this respect were:
1. Replacement of the Denominational Schools Board and the 
Board of National Education with a single Council of 
Education. This body was to control all elementary 
schools in receipt of state aid - hiring and firing 
teachers, conducting inspections and framing regulations 
for the conduct of all secular activities.
2. The imposition of stringent restrictions on the 
granting of aid to denominational schools. No money 
was to be given to schools which had fewer than forty 
pupils or which could not meet regulations designed to 
ensure that they did not unnecessarily duplicate the 
functions of state schools.
^Ibid.
2Namely, Parkes, Eagar, Wilson and Byrnes. Martin, Docker and Isaacs were conservatives.
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3. There was to be no state aid to finance the building 
of new denominational schools.
4. All denominational schools in receipt of aid were to 
admit children of any faith.
The bill allowed 1 23non-denominational1 religion to be taught
as part of the public schools' secular instruction, and it also
provided that clergymen were to be admitted to the schools for
up to one hour a day to teach the doctrines of their separate
churches. Moreover, religious instruction in denominational
schools was to be left entirely under the control of the
churches. Notwithstanding these provisions, some of the bill's
supporters saw it as a stepping-stone to wholly secular
education. Alexander Campbell, a conservative on most issues
but a Presbyterian, wanted clergymen banned from the schools
altogether, and rejoiced that
There was no doubt that the intention of the bill 
was to do away with the Denominational system 
altogether. There were certain vested interests 
that could not well be interfered with rashly or 
suddenly, and therefore the bill proposed to 
introduce the new system in a modified manner, and 
to allow the Denominational system gradually to 
die out....His own idea would be to introduce a 
national system at once. He had been brought up 
under the parochial system which existed in 
Scotland, and it was admitted to be the most 
perfect system of education in the world.
Similarly, T.A. Murray, who had bitterly opposed the
introduction of parliamentary democracy in the late 1850s but
who now largely endorsed the spirit of liberalism, rejoicing in
2the reforms which it had brought, defended the bill in a
speech with strong anti-clerical overtones. He had been
described by Archbishop Polding as a man who belonged to the
3religion of 'the unattached', and he bitterly attacked the 
sectarian doctrines of the Catholic Church to which he had once
~*~S ,M,H. , 16 November 1866.
2The evolution of Murray's views may be traced in, for example, 
Murray to James Macarthur, 27 April 1859, Macarthur Papers, 
vol.29, A2925, pp.271-9; Murray to Parkes, 27 December 1860, 
P.C., vol.55, A925, pp.259-65; Murray in Empire, 10 June 1865.
3Gwendoline Wilson, Murray of Yarralumla, Melbourne, 1968, p .293.
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belonged, expressing pleasure that 'the object of this Bill 
was to put these things down, and to prevent men's minds from 
being imbued with such notions'.^  He also recounted how an 
Anglican prelate had given him a book which distorted the 
findings of science to make them harmonize with scripture. He 
told the Council that
When he found that such a work as this could be 
issued and read in the present age...he had at 
once seen how dangerous it must be to entrust the 
charge of the children to men such as these, who 
would give their minds a wrong bias in youth, from 
which they would perhaps never recover. 2
Murray therefore advocated the total exclusion of the clergy
from the schools.
Joseph Docker, the government's representative, defended
the bill in much more moderate terms, pointing out that
ministers of all denominations would be given liberal access to
public schools. He was therefore able to claim that these
schools provided more comprehensive denominational instruction
than church ones, for the latter taught the doctrines of only
one church although they usually had pupils of varied religious
persuasions. For him, the most pressing reason for supporting
the bill was economic rationalism: there was no place for
subsidizing a proliferation of denominational schools in areas
3where a single public school was sufficient.
Docker's defence of the bill was calculated to appeal to
fellow conservatives who thought highly of the moral influence
of religion but were equally concerned that government funds
should not be wasted upon unnecessary projects, whether roads,
bridges or schools. The bill was, moreover, less radical than
4one which Cowper had proposed in 1863. Consequently, only two 
conservatives showed that unrelenting hostility to the bill 
expressed by most Catholic and Anglican clergy out of doors. 
They were Plunkett, the Council's only Catholic, and John 
Campbell, a devout Anglican. Campbell thought the bill 'a very
~*~S .M.H. , 2 2 November 1866.
2 Ibid.
2S.M.H., 15 November 1866.
4Mark Lyons, 'Aspects of Sectarianism in New South Wales Circa 
1865 to 1880', Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 
1972, pp.34-5.
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cruel one1 and argued that
if you could not entrust the education of children 
to clergymen or to those appointed by them, he did 
not know who could be entrusted with it...as a 
member of the church of England, he thought it his 
duty to oppose the thin end of the wedge. He 
objected to all religions being taught in one 
school - it was repugnant to his feelings....He 
did not see why the Denominational system, which 
had done so much good, should be done away with.
Campbell spoke in terms which would have been appropriate
to an Anglican bishop, and on most points was unable to carry
any substantial body of opinion with him in the Council. He hit
a more effective note, however, when he argued that by
extending government control of education the bill would lead
to corruption. Plunkett, realizing that this argument appealed
to conservative indignation at the abuse of patronage which was
supposed to characterize popular governments, took up the cry
with greater force and argued that since the Council of
Education was to consist of government appointees with the
Colonial Secretary as its statutory president, Parkes would be
able to dismiss all those who disagreed with him, while the
government as a whole would face additional temptations to
corruption.2
Most conservatives agreed with this argument, and the 
provision that the Colonial secretary should be statutory 
President of the Council of Education was struck out in 
committee. Most also supported Campbell and Plunkett by pushing 
through an amendment to allow the owners of denominational 
schools to appoint teachers subject to approval by the Council 
of Education; and they liberalized the clauses which restricted 
aid to denominational schools, although the restrictions were 
by no means abolished.
Most conservatives were, however, unwilling to go further, 
for they badly wanted the bill to pass. There were few, if any, 
conservatives in New South Wales who wanted to keep the poor 
ignorant in the hope that they would not become discontented 
with their station. In their view, education and conservatism 
went hand in hand, and they constantly described the radicals
1S.M.H., 16 November 1866.
2S.M.H., 15 November 1866.
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as men of little education. G.K. Holden, who had resigned from 
the Council in 1863 and become chairman of the Board of 
National Education, thought that education elevated the poor to 
the level of the rich, making them submit cheerfully to law and 
posing a barrier to 'the rashness of the merely speculative 
politician'.^ In 1860, he joined with Sir Alfred Stephen and 
other conservatives in proposing that the revenue from duties 
on tea and sugar should be used to provide free and universal 
primary education. Holden justified the proposal with the 
argument that 'to put popular institutions into the hands of 
the community without taking proper measures to educate them 
was equivalent to putting gunpowder into the hands of 
children'.^
Most conservatives were prepared to grant liberal aid to 
denominational schools, but they were convinced that education 
was too important a matter to be entrusted to the voluntary 
efforts of the churches. In 1848, conservative laymen had been 
the sponsors of educational reforms which led to the 
establishment of an efficient system of national schools during 
the 1850s; and if Deas Thomson, an enthusiastic supporter of 
national education, had had his way, there would have been a 
Minister for Public Instruction from the first day of 
responsible government - something which was not finally3achieved until 1880. Consequently, in 1866, the conservatives
supported many aspects of a bill which seemed likely to make
significant improvements in the education system. The Sydney
Morning Herald, which, as the organ of conservative
Congregationalist opinion, was favourable to the bill on several
grounds, defended it on behalf of the conservative minority:
If by extending education we can propagate a 
practical conviction that we have all equal rights 
and that the minority ought not to be trampled on 
by the majority, and the majority is nevertheless 
entitled to protect itself from the tyranny of a 
minority, we shall have accomplished much. 4
"^Quoted A. Barcan, 'Opinion, Policy, and Practice in N.S.W. 
Education, 1838-1880', Ph.D. thesis, Australian National 
University, 1962, p.XIII of the appendices.
.M.H., 5 January 1860.
^Cf. S.M.H,, 5 January 1857. From 1873, there had been a Minister of Justice and Public Instruction.4Quoted Barcan, op.cit., p.240.
284
Similarly, when Parkes told James Macarthur, who had recently
been appointed to the Council, that he was afraid the bill
would be lost in the Assembly if it was amended in the upper
house, Macarthur replied that he disliked some aspects of the
legislation, but would be sorry to see it defeated because its
main principles were 'deserving of all support'. He thought
that most of the opposition to the bill in the Assembly had been
'factious & unjustifiable', and was confident that there would
be 'no serious attempt of the same character' in the Council.^
With both liberals and conservatives agreed on the bill's
basic principles, compromise between the Council and the
Assembly was possible. The Assembly agreed to the Council's
amendment stopping the Colonial Secretary from being, ex officio,
president of the Council of Education; it also accepted an
amendment reducing from forty to thirty the number of pupils
which a denominational school had to have in order to qualify 
2for state aid. However, it successfully resisted the Council's
attempts to water down more elaborate restrictions on aid and to
allow the churches to appoint teachers to denominational 3schools. The bill therefore passed into law with its main 
features intact.
The bill's passage marked the final dissolution of the old
liberal and conservative groupings in the Council. It was the
product of a ministry which combined both liberal and
conservative elements; it was guided through the Council by that
4chamber's most conservative member; it was strongly supported
there by two of the three liberals of the late 1850s and early51860s who remained active members of the Council; and those who
^Macarthur to Parkes, 4 November 1866 and Parkes to Macarthur,
2 November 1866, in Macarthur Papers, vol.30, pp.393-408.
2J .L .C .. 1866, pt.l, pp.141, 147. The Assembly also accepted 
an amendment placing the Council of Education under the control 
of the Governor and Executive Council like 'any other Department 
of the Public Service'.
3Ibid., pp.142, 152. The Assembly also resisted attempts to 
resurrect the class of non-vested schools. (Ibid., p.145.)
4Docker. Robert Johnson, his only serious rival, died on 
6 November 1866, eight days before the debate on the second 
reading of the Public Schools Bill.
5Byrnes and Russell. The other liberal, Weekes, supported all 
conservative attempts to amend the bill.
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opposed the bill or tried to amend it were in almost every case 
conservatives who favoured the government. Moreover, although 
the extent of the restrictions on denominational schools made 
the reform, in some respects, a distinctively liberal one, few 
conservatives were entirely unhappy with the change. The bill 
was an outstanding example of the 'practical' legislation which 
they had demanded when the parliament was preoccupied with 
'theoretical' reforms, and it marked the beginning of an era 
when parliament devoted most of its attention to laws designed 
to foster economic development, administrative efficiency and 
moral improvement - 'progress' as conservatives understood that 
term.
In the following session, a large amount of uncontroversial 
legislation was passed and the two issues which raised in the 
clearest form potentially divisive issues of liberal and 
conservative principle were resolved without acrimony in favour 
of the conservatives. The first issue was that of Chinese 
immigration, which had caused bitter clashes between liberals 
and conservatives in 1861.“ Since then, agitation had subsided 
on the goldfields, the mining industry had declined, and the 
threat of being 'swamped' by Chinese immigrants had vanished. 
Reacting to these developments, South Australia and Victoria had 
repealed their anti-Chinese laws between 1861 and 1865, so that 
in 1867 New South Wales was the only colony with restrictions 
on Chinese immigration.
The move to bring New South Wales into line with the other
colonies came not from a conservative, but from the Reverend
J.D. Lang, who introduced a bill to repeal the Chinese
Immigration Act in September 1867. The bill was enthusiastically
received in the Assembly. Nearly all members agreed with Lang
that the Chinese Immigration Act had been rendered superfluous
by changed circumstances - had become, in fact, 'a discreditable 
2anomaly'. Some members may have been inclined to doubt his
assertions that the Chinese had played a useful role in the 3colony, but such doubts were submerged in the general
^See Chapter VI, part 1, above.
3Lang in S.M.H., 21 September 1867.
3Ibid.
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enthusiasm. This favourable attitude had been evident from
the outset, when Lang's announcement that he intended to move
for the abolition of restrictions on Chinese immigration had
been greeted by 'cheers from all parts of the H o u s e I t  is
not surprising, then, that the bill passed easily through all
its stages in the Assembly with only a few murmurs of protest.
In the Council, John Campbell complained that 'In his
neighbourhood he was losing sight of Anglo-Saxon features, and
saw nothing but Tartars - the produce of women who had married 
2the Chinese', but the response of most other members was very
different. Some argued that, although the Chinese Immigration
Act had once been just and necessary, it was no longer needed,
but most went further, alleging that the act had always been
3'a blot on the Statute book'. So strong was the support for
its abolition that when Campbell called for a division on the
second reading of Lang's bill, he was unable to find a second
4teller for the 'noes'. The bill was agreed to without 
amendment. In conservative eyes, the Chinese Immigration Act5had been ‘a barbarous piece of legislation' symptomatic of 
wider persecution of 'minorities' by the democratic 'mob'.
Its repeal was therefore taken as a sign that the 'excesses' of 
rabid democracy were passing and that 'minorities' would be 
allowed to assume once more their rightful place in the 
community.
The second major piece of legislation which helped restore 
conservative confidence was the Municipalities Act of 1867 
which superseded the Municipalities Act of 1858. The latter,
E^mpire, 28 August 1867.
2S,M.H., 17 October 1867.
3Ibid., Thomson and Gordon. Cf. Speeches by Hay, Chisholm and 
Docker. Plunkett and Murray said that in the circumstances 
existing in 1861, the bill had been justified. Manning said 
that future circumstances might require such a bill.
4Ibid.
^Ibid., Hay.
^See Chapter VI, part 1, above.
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passed in the year which saw the adoption of manhood suffrage,
gave equal voting power to all ratepayers having a freehold,
leasehold or household qualification for elections for the
Legislative Assembly'" - a provision which meant virtually all
race-payers. Under the new act, however, voting power was
apportioned on a sliding scale according to wealth. Ratepayers
who owned or leased property worth up to £25 per annum were
given one vote; men with property worth between £26 and £75 per
annum were entitled to two votes; those with property worth
between £76 and £150 per annum were given three votes; and
those with property valued at over £150 per annum could cast 
2four votes. This system of 'cumulative voting1 was combined 
with plural voting, which allowed an elector to cast votes in 
every ward in which he was qualified. Consequently, a merchant 
who owned a store in one ward and a large house in another was 
entitled to eight votes. Most ratepayers had only one vote and 
those who paid no rates at all were disfranchised.
When this undemocratic system had been first mooted in 
1866, some radicals outside parliament had protested against the 
allocation of 'plurality of votes for the wealthy, to the 
exclusion of the working classes, and wholesale confiscation of
3the people's patrimony and inherent rights'. But the protests
were feeble and never gained much support from the politicians.
John Robertson, however, remained true to his radical
principles and argued that since the municipalities gained much
of their financial support from the colony's general revenue, to
which men of all classes contributed, it was essential 'that
every man in the constituency should have fair play with regard
4to voting power', and William Forster declared that
The tendency of legislation in this colony and in 
England had been for some time in the direction 
of abolishing property qualifications. We were, 
then, taking a retrograde step. We were going 
back to the principle that property, apart from
"^ 22 Vic., no.13, ss 10-11.
^31 Vic., no.12, s.52.
~^S .M.H. , 28 November 1866.
4S.M.H., 29 November 1867.
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the citizen, had certain political rights which we 
were bound to recognize.^
Such arguments, however, fell on indifferent ears, for most
members agreed with Henry Parkes, the bill's sponsor, that 'It
was impossible to confound the municipal franchise with the
general franchise for election of members in this House', or
with the Sydney Morning- Herald, which argued in more frankly
conservative terms that 'Where property is concerned the
distribution of electoral power ought to be designed to protect 
2it'. To the chagrin of those few who cared about the further 
extension of democratic rights, the Assembly approved 
cumulative voting by the overwhelming majority of thirty-three 
to five.3
In the Council, the response to the bill was uniformly
favourable. Joseph Docker, representing the government, spoke
of the rights and duties of property and praised cumulative
4voting as the bill's most important feature. Other members 
praised the bill, not only because it gave special 
representation to property, but because by strengthening local 
government it seemed to promise a reduction in the duties of 
the colonial legislature. In conservative eyes this was 
important because, unlike the radicals, whose demands for 
retrenchment focussed upon the privileges of state pensioners 
and high public servants, they had long deplored 'excessive' 
expenditure on local public works, alleging that it was used to5'bribe' key electorates. They blamed such expenditure for the 
colony's budgetary deficits and argued that the remedy was to 
give responsibility for local development to the municipalities, 
which could bear the cost from local funds. In 1865, for 
instance, Deas Thomson had regretted the necessity for the
^Ibid.
2S.M.H., 28 November 1867. Cf. letter by D.E.P., S,M,H,, 
7 December 1866.
3s .m .h ., 29 November 1867.
^Empire, 12 December 1867 .
5See above, this chapter.
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Stamp Duties Bill on the grounds that 'a great deal of the
public money had been laid out on works in the colony that
ought to be raised by local taxation, and he had in mind
particularly expenditure on minor roads.1 23*5 Consequently, he was
delighted with the Municipalities Bill, which settled doubts
concerning the validity of municipalities raised by the Berry 
2case and gave to those bodies extensive powers, enabling them
to build roads, infant schools, libraries, asylums for the poor,
hospitals and systems of drainage, sewerage and public lighting.
He told the Council that
He was glad the Government had determined to 
establish local insitutions. He was sure that 
these institutions would take a great deal off 
the hands of the Government. He hoped to see the 
financial state of the colony in a wholesome 
condition. He hoped to see such objectionable 
bills as the package and ad valorem duties bills 
blotted out of the statute book.^
For the same reason, Sir William Manning thought the
Municipalities Bill
a very valuable instalment of what he hoped would 
become the rule of the whole country, namely, that 
every district should have the power of managing 
its own affairs, and relieve the central ^
Government of a great deal of expenditure.
The bill buried once and for all the conservative mistrust of
municipalities which had been kept alive by the Berry case, and the
Council gave it enthusiastic support. Liberalism, as an agent
of specifically democratic legislation, had lost its force, and
both branches of the legislature cooperated in passing a bill
which not only established municipal institutions on a firm
basis but ensured that for the rest of the century local 5government was far less democratic than it had been in 1858.
^Empire, 1 June 1865.
2See above, this chapter.
3Empire, 12 December 1867. 
^Ibid.
5The provisions for cumulative voting were repeated in the 
Municipalities Act of 1897. See Act no.23, 1897, s.55.
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In the calm political climate which facilitated the
passing of legislation which, in the late 1850s, would probably
have been rejected as undemocratic, conservative confidence
grew. Deas Thomson, who in the early 1860s had harped upon the
injustices perpetrated by liberal governments, in 1867 rejected
a bill to facilitate legal action against governments, justifying
his vote with the argument that 'He could not conceive a
Government that would act dishonestly - that would refuse any
part of justice'.^ Similarly, Sir William Manning, forgetful
of the days when he had lamented that men without education and
property had gained total political ascendancy, was now prepared
to object to the extension of government power by posing the
rhetorical question: 'How could anyone say how soon the time
might arise when the whole power of the colony might be in the
2hands of the unpropertied classes?' Apparently, he now
thought that the lower orders had not yet triumphed. A year
later,in 1868, he took office as Robertson's Attorney-General
and held the same post when Cowper came to power in 1870,
although in 1865 he had refused the position on the grounds
that 11 should feel myself out of place as a member of your3Government as at present composed'. Manning, although Attorney-
General, was not a member of the cabinet from 1868 to 1870, but he
supported the government consistently and was regarded in the
1870s as Robertson's closest supporter in the Council.^
Manning was not the only conservative in the Council to
form an alliance with liberal leaders in the Assembly. The
cabinet's representative in the Council from 1868 to 1870 was
Robert Owen, a member of the Australian Club and an opponent of
5manhood suffrage in 1858; Robert Towns, another supporter of 
Cowper and Robertson in 1868-70, had been prominent in the 
conservative walk-out which frustrated the swamping of 1861, but
'‘Empire, 13 September 1867.
2'"Empire, 5 September 1867.
3Manning to Cowper, 28 June 1865, Cowper Correspondence, A677, 
pp.691-2.
^S.M.H., 6 February 1875.
♦ & P ♦ (L.A., N.S.W.), 1858, pt.l, 30 July, 5 November 1858?
1858-9, pt.l, pp.417-8.
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had taken Cowper into business as a partner in the late 1860s;^
and other conservative members of the Council, like Sir William
Macarthur, Alexander Campbell, Thomas Icely and Thomas Holt
2were amongst Parkes' admirers and creditors. Perhaps the
ultimate proof that liberal-conservative conflict had long been
dead came in 1875, when the ultra-conservative Joseph Docker
took office in a ministry headed by his arch enemy, Robertson,
ending a rivalry which had existed from at least 1856 when
Robertson had beaten Docker in an election for the Assembly.
Many conservatives became reconciled to the new order as
they helped to build it in a non-political capacity. George
Allen, the Council's Chairman of Committees, was appointed to
the Council of Education with Parkes, Martin, W.M. Arnold and
Professor John Smith. Allen had seen merit in the Public 3Schools Act but, perhaps dismayed at the 'political' nature of 
some of the appointments to the Council of Education, he 
confided to his diary: 'I confess I do not think the selection
a very wise one nor do I expect the Board [i.e. the Council of 
EducationJ will be of much u s e . I n  the next eleven days, that 
body met five times under Parkes' chairmanship and embarked on 
a far reaching programme of educational reform. Surprised by 
such energetic administration, Allen observed that their 
appointments would 'not prove sinecures' and prayed for 'grace5wisdom and strength to perform my duty'. Three weeks later, 
his doubts about the effectiveness of the Council had been 
dissolved:
I am beginning to think that it is not a bad change 
that the Parliament has made in the Scheme of 
Education I fear there was very much deception
^Town and Country Journal, 19 April 1873.
2Macarthur to Parkes, 21 January 1870, Macarthur Papers, vol.42, 
A2938, pp.397-9; Campbell to Parkes, 20 October 1870, P.C., 
vol.50, A920, p .2 08; Icely to Parkes, 21 January 1870, P.C., 
vol.19, A889, p.371; Holt to Parkes, 18 November 1870, P.C., 
vol.16, A886.
3George Allen, Journal, Uncat. MSS set 477, 24 December 1866.
4Ibid., 2 January 1867.
"’ibid., 13 January 1867.
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under the former [system and that for want of 
proper inspection (which for want of means the 
Denominational Board could not fully carry out) 
they were often in the dark as to many of the 
schools under their care.^
The confiscation of property which conservatives had
feared in 1861 did not eventuate and many conservatives apart
from Allen retained their position as leaders of the colony's
economic and social life. In 1867, twenty members of the
committee which organized a testimonial to Sir John Young were
2conservatives and only nine were liberals; and an examination
of the directors of companies listed in Sands' Sydney Directory
for 1871 provides little evidence for the view that political
success had given the liberals economic power. Twenty-five
directors, holding sixty-six directorships, are known to have
been conservatives in the early 1860s, and only seven directors,
3holding fourteen positions, are known to have been liberals.
A similar examination of all office holders in the directory's
list of religious, charitable, scientific, educational and
cultural institutions showed that in that sphere, the liberals
had achieved greater recognition. Henry Parkes was on the
Council of the Agricultural Society of New South Wales, where
he rubbed shoulders with Sir William Macarthur, T.S. Mort,
Deas Thomson, James Chisholm and a host of other conservatives;
and, all told, nineteen men known to have been liberals in the
early 1860s held twenty-five offices in institutions devoted to
the social, moral, cultural and educational improvement of the
colony. The conservatives, however, were still dominant, for4forty-one of them held a total of seventy-six positions.
^"Ibid., 2 February 1867 .
2The list is in Empire, 5 September 1867. Those classed as 
conservatives are G. Allen, A. Campbell, J. Chisholm, Major 
Christie, J. Docker, W.A. Duncan, J. Fairfax, Judge Francis,
S.D. Gordon, J. Hay, R. Jones, E. Knox, Sir W.M. Manning,
J. Martin, J.L. Montefiore, M.E. Murnin, S. Samuel,
Sir A. Stephen, E.D. Thomson, R. Towns. Those described as 
liberals are W.M. Arnold, C. Cowper, W.B. Dailey, J. Hart,
H. Parkes, J. Robertson, T.W. Smart, J. Sutherland, G. Thornton. 
Murray and Egan cannot be easily classified and have not been 
included in the figures above.
3See Appendix VIII.
4See Appendix IX.
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Not only had the conservatives retained their position of 
leadership outside parliament, but by the 1870s they had 
regained access to parliamentary patronage. There were 
conservatives in every ministry from 1863, and by 1870 they had 
no reason to feel that in matters of patronage governments 
treated them badly. The use of patronage and 'influence' was a 
normal part of nineteenth century life, legitimate in the case 
of one's friends and 'corrupt' only when used by one's enemies. 
Not unnaturally, therefore, many conservative members of the 
Council were amongst the suppliants at the Colonial Secretary's 
door when Parkes held that office: Sir William Macarthur, 2soliciting the appointment of a neighbour as police magistrate;
Sir William Manning, asking provision for 'deserving' people in
3financial difficulties; and Sir John Hay, pressing the clarms4of W.H. Suttor for appointment to the Council.
One of the most successful conservatives in matters of 
patronage was Sir Alfred Stephen, who seems to have first become 
one of Parkes' clients in 1867 when he asked Eagar, Treasurer 
in the Martin-Parkes ministry, to arrange a transfer within the 
public service for a 'poor friend', J.H. Johnston, clerk at5Berrima gaol. The request was forwarded to Parkes, but with 
no result. Six months later, Stephen tried again, sending 
Parkes testimonials to show the esteem in which his friend was 
held.k Parkes immediately penned a stern reply, explaining 
that such testimonials were of little value and lecturing
Cf. P. Loveday, 'Patronage and Politics in New South Wales, 
1856-70', Public Administration, vol.18, 1959, pp.341-58, 
passim.
^Macarthur to Parkes, 14 March 1873, P.C., vol.24, A894, 
pp.37-9.
3Manning to Parkes, 17 November 1865[?J, 20 February 1868, P.C., 
vol.24, A894, pp.67-73.
^Hay to Parkes, 28 August 1873, P.C., vol.18, A888, pp.237-9. 
Suttor was not appointed.
5Stephen to the Treasurer, 16 November 1867, P.C., vol.34,
A904, pp.425-7. See also note dated 18 November 1867 on
pp.423-4. Johnston is described as a 'poor friend' in Stephen
to Parkes, 29 May 1868, P.C., vol.35, A905, pp.158-9.
^Stephen to Parkes, 29 May 1868, P.C., vol.35, A905, pp.158-9.
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Stephen on the principles of impartiality by which ministers 
had to be guided if 'the public service is to be raised in 
efficiency and economy1 Parkes stated that appointments 
should always be guided by concern for the public interest and 
argued that
So long as we consider the interests of the 
applicant before the interests of the Public in 
filling situations so long will the Public who 
pays be served badly and at unnecessary cost....
I have no friends of my own whom I wish to serve.
Why should I disregard my own judgment in serving 
the friends of others?...You have frequently 
yourself made observations reflecting on the 
manner in which appointments have been made in 
this Colony. But I think you would find great 
difficulty in pointing out any situation for 
which Mr. Johnson [sic] is especially fitted in 
the sense of best serving the Public....I hope I 
shall not be misunderstood....[i] shall be glad 
to see him receive any appointment for which his 
capabilities really qualify him.2 *4
Stephen hastily replied that he agreed with the high
principles which Parkes had enunciated, but that Johnson's
appointment to a new position could be reconciled with the
3public interest. He then launched into a diatribe on the 
'corruption' which had prevailed since the liberals had won 
power:
Parliamentary (or, as it is fancifully called, 
Responsible) Government is necessarily to some 
extent...a government by corruption. Donaldson 
refused to put the great Mr. Lucas into the Column, 
of the Peace, & lost his election... in consequence 
of it. Pass a stringent Public House Act - or try 
to do so, - such as shall really restrain largely 
drunkenness, & you will not be Colonl. Secty six 
months. Appoint the sons & nephews of a suffict. 
number of M.Ps. to be Clks of P. Sessns, or 
waiters in the Customs, or something on the Roads, 
or in a Light House, & you will command votes for 
the session...probably two...next following.^
Markes to Stephen, 30 May 1868, P.C., vol.35, A905, pp.160-66
2Ibid.
^Stephen to Parkes, 31 May 1868, P.C., vol.35, A905, pp.148-54
4Ibid.
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The rest of Stephen's letter dealt mainly with a scheme to 
reform the public service and, in particular, to 'put patronage 
out of any minister's power'. Magistrates were to be appointed 
by a specially constituted board consisting of the Chief 
Justice, the President of the Council and the Speaker of the 
Assembly. Appointments in other sections of the public service 
were to be made by permanent heads of the departments, partly 
on the basis of competitive examinations, whose absence was 
'no small evidence of the corruption that actually... in the 
Parlmtry sense... exists' .
Having established their bona fides as men who would never
solicit or grant unworthy appointments, Stephen and Parkes
settled down to a long and mutually beneficial relationship.
Parkes had always craved recognition by the leading
conservatives/ and from Stephen he gained sincere admiration,
friendship and advice on the drafting of bills. Stephen's
gains were more tangible. Johnston seems to have gained his 
2transfer, and Stephen became one of the most importunate
clients at the Colonial Secretary's door. He requested a free
railway pass for himself and for his family when they travelled
with him, saying that'by special favour' of another minister he
already had 'the great comfort of a private (separate)
3compartment for myself individually'; he urged the promotion 
of a nephew, Surgeon Bedford, commenting discreetly that 'It 
might wear a better appearance, with people who talk of 
influence. that he should obtain the advance after my4supercession !as acting Governorj'; in 1879, after years of
For example, in 1857, Parkes had dedicated some sonnets to 
Sir Charles Nicholson 'as A Link of A Valued Friendship'. See 
Parkes' Murmurs of the Stream, Sydney, 1857, p.93, and 
Nicholson's graceful reply, 16 October 1857, P.C., vol.56,
A926, pp.31-3.
2When requesting the transfer, Stephen said Johnston had served 
'ten or twelve' years as clerk at Berrima. In 1880, when 
soliciting yet another appointment for him, Stephen implied 
that his term at Berrima was twelve or thirteen years.
Cf. Stephen to Parkes, 31 May 1868, 30 July 1880, P.C., vol.35, 
A905, pp.148-54, 206-8.
3Stephen to Parkes, n.d., P.C., vol.34, A904, pp.332-5.
4Stephen to Parkes, n.d., P.C., A928, pp.142-3.
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lobbying, he finally gained compensation for the cut which the
Assembly had made in his salary when he was on leave in I860,
2and he solicited numerous other favours. One of his more 
notable successes concerned his brother, George Milner Stephen, 
who at various stages in his chequered career was barrister, 
public servant, geologist, land speculator, inventor, 
businessman and faith-healer. In 1877, George was appointed 
parliamentary draftsman after testimonials from Sir Alfred and3many others, but lost the job when his fame as a faith-healer
brought him up to fifty patients a day so that he was unable to
4carry out his duties. He still had one advantage, however, in
5that one of his patients was Lady Parkes, and to this was
added another when Sir Alfred interceded with her husband,
asking him to make George a District Court Judge or give him a
position in the Attorney-General's Department or the Ministry
of Justice.^ George was thereupon made Crown Prosecutor, but,
no doubt to his brother's annoyance, he was soon forced to
resign 'because his position required much travelling and he7was beset wherever he went by sufferers eager for healing'.
The cordial relationship between leading conservatives and 
liberals like Parkes was symptomatic of the declining importance 
of the old ideological distinctions. Men were still sometimes 
classified as liberals or conservatives, mainly on the basis of 
their political record in the late 1850s and early 1860s, and 
occasional attempts were made to gain political advantage by 
playing upon the old divisions. However, after 1866, the 
ideological differences of former years had little effect on 
voting patterns in the Council.
^"Stephen to Parkes, 10 April 1879.
2For example, Stephen to Parkes, 10 January [no year given], 
P.C., vol.35, A905, pp.481-2. Volumes 34 and 35 of the Parkes 
Correspondence contain many other letters from Stephen.
3Cf. P.C., vol.39, A909, pp.216-31.
4Article on George Milner Stephen in A,D.B., vol.2.
“’ibid.
^Stephen to Parkes, 23 June 1879, P.C., A928, pp.47-8.
7Article on George Milner Stephen in A,D.B., vol.2.
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In the session of 1867-8 Hay and Manning, both 
conservatives, criticized some of the Martin ministry's 
legislation and sought to press forward other measures against 
the wishes of the government. Their stand provoked a 'patterned' 
response and, as shown by Table XVI, they had the support of 
approximately half the members. The table shows the 
proportion of votes cast with the representative of the 
government in the most strongly 'patterned' divisions.
1TABLE XVI~
VOTING OF MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
IN MOST STRONGLY 'PATTERNED* DIVISIONS, SESSION OF 1867 -68
Vote
with Government 1 Independent'
Vote
aqainst Government
Allen 3/3 J . C ampbe11 2/3 Blaxland 2/9
Byrnes 6/8 Macfarlane 1/3 Busby 0/8
Docker A. Campbell 0/2
(Govt, rep.) 9/9 E . Cox 0/1
Icely 7/7 Gordon 1/8
Jennings 5/6 Hay 0/9
Lord 3/3 W. Macarthur 0/5
Mitchell 7/7 Manning 0/9
Plunkett 1/1 Murray 0/3
Thomson 6/7 Russell 0/3
Weekes 8/8 Towns 0/1
A majority of the 'patterned' divisions involved 
considerations affecting the rights of the Council and of 
individuals against governments and the Assembly. In the early 
1860s, such issues would probably have produced a split between • 
liberals and conservatives, with the latter asserting the rights 
of 'individuals' and the Council against the 'tyranny' of a 
democratic Assembly and governments responsible to it. Such 
considerations were not, however, raised in 1867-68 and there 
was no sign of a cleavage on liberal-conservative lines. Of the
^The table is based upon the divisions listed in Appendix III, 
which also describes the method by which they were chosen.
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four liberals present, two voted with the government, one voted 
against it, and one was an 'independent' casting two of his 
three votes against the government.“ The numbers are too small 
to be conclusive in themselves, but they are significant in 
the light of the debates, which did not place the issues in the 
context of liberalism and conservatism, and in view of the fact 
that there was no sign of a split between moderate conservatives 
and extreme ones. Allen, Mitchell and Thomson, for instance, 
moderate conservatives who had been reappointed by Cowper in 
1861, voted with the government, while those who voted against 
it included the liberal-conservative T.A. Murray and moderate 
conservatives in Gordon, Manning and Sir William Macarthur.
The votes in 'patterned' divisions were probably, in some
cases, based partly upon attitudes towards Martin's government.
William Byrnes, for instance, was the brother and business
partner of Martin's Minister for Public Works, and he voted
consistently with the government while Martin remained in power,
then suddenly began to vote against it after Robertson took
office late in 1868. The change is the more significant because
Byrnes' previous record suggests that his personal convictions
on some of the questions at issue should have led him to vote
2with the new government. However, only Byrnes and Docker (the 
Martin government's representative in the Council) voted with 
Martin in 'patterned' divisions in 1867-68 then voted against 
Cowper and Robertson from 1868 to 1870. More typical were 3Thomson, Allen, Lord and Weekes, who voted with both governments. 
Thomson, in particular, seems to have sympathized with those who 
faced the burdens of office and was frequently prepared to give 
ministries the benefit of the doubt now that the prejudices
^The liberals were Byrnes, Weekes, Macfarlane and Russell. 
2In particular, Byrnes, as a liberal, might have been 
expected to demur at the Council's protests against the 
accidental occurrence of illegal expenditure. See the 
discussion later in this chapter.
^Compare Table XVI with Table XVII, below.
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aroused by the old liberal-conservative conflicts had died 
down. ^
There were no strong avowals of 'party' preferences during
the session of 1867-68, although the debates contain a vague
suggestion that members sitting on the opposition benches formed
a recognized group which was inclined to oppose the government.
Certainly, this is the easiest interpretation to put upon
Manning's statement, made when Docker inadvertently seemed to
disprove his own case, that 'the hon. member...had argued on
2the other side of the House'. Manning himself sat opposite 3Docker and voted against him on all strongly 'patterned'4divisions, as did Hay. In fact, Hay voted against Docker in 
almost every division in the session, 'patterned' or 
'unpatterned'. It would be wrong, however, to regard Hay as an 
opponent of the Martin government in particular. He had voted 
as an 'independent' in the Assembly before Martin appointed him
5to the Council, and his voting record in the Council was 
symptomatic of a disinclination to follow the line pressed by 
any government at all.^
Alexander Campbell was another member who, while not 
opposing Martin's government per se, saw no reason to fit in 
with its wishes. Campbell continued to vote against the 
government when Martin lost power, and he dissociated himself7from those who voted in opposition on 'party' grounds. In the
■^ See Tables XVI and XVII, together with the discussion below of 
Thomson's attitude towards illegal expenditure by the Robertson 
government. See also, for example, his speech on the second 
reading of the Claims Against the Government Bill, Empire,
13 September 1867; and his support for the government in a 
division on the Railway Loan Bill after he had expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the ministry's stand on the question at 
issue and asked it to reconsider its position. (S,M.H..
14 December 1867.)
2Empire, 18 December 1867.
3Cf. ibid.
4For Hay's sitting opposite Docker, see Docker, S,M,H.,
26 September 1867.
5See P. Loveday, 'The Development of Parliamentary Government 
in New South Wales, 1856-1870', Ph.D. thesis, University of 
Sydney, 1962, p.512.
^See below, this chapter.
7Cf. A. Campbell, S,M,H,f 19, 24 March 1869, 5 May 1870.
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session of 1867-68, he showed quite clearly that he was not
motivated by personal dislike of Martin's ministry in his
speech supporting the second reading of a bill to facilitate
legal actions by individuals against governments. The
government opposed the bill, but its members could have taken
comfort from the fact that Campbell argued that the measure was
necessary because they might not 'always have such a liberal
Government as the one they had at present' and that it was
'future governments' which he thought 'might act with tyranny'.^
The years 1868-70, when ministries headed by Robertson and
Cowper held power, saw the re-emergence of overtly partisan
behaviour in the Council. The leader of the 'Opposition' was
Docker, who alleged that one minister had bought his position,
that Robertson was a perverter of the truth and that Cowper had
attained office like a 'burglar' by climbing through the
2scullery window. Docker played upon the Councillors' 
sensitivity about their financial powers in an effort to revive 
the old liberal-conservative divisions - a move which, had it 
succeeded, would have left Cowper and Robertson in a hopeless 
minority. His chance came in February 1869 when Robert Owen, 
the government's representative, introduced a partial 
appropriation bill to cover the government's expenditure for the 
month of March in anticipation of the final Appropriation Act. 
There was no urgent business on the notice paper and, when Owen 
was pressed by members on both sides of the house to consent to 
a week's adjournment so that they could write letters for the 
English mail, he readily agreed. He had forgotten, however, 
that February was a short month, so that the week's adjournment 
terminated two days after 1 April, the day on which the public 
service had to be paid. Confronted with this difficult 
situation, the government paid the public service in 
anticipation of the partial appropriation act, which it then 
tried to have passed as soon as the Council reconvened. The 
ministers were frustrated, however, by a gleeful Docker, who 
forced a debate on resolutions deploring the ministry's alleged
.M.H., 13 September 1867.
2S.M.H.t 5 May 1870.
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slight to the Council in issuing money approved by the vote of 
the Assembly alone.'* 2345'
Docker's attempt to instigate a conflict based on the
fears which had led to the battle over the Indemnity Bill in
1860 met with only limited success. John Campbell was the only
member who joined him in professing the suspicion that Robertson,
as an opponent of the Council, was seeking to undermine its 
2powers. The other conservatives divided into two groups which
agreed that the illegal expenditure had been the result of an
unfortunate oversight but differed on the appropriate response
to such an occurrence. The first group consisted mainly of
moderate conservatives led by Deas Thomson who thought the
Council should ignore the affair completely. Thomson sat3behind Docker on the opposition benches, but he attacked the
resolutions censuring the government on the grounds that
There could be no doubt that they were somewhat 
of a partisan character - they were directed 
against the present Administration, and he thought 
that this Council should avoid all party 
considerations when conserving its rights and 
privileges, and not take any steps to assert them 
when they might possibly be infringed through a 
mere matter of accident...
Docker, of course, denied the accusation that his resolutions 
were 'characterized by a spirit of partisanship', but drew from 
Thomson the retort that he 'was perfectly certain the 
resolutions had been so conceived, and it must be transparent
5to everybody that such was the case'. It was this conviction 
which led Thomson to move the previous question. He was 
supported by two of the three liberals of the early 1860s who 
were p r e s e n t by Manning and Owen, conservative members of the 
ministry; and by Allen, Gordon and Towns, moderate conservatives
4The above account is based upon the debates in S ,M.H. , 12, 17, 
19, 24 March 1869.
2S.M.H., 24 March 1869.
3Cf. Thomson, ibid.
4S.M.H., 19 March 1869.
5S.M.H., 24 March 1869.
^Weekes and Macfarlane supported him. Byrnes opposed him.
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reappointed to the Council by Cowper. However, the previous
question was defeated by eleven votes to eight.
The course which most members favoured was pointed out by
Hay, who objected to Docker's resolutions
because he felt that they were conceived in what 
appeared to him a hostile spirit of opposition 
to the present Administration...._He thought that]
Hon. members would be pleased to remember that 
Ministries were not displaced from power by any 
vote of want of confidence passed in that House, 
and such resolutions as had been proposed were 
therefore more within the sphere of the 
Legislative Assembly.
Hay conceded that there was no 'settled plan on the part of the 
present Government to make payments without...Parliamentary 
sanction', but he thought that the Council was bound, under the 
circumstances, to make a temperate reassertion of its rights. 
The core of his case was that expenditure had, albeit 
inadvertently, been sanctioned by a vote of the Assembly alone, 
and he moved that Docker's resolutions be amended so that they 
simply expressed 'regret at the irregularity which had been 
permitted' and reaffirmed the resolutions against illegal
expenditure which the Council had passed on the third reading2of the Appropriation Bill in 1860. Docker, sensing that the 
house was against him, agreed to Hay's formula. Thus amended, 
the resolutions were carried.
The divisions on the government's 'irregular' expenditure 
did not reflect the pattern of opinion on that issue alone. 
Members' opinions were not moulded by any isolated sense of 
constitutional propriety, but were subject to influences which 
provoked a similar voting pattern on other issues. In fact, 
there were twelve divisions on other matters during the 
Robertson and Cowper ministries of 1868-70 which closely 
resembled the divisions on the question of illegal expenditure. 
The nature of this 'patterned' response can be seen from 
Table XVII, which shows the proportion of votes which members 
cast with the representative of the government in the most 
strongly 'patterned' divisions.
1S,M.H., 24 March 1869.
Ibid. For the 1860 resolutions, see Chapter IV, part 3, above.2
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TABLE XVII1
VOTING OF MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
IN MOST STRONGLY 'PATTERNED' DIVISIONS, 1868-70
Vote Vote
with Government 1 Independent1 against Government
Allen G.H. Cox 2/4 Blaxland 3/12
Owen Murray 1/3 Busby 0/6
(Govt, rep.) 15/15 Byrnes 2/8
Gordon 11/11 A. Campbell 0/10
Lord 5/5 C. Campbell 0/7
Macarthur 4/5 J. Campbell 0/12
Macfarlane 12/12 Chisholm 0/5
Manning 
(Att.-Gen.) 13/13 Darley 2/14
Russell 5/5 Docker 0/15
Thomson 5/6 Hay 0/15
Towns 3/3 Holt 3/10
Smart 1/1 Icely 0/1
Weekes 11/11 Moore 0/12
Park 1/7
Richardson 3/13
Three of the divisions were on the question of illegal 
expenditure, and the others were on such diverse matters as a 
Road Act Amendment Bill, a Small-Pox Prevention Bill, an 
Unclaimed Balances Appropriation Bill, a Deficiency Loans 
Funding Bill and a Loan Bill. The only feature which some of 
these measures had in common was that they were supported by 
the government and attacked, either in part or as a whole, by 
Docker and his allies. It is,in fact, tempting to ascribe the 
cleavage to 'party' feeling, for ten of the twelve members who 
voted with the government had been appointed by Cowper and 
Robertson, while twelve of the fifteen members who voted against 
it had been appointed by Martin. But while personal allegiances 
and antipathies undoubtedly influenced the voting pattern,
■^ The table is based upon the divisions listed in Appendix III, 
which also describes the method by which they were chosen.
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it would be misleading to explain the members' behaviour purely 
in these terms.
Members who supported the government fell into two main 
categories. In one, there were five members who had been 
appointed as supporters of Cowper and Robertson - four liberals 
in Macfarlane, Russell, Weekes and Smart, and one conservative 
in Owen. These men consistently supported ministries headed 
by Cowper and Robertson, but they were little inclined to 
partisan behaviour and sometimes supported ministries headed 
by other men/ In the second category, there were seven 
moderate conservatives - five of them appointed by Cowper 
between 1861 and 1863 as men whose political principles were 
opposed to his own but who seemed unlikely to offer factious 
opposition. By the late 1860s and early 1870s, two of these
moderate conservatives, Manning and Towns, were close to
2Cowper and Robertson. The others - Thomson, Allen, Sir William 
Macarthur and Lord, were by no means identified with the 
ministry, but they were men of conciliatory temperament who 
abhorred factious opposition. They often opposed the 
government's point of view, but they were unwilling to press 
their objections to the point where they might cause serious 
inconvenience or appear obstructive. It was a natural 
consequence of their objection to factious opposition that, 
when Docker led the criticism of a ministry's measures, they 
should often have found themselves voting with the government.
Several members who voted against Cowper and Robertson
were clearly actuated to some extent by 'party feeling'.
Docker's hostility was unique in its virulence, but even
members who deplored his conduct were sometimes influenced by
mistrust of Cowper and Robertson. The brothers John and Charles
Campbell, for instance, rebuked Docker for his personal 3attacks, but revealed that they were, in part, actuated by a
^See their voting records in Appendix III. Cf. the discussing 
of liberal attitudes to the Forster ministry in Chapter II, above.
2For Manning, see S.M.H., 6 February 1875. Towns had taken 
Cowper into business from about 1865 to about 1867. (Town and Country Journal, 19 April 1873.)
3S.M.H., 5 May 1870.
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less extreme version of the same prejudices. John Campbell
supported Docker's attempt to argue that the illegal payments
made in March 1869 were part of an attack on the Council and he
professed to believe that Robertson's radical opinions still
posed a threat to its existence/ Charles Campbell's political
preferences were revealed when he welcomed Martin's return to
power in 1871, commenting that 'he had the pleasure of
reflecting that that gentleman professed, like himself,
2Conservative principles'.
The Campbells' hostility towards Cowper and Robertson was 
based partly upon the memory of past conflicts and partly upon3dismay at their financial policy. Their 'party' preferences 
were not therefore unrelated to principle and when Martin, as 
Premier, failed to produce a financial policy to their liking, 
they led the opposition to his financial measures in the 
Council.^
Any attempt by the Council to reject bills passed by the 
Assembly or to force governments to accept amendments to their 
legislation raised questions about the proper role of the upper 
house. Some of the opposition to Cowper and Robertson, as also 
to Martin, was motivated by a highly developed sense of the 
Council's power and 'independence'. Hay was pre-eminent amongst 
those members whose determination to ensure that the Council 
made a distinctive contribution to the work of the parliament 
led them to take a critical attitude towards the Assembly and 
towards governments, no matter who was in power. From the time 
of his appointment in 1867 until Parkes' accession to power in 
1872, Hay voted against successive ministries in every5'patterned' division. His standing as an 'independent' 
spokesman for the Council was duly recognized when he was 
appointed its President on the death of T.A. Murray in 1873.
1S.M.H., 24 March 1869.
2S.M.H., 16 June 1871.
3Ibid., for Charles Campbell's criticism of the Cowper 
ministry's deficiencies in financial matters.
4Ibid. Cf. the last table in Appendix III, below.
5See his voting record in Appendix III.
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Conservatives, particularly some of the extreme ones
appointed by Martin, were more likely to stand upon the dignity
of the Council than liberals, and a few members harked back to
the conflicts of years gone by; but conservatism and liberalism
no longer formed the basis of 'party' in the Council. The
attainment of liberal demands in the early 1860s and the lack
of new issues calculated to produce class antipathies meant
that the old distinctions became blurred. Men who had been
staunch conservatives in the 1850s and early 1860s often became
more 'liberal' as the threat to their social, economic and
political interests waned, while many liberals, having attained
their goals, became more conservative. Sir William Manning,
for instance, a member of the old conservative elite which had
framed the constitution, now felt able to discard the idea that
the Council should contain more of 'the wealth, the intelligence
and the education of the colony' than the Assembly and
proposed an upper house which was based partly on manhood 
2suffrage. Bourn Russell, on the other hand, who in the early31860s had advocated an upper house elected by manhood suffrage,
now favoured a nominated Council on the grounds that
If they conceded that the Council should be 
elected at all, he could not see what was to 
prevent them from coming down, at length, to 
universal suffrage, and that was a consummation 
which he should be very sorry to see.^
A striking demonstration of the development of a relative 
community of opinion amongst liberals and conservatives was 
given when Parkes tried to reform the Council after it had 
rejected his border duties and stamp duties bills in 1872. 
Parkes' Legislative Council Bill was by no means as democratic 
as those which had been proposed by Cowper and Robertson in the 
early 1860s. In the first place, it provided that all members 
of the existing Council should retain their seats, sitting with 
the elective members in a mixed chamber. This meant that the
XS ,M.H., 4 May 1870.
2See below, this chapter.
,M,H., 6 December 1861.
4S.M.H., 20 March 1874.
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Council would not have become wholly elective until the 
existing members had died or retired. In the second place, it 
was to be elected upon a somewhat less democratic franchise 
than the Assembly. The electors included freeholders, 
leaseholders, householders, lodgers of six months standing, 
university graduates and men holding a variety of professional 
qualifications. The simple residential franchise which allowed 
men to vote for the Assembly was, however, omitted, and electors 
who qualified to vote for the Council had to register on a 
separate roll for that house.
The restriction on the franchise was not severe, but the 
fact that it could be proposed at all by a liberal Premier 
showed that the political temper of the colony was more 
conservative than it had been in the early 1860s, when the 
reform bills put forward by all ministries had been based on the 
assumption that the qualification for both houses should be the 
same.^ The strength of support for that view had been shown 
in 1861, when the Assembly voted in favour of equal
2qualifications for both houses by twenty-two to seven. In 
1873, however, Parkes' attempt to establish a separate
franchise for the Council was rejected by only seventeen votes3to fifteen.
When the bill reached the Council, it was refused a first 
reading on the grounds that it had been originated in the 
Assembly, but the following session, the government introduced 
a similar bill in the Council. It was referred to a select 
committee, whose minutes of evidence showed that both 
conservatives and liberals were far more favourable to the 
nominated upper house than they had been in the early 1860s.
The Reverend J.D. Lang, for instance, that ancient enemy of the 
nominated Council, told the select committee that his 
confidence in the elective principle had been shaken by the
■^ See above, Chapter IV, part 2 and Chapter VI, part 4.
3V. & P. (L.A., N.S.W.), 1861, pt.l, divisions in committee,3 April 1861.
3V. & P. (L.A., N.S.W.), 1872-73, pt.l, p.380.
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protracted conflict between the two houses in Victoria**" from
1865 to 1868, during which the Council had three times rejected
the annual appropriation bills. He thought that the nominated
Council in New South Wales had worked better than the elective
one in Victoria, and that an upper house elected on the same
franchise as the Assembly would be even worse than the
Victorian one. He felt, however, that although nomination had
worked better than election, he was not free to advocate it
because he was trammelled by his life-long advocacy of elective 
2institutions. He attempted to solve the difficulty by opting
for unicameralism in the form of a single mixed house such as
had existed before responsible government, alleging that
There were no complaints about it as being based 
on a wrong principle. The public were satisfied 
with the legislation which it afforded, and there 
was no strong desire for change when the new 
Constitution was introduced.-^
Another liberal who hankered after the old mixed chamber
was Samuel Bennett, proprietor of the Empire, who thought that
before 1856, the colony had enjoyed 'very much better legislation'
4and been governed by more able men. Bennett said that the
public regarded proposals for reform of the Council with 'the
greatest indifference', but that in so far as there was any
opinion on the subject it was favourable to the elective 
5principle. He himself preferred election to nomination, but 
admitted that 'The [nominated; Legislative Council has worked 
on the whole satisfactorily' - a view which contrasted with his 
harsh judgment of the Assembly as a chamber whose membership
J.L.C.. 1873-74, pt.l, pp.381-6, passim. For the conflict 
between the two houses in Victoria, see Dorothy P. Clarke,
'The Colonial Office and the Constitutional Crises in Victoria, 
1865-68', Historical Studies, vol.5, no.18, May 1952, pp.160-71;' 
and F.K. Crowley, 'Aspects of the Constitutional Conflicts 
between the two Houses of the Victorian Legislative, 1864-1868',
M.A. thesis, University of Melbourne, 1947
2J.L.C. , 1873-74, pt.l, pp.381-6, passim.
3Ibid., p.384.
4*Ibid., pp.340.
5Ibid., pp.337, 340.
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had been subject to a process of ' deterioration. .. gradually-
going on to the present time'.3
Praise for the nominated Council also came from
P.R. Holdsworth, a political agitator who claimed to speak
2for 'the great masses of the people'. On their behalf, he 
denied 'the right of any irresponsible body to override the 
views of our representatives' but he stressed that popular
discontent with the Council was largely confined to this matter
3of constitutional principle. He told the select committee that
the public as a whole have been very well 
satisfied with the acts of the Legislative Council.
In fact, at times you have acted as a very wise 
bar to the acts of the Assembly.^
He also feared that future appointments to the Council might
not be so wise:
We may not always have men who would act as the 
present members have done....I do not wish to 
flatter you, but we have known most of you from 
our childhood, and we have reason to resoect you; 
but we have no guarantee for the future. ^
Like Holdsworth, most opponents of the nominated upper
house based their case on abstract principle and praised the
actual workings of the Council. John Fairfax, proprietor of the
Sydney Morning Herald, thought that it had 'worked upon the
whole remarkably well';  ^ J.B. Watt and A .T . Holroyd thought that7its members were men of high quality; L.F. De Salis could notQ'find any serious fault with the Council in anything they do'; • 
and Richard Jones, who had advocated an elective Council since 
the early 1850s, said that while he still favoured election in 
theory, he had lost much practical enthusiasm for change because
XIbid., pp.336, 341.
2Ibid., p .405.
3 Ibid., p .404.
^Ibid.
5Ibid., p .405.
6Ibid., p .329.
7 Ibid., pp.387, 410-11.
8Ibid., p.398.
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'the results of our Constitution, as now framed, have been so
far satisfactory that we might continue the experiment for some
time longer without any injury to the public'. ^ In fact, the
only witnesses who seriously criticized the performance of the
2Council were Frank Senior, a chemist who seems to have been 
examined as a representative of the politically illiterate, and 
Andrew Garran, editor of the Herald, who said that the Council 
lacked public support and that, because so few members were 
regular in their attendance, the debates were somewhat 
perfunctory.* 3 4
Eight of the twenty witnesses called by the select committee 
favoured the continuation of the nominated Council. They were 
T.S. Mort, who had been a member of the Constitution Committee 
which had opposed the proposed nominated upper house in 1853; 
William Barker and Thomas Walker, conservative members of the 
Legislative Council before responsible government; Thomas 
Buckland, conservative merchant and banker; Alexander Stuart, a 
future Premier; John Davies, ironmonger, president of the 
Protestant Political Association and a future Postmaster-General; 
James Merriman, mayor of Sydney; and Deas Thomson, who had been 
temporarily converted to the elective principal by the swamping 
in 1861. All these witnesses agreed that the Council had worked 
well and that there was no real demand for change. They assumed 
that an elective Council would return inferior men because, as 
Davies put it,
there is an indisposition on the part of gentlemen 
of independent means, intelligence and ability, to 
offer themselves to constituencies, on account of 
the annoyance, expense, and trouble of a contested 
election. The people therefore have not the same 
opportunity of making a good selection that the 
Government have by nominating gentlemen.^
Deas Thomson told the committee that he had become once
more a proponent of nomination because the elective principle
had failed in Canada (which had reverted to a nominated Council)
'''Ibid. , p. 37 5 .
3Ibid., p .395-6.
3Ibid., p.344.
4Ibid., p.380. Cf. Barker and Merriman, ibid., pp.368, 400.
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and because the elective upper houses in neighbouring colonies 
had caused 'constant collisions and dead-locks, and constant 
attempts to obtain power on the one hand, or to resist it on 
the other'. By contrast, said Thomson, the nominated Council 
in New South Wales had on the whole
worked very well. I do not think there has been 
any dead-lock. There has sometimes been a 
difference of opinion between the Upper or Lower 
Houses, but the result has always been, as in 
England, that when there has been a persistent 
determination to carry particular measures, the 
Upper House has given way to the other, as 
recently in the case of the Border Duties and also 
in the case of postage upon newspapers. There was 
another case also....When free selection before 
survey was insisted on by the Assembly, the Council 
gave way.2
Thomson remained true to the tradition of flexible conservatism
which had influenced the choice of a nominated upper house in
1853. In his view, the Council's inability to act as a
permanent barrier to change was one of its strengths.
From the testimony given before the select committee, it
appears that while most colonists were tepid supporters of the
elective principle, conservative opinion had, on the whole,3swung back in favour of nomination. Hardly anyone advocated 
an oligarchic upper house like the one which had failed so4disastrously in Victoria, for most feared deadlocks or felt, 
with Fairfax, that the high property qualification in the 
Southern colony had produced a Council whose members were5inferior to the members of the Assembly.
The select committee was chaired by Docker, but it was 
dominated by Manning and its report advocated an upper house 
which would not pose a 'greater danger of unyielding conflict 
than exists in the present constitution of the Imperial 
Parliament1 .^  In order to achieve this and to avoid 'class
1
2
3
4
5
6
Ibid., p.328.
Ibid., p.322.
See especially ibid., pp.331, 
The exception was De Salis. 
Ibid., pp.330, 332-3.
Ibid., p .283.
366, 368, 
See ibid.,
378, 401. 
p.397.
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distinctions1, the committee recommended that everyone entitled 
to vote in elections for the Assembly should be allowed to vote 
for the Council. However, there was to be a separate Council 
roll to which admission would be granted only upon application, 
and other 'elements of distinctiveness' were guaranteed by such 
means as larger electorates, longer terms of office and the 
lack of provision for a dissolution. Above all, not only were 
the members of the existing Council to retain their seats, but 
the proposed upper house was to be given a permanent nominee 
element consisting of
a limited number of tried public men, such as 
retired Judges of the Supreme Court, past 
Presidents of the Council, and Speakers of the 
Assembly, and persons who may for certain 
lengthened periods have held seats in the ^
Executive Council as responsible Ministers.
The report had been adopted by the select committee over
Docker's opposition, and it was he who led the criticism when
it was tabled in the Council. On his motion, the Council
rejected the report and resolved that
it is not advisable to recommend any alteration of 
the fundamental principles of the Constitution of 
the Council...more especially as the bulk of the 
evidence conclusively shows that the subject is 
viewed with the greatest indifference by the 
public generally, whilst nearly the whole of the 
witnesses testify to the satisfactory working of 
the Constitution in its present form, and desire 
no change in its fundamental principle.^
So perished Manning's report and, with it, Parkes' bill to
reform the Council. The only changes which the Council was
prepared to consider at all were proposals that the Governor
alone should make the appointments and that there should be a
3maximum and minimum number of members. No one, however, tried 
to force the adoption of these changes, for, in the eyes of most 
conservatives, the upper house had fulfilled its purpose. It 
had delayed or moderated some 'popular' reforms, and it had 
rejected others without proving unduly 'obstructive'. Those 
reforms which it had passed had also been conceded in much the
^Ibid., pp.283-4. 
“Ibid., pp.143-5. 
3Ibid.
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same form by the Victorian Council, so that few conservatives 
in New South Wales were tempted to attribute the triumph of 
democracy to the peculiar weakness of their nominated upper 
house. Meanwhile, as the architects of the constitution had 
prophesied in 1853, New South Wales had escaped those bitter 
and fruitless constitutional deadlocks which led A.C.V. 
Melbourne to conclude many years later that 'The whole course 
of legislative history in the Australian colonies bears witness 
to the unsatisfactory nature of the elective upper house'.
^A.C.V. Melbourne, Australian Constitutional Development, 
second edition, Brisbane, 1963, p.421.
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CONCLUSION
In 1853, the leading conservatives in New South Wales had 
felt sufficiently confident in their society to choose a 
nominated Legislative Council, knowing full well that it could 
be swamped to break a constitutional deadlock with the 
Assembly. They had not believed that democratic pressures 
would be so strong that the Governor could be coerced into 
using the power of swamping 'unwisely'. By the early 1860s, 
their confidence had been shattered, for those years witnessed 
the final triumphs of a radical liberal movement dominated by 
men of low station. For respectable men accustomed to political 
power, the consequences were traumatic. They lost control of 
patronage; they were 'insulted' and attacked by the 'hungry 
adventurers' who had driven them from office; they could not 
prevent the enactment of 'class legislation' which threw 'all 
power' into the hands of the lower orders and prevented the big 
man from utilizing the advantages of wealth; they heard liberal 
politicians scorn statute law and noted that liberal rule had 
been followed by the collapse of constituted authority on the 
goldfields and an epidemic of bushranging; they saw state aid 
withdrawn at a time when society seemed desperately in need of 
the conventional restraints of religion; they heard liberals 
reject the British concept of the 'balanced constitution' as 
irrelevant and demand a democratic upper house - or even no 
upper house at all; and they saw the Governor ignore 
constitutional precedent in swamping the Council. In short, 
having lost the power to control society themselves, they felt 
that it was out of control and headed towards chaos.
Under these circumstances, many conservatives left the 
colony, others wished to leave it, and they all took a perverse 
satisfaction from attributing the. colony's social and financial 
difficulties to the triumph of their opponents. They also 
abandoned their preference for a nominated upper house, for 
they believed that the colony lacked that attachment to 
British constitutional principles which alone could prevent 
abuse of the power of swamping.
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By the early 1870s, however, even the conservatives
realized that their doleful prophecies of chaos were not going
to be fulfilled. The people of New South Wales were more law-
abiding and better educated than ever before; the colony was
prosperous, the population was increasing and government revenues
2were beginning to outstrip expenditure; the squatters had
suffered losses as a result of free selection, but there had
been no wider attacks on property; and the conservatives still
dominated the colony's economic and social life. Moreover,
most people seemed to agree that the nominated Council had
worked well, and its future seemed assured because of the
readiness with which most politicians accepted the Governor's3right to veto appointments and guard its integrity. In fact,
it was not until the 1920s that New South Wales had, in
J.T. Lang, a premier whose scorn for nineteenth century
constitutional conventions made the nominated Council
unworkable; and even he was frustrated in his attempts to
abolish the Council when two successive governors refused to4make the necessary appointments.
When the liberals had achieved their major goals and the 
old ideological divisions had begun to lose their significance, 
many conservatives returned to positions of political power.
Every ministry in the 1870s included men who had been 
conservatives in the 1850s. In fact, such men made a 
significant contribution to the 'liberal' ethos which prevailed 
from the late 1860s to the late 1880s. This reflected the 
transformation of 'liberalism' into an ideology based upon 
assumptions which had been common to both liberals and 
conservatives in the 1850s. As Loveday and Martin have pointed
^Cf. A. Barcan, 'Opinion, Policy, and Practice in N.S.W.
Education 1833-1880', Ph.D. thesis, A.N.U., 1962, Appendix D.
The crime rate declined rapidly after 1866.
2See G.D. Patterson, The Tariff in the Australian Colonies, 
1856-1900, Melbourne, 1968, pp.62, 66.
3One exception was William Forster, who resigned from Martin's 
ministry in 1865 after the Governor had refused to accept advice 
to make appointments. His colleagues repudiated his action.
See Forster to Young, 23 January 1865, Martin to Forster,
26 January 1865, enclosed with Young to Cardwell, 16 February 
1865, P.R.O./C.O., 201/533. Cf. S.M .H ., 28 January 1865 and 
Empire, 31 January 1865.
4Ken Turner, House of Review?, Sydney, 1969, pp.12-13, 17, 19-20.
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out, although the ideal of 'independence' was usually 'taken
as an essential part of liberalism', it in fact belonged to a
wider political tradition, for conservatives had tried to claim
it as their own at the 1856 elections.“ The argument can be
extended to the other ideals which characterized liberalism in
the 1870s - the commitment to laissez faire, free trade and
'good government', the belief in 'progress', and the conviction
that parliament should legislate for 'the whole community'
rather than class or sectional interests. In the late 1850s
and early 1860s, commitment to free trade had been more common
amongst conservative merchants and pastoralists than amongst2radical artisans and petty manufacturers; and men of all 
political opinions had appealed to the principles of laissez3faire in the debate over the land bills. Similarly, both 
liberals and conservatives had always professed devotion to 
'good government' and the conservative belief in liberal 
'corruption' and 'incompetence' had formed the basis for many4complaints when Cowper held office. Both sides, of course, 
identified the interests of their favoured classes with the 
interests of the community as a whole, while accusing their 
opponents of favouring sectional interests and imposing 'class5rule'; and conservatives, as well as liberals, had always been 
in favour of 'progress'.
For conservatives, the term 'liberal' had never had the 
pejorative connotations of the word 'democracy'. 'Liberalism' 
had always referred, not simply to political doctrines of a 
democratic or 'popular' nature, but to a general belief in 
freedom, tolerance, laissez faire, progress and reform. 
Conservatives had claimed to believe in these things as much as 
liberals, and they asserted the right to describe themselves as 
liberal as well as conservative. Thus, in a letter explaining
^P. Loveday and A.W. Martin, Parliament, Factions and Parties, Melbourne, 1966, pp.57-8.
2Cf. Chapter VII, above.
3See Chapter IV, part 4, above.
4See especially Chapter VII, above.
5See especially Chapter IV, parts 1 and 4, and Chapter VI, part 1.
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the policies of the 'Anglo-Constitutional, or Conservative'
party, James Macarthur had attributed to it a commitment to
'a liberal and unrestrictive policy in commercial and fiscal
matters generally, carrying out as far as practicable the great
principles of free trade and municipal self government'. He
also described the anti-democratic Parker ministry, which
adhered to the principles of the 'Conservative' party, as
'truly l i b e r a l S i m i l a r l y , m a n y  conservatives in the early
and middle 1850s described themselves as 'liberal conservatives'
2or 'progressive conservatives'.“ Not unnaturally, they 
bitterly resented the democrats' largely successful attempt to 
claim that they were the only real liberals, depicting the 
conservatives as a selfish clique opposed to freedom, progress 
and reform.
After the achievement of the major 'popular' reforms by 
the early 1860s, liberalism's specifically democratic content 
began to fade. Men still occasionally distinguished between 
liberals and conservatives on the basis of their past attitudes 
to democratic reforms, but, for most practical purposes, the 
term 'liberal' had been shorn of its democratic connotations. 
Thus, A.T. Holroyd could say in 1873: 'I have always been a
3liberal, though I have never advocated democracy.' Liberalism 
had come to mean what the conservatives had tried to make it 
mean in the 1850s and its all-pervasive influence stemmed from 
the fact that it embodied beliefs which had always been 
characteristic of both liberals and conservatives.
United by a common ideology, the rival political groups of 
the early 1860s were, by the 1870s, being fused into a single 
political class. The process culminated in 1889 in the 
appointment to the Council of James Hoskins and David Buchanan, 
the most extreme radicals in the Assembly in the early 1860s
^James Macarthur to Henry Oxley, 20 October 1856, Macarthur 
Papers, vol.24, A2920, pp.139-70.
2See, for example, P. Loveday, 'The Development of 
Parliamentary Government in New South Wales, 1856-187 0', Ph.D. 
thesis, University of Sydney, 1962, pp.75-6; and Barrie Dyster, 
'The Fate of Colonial Conservatism on the Eve of the Gold-Rush', 
J.R.A,H.S,, vol.54, part 4, December 1968, pp.334-5.
3J.L.C., 1873-74, p .410.
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and in those days the bitterest opponents of the upper house.
By the late 1880s, most politicians who had been liberals in
the early 1860s were, as much as the conservatives of those
years, the representatives of an old order. They were bound
together by common memories, traditions, convictions, and by
the threat from new men and new ideas. The old conservatives
regarded Parkes, the last prominent politician of their
generation, with affection and admiration. Like him, they were
exponents of the 'liberal' values of the 1870s and early 1880s
and with him, they were being by-passed by a new generation of
liberals bent on a new type of social reform. They were
seldom, however, amongst the active defenders of the old order,
for their thoughts were turning increasingly to reminiscence
and calm reflection. As Sir Alfred Stephen passed his
ninetieth birthday, he recalled wistfully the happy days which
he had spent with Parkes, Dailey, Martin and their friends.^
When angry thoughts welled up, it was not the labour movement
or new political doctrines which provoked them, but the memory
2of the reduction of his salary by the Assembly in 1860.
Stephen knew he would soon be dead, and the current crop of
radicals could scarcely hurt him now.
As W.R. Piddington lay dying, his thoughts turned once more
to that democracy from which he had formerly expected such dire
results. His estimation of its consequences was more tentative
now, and perhaps more hopeful. 'By the bye', he asked Parkes,
do you think that in the next world we shall be 
permitted to know what is going on here? If so,
I shall be curious to know the result of manhood 
suffrage and payment of members. Will it be an  ^
enlightened despotism? I believe it most likely.
■^Stephen to Parkes, 24 November 1892, P.C., vol.35, A905, 
pp.282-4.
2Stephen to Parkes, 25 July 1894, P.C., vol.35, A905, pp.423-8. 
Cf. Chapter IV, part 3, above.
3Piddington to Parkes, 13 August 1887, P.C., vol.30, A900, 
pp.40-42. Slight changes have been made in the quotation, to 
the extent of using capital letters at the beginning of each 
sentence.
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From Sir William Manning, there came, during the great
Maritime Strike of 1890, not impassioned defence of the rights
of property, hut sad comment on the futility of reform.
'These are troublesome times', he wrote to Parkes,
What is to be done?...You must feel the strain a 
great deal, though I do not doubt you go a long 
way - as I do - in sympathy with the struggle 
for more equality and higher manhood than is the 
lot of most men at present. But there will not 
be the utopia to which they look; and which, if it 
came, would end in more degradation than exists 
under the existing system. 1
Manning had seen one generation of reformers fail to change 
society and it was with more sorrow than satisfaction that he 
awaited the failure of the next.
^Manning to Parkes, 7 October 1890, P.C., vol.24, A894, 
pp.55-7. 'Higher manhood' is a transcription based only on a 
tentative interpretation of Manning's handwriting.
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PART B : Divisions Used in Compiling Part A.
The divisions used in the table are ones which contemporaries 
regarded as good tests of liberalism and conservatism. They 
are:
1 . Second reading of Constitution Bill.
2. Motion for committal of Constitution Bill, 
8 December 1853.
3. Third reading of Constitution Bill, 21 December 1853.
4. Martin's amendment in favour of the elective, as 
opposed to the nominee, principle, 8 December 1853.
5. Wentworth's motion that the property qualification 
be held for at least six months prior to the 
election, 9 December 1853.
6. Flood's motion that £5 householders be entitled to 
vote, 9 December 1853.
7. Murray's motion to increase the representation of 
East and West Camden from one member each to two, 
9 December 1853.
8. Allen's motion to increase Sydney's representation 
from four members to six, 9 December 1853.
9. Plunkett's motion to increase Sydney's representation 
from four members to five, 9 December 1853.
o 1—1 Allen's motion to increase the representation of 
Sydney Hamlets from one member to three, 9 December 
1853.
11. Holroyd's motion to reduce the representation of the 
Murrumbidgee from two members to one, 9 December 1853
•
C
M
 
•—
1 Holroyd's motion to reduce the representation of the 
Liverpool Plains and the Gwydir and of the New 
England and the Macleay from two members to one,
9 December 1853.
13. Flood's amendment to eliminate the two-thirds 
clauses, 13 December 1853.
r
H Wentworth's motion that the clergy be incapable of 
sitting in the Assembly, 13 December 1853.
15. Wentworth's motion giving large pensions to senior 
government officials and judges on their retirement 
or release from office, 14 December 1853.
k
O
 
r—
1 Wentworth's motion that the colony have control of 
Crown land 'Subject to the provisions' of the 
Constitution Bill, 14 December 1853.
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17. Darvall's amendment to omit the constitutional guarantee that 'vested or other rights' of the 
squatters be honoured, 14 December 1853.
18. Allen's amendment to increase the representation 
of Sydney from four members to six, 14 December 
1853.
PART C: Footnotes to Table in Part A.
1. Campbell cast his vote with the conservatives, but 
from liberal motives. See his speech in Silvester 
(ed.), The Speeches in the Legislative Council..., 
p.146.
2. Oakes has been classed as a liberal, although absent, 
because in subsequent years he always sided withthe liberals.
3. Park has been classed as a liberal on the basis of 
his single vote because he generally sided with the 
liberals in the session of 1855. (Cf. P. Loveday,
‘The Development of Parliamentary Government in New 
South Wales, 1856-1870', Ph.D. thesis, Sydney 
University, p.457.)
4. Dobie was well known as a conservative pastoralist 
and surgeon, and has therefore been classified on 
the basis of a single vote.
5. Parker gave few votes as he was Chairman of 
Committees. He was James Macarthur1s brother-in-law 
and a leading conservative. See his speech on the 
second reading in Silvester, op.cit., p.209,
et passim.
6. For Marsh's conservative convictions, see his speech ■ 
on the second reading in Silvester, op.cit., 
pp.72-4, et passim.
7. This was not really a 'liberal' vote. Martin voted 
in favour of the principle of an elective upper 
house from conservative motives, and those who 
voted with him did so from liberal ones.
Cf. Chapter I, above.
8. Nicholson was Speaker and abstained from voting even 
in committee. He was a leading conservative. For 
his views on the constitution see, for example, 
Nicholson to James Macarthur, 21 April 1853,
Macarthur Papers, vol.27, A2923.
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9. Nichols was an associate of Wentworth's, and can 
safely be classified on the basis of a single 
vote. See his speech on the second reading in 
Silvester, op.cit., p.197, et passim.
10. Russell seems to have voted with the liberals 
against the second reading of the Constitution 
Bill only because clause 51 prevented the 
separation of Moreton Bay. He was otherwise in 
favour of it. Cf. Silvester, op.cit., p.201.
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APPENDIX II
OCCUPATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE 
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, DECEMBER 1853
A. CONSERVATIVES:
1. Officials:
Barney, Lieut.-Col.G.
Christie, Major W.H. 
Gibbes, Lieut-Col.J.G.N. 
Manning, W.M.
Mayne, W.C.
Merewether, F.L.S. 
Plunkett, J.H.
Thomson, E. Deas 
Riddell, C.D.
2. Non-official Nominees;
Allen, G.
Barker, T.
Berry, A.
Bradley, W.
Broadhurst, E.
Cox, E.
Dobie, J.
Holden, J.R.
Parker, H.W.
- Chief Commissioner of
Crown Lands
Postmaster-General
Collector of Customs
Solicitor-General
(squatting interests)
- Inspector-General of Police 
Auditor-General 
Attorney-General
- Colonial Secretary
- Colonial Treasurer
Solicitor
- Manufacturer
- Pastoralist and
agriculturalist 
(squatting interests)
Pastoralist (squatting 
interests)
Barrister (squatting 
interests)
Pastoralist (squatting 
interests)
Pastoralist and surgeon 
(squatting interests)
- Solicitor
- Company director with
private means
3. Elective Members:
Bowman, G. - Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
Bowman, W.
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Chisholm, J. Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
Douglass, Dr H.G. Medical practitioner 
and landowner
Dumaresq, W. - Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
Finch, C.W. - Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
Fitzgerald, R. - Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
Holroyd, A.T. Barrister
Jeffreys, A. - Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
King, P.P. Pastoralist
Leslie, G.F. - Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
Macarthur, J. Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
Macarthur, W. - Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
Macleay, G. Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
Marsh, M.H. 
Martin, J.
- Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
- Barrister
Morris, A. - Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
Murray, T.A. — Pastoralist
Nicholson, Sir C. - Medical practitioner,
businessman, landowner
Nichols, G.R. - Solicitor
Osborne, A. 
Osborne, H.
- Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
- Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
Russell, H.S. - Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
Suttor, W.H. - Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
Smith, R.J. - Unknown
Wentworth, W.C. - Pastoralist and barrister 
(squatting interests)
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B. LIBERALS:
1. Officials :
2. Non-official Nominees:
3. Elective Members:
Bligh, J.W.
Campbell, R.
Cowper, C.
Darvall, J.B.
Flood, E.
Oakes, G.
Park, A.
Richardson, J.
Smart, T.W.
Thurlow, W.
- Nil
- Nil
Solicitor
Merchant
(squatting interests)
Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
Barrister
Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
Pastoralist
(squatting interests)
Pastoralist and 
agriculturalist
Merchant
(squatting interests)
- Merchant 
Solicitor
Sources: The Australian Dictionary of Biography and its
associated files; contemporary directories 
(listed in bibliography); and squatting lists 
appended to the report on Crown lands, V . & P. 
(L.C., N.S.W.), 1854, pt.2.
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APPENDIX III
ANALYSIS OF VOTING PATTERNS IN 
THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1858-72
PART A : DESCRIPTION OF THE METHOD
The following analysis of voting patterns is based partly 
upon the POLIT computer programme devised by L.G. Veitch and 
D.H. Jaensch. Details of their technique have recently been 
published^ and they need not be explained in full here.
Briefly, however, the POLIT programme uses a variant of 
principal component analysis to provide:
1. A measure of 'patterned' voting in legislative 
bodies, identifying significant patterns and 
isolating those divisions which contribute most 
strongly to each pattern.
2. A statistical measure of where members of 
legislative bodies are placed, by their votes, 
in relation to other members in each of the 
patterns identified.
If POLIT analysis were applied to a modern legislature 
containing two parties whose members voted strictly on party 
lines, it would simply reveal what should have already been 
obvious - the fact that the legislature was polarized into two 
district groups whose members were opposed on a single voting 
pattern to which all divisions contributed strongly. However, 
POLIT is invaluable in studying the structure of voting in 
bodies without a strong party system for, in such cases, the 
voting patterns are difficult and sometimes impossible to detect 
with the naked eye. It has the additional advantage of 
providing a safeguard against unconscious bias in the 
identification of voting patterns by less systematic methods.
L.G. Veitch and D.H. Jaensch, 'A Procedure for the Analysis 
of Colonial Australasian Legislatures 1, Political Science 
(New Zealand), vol.26, no.l, July 1974. POLIT analysis has 
also been used by Peter Loveday in 'The Federal Convention, an 
analysis of the voting', Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, vol.XVIII, no.2, August 1972, pp.180-88.
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Unfortunately, the results given by POLIT are subject to 
distortion where there is a very high level of absenteeism, 
as in the case of the New South Wales Legislative Council. To 
overcome this difficulty, a modified technique has been adopted. 
First, the computer excluded from POLIT analysis all members who 
were not present for at least 40 per cent of divisions in the 
period for which voting patterns were being analysed. When this 
was done, absenteeism produced no significant distortion in 
the identification of the divisions which made the greatest 
contribution to the voting patterns, and the voting patterns 
themselves were real ones. However, it was found that when 
members missed divisions which were strongly associated with a 
particular pattern, absenteeism still affected their position 
relative to other members in respect of that pattern. For this 
reason POLIT was not used as the final arbitrator of the 
members' position: it was used mainly to identify the 
significant patterns and the divisions which contributed to 
them most strongly.
The calculation of the members' position in relation to 
each other in 'patterned' voting was made as follows:
1. A table was constructed giving the votes in 
strongly patterned divisions of all members, 
including those excluded from POLIT analysis on 
the grounds of absenteeism.
2. The votes of members whom POLIT had shown to be 
most strongly opposed on a particular pattern 
were checked in order to construct opposing 
paradigms of voting behaviour for the pattern.
3. The positions of other members were then 
calculated by comparing their voting patterns 
with the paradigmatic responses.
4. Since the votes of the representative of the 
government usually conformed to one of the 
paradigms, it was normally convenient to express 
members' positions by showing the number of times 
they voted with the government in strongly 
'patterned' divisions as a proportion of all the 
votes which they cast in those divisions.
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5. Members who cast more than two-thirds of their 
votes with the government's representative were 
grouped with the government; members who cast 
more than two-thirds of their votes against the 
government's representative were designated as 
'anti-government voters'; other members were 
classed as 'independents', or, if they did not 
vote in any 'patterned' divisions, excluded.
6. In order to standardize the selection of 
'patterned' divisions in a manner intelligible 
to those unfamiliar with POLIT analysis, all 
the 'strongly patterned' divisions were checked 
to ensure that they had more than two-thirds of 
'government voters' opposed to more than 
two-thirds of 'anti-government' voters. This 
was almost invariably the case, but in several 
sessions a few divisions were omitted because 
they did not conform to the pattern closely 
enough to satisfy this criterion. When such 
exclusions were made, members' votes were 
re-calculated. This never resulted in a 
significant realignment of voting patterns.
The remainder of this appendix consists of tables 
constructed by the above method for the years 1858 to 1872.
The voting for several sessions has not been analysed on the 
grounds that there were too few divisions. No table has been 
given for the session of 1857 because POLIT analysis failed to 
detect any voting patterns significant at the 5 per cent level.
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PART B : TABLES OF VOTING PATTERNS, 1858-1872
1. SECOND COWPER MINISTRY, 
SESSION OF 1858
Level of Agreement with Representative of Cowper Government: 
Votes in Eighteen Most Strongly 'Patterned' Divisions
Liberals Independents Conservatives
Blake 7/8 Jones 10/15 A 'Beckett 0/13
Bland 14/14 Prince 4/8 Alexander 0/17
Bligh 10/11 Allen 0/5
Byrnes 16/16 Berry 0/12
Dickson 14/14 Broadhurst 0/12
Forbes 13/13 Burton 1/9
Hill 12/12 Comrie 1/9
Hunt 15/15 Docker 0/18
Lang 11/12 Douglass 0/7
Lutwyche Faithful 0/3
(Govt. rep. )18/18 Fitzgerald 0/2
MacFarlane 11/11 Holden 0/18
Pennington 18/18 Isaacs 0/16
Robey 11/13 Lamb 1/11
Russell 12/13 Lord 1/13
Wilshire 11/11 Macnamara 0/1
Merewether 0/17
Mitchell 0/18
Norton 0/17
Park 0/9
Stephen 1/9
Therry 0/12
Thomson 0/17
Wise 0/14
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Note:
The table was compiled from the following divisions:
(a) District Courts Bill (two divisions, 16, 29 April 
1858) .
(b) Electoral Law Amendment Bill (sixteen divisions). 
These divisions were held on the following dates 
in 1858: 10 September; 15 September (two 
divisions); 5, 6 October; 7 October (two 
divisions); 12 October; 13 October (three 
divisions, being the one passed 24-8 and the ones 
lost 6-17 and 8-14); 11 November (three divisions, 
being the ones passed 13-12 and the one lost 
14-17); 12 November (two divisions).
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2. SECOND COWPER MINISTRY, 
SESSIONS OF 1858-9 AND 1859-60
Level of Agreement with 'Liberal' Paradigm: 
Votes cast in Seven Divisions 
with Most Strongly 'Patterned* response
1 Liberals 1 1 Independents 1 1 Conservatives 1
Bayley 4/4 Dickson 3/5 A 'Beckett 1/4
Bland 6/6 Forbes 3/5 Alexander 1/6
Bligh 2/2 Jones 2/3 Allen 1/6
Byrnes 3/3 Montefiore 2/5 Berry 0/3
Hunt 4/5 Pennington 2/3 Broadhurst 0/3
Lang 2/2 Docker 0/2
Lutwyche 3/3 Douglass 1/4
Macfarlane 5/6 Holden 0/3
Russell 4/4 Hood 0/2
Wilshire 4/4 Isaacs 0/6
Johnson 0/7
Lamb 0/5
Merewether 0/2
Mitchell 0/6
Norton 0/4
Thomson 0/6
Want 0/4
Wise 0/7
Notes:
(i) Nine members who cast only a single vote in relevant, 
divisions have been omitted, as the issues raised 
were not strong 'ideological' ones which would admit 
of reliable classification on the basis of a single 
vote.
(ii) The table was compiled from the following divisions:
(a) District Courts Act Amendment Bill (19 January 
1859).
(b) Adjournment of debate on motion of Douglass 
(3 February 1859).
(c) Unparliamentary words by Attorney-General 
(3 February 1859).
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(d) Adjournment of the House (2 March 1859).
(e) Prosecutions for Libel Amendment Bill 
(23 February 1859).
(f) Adjournment (7 September 1859).
(g) Representation of the Government (5 October 1859).
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3. ROBERTSON MINISTRY AND THIRD COWPER MINISTRY, 
SESSIONS OF 1859-60, 1860 AND 1861
Level of Agreement with Representatives of Robertson and Cowper 
Governments: Votes in Twenty-two Most Strongly 'Patterned'
Divisions in Council
Liberals 1 Independents1 Conservatives
Bland 9/9 Eagar 2/5 Alexander 1/19
Byrnes 12/12 Forbes 2/5 Allen, G. 2/16
Cowper Allen, G.W. 1/5
(Govt, rep.) 4/4 Berry 0/11
Hargrave 
(Govt, rep.) 2/22 Broadhurst 0/4
Macfarlane 10/13 Comrie 2/10
? Montefiore 1/1 Docker 0/20
Oakes 11/11 Douglass 0/4
Robey 15/17 Faithfull 0/1
Russell 20/20 Fitzgerald 0/2
Robertson Hill 0/5
(Govt, rep.) 10/10 Holden 1/14
Wilshire 1/1 Hood 0/6
Hunt 2/9
Isaacs 0/21
Johnson 0/22
? Jones 0/1
Lamb 3/19
Lord 0/5
Merewether 0/19 
Mitchell 1/21
Norton 0/8
Park 1/5
Prince 0/13
Thomson 0/14
Towns 0/14
Want 0/18
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Notes;
(i) The categorization of Montefiore as a 'liberal' on 
the basis of a single vote would be unwarranted. 
Montefiore was in fact a conservative, but friendly 
to the ministry. The question involved in the 
division was as much a matter of courtesy to the 
ministry as a matter of ideology.
(ii) The categorization of Jones as a conservative on 
the basis of a single division has been queried, 
because that division had no strong ideological 
overtones and Jones had in previous sessions voted 
as an 'independent'.
(iii) The table was compiled from the following divisions:
(a) Adjournment (8 March 1860).
(b) Proceedings in Lunacy Bill (17 May 1860).
(c) Lien on Wool Act Continuation Bill (17 May 1860).
(d) Shoalhaven Municipality Petition (20 June 1860).
(e) Appropriation Bill for 1859-60 (29 June 1860).
(f) Address in Reply and Adjournment (four divisions 
on 11 January 1861).
(g) Customs Duties Bill and tabling of estimates 
(three divisions on 13, 20 February 1861).
(h) Legislative Council Bill of 1861 (six divisions 
on 11, 19, 24, 25 April 1861) .
(i) Crown Lands Alienation Bill (two divisions on 
12 April, 6 May 1861).
(j) Adjournment (24 April 1861).
(k) Additional days for despatch of business 
(26 April 1861).
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4. THIRD COWPER MINISTRY. 
SESSION OF 1861-62
Level of Agreement with Representative of Cowper Government: 
Votes in Fourteen Most Strongly 'Patterned' Divisions
'Liberal1 1 Independent1 1 Conservative 1
Voters Voters Voters
Butler 10/11 Robey 5/8 Darvall 0/2
Byrnes 7/7 McArthur 6/10 Fitzgerald 0/1
Hargrave Campbell 3/8 Gordon 1/4
(Attorney-
General) 9/9 Allen 1/3 Holden l/ii
Robertson Kemp 5/10 Manning 0/11
(Govt, rep)11/11 Ward 5/8 Merewether 0/7
B. Russell 9/9 Mitchell 0/11
Plunkett 10/10 Thomson 0/7
W. Russell 9/10 Watt 2/8
Wentworth 2/9
Notes:
(i) 'Liberal' voters in this session were not always
liberals by ideological conviction. The reader is
referred to Table XI in Chapter V, above, for a 
comparison of voting behaviour with ideological 
orientation. In particular, it will be found that 
although Plunkett and W. Russell voted consistently 
as liberals, they had conservative views on most 
questions.
(ii) The table is based on the divisions on the following 
bills:
(a) Crown Lands Alienation Bill (five divisions on . 
10 October 1861 and two divisions on 11 October 
1861).
(b) Chinese Immigration Restriction Bill (two 
divisions on 16 October 1861).
(c) Goldfields Bill, divisions on 23 October and 
30 October 1861.
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5. THIRD COWPER MINISTRY. 
SESSION OF 1862
Level of Agreement with Representative of Cowper Government: 
Votes in Twenty Most Strongly 'Patterned' Divisions.
1 Liberal' 1 Independent1 1 Conservative'
Voters Voters Voters
Butler 13/13 Allen 3/8 Campbell 0/16
Byrnes 16/16 Holden 7/12 Kemp 0/16
Hargrave Watt 8/12 Manning 0/18
(govt, rep.) 20/20 Merewether 0/18
Macfarlane 12/12 Mitchell 0/17
B. Russell 13/13 Plunkett 0/20
Robey 12/12 W. Russell 2/9
Scott 19/19 Thomson 0/17
McArthur 8/8 Wentworth 0/3
Murray 6/7
Ward 15/15
Notes :
(i) Although Murray and Ward voted with the liberals in
this session, which was dominated by the issue of 
state aid to religion, they had conservative views on 
some matters. For a comparison of voting behaviour 
with general ideological orientation see Table XII 
in Chapter V, above.
(ii) The table is based on divisions on the following 
issues:
(a) Grants for Public Worship Prohibition Bill, 
divisions in Council on 24 September 1862 (two 
divisions), 1 October 1862, 8 October 1862,
30 October 1862 (two divisions), 3 December 1862; 
divisions in committee on 28 October 1862 (three 
divisions), 3 December 1862 (two divisions).
(b) Legislative Council Bill, two divisions on 
clause 1 and one division on clause 4,
30 September 1862.
(c) Life Assurance Encouragement Bill, divisions in 
Council, 17, 18 December 1862; division in 
committee, 17 December 1862.
(d) Seamen's Laws Amendment Bill, 20 December 1862.
(e) Coal Fields Regulation Bill, 12 December 1862.
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6. MARTIN MINISTRY: 
SESSION OF 1863-4
Level of Agreement with Representative of Martin Government: 
Votes in Thirteen Most Strongly 'Patterned' Divisions
'Government1 1 Independent1 1 Anti-Government1
Voters Voters Voters
Blaxland 10/10 Kemp 8/13 Allen 0/3
Byrnes 6/6 Macfarlane 6/9 G.H. Cox 0/2
J. Campbell 10/10 Walker 2/5 Docker 0/10
Hargrave 7/7 Johnson 1/13
Gordon 1/1 Lloyd 0/4
Murray 12/12 Manning 0/10
Ogilvie 5/5 Mitchell 0/11
Plunkett B. Russell 1/8(Govt, rep.) 13/13 Scott 1/7
Ward 6/6 Thomson 1/11
Towns 2/10
Watt 2/11
Notes:
(i) It should be noted that most 'Anti-Government' voters 
favoured the government in principle. Their voting 
behaviour was dictated mainly by the principles 
involved in the divisions. Similarly, Hargrave, who 
voted with the government, was strongly opposed to it. 
See the discussion in Chapter VII, above.
(ii) The table is based on divisions on the following 
matters:
(a) Customs Duties Bill, division in Council,
18 February 1864; divisions in committee,
16 February 1864 (three divisions), 17 February 
1864 (four divisions).
(b) Orders of Sequestration in Insolvency Bill, 
division in Council, 9 December 1863; divisions 
in committee, 9 December 1863 (two divisions).
(c) Prevention and Cure of Scab in Sheep Bill,
23 December 1863 (two divisions - involving the 
powers of the Council to amend money bills).
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7. FOURTH COWPER MINISTRY, 
SESSION OF 1865
Level of Agreement with Representative of Cowper Government: 
Votes in Ten Most Strongly 'Patterned' Divisions
'Ministerialist1 1 Independent1 1 Opposition1
Voters Voters Voters
Gordon 5/5 Allen 1/2 A. Campbell 2/8
Hargrave Blaxland 4/7 J. Campbell 2/7
(Govt, rep.) 10/10 Byrnes 2/3 J. Chisholm 2/8
Macfarlane 5/5 Murray 3/5 G.H. Cox 0/3
B. Russell 4/4 Plunkett 3/7 Docker 0/10
Scott 1/1 Icely 0/9
Watt 1/1 Johnson 0/7
Lord 0/3
W. Macarthur 0/5
Manning 0/8
Ogilvie 0/2
Thomson 0/7
Towns 0/3
Walker 0/4
Notes:
(i) Divisions for the session of 1865-6 were also included 
in the POLIT analysis but none were strongly 'patterned 
The table therefore includes only divisions for the 
session of 1865.
(ii) The table is based on divisions on the following 
matters:
(a) Coal Fields Regulation Act Amendment Bill,
17 May 1865 (two divisions).
(b) Package Bill, division in Council, 15 June 1865; 
division in committee, 13 June 1865.
(c) Stamp Duties Bill, division on clause 2, 2 June 
1865; division on clause 8, 6 June 1865.
(d) Impounding Bill, divisions on clause 30, 17 May,
2 June 1865.
(e) Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Facilitation 
Bill, 26 April 1865.
(f) Tabling of papers on expenses of general 
elections and electoral rolls, 12 April 1865.
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8. MARTIN MINISTRY, 
SESSION OF 1866
Level of Agreement with Representative of Martin Government: 
Votes in Eighteen Most Strongly 'Patterned' Divisions
'Liberal' 'Independent' 'Conservative'
Voters Voters Voters
Blaxland 9/9 Chisholm 2/4 J. Campbell 0/18
Byrnes 13/13 Manning 8/17 E . Cox 2/15
A. Campbell 18/18 Ogilvie 7/18 Icely 1/12
G.H. Cox 12/12 Lord 1/11
Docker J. Macarthur 4/18
(Govt, rep.) 18/18 W. Macarthur 1/15
Gordon 16/16 J. Mitchell 0/14
Murray 16/16 Plunkett 0/18
B. Russell 7/7 Thomson 0/18
Towns 0/16
Weekes 0/17
Notes :
(i) All the divisions were on Parkes' Public Schools Bill, 
which involved sufficient questions of liberal and 
conservative principle to make it regarded as, in some 
respects, a distinctively 'liberal' reform. This seemed 
to justify the use of the terms 'liberal' and 
'conservative' as very loose labels to describe 
supporters and opponents of the bill's distinctive 
features. However, as noted in Chapter VII, some 
conservatives supported the bill whole-heartedly and 
many others approved of its basic objectives. 
Consequently, the division between liberals and 
conservatives was not as clear as it had been on such’ 
issues as land reform and electoral reform.
(ii) The table is based on divisions on the following 
clauses of the bill:
- Clause 1, four divisions on 29 November 1866; one 
division on 30 November 1866; one division on
4 December 1866.
- Clause 5, three divisions on 4 December 1866
- Clause 6, one division on 4 December 1866; one 
division on 5 December 1866; one division on 
19 December 1866.
- Clause 9, one division on 5 December 1866; two 
divisions on 19 December 1866.
- Clause 10, two divisions on 6 December 1866; one 
division on 19 December 1866.
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9. MARTIN MINISTRY, 
SESSION OF 1867-8
Level of Agreement with Representative of Martin Government: 
Votes in Nine Most Strongly 'Patterned' Divisions
Vote with 'Independent' Vote aqainst
Government Voters Government
Allen 3/3 J. Campbell 2/3 Blaxland 2/9
Byrnes . 6/8 Macfarlane 1/3 Busby 0/8
Docker A. Campbell 0/2
(Govt, rep.) 9/9 E . Cox o/i
Icely 7/7 Gordon 1/8
Jennings 5/6 Hay 0/9
Lord 3/3 W. Macarthur 0/5
Mitchell 7/7 Manning 0/9
Plunkett 1/1 Murray 0/3
Thomson 6/7 Russell 0/3
Weekes 8/8 Towns 0/1
Note:
The table is based on divisions on the following bills:
(a) Claims Against the Government Bill, divisions on 
12, 19, 25 September 1861.
(b) Railway Loan Bill, division in Council, 17 December 
1867; two divisions in committee, 13 December 1867.
(c) Municipalities Bill, division on clause 161,
13 December 1867.
(d) Gates on Public Roads Bill, 13 December 1867.
(e) St. Andrew's (Presbyterian) College Bill, 31 July 
1867.
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10. ROBERTSON AND COWPER MINISTRIES, 
SESSIONS OF 1868-9, 1870
Level of Agreement with Representative 
of Robertson and Cowper Governments:
Votes in Fifteen Most Strongly 'Patterned' Divisions
Vote with 1 Independent1 Vote acrainst
Government Voters Government
Allen 5/5 G.H. Cox 2/4 Blaxland 3/12
Owen Murray 1/3 Busby 0/6
(Govt, rep.) 15/15 Byrnes 2/8
Gordon 11/11 A. Campbell 0/10
Lord 5/5 C. Campbell 0/7
Macarthur 4/5 J. Campbell 0/12
Macfarlane 12/12 Chisholm 0/5
Manning 
(Att. -Gen.) 13/13 Darley 2/14
Russell 5/5 Docker 0/15
Thomson 5/6 Hay 0/15
Towns 3/3 Holt 3/10
Smart 1/1 Icely 0/1
Weekes 11/11 Moore 0/12
Park 1/7
Richardson 3/13
Note:
The table is based on divisions on the following matters:
(a) Expenditure of public monies without statutory 
authority (three divisions on 23 March 1869).
(b) Road Act Amendment Bill (28 January 1869 and two 
divisions on 4 February 1869).
(c) Small Debts Recovery Act Amendment Bill, 4 March 
1869.
(d) Small-Pox Prevention Bill, 30 March 1869 (two 
divisions).
(e) Unclaimed Balances Appropriation Bill, 23 February 
1870 (two divisions).
(f) Deficiency Loans Funding Bill, 4, 5 and 6 May 1870.
(g) Loan Bill of 1870, 3 May 1870 (two divisions).
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11. MARTIN-ROBERTSON MINISTRY, 
SESSIONS OF 1870-1, 1871-2
Level of Agreement with Representative 
of Martin-Robertson Government:
Votes in Thirteen Most Strongly 'Patterned' Divisions
Vote with 
Government
1 Independent1 
Voters
Vote against 
Government
Allen 3/4 Darley 3/8 Busby 1/7
Blaxland 8/11 Gordon 1/3 C. Campbell 0/11
Byrnes 11/11 Holt 3/6 J. Campbell 0/13
Docker 13/13 Manning 5/10 Chisholm 0/1
Moore 12/13 Murray 1/2 Hay 0/9
Owen 3/4 Thomson 3/6 Lord 0/6
Richardson 10/11 Macarthur 0/4
Weekes 13/13 Smart 0/1
Notes:
(i) The confusion created by the Martin--Robertson
coalition, which completely disrupted traditional 
allegiances, was reflected in the large number of 
'independent' voters. This heavy 'independent' 
vote was characteristic of most sessions in the 
1870s, contrasting with the comparatively 'disciplined 
voting which hitherto prevailed. Analyses of voting 
in the Council during the 1870s are in my possession.
(ii) The table is based on divisions on the following bills
(a) Customs Duties Bill, division in Council,
10 May 1871; divisions in committee, 27 April 
1871, 3 May 1871 (division on clause 9 passed 
9-5), 5 May 1871 (divisions on clauses 12, 14).
(b) Sydney Meat Company's Incorporation Bill,
2 June 1871.
(c) Main Roads Act Amendment Bill, 15 June 1871.
(d) Roads Bill, 1 March 1871.
(e) Superannuation Act Amendment Bill, division in 
Council, 16 June 1871; divisions in committee,
16 June 1871 (division on clause 2 tied 7-7, 
and division on clause 6).
(f) Appropriation Bill, 21 June 1871.
(g) Cumberland and Camden Bathurst-Burr and Thistle 
Bill, 12 April 1871.
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APPENDIX IV
PRINCIPAL OCCUPATION OF MEMBERS 
TAKING SEATS IN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 
1856-1872
The following table has been compiled from personal files 
containing 'potted biographies' of all members of the Council 
from 1856 to 1900. The files contain, as well as occupational 
details, such standard information as place and date of birth, 
religion and public appointments, together with some 
information on political and social activities. I would be 
happy to make this information available to those who require 
it.
The limitations of the type of occupational classifications 
adopted below are well known, and they are particularly 
relevant to members of the Council, for most men who had the 
stature conventionally required for appointment had a wide 
variety of interests. Most big merchants were heavily involved 
in banking or insurance, and many had pastoral interests. 
Similarly, wealthy lawyers usually had business connections 
and a few had pastoral interests. The colonial elite from which 
most members of the Council were drawn was, in an occupational 
sense, more integrated than either the following table or 
traditional accounts imply. This community of interest between 
a horizontally defined elite was, in fact, basic to the analysis 
of political conflict in Chapters III, IV and VI, above.
The following abbreviations have been used for the sources 
referred to in the table:
A/Asian
A.D.B.
A.E.
A.O.N.S.W.
Bedford
ABBREVIATIONS
Australasian
Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
ed. D. Pike, vols.l to 5, Melbourne, 
1966-74.
The Australian Encyclopedia, ed.
A.H. Chisholm, 10 vols, Sydney, 1958.
Archives Office of New South Wales.
Ruth Bedford, Think of Stephen, 
Sydney, 1954.
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Crew
Ford's, 1851 
Ford's, 1853 
Heaton
J.L.C.
M.L.
M. & W.
Menne11 
Mowle
Sands & Kenny
B.H. Crew, 'The History of the 
Walker and Archer Families in 
Australia, 1813-1968', M.A. thesis, 
A.N.U., 1963.
Ford's Sydney Commercial Directory, 
Sydney, 1851.
Ford's Australian Almanac...,
Sydney, 1853.
J.H. Heaton, Australian Dictionary 
of Dates and Men of the Time,
London, 1879.
New South Wales. Journal of the 
Legislative Council.
Mitchell Library.
A.W. Martin and P. Wardle, Members 
of the New South Wales Legislative 
Assembly, 1856-1900, Canberra, 1959.
P. Mennell, Dictionary of 
Australasian Biography, London,
1892.
P.C. Mowle, Pioneer Families of New 
South Wales. Sydney, 1948.
Sands & Kenny's Commercial and 
General Sydney Directory, Sydney, 
1861.
S.S,D . Sands 1 Sydney Directory, Sydney,
various years.
S, M.H, Sydney Morning Herald
T. & C,J, Town and Country Journal
V . & P. (L.A., N.S.W.) New South Wales. Votes and
Proceedings of the Legislative 
Assembly.
Waugh’s Waugh's Australian Almanac, Sydney, 
1860.
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APPENDIX V
POLITICAL OPINIONS OF DIRECTORS AND TRUSTEES 
OF COMPANIES LISTED IN 'SANDS AND KENNY'S 
SYDNEY DIRECTORY1, 1861
Liberals Conservatives
R.M. Robey E . Hunt
G. Thornton G. Hill
Sir Daniel Cooper 
S.D. Gordon 
J. Alexander 
A. Campbell 
James Mitchell 
John Fairfax 
Thomas Holt 
A .T. Holroyd 
M.E. Murnin
G. K. Holden 
J.B. Watt
E. Deas Thomson 
George Allen 
Clark Irving 
J.B. Darvall
C. Kemp
H. Prince
F. L.S. Merewether 
J.E. Graham 
Henry Mort 
George Rattray 
R.J. Want
Saul Samuel
G. W. Allen
Sir Charles Nicholson 
Thomas Barker 
George Barney 
G.R. Hirst
358
Note on political classifications:
Robey was a liberal member of the Council from 1858 to
1864. Thornton was one of the twenty-one members appointed to 
'swamp' the Council on 10 May 1861, and was therefore presumably 
a liberal.
Cooper and Gordon had been regarded as liberal members of 
the Assembly until they opposed free selection before survey 
in 1860. Gordon was thereafter a moderate conservative in the 
Council, while Cooper, who returned to England in 1861, seems 
to have been regarded as one of the 'old colonists' driven from 
the colony by democracy. (George Allen, Journal, 21 February
1865, Uncat. MSS, set 477.) Hunt and Hill had been liberal
members of the Council in 1858, but by 1860 they were voting 
with the conservatives. Nicholson, Barker and Barney had been 
conservative members of the old Legislative Council before 
responsible government. (See Appendix I.) Hirst had been a 
public opponent of the Cowper ministry in 1856 and was 
therefore probably a conservative. (Empire, 30 September 1856.)
All the other men listed were members of the conservative 
Constitutional Association or conservative members of the 
Council or the Assembly in 1860-61.
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APPENDIX VI
POLITICAL OPINIONS OF LAWYERS IN 1861
Lawyers in practice in New South Wales 
before 1850
Liberals Conservatives
W. Redman G. Allen
J.W. Bligh G.W. Allen
W.G. Pennington J.R. Brenan 
G.K. Holden 
R. Holdsworth 
T. Iceton 
Robert Johnson 
Richard Johnson 
J. Norton 
G.R. Nichols 
W. Roberts 
G . Rowley 
J.P. Roxburgh 
R.J. Want 
J. Martin 
J.H. Plunkett 
W.M. Manning 
E. Broadhurst 
J.B. Darvall 
A.T. Holroyd
Lawyers beginning practice in New South Wales 
in 1850 or later
Liberals Conservatives
A. Dick 
D. Deniehy
W. Teale 
T. Weedon 
F.J. GarrickJ. Hart 
R. Driver
I. Blake
J. F. Hargrave 
E. Butler 
W.C. Windeyer 
W.B. Dailey 
R. Wisdom
W. Barker
P. Faucett 
E. Wise 
W.V. Wild 
W.D. Somerville 
H.R. Francis 
Herman Milford
W. Hellyer 
G. Graham
Notes:
(i) The dates at which lawyers were registered for
practice in New South Wales have been taken from 
Moore's Handbook and Almanac for New South Wales... 
Sydney, 1856, and from information based on the New 
South Wales bar roll in the files of the A.D.B.
(ii) Hellyer and Graham were amongst the twenty-one
members appointed to 'swamp' the Council on 10 May 
1861. All the other liberals were active members 
of the Assembly or the Council in 1860-61.
(iii) For Brenan's conservatism, see P. Loveday and 
A.W. Martin, Parliament Factions and Parties, 
Melbourne, 1966, pp.12-13. For Nichols' political 
views, see Chapter I, above, and Appendix I. All 
the other conservatives were active members of the 
Council, the Assembly or the Constitutional 
Association in 1860-61.
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APPENDIX VII
COMPOSITION OF THE NEW SOUTH WALES 
CONSTITUTIONAL ASSOCIATION, 1860
1• MERCHANTS AND OTHER BUSINESSMEN
Allardice, A. Manning, J.E.
Beit, J.N. Martyn, J.
Cape, W.F. Mort, H.
Caraher, 0. Murnin, M.E.
Donovan, J. Phenna, R.
Eagar, G. Piddington, W.R,
Fairfax, J. Rattray, G.
Felton, T. Raymond, R.P.
Graham, J.E. Rundle, J.B.
Hely, H. Samuel, S.
Johnson, W.J. ? Taylor, J.
Lacy, M. Thomson, J.
Lenehan, A. Tooth, R.
McEncroe, E.
TOTAL BUSINESSMEN: 27
BARRISTERS
Darvall, J.B. Milford, Herman
Francis, H.R. Somerville, W.D
Isaacs, R.M. Wild, W.V.
Martin, J.
TOTAL BARRISTERS: 7
SOLICITORS
Barker, Norton, J.
Deniehy, D.H. Roberts, W.
Garrick, F.J. Rowley, G.
Holdsworth, R. Roxburgh, T.P.
Iceton, T. Teale, W.
Johnson, Richard Want, R.J.
Johnson, Robert Weedon, T.E.
TOTAL SOLICITORS: 14
362
4. PASTORALISTS WITH SQUATTING INTERESTS
? Binney, J. Macleay,
Chauvel, C.G.T. Morris,
Cox, A.B. ? Morris,
Hay, J. ? Ryan, T.
Lord, E. Simpson
Maclean, J.D.
TOTAL PASTORAL1ST-SQUATTERS: 11
5. LANDOWNERS WITHOUT SQUATTING INTERESTS
Docker, J.
Farneil, J.S.
TOTAL LANDOWNERS: 2
6. UNKNOWN
Allen, E .A . Henrey, W.G.
Bolton, E. Humphery, F.F
Bunn, J.W. Jones, A.
Clark, T.B. Morrison, M.
Cohen, S. Osborne, P.
Curtis, W.C. Smith, J.
Graham, A.H. Windeyer, W.O
Gwynne, R .
TOTAL UNKNOWN: 15.
TOTAL MEMBERSHIP: 76
TOTAL IDENTIFIED: 61
7. SOURCES
The list of members is in the Macarthur Papers, 
vol.39, A2935, p.93. Occupations of the less well known 
members have been obtained from contemporary Sydney 
directories and from lists of pastoralists and squatters 
in V . & P , (L.A., N.S.W.), 1859-60, pt.3, pp.635-708, and
The New South Wales Gazetteer, Sydney, 1866.
363
APPENDIX VIII
CLASSIFICATION ACCORDING TO POLITICAL OPINIONS IN 1861 
OF DIRECTORS OF COMPANIES IN 1 SANDS 1 SYDNEY DIRECTORY1 , 1871
L i&e ft A l s
Allen, E .A . Byrnes, J.
Allen, G. Flood, E.
Allen, G.W. Lucas, J.
Campbell, A. Thornton, G
Campbell, J. Smart, T.W.
Darvall, J. Weekes, E.C
Fairfax, J. Wilson, J.B
Francis, Judge H.R.
Gordon, S.D. TOTAL: 7
Hay, J.
Holden, G.K.
? Jones, R.
Knox, E .
Lord, E.
Lord, G.W. 
Martin, J. 
Montefiore, J.L. 
Mort, H.
Piddington, W.R. 
Prince, H. 
Rotton, H. 
Rundle, J.B. 
Samuel, S. 
Thomson, E. Deas 
Watt, J.B.
TOTAL: 25
364
NOTES:
1. The twenty-five conservatives held a total of 
sixty-six directorships, while the seven 
liberals held only fourteen.
2. All the men listed except for Knox and Thornton 
were active members of either the Council, the 
Assembly or the Constitutional Association in 
1860-1, and their opinions were a matter of 
public record. Knox had been in the Council in 
1856-7 and showed his principles by voting for 
a motion asserting the Council's right to amend 
money bills,-- while Thornton had been one of 
the members appointed to the Council to swamp 
it in 1861. A few of those classed as 
conservatives, notably Gordon, J. Campbell and 
Jones, had been regarded as liberals until they 
opposed Robertson's land bills in 1860-1.
Campbell and Gordon were subsequently appointed 
to the Council, where they normally spoke the 
language of conservatism. Jones has been 
classified only tentatively as a conservative 
because he retired from politics, leaving no 
way of confirming that his conservative views 
on the land question were fully representative 
of his political position. Wilson equivocated
on the land issue in 1860-1, but has been grouped 
with the liberals because he was consistently 
radical on most issues.
1Empire, 5 February 1857.
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APPENDIX IX
CLASSIFICATION ACCORDING TO POLITICAL OPINIONS IN 1861 
OF OFFICE HOLDERS IN EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC, 
CHARITABLE AND RELIGIOUS BODIES LISTED IN 
'SANDS1 SYDNEY DIRECTORY1, 1871
1. CONSERVATIVES
Name of Number of Name of Number of
Office-holder Offices Held Office-holder Offices Held
A 1 Beckett, A.M. 1 ? Jones, R. 2
Alexander, J. 1 Knox, E . 2
Allen, G. 9 Lackey, J. 1
Allen, G.W. 2 Macarthur, Sir W. 3
Allen, H.E.A. 4 Macleay, W. 2
Barker, T. 1 Manning, J.E. 2
Campbell, A. 1 Manning, Sir W. 2
Campbell, C. 2 Martin, J. 1
Campbell, J. 1 Mort, T.S. 1
Chisholm, J. 1 Murnin, M.E. 1
Comrie, J. 2 Nicholson, Sir C. 1
Cox, G.H. 1 Oxley, J.N. 1
Curtis, W.C. 1 Stephen, Sir A. 2
Duncan, W.A. 1 Suttor, W. 1
Fairfax, J. 5 Teale, W. 1
Faithfull, W.P 1 Thomson, E. Deas 6
Faucett, P. 1 Towns, R. 1
Gordon, S.D. 3 Watt, J.B. 1
Hay, J. 2 Wentworth, W.C. 1
Holroyd, A.T. 1 West, Reverend J. 1
Holt, T.
TOTAL OF
2
CONSERVATIVE OFFICE-HOLDERS: 41
NUMBER OF OFFICES HELD BY CONSERVATIVES: 76.
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2. LIBERALS
Office-holder Offices Held
Arnold, W.M. 1
Butler, E. 1
Cowper, C. (jr) 1
Dailey, W.B. 1
Hart, J. 1
Hill, E.S. 1
Lang, Rev. J.D. 2
Love, W. 2
Macfarlane, J. 1
Parkes, H. 1
Pennington, W.G. 1
Sadleir, R. 1
Scott, A.W. 3
Smart, T.W. 1
Stewart, R. 1
Sutherland, J. 1
Weekes, E.C. 1
Wilson, J.B. 1
Windeyer, W.C. 3
TOTAL OF LIBERAL OFFICE-HOLDERS: 19
NUMBER OF OFFICES HELD BY LIBERALS: 25.
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3. NOTE ON THE CLASSIFICATION
In most cases, classification as liberal or conservative
is very easy, for all the liberals and most of the conservatives
were members of the Council, the Assembly or the Constitutional
Association in 1860-1 whose opinions were a matter of public
record. Those who were not members at that period were Thomas
Barker, James Chisholm, Sir Charles Nicholson and Sir William
Macarthur, conservative members of the legislature in 1853;^
2Edward Knox, a conservative in the Council in 1856-7; Sir 
Alfred Stephen, first President of the Council and a3conservative in that body until 1858; G.H. Cox, a conservative
4in the Assembly from 1856 to 1859; J.N. Oxley, a conservative5neighbour of the Macarthurs at Camden; Charles Campbell, who 
used the language of Toryism when appointed to the Council in 
1870 and had held such views since the 1840s; T.S. Mort, who 
had opposed Cowper in 1856 and spoke slightingly of political7'cries' like free selection; W.A. Duncan, a radical in the
Q1840s but a conservative supporter of the constitution in 1856; 
and John West, editor of the Sydney Morning Herald. See also 
the comments on the criteria for the classification of 
J. Campbell, S.D. Gordon, R. Jones and J.B. Wilson in 
Appendix VIII, above.
^See Appendix I, above.
2See Appendix VII, above.
3See, for example, his votes for the session of 1858 in 
Appendix III, above.
4See, for example, his votes and classification in P. Loveday, 
'The Development of Parliamentary Government in New South Wales, 
1856-1870', Ph.D. thesis, Sydney University, 1962, pp.493-4.
5Cf. P. Loveday and A.W. Martin, Parliament, Factions and 
Parties, Melbourne, 1966, p.12.
^Cf. B.D. Dyster, 'The Role of Sydney and the Roles of its 
Citizens in New South Wales, 1841-1851', M.A. thesis, Sydney 
University, 1965, p.257; and Michael Roe, Quest for Authority 
in Eastern Australia, Melbourne, 1965, pp.45-7, et passim.
^Empire, 30 September 1856; J.L.C,, 1873-4, p.400.
^W.A. Duncan, A Plea for the New South Wales Constitution, 
Sydney, 1856.
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